The seller's duties in sale of goods: a comparative approach by Shirani Faradonbeh, Alireza
THE SELLER'S DUTIES IN SALE OF GOODS: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
ALIREZA SHIRANI FARADONBEH 
PHOT 




I hereby declare that unless otherwise mentioned by quotations or references, this 
thesis has been entirely and solely composed by me. Moreover, no parts of that has 
been published or submitted for another degree. 
Alireza Shirani Faradonbeh 
I 
In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
With the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Praise be to Allah, the 
Sustainer of the Worlds, and Peace be upon the Chief of Prophets and Messengers 
and his pure and Chaste descendants. 
It gives me a grate pleasure to thank all those -too numerous to name them 
specifically- who have helped and inspired me during the research and preparation of 
this thesis, for all their support and guidance. 
II 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss and compare a seller's duties with respect to 
delivery and quality of the goods sold under specified national systems namely 
English, United States (US), French and Iranian law as well as the Vienna 
Convention for International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG). 
The thesis consists of an introduction and two parts. Part 1 consists of 5 chapters 
each of which is respectively devoted to the discussion of the seller's duty to deliver 
under one of the aforesaid legal systems. This discussion covers a variety of issues 
such as modes of delivery, time of delivery, place of delivery, quantity of the goods 
delivered, breach of the duty to deliver by the seller and his right to remedy the 
breach both before and after expiry of the time for delivery. The discussion goes on 
to deal with the issue of the buyer's remedies for breach of the contract by the seller 
including his right to reject the goods or to revoke his acceptance of the goods, to 
apply for damages on the basis of "cover" or "contract- market" differential price 
formula, and to demand compensation for incidental and/or consequential damages 
caused by the breach. The discussion will end by considering the aggrieved buyer's 
chance to acquire an order from the court requiring the seller to specifically perform 
the contract under aforegoing systems. 
Part 2 of this thesis contains 6 chapters. The first chapter of this part concerns the 
seller's duty as to quality of the goods under the English system and examines the 
problems arising from both the express warranties and the implied warranties 
imposed by the law. The same discussion will follow in chapters 2 -5 which has been 
allocated respectively to US, French, Iranian law, and the CISG. Finally, the thesis 
will end with chapter 6 which is allocated to the issue of conclusion of the foregoing 
discussions. 
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XXVI 
THE SELLER'S DUTIES IN SALE OF GOODS: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
Introduction 
This thesis is an examination of two central features of the law relating to the sale of 
goods. The duties of the seller with regard to delivery and the issue of quality of the 
goods are matters of profound importance in commercial practice and in the law. 
There is a widely- recognised principle that the parties to a contract of sale are free 
to determine their obligations vis -à -vis one another. However, because of the 
complexity and diversity of the contracts, it is difficult for the parties to anticipate all 
eventualities and to stipulate all the features of their transaction with one another. 
Consequently, the law is required to adjudicate on disputes relating to issues which 
have not been clearly provided for by the parties concerned. 
The approach adopted here is comparative. It is particularly useful to adopt a 
comparative view in sale matters because of the extent to which this area of the law 
in many jurisdictions has been influenced by the law of other jurisdictions. 
The legal systems chosen for this study are the following: English law, US law, 
French law, and Iranian law as well as the Vienna Convention for International Sale 
of Goods 1980 (CISG). The choice of these systems is made on the following 
grounds: English law is a system of mercantile law which has been widely influential 
owing to British trading and political influence over the last several centuries. US 
law is chosen for its evident importance as the law of the most significant trading 
jurisdiction in modern times. It also represents an interesting development on English 
law, on which it is based. The US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is based 
mainly on the previous US Uniform Sales Act 1903, and as such embodies many 
principles of English law, even if it has some particular features which in many 
instances differ from English law. French law is chosen as an important system 
1 
which has many similarities with other continental systems, and also has had a 
profound influence on Iranian law and other middle eastern legal systems. Iranian 
law is chosen as a significant trading system in the middle east, which is based 
mainly on Islamic law and as such shares many principles with other Moslem legal 
systems in the world. The ever increasing volume of sale transactions in the 
international arena, and the problems and uncertainties arising from the differences 
between various legal systems which apply to such transactions, necessitates an 
examination of the CISG in the context of the aforegoing legal systems. The purpose 
of this is to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the drafters of the CISG have 
succeeded in achieving uniformity in this area of law . 
The thesis attempts a critique, and sets out to highlight problems encountered in 
this area in each legal system. Account is taken of variety of views and arguments 
expressed by commentators on these systems, with a view of proposing an 
appropriate solution. To support this discussion, other legal systems and legal 
institutes such as German, and Swedish law, as well as the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade law (UNCITRAL), the 1964 Hague Uniform 
Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS), as well as the Islamic principles, 
may also be referred to from time to time. 
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PART 1 
The Seller's Duty to Deliver the Goods Sold 
Chapter 1 
Delivery of Goods under English Law 
Delivery of the goods to the buyer is the ultimate goal of the parties in entering into a 
contract of sale. In fact, one of the main obligations of the seller in a binding sale 
under all legal systems is to deliver the goods to the possession of the purchaser in 
conformity with the contractual temis. This obligation to deliver is important for 
other reasons: for its performance by the seller determines the time when the title and 
the risk in the goods pass to the buyer. Nonetheless, what is to be done by the seller 
in the implementing of this obligation may vary under different legal systems. 
Like the French system, section 27 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 imposes a 
duty on the seller to deliver the goods sold to the buyer.' Section 61(1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 defines "delivery" as the "voluntary transfer of possession from one 
person to another." Accordingly, it is the duty of the seller in a contract of sale to 
transfer possession of the goods sold to the purchaser' unless otherwise expressly or 
impliedly agreed by the parties concerned.' 
Like civilian systems, the seller's duty to deliver covers three entirely different 
possibilities. There may be a duty on the part of the seller to deliver the article sold to 
the buyer where the property in it has already passed to the latter. In such instances, 
the duty of delivering the article is specific and the seller, subject to the issue of the 
payment of the purchase price by the buyer, is in breach of this duty where he fails to 
deliver that particular article. In other words, in these instances the seller, without the 
consent of the buyer has no right to substitute another article in fulfilling his duty 
under the contract with the latter. 
In the case of sale of purely generic goods the seller's duty to deliver is a duty to 
procure and supply to the buyer goods in accordance with the contractual 
For the provisions of this section, see Appendix II. 
' See Biddell Bros. v. E Clemens Horst & Co. Ltd. [1911] 1 K.B. 934 at p. 958, per Kennedy J.; Kwei 
Tek Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 459 at p. 486, per Devlin J. 
3 See e.g., the case of Levy & Co. Ltd. v. Goldberg [1922] 1 K.B. in which it was held by McCardie J. 
that the seller did not have to tender delivery but need only have been ready and willing to deliver. 
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descriptions, but he is under no obligation to deliver any particular lot of goods as no 
particular goods have been designated to which the duty of delivery attaches. 
Accordingly, the buyer cannot sue the seller for breach of the duty of delivery under 
the contract of sale where the latter procures goods in accordance with the contractual 
descriptions, intending to use them in fulfilment of the contract, but later changes his 
mind and sells them to another person.' Moreover, the buyer, in such instances, may 
not apply to the court to grant a decree of specific performance as such a decree can 
be obtained only where the goods are specific or where they have been ascertained by 
the parties to the contract. 
Finally, there is the possibility that the seller may have undertaken to deliver a 
particular lot of goods although the property in them has not yet passed to the buyer. 
This is the case where there is an agreement between the parties for the sale of 
specific goods. Obviously, the seller is in breach of the contract if he resells those 
particular goods to a third party. Even in a case of the sale of unascertained goods, it 
is possible for the parties to attach to the seller's duty of delivery a particular lot of 
goods before the passing of the property to the buyer, in which case the seller cannot 
resell the goods without being guilty of breach of contract with the latter. For 
example, in a F.O.B. contract, the seller who ships the goods but retains the bill of 
lading as security for the payment of the price by the buyer, will come under an 
obligation to deliver the actual goods shipped to the latter, though the property in 
them does not pass until full payment of the price and acquirement of the documents 
by the buyer.' Likewise, the effect of a notice of appropriation in a C.I.F. contract to 
the buyer is to fix the goods to be delivered by the seller who retains the title in the 
goods until the bill of lading is transferred to the former. It might be noted that prior 
to the Bills of Lading Act 1855, the buyer as an indorsee of a bill of lading could 
neither sue nor be sued on the contract of carriage.6 Under alteration made by this Act 
to this highly in- convenient rule, all rights of suit under the contract of carriage were 
The decision complies with the requirement of section 28 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
See Carlos Federspiel & Co. SA v. Charles Twigg & Co. Ltd. [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep 255 -6 per 
Pearson J. 
5 See Wait v. Baker [1848] 2 Ex 1, 8 -9. 
6 See, e.g., Young v. Moeller (1855) 5 E and B 755. 
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transferred and vested in the rightful holder of the bill of lading . A serious problem 
with this Act was the limitation of its scope: it applies only to contracts of carriage 
covered by a bill of lading and only if property passes in the way envisaged by 
section 1, which often does not happen.' This problem, however, was addressed by 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, which repealed the Act of 1855 and which 
vests the right of suit in the transferee as soon as he becomes a lawful holder and 
continues until the bill is further transferred.' 
As noted above, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the seller is 
considered to have performed his duty to deliver the goods where he makes them 
available to the buyer in the deliverable state at the time and the place stipulated in 
the contract so as to enable the buyer to obtain custody of, or control over, the goods 
purchased.9 In fact, there is no general rule requiring the seller to dispatch the goods 
to the buyer, for according to section 29 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
(2) Apart from any such contract, express or implied, the place of delivery is the 
seller's place of business, if he has one, and if not, his residence; except that, if 
the contract is for the sale of specific goods, which to the knowledge of the 
parties when the contract is made are in some other place, then that place is the 
place of delivery." 
According to the provisions of this section, there is a presumption that in the absence 
of an agreement to the contrary, the place of delivery is the seller's place of business 
where the goods sold are not specific. In cases of the latter sort, i.e. where the goods 
are specific then the place of delivery is the place where the goods are known to be at 
the time of the contract. This means that in both the aforegoing instances, it is the 
duty of the buyer to collect the goods, and not of the seller to send them to him 
unless, of course, otherwise expressly or impliedly provided by the parties in the 
contract of sale, in which case the delivery is to be made in accordance with the 
contractual terms. 
' See, e.g., Leigh & Sillivan v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Aliakmon) [1986] A.C. 785, [1986] 2 
W.L.R. 902; The Aramis [ 1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213, 218. 
$ See for details, E M Clive, "Jus Quaesitum Tertio and Carriage of Goods by Sea" in Comparative 
and Historical Essays in Scots Law (Edinburgh Butterworths, Edited by D L Carey Miller and D W 
Meyers 1992) pp. 47 -56; Michael D. Bools, The Bill of Lading: A Document of Title to Goods, An 
Anglo- American Comparison (London, Hong Kong, L IL 1P 1,1997), Ch. 4, pp. 85 -99. 
9 See Wood v. Tassel (1844) 6 Q.B. 234, 115 ER 90; European Grain & Shipping Ltd. v. David 
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Expenses of delivery 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that, like the French system,10 in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary between the parties concerned, the seller, under English 
law, has a duty to do at his own expense what is necessary to put the goods into a 
deliverable state." Accordingly, the seller in the case of sale of unascertained goods 
is obliged to appropriate to the contract goods in conformity with the quality and 
descriptions stipulated in the - contract and the expense thereby incurred falls on him. 
Similarly, the responsibility of attending to such matters as acquiring a licence in an 
export sale,12 or measuring of the goods where it is required by the contract, is laid on 
the seller which must be carried out at his own expense.13 
Methods of delivery 
The modes by which the seller can perform this duty of delivery under English and 
US law14 are generally the same as those of French" and Iranian law;16 that is, he may 
effect this duty either by actual delivery, or by constructive delivery of the goods to 
the buyer or to an agent acting on behalf of the buyer. " 
Transfer of physical possession of the goods is the most common method which 
is often used in domestic sale transactions. Depending on the agreement between the 
parties, the physical delivery may be made either to the buyer himself or to a third 
party nominated by him. In other words, the seller is considered to have sufficiently 
Geddes (Proteins) Ltd. [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 591. 
10 See p. 81, post. 
" Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 29(6). One must remember that expenses referred to in this section 
is to be distinguished from the expenses of delivery itself. In the latter case depending on the terms of 
the contract either the seller or the buyer must bear the expenses necessary for delivering of the goods. 
See Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.) vol. 41, para 765. 
12 See also, Mohanlal Hargovind of Jubbulpore v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1949] A.C. 521. 
13 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 29(6). 
14 As to the provisions concerning modes of delivery under US law, see pp. 34 -38, post. 
15 See pp. 79 -81, post. 
16 See pp. 103 -106, post. 
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fulfilled his contractual duty by delivering the goods to a third party nominated by 
the buyer rather than to the buyer himself, where there is an agreement between the 
parties to this effect.18 
Where the buyer possessed the goods as the seller's bailee before entering into 
the contract of sale with the latter, then, as in French law,19 the mere consent of the 
parties is sufficient for performance of delivery of the goods to the former. As 
mentioned earlier, the seller may fulfil the duty of delivery by transfer of control of 
the goods to the buyer without physical possession (constructive delivery). There are 
various methods recognised in the law of sale by which possession of the goods can 
be transferred so as to effect the seller's duty of delivery as required by the law. As 
an illustration, the seller may discharge the duty placed on him by the law by giving 
the buyer the only effective means20 of gaining access to the goods, for example a 
warehouse key.'-' 
Another method of constructive delivery by the seller is to hand over the goods 
to a carrier for the purpose of transmission to the buyer for, as in French law," under 
English law there is a prima facie rule under which the duty of delivery is regarded to 
have been performed upon handing over of the goods to the carrier.'3 According to 
section 32(1) of the Act 1979 where such prima facie rule applies, it is irrelevant that 
the carrier may not have been nominated by the buyer and the contract of carriage 
negotiated by the seller,' who will be treated as the buyer's agent for the purpose of 
contract of carriage.' The complicated issue, however, is the question as to who is 
17 See generally, Benjamin's Sale of Goods (5th ed. Edited by A. G, Guest et al 1997), pp. 384 -389. 
18 Bull v. Sibbs (1799) 8 T.L. 327, 328; Four Point Garage Ltd. v. Carter [1985] 3 All E.R. 12. 
19 See p. 79, post. 
2° For the requirement of exclusive access; see Dublin City Distillery Ltd. v. Doherty [ 1914] A.C. 823, 
per Lord Atkinson, at pp. 843 -44 (H.L. (Ir.)). 
21 Ellis v. Hunt (1789), 3 Term Rep 464, 100 E.R. 679 (K.B.). This principle was also approved in the 
Canadian case of Marshall v. Crown Assets Disposal Corporation (1965) 5 D.L.R. (2d) 572, per 
Hogg J.A., at p. 576 (Ont. C.A.). 
22 See pp. 83 -84, post. 
23 See, section 32(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. This section corresponds with section 31(1) of the 
Canadian Sale of Goods Act. See further Volansky Clothing Co. v. Bannockburn Clothing Co. Ltd., 
[1919] 3 W.W.R. 913 (CAN); Wait v. Baker (1848), 2 Ex. 1, 154 E.R. 380. See also, Benjamin's Sale 
of Goods, op. cit. supra., note 17 § 8 -014, p. 387 and the cases cited there. 
24 As to how the seller may in certain F.O.B. contracts makes the shipping arrangements , see Pyrene 
& Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 402, per Devlin J. 
25 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 31(2). See also The Albazero [1977] A.C. 774 (H.L.) per Brandon 
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entitled to sue the carrier for damage done in transit. If the seller could sue, it would 
be because he was still the owner of the goods or (less likely) bore the risk and 
therefore it could be said that the seller makes the contract with the carrier as 
principal.'6 Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the rule in section 32(1) is only 
presumptive and is displaced where the parties in the contract of sale agree expressly 
or impliedly not to treat delivery to the carrier as delivery to the buyer. As an 
example, in Beaver Specialty Ltd. v. Donald H. Bain Ltd.," a case dealing with the 
sale of nuts by a Vancouver seller to a Toronto buyer on F.O.B. Toronto terms, it was 
decided by the court that the place of delivery was Toronto rather than Vancouver, 
where the goods were physically handed over to the carrier.'$ For the same reason, 
the rule in section 31(1) should be displaced in those cases where the seller 
undertakes to deliver the goods at his own risk at the agreed destination.79 Similarly, 
the presumptive delivery rule in section 32(1) of the Act does not apply where the 
carrier is the employee of the seller.30 In these circumstances, delivery will take place 
when the goods are tendered to the buyer at the end of the transit, or, in contrast with 
the position in Iranian law, at least to someone in the buyer's establishment who 
presents a reasonable appearance of being entitled to accept delivery. In other words, 
only when delivery is thus made, will the seller be discharged from the liability for 
damages for non- delivery31 and, thereafter, he will be held as having complied with 
the condition normally concurrent with the buyer's duty to pay the price of the 
goods.32 
J., at pp. 785 -86 (Q.B.) and Lord Diplock , at pp. 841 -42 (H.L.). 
It is to be remembered that although the carrier is ordinarily the agent of the buyer to receive the 
goods sold, he cannot act as the buyer agent to accept them, for it is no part of his function to examine 
the goods to see whether they are in accordance with the contract of sale. Moreover, although delivery 
to the carrier as such is regarded as delivery to the buyer's agent, the seller may still stop the goods in 
transitu before they are actually being handed over to the buyer. See Cork Distillieries Co. v. Gt. 
Southern Railway (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 269, 277. 
26 
See The Albazero, supra., note 25, per Lord Diplock, at pp. 844 -45. 
27 (1973) 39 DLR (3d) 574; [1974] S.C.R. 903. 
28 See also Stephens Bros. v. Burch [1909] 10 W.L.R. 400 (Alta. S.C. en banc), 2 Alta LR 68 (CAN). 
29 
See Dunlop v. Lambert (1839), 6 Cl. & F. 600, 7 E.R. 824. 
30 For in such circumstances the carrier is not acting as the buyer's agent. See Volansky Clothing Co. 
v. Bannockburn Clothing Co. Ltd., [1919] 3 W.W.R. 913 (CAN) 
31 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 51. 
32 Ibid., Section 28. 
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Constructive transfer of possession may also take place where the contract 
expressly or impliedly permits the transfer of possession "symbolically" by transfer 
of some document which allows the possessor thereof to obtain possession of goods 
(i.e., document of title); the seller's duty to deliver is effected by handing such 
document over to the buyer. It is a matter of mercantile law or custom to determine 
whether or not such a document has such effect. It is established now that in a C.I.F. 
contract, the constructive delivery of the goods sold can be satisfied by transferring 
to the buyer a negotiable document generated by the carrier who, as bailee of the 
goods, undertakes to deliver them to the holder on due presentment of the said 
document. In such a contract, the goods are delivered, so far as they are physically 
delivered, when the seller puts them on board a ship at the port of shipment, while 
the documents are delivered when they are tendered to the buyer.33 This distinction 
between the goods and the documents relating the goods in a C.I.F. contract has led 
to the proposition that the buyer's right to reject faulty documents is distinguished 
from his right to reject defective goods with the consequent effects upon the 
provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 relating to acceptance of delivery by him 
and its results.34 What is beyond doubt, however, is that the seller's duty in such 
contracts, as well as in "ex ship" contracts, is not to deliver the goods but appropriate 
documents.' In fact, the physical delivery of the goods by the seller in such instances 
is not sufficient for to constitute a performance to the buyer where the documents are 
not in order.36 There is a difficult question as to whether in other kinds of contract of 
sale of goods, delivery of documents by which the holder is allowed to acquire the 
possession of the goods -such as a delivery warrant or order- is adequate for 
33 Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd. Supra., note 2 at p. 486 per Devlin J. The bills of 
lading in law and fact represent the goods. Possession of the bill of lading by the buyer places the 
goods at his disposal: Biddell Bros. v. E Clemens Horst & Co. Ltd., supra. note 2, at p. 956, per 
Kennedy L.J. In fact, bills of lading as negotiable instruments play an important role in mercantile law 
particularly in sale of goods at international level. See further Payne and Ivamy's Carriage of Goods 
by Sea (13th ed. 1989) at pp. 81 -140; Clive M. Schmitthoff, Schrnitthoff's Export Trade: The Law & 
Practice of Interational Trade, (9th ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1990) pp. 590 -593. 
34 Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd., supra., note 2. 
35 This is one of the instances where the presumption in section 32 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
is ousted by the parties to the contract of sale, since they intend delivery to be expressed through the 
documentary exchange. See Wait v. Baker (1848), supra. note 16, per Parke B. at p. 383. 
36 Orient Co. Ltd. v. Brekke & Howlid [1913] 1 K.B. 531. 
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performance of the seller's duty to deliver.37 It is probable that the answer to this 
question depends on whether mercantile custom recognises such documents as 
effective as to transfer the property in the goods or the right to claim the property in 
the goods to the buyer by tendering of the documents to him.38 
Finally, where the goods are held by a third party bailee who has not issued a 
negotiable document of title, such as a bill of lading, then under the English system 
the goods are regarded as being constructively delivered as and when the bailee 
acknowledges to the buyer that he will thereafter hold them for the buyer. But the 
mere transfer of the seller's ,delivery order, or of a non -negotiable warrant or other 
document generated by the bailee to the buyer is not sufficient to constitute 
delivery.39 In other words, where a warehouseman issues a non -negotiable receipt, or 
where the seller draws a delivery order on the bailee nominating the buyer as entitled 
to receive the goods from the bailee's premises, the bailee must attorn to the buyer 
before it can be said that new bailment with the buyer supersedes the old one with the 
seller.40 If the bailee declines to comply with the seller's instruction, he will be held 
liable as against the latter for breach of obligation arising out of contractual bailment, 
but he has no liability as against the buyer before he attorns to the buyer. Even where 
a negotiable document of title involves, the passing of this document from the seller 
to the buyer, this may be seen as expressive of the principle of attornment41 as well as 
constructive delivery of goods in the form of a document. For the bailee in the 
document undertakes to deliver the goods to anyone who holds or is the named 
37 See e.g. Laurie & Morewood v. John Dudin & Sons [1926] 1 K.B. 223; Mount (D.F.) Ltd. v. Jay & 
Jay (Provisions) Co. Ltd. [1960] 1 Q.B. 159. 
38 It is to be noted that delivery of the goods may have different effects in different circumstances 
depending on whether the delivery is made by the seller to the buyer, to the carrier on behalf of the 
buyer, or to the carrier on behalf of the seller, or by the carrier to the ultimate consignee, i.e., the 
buyer, or delivery by the seller to the sub -purchaser from the buyer. In other words, any of these 
varieties of delivery may amount to performance of the duty to deliver by the seller, but they may 
have different effects as regards the rights and liabilities of the parties with regard to breach of 
contract, or the question of risk, or the right of the seller over and in respect of the goods where the 
buyer declines to pay the contractual price. 
39 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 29(4); Lackington v. Atherton (1844), 7 Man. & G. 360, 135 
E.R. 151 (C.P.); Marshall v. Crown Assets Disposal Corporation, supra., note 15. 
40 Waren Import Gesellschaft Krohn & Co. v. Internationale Graanhandel Thegra N.V., [1975] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 146. 
41 Leigh & Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. [The Aliakmon], supra., note 7, per Lord 
Brandon at p. 916. 
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indorsee of the document, and this continuing undertaking is transmitted by the 
bailee through the agency of the seller. 
In those cases where the goods are still in the possession of the seller, he may 
also be held to have constructively delivered them to the buyer when he attorns to the 
latter by acknowledging that he holds the goods as the buyer's bailee.' An 
attornment by the seller may take place even where the seller agrees to send the 
goods to the buyer's premises at a later date; the seller's undertaking with regard to 
dispatching of the goods can reasonably be construed as a collateral engagement.43 
It is worth pointing out that an attornment normally concerns identified goods. 
This is because an attornment in respect of an unidentified part of a bulk gives rise 
merely to a personal obligation and, consequently, the buyer does not acquire a 
possessory interest over the goods purchased. 
Place of delivery 
The provisions of English law concerning the place of delivery are identical to those 
of French law.44 This means that the parties to a contract of sale under English law 
are free to choose the place where the goods are to be delivered by the seller." The 
agreement as to the place of delivery may be made either expressly or by implication 
by the parties in the contract of sale.46 In the latter case, the intention of the parties 
with regard to the place of delivery may be deduced from their contractual 
stipulation as to transport of the goods sold. For example, in the sale of goods 
involving carriage by sea, the duty of delivering the goods takes place when they are 
handed over to the carrier, therefore, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary 
42 Castle v. Sworder (1861), 6 H. & N. 828, 158 E.R. 341 (Ex. Ch.); Dublin City Distillery Ltd. v. 
Doherty, supra., note 20, per Lord Atkinson at p. 844. 
u This interpretation was followed by the court in the Canadian case of Rear v. McCullough [1928] 2 
D.L.R. 434; [1928] 1 WWR 716; 22 Sask LR 446 (CAN) where the seller of a horse agreed first to 
stable it over the winter months. It was held the buyer could have terminated this arrangement by 
calling for the horse at any time. 
44 See pp. 83 -85, post. 
u See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., note 17 § 8 -019, p. 389. 
a6 Section 29(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
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between the parties concerned, it is normally the port of loading which constitutes 
the place of delivery.' 
Where there is no stipulation as to the place of delivery in the contract of sale, 
then under section 29(2) of the Act, the seller must deliver at the place where the 
goods were at the time of the sale, if they are specific, provided that the purchaser 
knew of this location before entering into the contract of sale with the former. In 
contrast with Iranian law, where the goods sold are unascertained, delivery takes 
place at the seller's place of business if he has one, and if not, at his residence.`18 Like 
French law, the Sale of Goods Act 1979, however, does not provide where delivery is 
to take place if the seller has more than one place of business. This question may 
cause significant problems to the parties concerned particularly in an international 
sale of goods where the seller's places of business are situated in different countries. 
One answer to the question is to consider the seller's main place of business as the 
place where the goods are to be delivered. Nonetheless, this proposition does not 
obviate the aforegoing problem in those rare circumstances where there is no 
evidence to differentiate between the seller's places of business. One solution to this 
problem is to deliver the goods at that place of business which has closer links with 
the contract than the other seller's places of business.' Alternatively, it might be 
justifiable to require the seller to deliver at his nearest place of business to the buyer 
where the buyer was not aware that the seller has different places of business at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. 
Time of delivery 
47 Under section 10 of the Swedish Sale of Goods Act, delivery of goods takes place when the goods 
are handed to the carrier where the parties agreed that the seller shall send the goods to the buyer if no 
other detail with regard to the place of delivery is being settled between them, but if the goods sold 
are to be send by ship delivery occurs when the goods are placed on the railing of the Ship. See Stig 
Stromholm (Editor) An Introduction to Swedish Law (1981, Boston, Frankfurt), vol. 1 at p. 213. 
48 The rules as to the place of delivery under the Law of South Africa are identical with English law. 
See Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods in South Africa (5th ed. Edited by G.R. Hackwill 1984) at p.77 and 
authorities there cited. The same provisions are applicable to the contract of sale between the parties 
under section 9 of the Swedish Sale of Goods Act. See Stig Stromholm (Editor) An Introduction to 
Swedish Law (1981, Boston, Frankfurt), vol. 1 at p. 212. 
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In accordance with section 10(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, whether a 
stipulation as to time of delivery of the goods is, or is not, of the essence of the 
contract depends on the terms of the contract between the parties concerned. This 
means that the parties may stipulate in their contract that the time fixed by them for 
performance of the seller's duty with regard to delivering of the goods is to be of the 
essence of the contract, so that the seller's failure to deliver at that time would be 
breach of condition which entitles the buyer to refuse to take the goods and to treat 
the contract as repudiated. In other words, in contrast with the French and the Iranian 
legal systems, under English law the buyer cannot automatically use the right to 
reject the goods for the seller's failure to deliver them at the time stipulated in the 
contract, unless rejection of the goods can be justified by reference to the terms of the 
contract, as, under the latter legal system, "there is no presumption or rule of law that 
stipulation as to the time of delivery is of the essence of a contract of sale of 
goods. "50 Nevertheless, McCardie J. in Hartley v. Hymans5' suggested that the 
provision of section 10(2) is in conflict with section 62(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 and that the common law and law merchant referred to in the latter section did 
not look at the terms of the contract but at the nature of a contract and character of 
the goods being sold. In ordinary commercial contracts for the sale of goods the rule 
clearly was that time was prima facie of the essence of the contract with respect to 
the seller's duty of delivery of the goods sold.52 Therefore, the condition which 
relates to and affects the time at which the seller is to deliver the goods may well be 
essential to the contract between the parties concerned even if they fail to state this in 
the words of their contract.53 Under this view, in other words, in a commercial 
contract the seller's failure to deliver the goods within the period of time stipulated in 
49 For the problem associated with this approach under the CISG, see pp. 144 -145, post. 
5o See Benjamin 's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., note 17 at p. 359 § 8 -024, and the sources cited 
thereto. 
51 [1920] 3 K.B. 475, 483. 
52 Ibid., per McCardie, J, at p. 484. According to him: 
"In ordinary commercial contracts for the sale of goods the mle clearly is that 
time is prima facie of the essence with respect to delivery." 
53 Bowes v. Shand (1877) 2 App. Cas. 455; Toepfer v. Lenersan Poortman N. V. [ 1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
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the contract can be considered as a breach of condition upon which the buyer is 
justified to reject the goods and to treat the sale as repudiated.' This view, however, 
has not been applied by all courts, some of which see a stipulation concerning the 
time of delivery as a mere "innominate" or "intermediate" term rather than as being 
of the essence of the contract. The latter approach suggests that the buyer may reject 
the goods and repudiate the contract only if the seller's delay in delivering the goods 
is so prolonged as to deprive him (the buyer) of a substantial part of the benefit 
which he should have received from the contract had the contract been performed at 
due time." This approach is reinforced by section 62(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 (as amended) under which any provision which is inconsistent with those of the 
Act is invalid. In other words, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary by the 
parties, the time of delivery stipulated in the contract should not be considered as an 
essence of the contract, as it is inconsistent with the provisions of section 10(2) of the 
Act 1979. 
In contrast with this view, however, the time of delivery in a contract of sale 
involving carriage of goods by a ship before a fixed date or within a stipulated period 
is, unlike the position in French' and Iranian law, generally regarded by the English 
courts as being the essence of the contract, so that any deviation from it justifies the 
buyer in treating the contract as repudiated, even though the breach does not cause 
any damage to him. This was the case, for example, in Bowes v. Shand" where the 
seller agreed to ship a quantity of Madras rice during the month of March and /or 
April. After finding that the bulk of the goods were shipped at the end of February 
and only about one eighth of them were shipped during March, the court ruled that 
the buyers were entitled to reject the goods, although it was conceded that there was 
no difference between the rice actually shipped and any rice which might have been 
143; Bunge Corpn. v. Tradax Export S.A. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711, 716, 719. 
54 Coddington v. Paleologo (1867) L.R. 2 Exch. 193, 196 -197; 15 WR 961:15 LT 581. 
ss Tradax Export SpA. v. Italgrani Di Francesco Ambrosio [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 112. This view is 
followed in Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., note 17 § 8 -025, pp. 391 -392. 
56 As to the position under French law, see pp. 84 -87, post. 
(1877) 2 App. Cas. 455. The court in this case made it clear that early shipment is just as much a 
breach as late shipment. 
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have been shipped during the period agreed between the parties (i.e., during March 
or /and April). 
It is accepted that, when a buyer wishes to repudiate a contract on the ground of 
lateness of delivery, he must do so immediately, provided, of course, that the time of 
delivery is, in the circumstances, of the essence of the contract. A buyer may not 
repudiate a contract on the ground that he wishes to get out of a bad bargain. 
However, a buyer may, in practice, try to escape such a bargain by relying on 
lateness of delivery to justify his repudiation. One might therefore criticise such 
carriage of goods by sea cases on the ground that the buyer is allowed to escape from 
a bad bargain as a result of a highly technical breach of the contract by the other 
party. The criticism, however, seems to be untenable, for the allegation that the 
innocent party has repudiated the contract because he wants to escape from a bad 
bargain is not necessarily true where the buyer, for example, complains of the failure 
to give notice on time or other similar breaches. And it is undesirable to allow a party 
to litigation to raise issues about the motives which have led the other party to act in 
a certain way, for examination of such motives often leads to very serious and 
difficult factual disputes. Moreover, under the principle of freedom of contract, it is 
up to the parties themselves to predict any such technical breach by one party by 
inserting a suitable term in their contract to prevent the other party from using it to 
escape from a bad bargain. The duty of the courts is simply to enforce the agreement 
between the parties concerned, not to investigate their motive in agreeing on the 
terms of the contract. 
If, in the aforegoing instances, there is a stipulation which allows the seller to 
deliver within a specified period, e.g. shipment during August, then the seller may 
deliver at any time within that period and he will not be held liable to the buyer in 
respect of breach of the duty to deliver the goods until after the expiry of that period, 
except where the last day of this period is a non -working day (e.g., a bank holiday), 
in which case the seller will not have an extension of time to the next day.'8 
58 See e.g., Jacobson Van Den Berg & Co. v. Biba Ltd. (1977) 121 Sol Jo 333. 
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Where no time for delivery of the goods has been stated in the contract, the 
seller, under section 29(3) of the Act, must send them within a reasonable time.'9 The 
same rule applies to the cases where the seller does not undertake to dispatch the 
goods to the buyer, but to make them ready for the collection by the latter. In other 
words, it is a general rule of English law that the seller is to deliver the goods to the 
buyer within a reasonable time where the contract is silent as to the time of 
delivery.60 What is a reasonable time is a question of fact.61 The question of 
reasonable time may be affected by the usage of trade.62 It could also be extended 
beyond its normal span if the seller's fault is not the cause of hampering the 
performance of the duty in delivering the goods.63 
Where, under the terms of the contract, delivery is to take place upon 
performance of some act by the buyer, as in the cases where the buyer is bound to 
supply containers for the goods or to provide the means for their carriage, the time of 
delivery is the time when the stipulated act is performed by the buyer, and the seller 
will be in default only if he fails or delays to deliver the goods within a reasonable 
time after performance of the act by the former.' In contrast with French law,65 the 
buyer under English and US law is not required to give notice, formal or informal, to 
the seller demanding him that he deliver the goods. In other words, unlike the French 
rule, mere delay in performing the duty of delivery within the time stated in the 
contract is sufficient to grant the buyer a right to invoke the remedies provided by the 
law for breach of the duty to deliver. The same provisions apply where no time as to 
delivery of the goods has been provided for in the contract: the buyer need not 
request the seller to deliver the goods and a mere delay on the part of the latter in 
59 For the provisions of this section, see Appendix II. 
60 Jones v. Gibbons (1853) 8 Ex. 920, 922; Hartwells of Oxford Ltd. v. British Motor Trade 
Association [1951] Ch. 50. This rule corresponds with the provisions of CISG, Article 33 (c). In 
contrast with this rule under China's legal system, the parties cannot enter into a valid contract 
without specifying a time limit for delivering of the goods by the seller. See Henry R. Zheng, China's 
Civil and Commercial Law (1988) at p. 77. 
61 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 59. 
62 Bradely & Sons v. Colonial Continental Trading Co. (1964) 108 S.J. 599. 
63 Re Carver & Co. and Sasson & Co. (1911) 17 Com. Cas. 59; Hartwells of Oxford Ltd. v. British 
Motor Trade Association, supra., note 60. 
64 Compagnie Commerciale sucres et Denrees v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1337; Norman v. 
Ackland [1915] S.A.L.R. 177. 
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delivering within a reasonable time would be a breach entitling the buyer to treat 
himself as discharged from any further liability under the contract of sale.66 An 
exception to this general rule is where the seller has agreed to deliver the goods to the 
buyer "on request" or "as required" or on similar temis, in which case he is not 
bound to deliver unless and until the buyer has given him a notice requesting him to 
do so.67 However, once the seller has received such a request, then he must deliver 
the goods as soon as the buyer is ready and willing to receive them. Where the time 
for the buyer's request in delivering the goods has not been limited or fixed by the 
contract of sale, there is a general rule which precludes the seller from discharging 
himself from liability under the contract against the buyer by the fact that the latter 
has not given any notice requiring delivery of the goods. Instead, like French law, the 
seller, after the expiry of a reasonable time, may give notice to the buyer reminding 
him of the requirement under the contract; and if the buyer fails to request delivery of 
the goods within a reasonable time after receiving the notice, the Ruiner may treat 
himself as discharged from further liability under the contract vis -à -vis the buyer.68 
It is to be noted that, under section 28 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, delivery of 
the goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions. The seller must be 
ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for the 
sale price agreed between the parties, and the buyer must be ready and willing to pay 
the said price in exchange for possession of the goods. In other words, like the 
French69 and the Iranian70 systems, English law does not hold the seller liable for 
delay in delivery of the goods where the buyer declines to pay the contractual price, 
65 See pp. 85 -86, post. 
66 Thomas Borthwick (Glasgow), Ltd. v. Bunge & Co., Ltd. [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 17, 28. 
67 Jones v. Gibbons, supra., note 49; G.N. Ry. v. Harrison (1852) 12 C.B. 576. According to the case 
of Bowdell v. Parsons (1808) 10 East 359; 103 E.R. 811, even where the seller does not receive such 
a request, he may, nevertheless, be in breach of the contract if he disposes of the goods or if he 
declares to the buyer that he is not willing to deliver them to the latter. See further, the Canadian case 
of Wingold v. William Looser & Co. [1951] 1 D.L.R. 429. 
68 Pear Mill Co. Ltd. v. Ivy Tannery Co. Ltd. [1919]1 K.B. 78, 81. 
69 See pp. 91 -92, post. 
70 See pp. 121 -122, post. 
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unless the parties have agreed on making delivery a condition precedent, in which 
case the seller is bound to deliver the goods on the time states in their agreement." 
Quantity of the goods delivered 
Like the civilian system'', the seller under English law is required to deliver the 
correct quantity of goods. Section 30(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides: 
"Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he 
contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them, but if the buyer accepts the goods 
so delivered he must pay for them at the contract rate." 
According to these provisions, any shortfall in quantity of the goods delivered to the 
buyer may permit him to treat the whole contract as repudiated unless the shortfall in 
the quantity is trivial, in which case the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended by 
section 30(2A) of the Act 1994 ) precludes him from rejecting the goods'. These 
provisions are identical with those of the French system.74 The only difference 
between the two systems is that while according to French law the amount of the 
shortfall or excess in the quantity of the goods which is designated to be disregarded 
by the buyer is one -twentieth of the total goods sold, there is no precise figure under 
English law to specify the extent of the shortfall or excess in the quantity of the 
goods delivered which could not be regarded as a breach to justify the buyer to treat 
the whole contract as an end. Instead, section 30(2A) of the 1994 Act, amending the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, states that a non -consumer buyer may not reject the whole 
of the goods delivered "if the shortfall or, as the case may be, excess is so slight that 
71 For as Lord Halsbury states, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary by the parties, delivery 
and payment must take place together. See Forrestt & Son Ltd. v. Aramayo (1900) 83 L.T. 335 at p. 
338 
72 See, Article 384 of the Iranian Civil Code. Similarly, under Article 1618 of the French Civil Code, 
the buyer may disavow the sale provided that the amount of the shortage in the goods delivered is 
more than one -twentieth of the amount of the goods stated in the contract. Where the shortage is less 
than one -twentieth of the amount of the goods provided in the contract, the buyer cannot disavow the 
sale but is entitled to diminish price at the contract rate. 
73 The same conclusion could be reached by referring the case to the maxim of de minimis non curat 
lex (the law pays no attention to trifles). See P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods (9th ed. 1995), at pp. 
106 -107 and the cases quoted there. 
74 See French Civil Code, Article 1618. 
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it would be unreasonable for him to do so. "75 In other words, under the latter system, 
the courts have a discretionary power to decide objectively whether or not in the 
circumstances surrounding each case the shortfall or excess in quantity is significant 
enough to allow the buyer to reject the whole goods. It seems that while this 
approach may, to a limited extent, be the cause of uncertainty among the parties, it 
also offers the advantage of flexibility, which is necessary in dealing with the issues 
concerning a commercial transaction. 
Unlike some modern systems, section 31(1) of Act 1979 states: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of the goods is not bound to accept delivery 
thereof by instalments." 
This means that, unless otherwise provided by the contract, the seller, in the case of 
shortfall in the quantity of the goods is precluded from discharging himself of 
liability for breach of the contractual duty to deliver by delivering the remainder later 
if the buyer decides not to accept the goods delivered in more than one load.76 The 
provisions of this section seem quite justifiable where delivery of the goods by 
instalments may cause unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expenses to the 
buyer. Nevertheless, it seems that there are no justifiable grounds to prevent the 
seller from delivering the goods by instalment where he has reasonable evidence to 
indicate that delivery by instalment does not cause any inconvenience to the buyer. 
This will be particularly the case if the time set out by the parties for delivery has not 
expired or if the time of delivery is not essential to the buyer." 
The wording of section 31(1) also suggests that the buyer may decide to accept 
the goods delivered in more than one load even where there is no agreement to this 
effect in the contract between the parties. However, whether the buyer can refuse to 
accept the loads of goods which are delivered following acceptance of the first load, 
where the time for delivery of the goods stipulated by the contract has not expired, 
75 Italics added. 
76 Behrend & Co. Ltd. v. Produce Brokers Co. Ltd. [1920] 3 KB 530; Gill & Duffus SA v. Berger & 
Co. Inc [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep 622. 
77 It is to be noted, however, that if the buyer accepts an insufficient quantity of goods delivered by 
the seller, then he may not reject the seller's offer to deliver the shortfall in quantity if the time for 
delivery has not expired. See, The Kanchenjunga [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379, at p. 399, per Lord Goff 
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and if so, whether he is entitled also to repudiate the whole contract for the breach of 
the duty to deliver where despite the following deliveries the amount of the goods 
delivered is less than what was provided for in the contract, are questions which have 
been left open by the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Further questions may arise when the 
buyer chooses to accept the first load of the goods in the hope that the seller will 
deliver the remaining goods at a later stage before expiry of the time for delivery 
stated in the contract, but the latter fails to deliver the remaining part in due course. 
The issue, in such circumstances, is again whether the seller's default in delivering 
the remaining part of the goods justifies the buyer in treating the whole contract as at 
an end, with the consequence that he is to return that portion of the goods which has 
been duly delivered to him or he is only entitled to sue the seller for compensation 
for the shortfall in quantity of the goods delivered to him. These, and a variety of 
similar questions arising from the provisions of section 31(1) of the Act, indicate that 
these provisions at the best are ambiguous and likely to cause much uncertainty and 
confusion among the parties concerned and, accordingly, should be duly amended by 
the legislators. 
In contrast with Article 1619 of the French Civil Code, under which in the event 
that the quantity of the property delivered by the seller is larger than specified by the 
contract, the buyer has an option either to disavow the contract or to pay to the 
former an additional price for the excess in quantity at the contract rate, section 30(2) 
of the Act 1979 states that, in such instances, the buyer may accept the goods 
included in the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole goods 
delivered to him and, therefore, treat the contract as repudiated. However, according 
to section 30(3) of the same Act, he may also accept all the goods delivered, in which 
case the law requires him to furnish the seller with an additional price at the contract 
rate. Accordingly, there is a fundamental difference between the two legal systems; 
that is, unlike the English system, the French Code, in the case of an excess delivery, 
does not permit the buyer to divide the goods delivered by retaining the part included 
in the contract and rejecting the rest. 
of Chieveley. See further, Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., note 17, § 8 -048, pp. 401 -402. 
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It has been suggested that the provision of section 30(3) of the 1979 Act in 
granting the buyer an option to accept and to pay for any excess in quantity of the 
goods delivered is based on the presumption that delivery is a counter -offer by the 
seller which may be accepted by the buyer by taking of the goods.78 The fundamental 
problem with this suggestion is that it ignores the fact that the parties have already 
made a valid contract and that this contract has been breached by the seller. 
Secondly, it seems wrong to determine the legal status of the parties by reference to 
this assumption, particularly where the buyer knew, or he should not reasonably have 
been unaware by the surrounding circumstances of the case, that the seller mistakenly 
delivered a quantity of goods larger than he contract to sell.79 Finally, treating of 
excessive delivery by the seller as a counter -offer is inconsistent with the buyer's 
option under section 30(2), under the terms of which he can accept the goods 
included in the contract and reject the rest unless it could be assumed that the seller 
agrees by his counter -offer to permit the latter to accept any distinct part of the goods 
delivered and to reject the rest.80 This assumption, however, is not in conformity with 
the provisions of section 30(2A) under which the seller must accept the goods 
delivered if the shortfall or surplus in quantity is not substantial. 
Furthermore, one may criticise both French and English law for their approach 
in granting the buyer an option to reject the whole goods for an excess in their 
quantity for, as Professor Atiyah pointed out in such instances, "there seems no 
obvious reason why the buyer should not be required to accept that part which should 
have been deliveredi81 to him. In other words, it is unjust to hold the seller liable for 
breach of the duty of delivery merely because the quantity of the goods delivered is 
larger than what was contracted to sell. It is equally unjust to allow the buyer to 
78 Hart v. Mills (1846) 15 M & W 85. See further, P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., 
note 73, at p. 106. 
79 As in the Iranian and the French systems, under section 62(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, the seller's 
mistake in such cases prevents the conclusion that the parties have made a new valid contract in 
respect of the excess in quantity. 
80 It appears that this assumption has been adopted by the common law. See Champion v. Short (1807) 
1 Camp 53; Hart v. Mills, supra., note 63 ; and see also Hudson, "Dividing Acceptances in Sale of 
Goods" (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 506. 
81 P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., note 73, at pp. 105 -106. This is the rule under the 
Iranian legal system. See Article 384 of the Iranian Civil Code. 
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accept the excess in quantity at his will at the contractual rate, where both the excess 
in quantity and the market price of the goods are substantially higher than what was 
set in the contract, particularly if the seller can show that he has delivered the goods 
inadvertently. 
In short, the options given to the buyer in the case of excess in quantity 
delivered by the seller under both French and English law, seem unjustifiable and 
unreasonably favour the buyer. This problem has been appropriately avoided by 
Article 384 of the Iranian Civil Code under which, in contrast with the foregoing 
systems, the buyer, in such instances, is required to accept the amount included in the 
contract and to return the surplus to the seller.' 
The buyer's remedies under English law 
There is variety of ways in which the seller may be in breach of the contract with the 
buyer. He is in breach of the contract when he fails to deliver the goods sold, when 
he delivers the wrong quantity or the wrong quality of goods, or when he delivers the 
right quantity and quality of goods but at a time later than the time stipulated by the 
parties. In contrast with the civilian systems, the buyer's prime remedy in all these 
instances is to maintain an action for damages against the seller. The buyer's action 
for damages may take one of two forms; it may be an action for non -delivery under 
section 51 of the Act 1979 or it may be an action for breach of an express or implied 
term in respect of the goods sold. The buyer may also claim damages for non- 
delivery where the seller completely fails to deliver the goods sold, or where the 
buyer rightfully rejects the goods delivered to him. 
The right to reject 
The buyer's right to reject the goods and to repudiate the contract depends on 
whether the contractual obligation breach by the seller is classified as a condition or 
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as a warranty within the context of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In accordance with 
section 11(3) of this Act, the breach of a condition entitles the buyer to reject the 
reject the goods and recover the price paid to the seller while in the case of a breach 
of a warranty the buyer may only claim damages for the breach.83 
Ordinarily in law "condition" means an operative fact, some event or 
contingency that may or may not happen. In its broadest sense, "condition" may 
include within its meaning the performance or non -performance of some material 
promise which is made by the promisor and whereupon he is bound to act. It is this 
broad sense in which the Sale of Goods Act 1979 uses the term.84 "Warranty ", on the 
hand, is restricted to "collateral agreements" with reference to the goods sold.85 
The terms implied into the contract by the Act with respect of quality and 
quantity of the goods are classified under English law as conditions,86 the breach of 
which, subject to section 15(A) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended)87 entitle 
the buyer to repudiate the contract. Nonetheless, the buyer may treat such a breach as 
a breach of warranty and therefore sue the seller for the damages sustained as a 
consequence of the breach. 
In contrast with the statutory implied terms which are conditions under the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979, the express terms provided by the parties in the contract are 
generally treated as innominate terms whose consequences depend on the actual 
outcome of the breach. This means that the buyer may repudiate the contract for 
breach of a term of this character only if the nature and consequences of the breach is 
so serious as to justify this result.88 This rule complies with the provisions of section 
15A of the Act 1979 (as amended) which limits the buyer's right to reject for a 
82 See pp. 118 -120, post. 
83 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 61. 
81Ibid., Section 11(3). 
85 Ibid., Section 61. The term `collateral' used in this section should not be taken as meaning that a 
warranty is a term outside the contract. See Stoljar, "Conditions, Warranties and Descriptions of 
Quality in Sale of Goods -I" (1952) 15 Modern Law Review 425, 430 -432. 
86 The body of Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended) uses the word `term' instead of `condition' but 
provides in Schd. 2 that in England and Wales and Northern Ireland the implied terms are conditions 
(save in the cases of sections 12(2), (4) and (5)). 
87 According section 15(A), in a non -consumer sale, the buyer may not reject the goods for a breach 
on the part of the seller of a term implied by section 13, 14 or 15 if the consequences and nature of 
the breach are so slight that rejection would be unreasonable. 
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shortfall, or his right to reject all the goods for an excess, if the shortfall or the excess 
"is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him to do so ". 
The difference between the UCC and English law in this respect is that, in 
contrast with the latter system, the terms implied in a contract under the UCC are all 
considered as warranties, the breach of which, irrespective of their gravity, 
discharges the buyer from his liability under the contract. The same rule also applies 
with respect of the express terms provided by the parties in the contract; any non- 
conformity in the goods with the express warranties, however trivial, entitles the 
buyer, at least nominally, to treat the contract as an end and to recover the price paid 
to the seller.89 
Loss of right to reject and its consequence 
As in other legal systems under consideration, where the buyer has a right to reject 
the goods either because of a breach of a condition or because of the nature and 
consequences of a breach of an innominate term, section 35 of the Act 1979 requires 
him to exercise this right within a reasonable period. In accordance with section 
35(5) of this Act, the questions that are material in determining whether a reasonable 
time has elapsed include whether the buyer had a reasonable opportunity for 
examining of the goods to ascertain their non -conformity with the contract. This 
means that the buyer will lose the right to reject the goods if he fails to do so within a 
reasonable period after detection of the non -conformity or, after the time when he 
should have reasonably detected the non- conformity.9° 
Furthermore, the buyer who intimates to the seller that he has accepted the 
goods,91 or who does any act with the goods which is inconsistent with the seller's 
ownership,' can no longer exercise the right to reject the goods and to repudiate the 
contract. This is because, in such instances the buyer is deemed to have accepted the 
88 See, e.g., Cehave NV v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft (The Hansa Nord) [ 1976] QB 44. 
89 See p. 61 -64, post. 
90 Bernstein v. Pamson Motors (Goldeis Green) Ltd. [1987] 2 All ER 220. 
91 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 35(1)(a). 
92 Ibid., Section 35(1)(b). 
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goods and the acceptance, in contrast with the UCC,93 precludes him from rejecting 
them later under English law. Nonetheless, section 35(6)(b) of the Act 1979 (as 
amended) makes it clear that the buyer is not deemed to have accepted goods merely 
because the goods are delivered to another under a sub -sale or other disposition. 
The rule under section 35(1)(b) of the Act 1979 under which the buyer is 
deemed to have accepted the goods where he does an act which is inconsistent with 
the seller's ownership, may suggest that the property in the goods cannot pass to the 
buyer until he accepts them. However, this suggestion is not correct for, as Devlin J. 
pointed out the passing of the property to the buyer is merely conditional where 
despite the passing he retains the right to reject the goods.94 
The buyer who loses the right to reject may only claim damages for non- 
conformity of the goods with the contract. 
The right to recover damages caused by the breach 
Whether the buyer who rejects the goods or to retain the goods either because he 
loses the right to reject or because he chooses to treat the breach of the condition as a 
breach of warranty, may also claim damages which he has sustained as a 
consequence of the breach. Nonetheless, the loss which the buyer may recover in the 
cases of non -delivery or rejection of the goods differs from the one which is 
recoverable by him for the breach of a warranty. 
Damages for non -delivery and rejection of the goods by the buyer 
As pointed out above, the buyer may maintain an action of damage for non -delivery 
both where the seller fails to deliver the goods sold and where the buyer justifiably 
reject them. The rules for assessment of such damages have been generally set by 
section 51 of the Act 1979 as follows: 
"(1) Where the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods to the 
93 As to the effect of acceptance on the buyer's right to reject under UCC, see pp. 63 -65, post. 
94 Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd. supra., note 2 at p. 487. 
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buyer, the buyer may maintain an action against the seller for damages for non- 
delivery. 
(2) The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally 
resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of contract. 
(3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of 
damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the 
contract price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or 
times when they ought to have been delivered or (if no time was fixed) then 
at the time of the refusal to deliver." 
Under these provisions, the buyer's damages, in contrast with the UCC,95 will be 
assessed primarily by reference to the market price of the goods at the time and at the 
place96 when and where they ought to have been delivered. Therefore, unlike the 
cover formula under section 2 -712 of the UCC, the court under English law does not 
pay any attention to the actual loss of the buyer resulting from purchasing of 
replacement goods. This means that if an aggrieved buyer made a cover purchase, 
there is no assurance that the court will measure the market at or near the time when 
he made his purchase, and, accordingly, the court's contract -market differential 
formula depending on whether the market price of the goods after the time of 
delivery falls or rises may over or -under- compensate him. Moreover, unlike the 
civilian systems, the mere fact that the buyer has already contracted to resell the 
goods to a third party at a price higher or lower than the market price at the date 
when delivery should be made, does not alter the general rule of contract -market 
differential in assessing of the damages caused by the breach.97 It is argued that the 
purpose of damages for the non -delivery is to compensate the buyer for the additional 
cost of buying in the market and therefore the buyer in the case of non -delivery must 
buy in the market in order to fulfil his obligations against the third party under a sub - 
sale.98 The problem with this argument is that it does not take into account the fact 
that the buyer cannot always purchase substitute goods immediately after the breach, 
either because no such a market is readily available to him at the place of delivery or 
because he is not able to afford to pay the market price. Even in the absence of these 
95 Under the UCC, the buyer's prime remedy is to claim cover damages under section 2 -712. For more 
details, see 65 -68, post. 
96 Attorney -General of the Republic of Ghana v. Texaco Overseas Tank Ships Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 471. 
97 Rodocanachi v. Milburn (1886) 18 QBD 67; Williams v. Agius [1914] AC 510. 
98 P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., note 73, p. 482. 
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problems, it seems unreasonable to suppose that a buyer can in practice buy 
substitute goods in the market on the very day on which the breach takes place, for 
the buyer may often wish to consider his position, or to negotiate with the seller on 
the breach before purchasing substitute goods. Moreover, there are many instances 
where it takes some time for the buyer to negotiate a new contract to buy substitute 
goods. These are indications that generally there is some delay before the buyer can 
buy substitute goods, and therefore, he is liable against the third party for the delay in 
delivering under his sub -sale. This means that the loss recoverable under the 
contract -market price differential formula under section 51 is not often adequate to 
compensate the aggrieved buyer against the damages caused by the breach. This is so 
even if the seller has fraudulently breached the contract. 
Nonetheless, under section 54 of the Act 1979, the buyer in some exceptional 
cases may claim damages representing the loss he has sustained on sub -sales which, 
because of the seller's breach he has been unable to fulfil. In other words, while 
under section 51 of the Act 1979 the aggrieved buyer may cover the loss which 
naturally and directly resulted from the breach, section 54 of this Act allows him to 
recover the loss which are not directly and naturally followed from the breach, but 
the loss arising from special circumstances of which the parties were aware at the 
time of the contract. The provisions of sections 51 and 54 of the 1979 Act under 
which these two different types of damages are recoverable correspond to the first 
and second rules which were derived from the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale99 
which states: 
"Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the 
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of 
contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either 
arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach 
of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the 
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable 
result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the 
contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the 
defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the 
breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and 
communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were 
wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only 
99 (1854) 9 Ex 341. 
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be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would 
arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special 
circumstances, from such a breach of contract."' °° 
On this basis, in one case the court held that the buyer was entitled to claim damages 
for the freight which he had to pay despite non -delivery of the goods, as the seller 
could reasonably contemplate that the buyer had to pay the freight to the carrier.101 
Clearly, the buyer who claims damages on the basis of difference between the 
contract price and the resale price has, under the second rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, 
to show that the seller was aware or ought to have been aware, of the buyer's 
intention to resell.102 However, the fact that sub -sales were reasonably contemplated 
by the seller has been held by some court not to be enough to render the seller liable 
under the contract -resale price differential formula. In The Arpad,103 for example, 
Maugham LJ stated: 
I suppose most vendors of goods and most carriers might be taken to know that 
if the purchaser or consignee is a trader the goods will probably be sold, or be 
bought for sub -sale; but the authorities seem to show conclusively that 
something more than that is necessary to enable the damages to be assessed by 
reference to a contract of sub -sale entered into before the date of delivery." 
On this basis, it appears from the later decision by the House of Lords that the correct 
test is the probability of the loss occurring, for a consequence could be foreseeable 
but unlikely to occur. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the contract -resale price differential 
formula is applicable only if the buyer resells the specific goods which he agreed to 
buy under the first contract with the seller, presumably because only in these 
instances he will not be able to fulfil his obligation under the sub -sale if the seller 
fails to deliver the goods.' A criticism of this proposal is that it does not consider 
the damages which the aggrieved buyer may have to suffer as a consequence of the 
delay which often follows after the breach and before he purchases substitute goods. 
10o Ibid. at 354 -355, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151. This decision was followed by the House of Lords in 
Koufos v. Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350, 386 per Lord Reid. 
101 E Braude (London) Ltd v. Porter [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep 161. 
102 Seven Seas Properties v. Al -Esso [1993] 3 All ER 577. 
103 [1934] P 189, 230 
104 See, e.g., P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., note 73, p. 486; A. I. Ogus, The law of 
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Even in the absence of such a delay, it seem unreasonable to deprive the buyer of the 
right to recover damages on the basis of the contract -resale price differential formula 
merely because the goods sold are not specific and therefore he may purchase 
substitute goods in order to fulfil the sub -sale. This is because, the time and the 
capital which are necessary for purchasing the substitute goods, may be used by the 
buyer to make a further profit by dealing with another person, while he will unjustly 
loose this new profit if he has to buy the substitute goods for the purpose of the 
fulfilling of the sub -sale. 
Damages for breach of condition , warranty or innominate term 
In accordance with section 53 of the Act 1979, the buyer may maintain an action for 
breach of a warranty where the breach by the seller does not amount a breach of a 
condition or where the buyer elects (or is compelled) to treat any breach of condition 
or innominate term as a breach of warranty. The rule for assessment of such 
damages has been set by section 53(2) as "the estimated loss directly and naturally 
resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty." 
Damages for delay in delivery 
In the case of late delivery, for example, the method of assessing the damages 
depends on whether the buyer is buying the goods for use or he is buying to resell 
them. In the former case, the damages will be assessed on the basis of the cost which 
the buyer has to sustain for hiring of substitute goods during the delay, while in the 
later case, the buyer is entitled to recover as damages the difference between the 
market price at the time when the seller should have delivered the goods and the 
market price at the time when he actually delivered them. In Koufos v. Czarnikow,10' 
for example, the House of Lords relied on the second rule to assess the damages 
damages, (London: Butterworths, 1973), pp. 333 -335. 
'05 Supra., note 81(The Heron II). 
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caused by delayed delivery. Although this case concerned to contract of carriage, 
there seems no real reason why the same rule should not apply in a contract of sale.106 
Damages for breach of warranty of quality 
Under section 53(3) of the Act 1979, where the breach related to the quality of the 
goods delivered, the damages which the buyer may recover is prima facie the 
difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery and the value they 
would have had if they had conformed to the contract.107 In contrast with the cases of 
delayed delivery, the damages recoverable under this section for the defects in the 
quality are the same for both goods bought for use and goods bought for resale. In 
practice, however, the damages for defective goods purchased for use may be 
calculated in a different manner. For example, it is likely that the buyer will be 
awarded as damages the cost of repairs or modifications of the goods which he has 
sustained in order to bring them up to the requisite standard. This was the case, for 
example, in Keely y Guy McDonald,108 where the seller sold and delivered a Rolls - 
Royce which was found unmerchantable. The court held that the seller was liable for 
the cost of repair of the Rolls- Royce. 
The main difference between the UCC and English law concerning the issue of 
assessing the damages in the case of seller's breach is that the UCC provides a set of 
unified remedial rules which irrespective of the type of the breach may be invoked to 
assess the damages suffered by the aggrieved buyer, whereas, like the civilian 
systems, under English law, the remedial provisions applicable for assessing of 
damages may, depending on the type of the breach, differ in each case. 
Consequential damages 
As in the case of non -delivery, the buyer may in certain circumstances apply for 
consequential damages resulting from the breach of warranty of quality. As an 
106 See, Mc Gregor on Damages, (15`h ed., 1988) p. 771 
107 Jackson v. Chrysler Acceptances Ltd [ 1978] RTR 474, 481. 
m(1984) 134 N LJ 522. 
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example, in Godley v. Perry,109 a child was blinded as a consequence of using a 
defective catapult sold and delivered by the seller. Applying the second rule in 
Hadley v. Baxendale,10 the court held that the seller was liable for the damages 
which the defect caused to the child. As pointed out above, the second rule in Hadley 
v Baxendale, covers "special damages" arising from particular circumstances known 
to both parties at the time of the contract. It is argued that it is unjust to hold the 
seller liable for such damages without giving him the opportunity to limit his liability 
or to adjust the price of the goods for the extra risk. ' However, while this argument 
is convincing in those cases where the breach is not attributable to the seller's fault, it 
seems unjust to exclude or to limit the seller's liability where he fraudulently 
breaches the contract particularly if the consequences of his breach were foreseeable 
to him at the time of breach though not necessarily at the time of the contract. 
Specific performance 
In contrast with continental systems as well as the Scottish common law where an 
aggrieved party is legally entitled to seek specific implement of the contractual 
obligation by the breaching party, "2 the buyer's prime remedy for the seller's 
wrongful 13 neglect or refusal to deliver the goods under English and US law is to 
maintain an action against the seller for damages for non- delivery.14 In fact, specific 
performance is an equitable remedy developed by the Court of Chancery as an 
alternative to the common law remedy of damages, where the latter was considered 
109 [1960] 1 WLR 9; see further, Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley, Ingham & Co., Ltd. [1987] QB 
791. 
110 Supra., note 80. 
"' P. D. V. Marsh, Comparative Contract Law England, France, Germany (1994) p.314 
12 See, for example, French Civil Code, Article 1143; Spanish Civil Code, Article 1124; German 
Civil Code, Article 241. As to the Scots law see, for example, Retail Parks investments Ltd. v. The 
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC 1996 SC 227, 244 per Lord Cullen. 
"3 The buyer will have no remedy against the seller for non -delivery of the goods where he has 
previously repudiated the contract by word or by conduct, or has failed to tender the price, if the time 
for payment is due, or is otherwise in breach of his obligations under the contract. This is because in 
these instances the seller's refusal to deliver the goods sold is not wrongful as required by section 
51(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
114 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 51(1). 
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to be inadequate and unfair, ' and, therefore, unlike the civilian systems, it could be 
regarded as secondary remedy under English law, the availability of which is a matter 
for the discretion of the court. This requires the court to examine the merits of 
individual cases to ascertain whether it is appropriate to grant an order of specific 
performance compelling the recalcitrant seller to carry out his duty of delivering of 
the goods under the sale. Clearly, the vesting in the court of such a discretionary 
power may cause a great deal of uncertainty among the parties concerned. The 
danger of this uncertainty in the field of commercial law has led both the legislators 
and the judges to enunciate principles or guidelines to constrain the exercise of 
discretion and to classify those contracts where typically specific performance will or 
will not be awarded. 
Restriction of the remedy of specific performance to the cases where the goods 
sold are specific or ascertained 
Accordingly, the court's discretion in ordering specific performance to deliver by the 
seller under section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act has been restricted to the cases 
where the goods sold are specific or ascertained.16 In other words, the buyer's 
application to obtain specific performance directing the seller to deliver will normally 
be rejected if the goods sold are of a generic nature or they are to be produced by the 
seller after entering into the contract. ' Nonetheless, in the case of Sky Petroleum 
Ltd. v. V.I.P. Petroleum Ltd.,18 the defendant suppliers were restrained from 
withholding supplies of petrol on the ground that there was no prospect of the buyer 
being able to find an alternative source of supply in the time of the petrol crisis. The 
goods in that case were neither specific nor ascertained as suggested by section 52 for 
granting of specific performance to carry out the contract by the seller. This indicates 
15 See generally, I. C. F. Spry. Equitable Remedies (2nd ed. 1980); Sharp R., "Specific Relief for 
Contract" in B. J. Reiter and J. Swan, Studies in Contract law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980). 
116 For the provisions of section 52(1) of the Sale of Goods Act, see Appendix II. 
11 [ 1974] 1 W.L.R. 576.A 
118 [1974] 
1 All ER 954. 
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that section 52 is not an exhaustive statement of when specific performance of 
contracts to deliver goods will be granted. 
Inadequacy of the damages and the issue of hardship which equitable remedy 
may cause to the breaching seller 
According to traditional doctrine, the plaintiff buyer must show that damages would 
be an "inadequate" remedy before he can obtain a decree of specific performance 
compelling the seller to deliver the article sold.19 Such is the case where the buyer 
can obtain no satisfactory equivalent article in the market; what was purchased is 
"unique ". Specific performance may well be an appropriate remedy where it is 
difficult to assess the exact value of the loss sustained by the buyer as a consequence 
of the seller's failure to deliver the article sold and award of damages for non- 
delivery by the court would create the risk of under compensation or where the 
defendant- seller would not be able to pay damages caused by non- delivery. 120 It 
seems, however, that unlike the situation in the law of the United States,121 damages 
under English law are not considered to be inadequate so as to justify the court to 
order specific performance of the contract by the seller where they are hard to assess 
because the loss will occur in the distant future, for example, in the event of 
repudiation of a long term instalment contract to supply goods by the seller.122 
Similarly, English courts would reject the buyer's application to obtain the remedy of 
specific performance where the goods can be obtained elsewhere, even though they 
are unusual123 or are available only after a considerable delay because they have to be 
made to order.'24 
"9 See Cooke & Oughton, The Common Law of Obligations (2nd ed. 1993), at p. 218. 
120 Decro -Wall International S.A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 361, 371 -372; 
Evans, Marshall and Co. Ltd. v. Bertola S. A. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 349, 379 -380. 
121 See Treitel, G. M., "Specific Performance in the Sale of Goods" [1966] Journal of Business Law 
211, 224. 
122 Fothergill v. Rowland (1873) 17 Eq 132 CA. 
123 Cohen v. Roche [1927] 1 K.B. 169. 
124 Société des Industries Metallurgiques S.A. v. Bronx Engineering Co. Ltd. [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
465. 
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Another set of principles reflects traditional equitable remedy concern with 
justice and fairness. Under these principles, no order of specific performance will be 
granted if it would cause severe hardship to the seller (e.g., where the cost of delivery 
by the seller is out of the proportion to the benefit accruing to him under the contract 
of sale).''S 
As can be seen, unlike the continental and the Iranian systems, specific 
performance under English law is an equitable remedy granted at the discretion of the 
court which could be available only in very limited circumstances. In practice, 
English courts have always preferred to enforce contracts negatively or indirectly, 
i.e., by awards of damages for breach and, therefore it is very difficult to convince 
them to grant specific performance requiring the seller to carry out properly the 
contract he has repudiated. In contrast with the English system, US courts take a 
somewhat more relaxed view of this remedy, more in keeping with continental 
practice. They are empowered by sections 2 -709 and 2 -716 of the UCC to order 
specific performance wherever commercial needs make it equitable to do so. But 
even under the latter system specific performance is regarded as extraordinary: it is 
discretionary and is made available only where the courts decide that it is fit to do so- 
the buyer has no `right' to specific performance. 
The English law approach in refusing to grant specific performance compelling 
the breaching seller to carry out his duty to deliver the goods under the contract 
seems hardly justifiable and may tip the balance of interests between the parties in 
favour of the seller. In fact, the buyer's alternative remedy in such instances is to sue 
the seller for the damages caused by the breach, while, "the rules on damages 
sometimes actually encourage breach ".16 This is because, as pointed out earlier, the 
provisions concerning damages under this system do not go far enough to 
compensate properly the buyer against all the losses which have been caused by the 
seller's breach of the duty to deliver the goods sold.'' And the seller who realises 
''' See generally, Tito v. Waddel [1977] Ch. 106; Denne v. Light (1857) 8 De G.M. & G. 774. One 
may draw the same conclusion under the civilian tradition of good faith which is to be observed by 
the parties concerned in performance of their contract . 
126 H. Beale, Remedies for Breach of Contract (1st ed. 1980) p. 158. 
'27 See pp. 25 -29, 31, ante. 
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that he is not liable to reimburse the buyer for all the damages caused by the breach, 
and that he can resell the goods in a higher price or use them in a more sufficient and 




This chapter deals with the issue of delivery of goods under the US Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC). It is important to point it out that the provisions of the 
UCC concerning the issue of delivery are substantially based on the former US Sales 
Law Act 1903 which was derived from the UK Sale of Goods Act 1893. 
Accordingly, there are a lot of similarities between the provisions of the UK and the 
US legal systems with regard to the seller's duty to deliver the goods sold. However, 
because of the differences between the UK Sale of Goods Act and the US Sales Law 
Act and the alterations made by the drafters of the UCC in the provisions of the Sales 
Law Act, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the UCC in order to find out 
whether and if so to what extent the drafters of the UCC succeed in eliminating the 
problems arising from the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
The Duty to Deliver under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
As in the other systems under consideration the seller under the UCC is bound to 
tender the delivery of the goods sold to the buyer in conformity with the contract 
between the parties concerned. Delivery is considered as a voluntary transfer of 
possession and may be defined as an act by which the seller parts with possession 
and the buyer acquires it; delivery occurs whenever the seller does everything 
necessary to put the goods completely and unconditionally at the buyer's disposal.' 
In accordance with US law, tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold 
Crowder v. Aurora Co -op. Elevator Co., 393 N.W.2d 250, 223 Neb. 704 (1986). 
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confolniing goods at the buyer's disposition and give the latter any notification 
reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery.' 
Methods of delivery 
The acts and facts, which constitute delivery, vary in different classes of case and 
depend upon the character, quantity, and condition of the property as well as the 
particular case.' The parties may agree on the manner of delivery in their contract of 
sale. The various categories of manner of delivery are generally the same in every 
legal system. Accordingly, as in the example of English law, the seller, depending on 
the surrounding circumstances of each case and the terms of the contract between the 
parties, may fulfil the duty of tendering delivery by either actual delivery or by 
constructive delivery of the goods sold.' 
The most obvious way of performing delivery under the contract is for the actual 
goods to be physically transferred to the buyer. In the case of a sale involving the 
shipment of the goods, tender of delivery occurs at the time when the goods are 
delivered to the carrier. In such instances, the carrier is regarded as the agent of the 
buyer who is authorised to take the goods on behalf of the latter.' This rule, 
nonetheless, does not apply where the seller is to carry the goods himself or where 
the carrier is his agent. Likewise, where the contract requires the seller to deliver at a 
particular destination, he is not discharged from the obligation to deliver before he 
has delivered the goods to the named destination and given the buyer any notification 
or instructions necessary to enable him to take delivery. As an example, where 
' Huskinson v. Vanderhaiden, 251 N.W.2d 144, 197 Neb. 739 (1977). 
3 Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 37 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 647 
(Minn 1983). 
4 Lakeview Gardens, Inc. v. State, Ex re. Schneider, 557 P.2d 1286, 221 Kan. 211 (Kan. 1976). 
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the provisions of section 2 -503 of the UCC with respect to the 
tendering of delivery are more detailed and clearer in comparison with those of English law under the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
5 In re Nevins Ammunitio, Inc., 79 B.R. 11 (Idaho 1987). 
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purchase orders provided that delivery of goods would be "F.O.B. carrier, Job site ..." 
tender of delivery under the UCC did not occur until goods were delivered to job 
site.' Similarly, a contract under which a carpet seller agreed to deliver carpeting to 
Chicago on a specified date became a "destination contract," and therefore created a 
duty for the seller to give the buyer any specific instructions which would be 
necessary for her to take delivery at destination.' It has been held that a mere written 
offer to perform by the seller will be sufficient for the fulfilment of the duty in the 
tendering of the goods as required by the UCC.8 In other words, tender of delivery 
does not require actual physical delivery and a written offer to perform has the same 
effect as physical delivery.' 
Constructive delivery is effectuated when, without transfer of the goods or their 
symbol, the conduct of the parties is such as to be inconsistent with any supposition 
other than that there has been a change in the nature of the holding of the property in 
the goods.10 The act or state of possessing is a condition of facts under which a 
person can exercise power over property at his pleasure to the exclusion of all other 
persons," and constructive possession is assumed to exist where one claims to hold 
by virtue of some title without its actual detention or custody.' A constructive 
delivery of the article sold may be substituted for an actual delivery thereof only 
where such constructive delivery is in pursuance of the terms stipulated by the parties 
6 Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Systems, Inc., 569 F.Supp. 1261 (D.C.Del. 1983). 
' June G. Ashton Interiors v. Stark Carpet Corp., 96 Ill. Dec. 306, 491 N.E.2d 120, 142 Ill. App. 3d 
100 (1st Dist. 1986). It is to be remembered that in accordance with the UCC parties to a contract of 
sale must specifically agree to the destination contract, otherwise the contract will be regarded as a 
shipment contract; see e.g., Ladex Corp. v. Transportes Aeros Nacionales, S.A., 476 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 
App. 1985). 
8 Sand Seed Service, Inc. v. Bainbridge, 246 N.W.2d 911, 20 UCC Rep.Serv. (Callaghan) 654 (Iowa 
1976). 
9 However, where installation is required under the contract, tender of delivery does not occur when 
the goods are physically brought to the site, but, rather when installation is complete. 
1° Lakeview gardens, Inc. v. State ex rel. Schneider, 557 P.2d 1286, 221 Kan. 211 (Kan. 1976). 
" Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank - Western, 396 N. Y. S. 2d 319, 90 Misc. 2d 868, UCC 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 391 (1977). 
12 Ibid. 
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in the contract of sale or an established custom with regard to the sale of the said 
article.13 In one cases constructive delivery has been held sufficient to comply with 
contractual delivery terms and thus avoid the seller's liability for breach of the 
contract in failing to perform the duty to deliver.14 Accordingly, the seller may be 
considered to have sufficiently transferred the possession to the buyer by handing 
over to the buyer an object of physical control over the goods. For example, the seller 
will be discharged from the duty to tender delivery when he delivers to the buyer the 
keys of the premises where the goods are stored. 
In accordance with section 2- 503(4)(a) of the UCC, if the goods are in the 
possession of a bailee, the tender of delivery, as in English law," takes place when 
the seller either tenders a negotiable document of title covering such goods or 
procures acknowledgement by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the 
goods. But in contrast with the latter system,16 under section 2- 503(4)(b) the seller is 
also considered to have complied with the provisions of section 2- 503(1) of the UCC 
in tendering the goods to the buyer by handing over to the latter a non -negotiable 
document of title or a written direction to the bailee to deliver unless the buyer 
seasonably objects. Receipt of notification of the buyer's rights over the goods by the 
bailee in such instances fixes those rights as against the bailee and all third persons. It 
is to be noted that, unlike other methods of delivery, tender of the goods by this 
method does not cause risk of loss of goods to pass to the buyer. In addition the seller 
is also responsible for loss of any failure by the bailee to honour the non -negotiable 
document of title or to obey the direction until the buyer has had reasonable time to 
present the document or direction. A refusal by the bailee in such instances, to 
honour the document or to obey the seller's direction to deliver the goods to the 
buyer would defeat the tender of the goods by the seller. However, where the buyer is 
also the bailee who has physical possession of the goods when the contract is 
executed, delivery of a negotiable document of title as a form of tender is 
13 H.O. Anderson, Inc. v. Rose, 352 S.E.2d 541, 177 W. Va. 419 (1986). 
4 Mc Greal v. Jakie Fine Arts, Inc., 654 P.2d 149. (Wyo. 1982) 
15 See pp. 10 -11, ante. 
16 Ibid. 
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unnecessary, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary by the parties 
concerned." 
There may be a completed delivery where the goods remain in the possession of 
the seller, as the agent of the buyer, or where they so remain for storage or care at the 
buyer's request, and nothing further remains to be done by either of the parties to 
complete the sale.18 In other words, in such a case the delivery takes place as soon as 
the seller attorns by acknowledging that he holds the goods as the buyer's bailee. It 
would seem that to effect constructive delivery, the attornment must relate to an 
identified article. An attornment in respect of an unidentified part of a bulk gives rise 
merely to a personal obligation on the part of the bailee, but it does not confer the 
buyer a direct possessory interest over the goods. 
In the case of contracts involving documents, the seller can "put and hold 
conforming goods at the buyer's disposition" under section 2- 503(1) by tendering 
documents which grant the buyer complete control of the goods under the provisions 
of Article 7 on due negotiation provided the documents so tendered are in the correct 
form.'9 In accordance with section 2- 503(5)(b) of the UCC, where the seller under the 
contract is required to deliver documents, unless otherwise agreed by the parties 
concerned, tender through customary banking channels is sufficient and dishonour of 
a draft accompanying the documents by the buyer constitutes non -acceptance or 
rejection of the goods delivered. It is to be remembered that in accordance with 
paragraph (a) of section 2- 503(1) the seller must tender delivery at a reasonable hour 
and he must keep the goods so tendered for a period of time reasonably necessary to 
enable the buyer to take their possession. 
Place of delivery 
"North Dakota Public Service Com'n v. Valley Farmers Bean Ass 'n, 365 N.W.2d 528, 40 UCC Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1847 (N.D. 1985). 
18 Lakeview Gardens, Inc. v. State ex rel. Schneider, 557 P.2d 1286, 221 Kan. 211 (Kan. 1976). 
19 See the UCC, Section 2- 503(5). For the full provisions of this section, see Appendix I. 
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In respect of the place of delivery, the provisions of the UCC are identical to those of 
English law and are thus susceptible to the same criticism as those arising under the 
latter legal system.'° Accordingly, under the UCC the parties may either expressly or 
by implication specify in their contract the place where the goods are to be delivered. 
In the latter case, the parties' intention with regard to the place of delivery is to be 
deduced from their stipulation in the contract of sale. For example, the use of the 
term "arrival port" by the parties in the case of a sale involving carriage by sea, may 
be construed as an indication that the agreement between them is a destination 
contract and thereby due tender requires physical delivery of the goods at the 
destination specified in the sale, whereas if a contract uses no mercantile terms or 
trade symbols specifying requirements for delivery, and there is no specific 
agreement otherwise, a contract for the transportation of the goods by the carrier will 
be presumed to be a shipment contract. In such circumstances, it is normally the 
departure station which constitutes the place of delivery." 
If the seller under the contract is required to make delivery at a particular 
discharged port, and the term "discharged port" is rationally susceptible to differing 
interpretations, the court would consider extrinsic evidence, including usage in the 
trade and the course of dealing and performance between the parties, to determine 
whether "discharged port" referred to the port city itself or included an offshore 
lighterage facility." 
In the event of the parties' failure to agree on the place of delivery, then, as in 
English law, if the goods sold are identified, delivery in accordance with section 2- 
308(b) of the UCC takes place at the place where the goods were at the time when 
the parties entered into the contract. The same provision applies to a bulk of goods 
in possession of a bailee, unless as would be normal, the circumstances show that 
delivery by way of documents is intended. In such instances, however, the seller is 
not discharged from the responsibility vis -à -vis the buyer to deliver the goods unless 
2° For a discussion of the problem arising under these provisions, see pp.11 -12, ante. 
21 UCC, Section 2 -320. For the provisions of this section, see Appendix I. 
22 Crescent Oil and Shipping Services, Ltd. v. Phibro Energy, Inc., C. A. 2 (N.Y.), 929 F.2d 49 
(1991). 
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he also procures the acknowledgement by the bailee of the buyer's right to their 
possession.'3 In other instances, namely, where the goods contracted for have not 
been identified by the parties concerned, "the place for delivery of the goods is the 
seller's place of business or, if he has none, his residence ".24 
Although the agreement as to place of delivery may be supplied by surrounding 
circumstances, usage of trade, course of dealing and course of performance, as well 
as by the express language of the parties,' a court will not interpret a contract to 
imply a duty on the part of the seller to deliver the goods to wherever a buyer 
requests, if the contract and the course of dealing negate such interpretation.'6 
Where the duty to deliver undertaken by the seller under the contract can be 
performed through tendering of a document of title, then, in accordance with 
paragraph (c) of section 2 -308 of the UCC, tender at the buyer's address is not 
required if "customary banking channels" call only for due notification by the banker 
that the document is on hand, leaving the buyer himself to see to the physical receipt 
of the goods." 
Time of delivery 
Like other legal systems, the UCC permits the parties to fix in their contract the time 
of delivery of the goods by the seller.78 In accordance with official Comment 1 of 
section 2 -309, an agreement as to the time of delivery between the parties "may be 
found in a term implied from the contractual circumstances, usage of trade or course 
of dealing or performance as well as in an express term" of the contract. In contrast 
with English law, where contractual time in a contract of sale involving carriage of 
23 See UCC, Section 2 -308, Official Comment 2. 
'4 UCC, Section 2- 308(a). 
25 Mechanics Nat. Bank of Worcester v. Gaucher, 386 N.E.2d 1052, 7 Mass. App. 143, 25 UCC Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1313 (1979). See UCC, Section 2 -308, Official Comment 4. 
'6 L.C. Williams Oil Co., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., M.D.N.C., 627 F. Supp. 864 (1985). 
27 See UCC, Section 2 -308, Official Comment 3. 
28 Banner Iron Works, Inc. v. Amax Zinc Co., Inc., C.A.Mo., 621 F.2d 883 (U.S. App. 1980). 
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goods by sea is generally considered as constituting the essence of the contract,29 the 
time so fixed under US law is not regarded as an essential term of the contract 
between the parties.30 More specifically, in accordance with the latter system, time is 
not of the essence of the sales contract unless the parties expressly so provide in the 
contract,31or unless the circumstances clearly indicate that the parties intended to 
make it so.32 Accordingly, although in general a failure to comply with the terms of 
delivery constitutes a breach of the contract entitling the buyer to resort to the 
remedies available under the UCC for the breach33, delivery within a reasonable 
period from the original contractual delivery date has been held to constitute 
substantial performance of the contract.' 
Where a time for delivery is fixed without being made of the essence of the 
contract, the parties are assumed to have contemplated that there will be reasonable 
compliance therewith in accordance with commercial standards within the particular 
industry.35 Thus, where time was not stipulated to be the essence in the contract, a 
reasonable delay in delivery was held not to constitute breach of the contract.36 This 
rule, as is the case in Iranian law, rightly prevents the purchaser from cancelling the 
transaction with the seller where the time for delivery is not so essential as to render 
the late delivery by the latter useless to him, as it was the intention of the parties to 
perform the transaction which they have validly made , but, unlike Iranian law, it 
does not address the issue of damage which the buyer may have suffered as a result 
of the delay in the delivering of the goods. Nonetheless, as in the Iranian system, an 
29 See p. 14, ante. 
3° Texas Energy Fuels Corp. v. Pemco Supply Co., Inc., M.D.Pa., 640 F. Supp. 2 (1985). 
31 Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 783 (8th Cir. 1977). 
32 Farmers Union Grain terminal Ass 'n v. Hermanson, C.A.N.D., 559 F.2d 1177, (8th Cir. 1977). 
33 W.B. Dunavant & Co. v. Southmost Growers, Inc., Civ. App., 561 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App. 1978). 
34 Master Palletizer Systems, Inc. v. T.S. Ragsdale Co., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1525 (D.Colo. 1991), 
affirmed 937 F.2d 616. 
35 JA. Jones Const. Co. v. Cith of Dover, Super., 372 A.2d 540, appeal dismissed 377 A.2d 1, 22 Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 694 (1977). 
36 Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285 ((8th Cir. 1977). 
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unreasonable delay by the seller to deliver the goods sold is considered by the UCC 
to be a breach entitling the buyer to invoke the remedies available to him under the 
UCC for breach of the contract.37 As will be shown later, however, there is a major 
difference between these two systems in such instances: while under the former 
system the buyer initially has to apply to the court for enforcement of the contract by 
requiring the seller to deliver the goods sold,38 his main remedy in accordance with 
the UCC is to sue the seller for damages caused by non -delivery. 
Where a contract contains a clause by which the parties agree that the time of 
delivery of the goods not to be of the essence, a reasonable delay will be treated as 
allowing the buyer to extend the time for delivery for a reasonable period.39 Where, 
however, the seller is able and willing to deliver the goods at the time fixed by the 
parties in the contract, the buyer may not extend the time for delivery pursuant to 
such a contractual extension clause.' On the other hand, a contract under which the 
time for delivery is provided to be of the essence will place the burden of shipping 
charges and risk of delay on the seller.41 Nevertheless, if the parties provide an 
approximate delivery date for delivery of the goods sold and, due to the nature of the 
particular industry, a certain variation between the stated delivery time and the actual 
delivery time is acceptable within the trade, a delivery made within the industry time 
frame will be regarded to be in conformity with the contractual delivery terms.' 
A contractual agreement requiring the seller to make delivery "as soon as 
possible ' has been construed as meaning as soon as can be done using his greatest 
37 Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass 'n v. Hermanson, C.A.N.D., 549 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1977). 
38 See p. 121, post. 
39 Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977); Jon -T 
Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
40 Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass 'n v. Hermanson, C.A.N.D., 549 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1977). 
41 T & S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic -Air, Inc., C.A.4(S.C.), 790 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
42 Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp. 1280 (D.C.Pa. 1984). 
43 The requirement to deliver the goods "as soon as possible" after the sale under Iranian law applies 
where there is no stipulation as to the time of delivery in the contract between the parties concerned. 
See p. 110, post. In contrast with Iranian law, under Article 75 of the Swiss Federal Code of 
Obligations the seller, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, may deliver the goods "as soon 
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diligence.44 In such instances US law generally grants the seller a reasonable time 
within which to make delivery,' provided that time is not stipulated to be of the 
essence under such a delivery term.46 A provision in a contract calling for delivery of 
the goods "as directed" by the purchaser has been held not to be an ambiguous 
delivery term.47 The court construed it to mean that a delivery will be effective where 
the buyer directs delivery within a reasonable time, in the light of the nature and 
circumstances of the contract.48 
Where the parties fail to fix the time for shipment or delivery, or any other 
related matter in their sale contract, both the UCC49 and the US pre -UCC law,50 like 
English law, require the seller to deliver the goods within a reasonable time after the 
making of the contract with the buyer. Accordingly, in F.E. Myers Co. A Div. Of 
McNeil Corp. v. Pipe Maintenance Services, Inc.,'' the buyer was held not to be 
entitled to damages from the manufacturer for delay in the delivery of grinder pumps 
where the pumps were received by the former within a reasonable time after the 
conclusion of the agreement. On the other hand, in Morin Bldg. Products Co., Inc. v. 
Volk Const., Inc,' it was argued that even if the scheduled shipping date was not 
expressly agreed upon by the parties concerned, it was a shipping date which would 
be applied as commercially reasonable, and thus the seller, who was advised that 
as possible" after the conclusion of the contract if he wishes to do so or if the buyer demands their 
immediate delivery from him. 
44 In re First Hartford Corp., Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y., 63 B.R.479. 
45 In re First Hartford Corp., Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y., 63 B.R.479. 
46 In re First Hartford corp., Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y., 63 B.R.479. 
47 Capital Steel co., Inc. v. Foster and Creighton Co., 574 S.W.2d 256, 264 Ark. 683 (1978). 
48 Ibid. 
49 UCC, Section 2- 309(1). See further, Bob Robertson, Inc. v. Webster, 679 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App. 1 
dist. 1984); Luedke Engineering Co., Inc. v. Indiana Limestone Co., Inc., C.A.Ind., 740 F2d 598 (U.S. 
App. 1984); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P2d 709, 100 Idaho 175 (1979). 
5o In re Zerodec Mega Corp., Bkrtcy.Pa., 54 B.R. 814, 42 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 382 (1985); 
Beiriger And Sons Irr., Inc. v. Southwest Land Co., Inc., 705 P.2d 532 (Colo App. 1985); Nasco, Inc., 
v. Dahtron Corp., 392 N.E.2d 1110, 30 Il. Dec. 242, 74 Ill. App.3d 302 (1979). 
51 559 F.Supp. 697 D.el. 1984) 
52 500 F.Supp. 82 (D.C.Mont.1980). 
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time was of the essence and who failed to deliver metal siding to the buyer by such a 
date, breached the contract for the sale of the siding, notwithstanding the fact that the 
seller's failure to deliver was due to problems it experienced with its subcontractors 
and suppliers, since the seller should have contemplated such problems at the time of 
forming the contract of sale with the buyer. 
The requirement to deliver the goods within "a reasonable time" will also be 
applicable to those cases where the time for delivery is initially specified in the 
contract, but it becomes indefinite by the application of other provisions of the 
contract, or where the time for delivery under the contract is waived or modified by 
the parties concerned.'3 Furthermore, unlike Iranian law, section 2- 309(2) of the 
UCC54 contains provisions by which the parties are permitted to enter into a contract 
calling for successive performances without specifying duration. According to this 
section, the contract in such instances will be valid for "a reasonable time ", but in the 
absence of a contrary agreement between the parties, either of them may terminate 
the contract" at any time, without regard as to whether a reasonable time has already 
expired,56 by giving the other party reasonable notice to that effect." This may give 
rise to a problem, particularly in an international sale, if either of the parties chooses 
to terminate the contract immediately after its formation, as in such instances under 
the UCC the other party will have no remedy for the expenses which he has sustained 
in the making of the transaction with the terminating party.'8 
53 Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass 'n v. Hermanson, C.A.N.D., 549 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1977). 
54 For the full provisions of this section, see Appendix I. 
55 It is to be remembered that the effect of termination of the contract is to stop the contract from 
being operated as against the parties from the time of termination and as such must be distinguished 
from a party's justifiable cancellation of the contract as a separate remedy for breach of the contract 
by the other party. See UCC, Section 2 -309, Official Comment 9. See further Mott Equity Elevator v. 
Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900 (N.D.1975). 
56 UCC, Section 2- 309(2). 
57 UCC, Section 2- 309(3). 
58 Of course, in accordance with the UCC's requirement of good faith declared in UCC, Section 1 -203 
which is applicable to all provisions of the UCC, the person who chooses to terminate a dealership 
contract must act in good faith otherwise he will be responsible as against the other party for breach of 
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What is a reasonable time is a question of fact which, in accordance with the 
guidelines set forth in the Official Comments to the UCC,'9 depends upon what 
constitutes acceptable commercial conduct in view of the nature of the goods to be 
delivered, the extent of the seller's knowledge of the buyer's intentions,60 
transportation conditions,61 and the nature of the market in respect of the goods.62 The 
nature, purpose and circumstances surrounding a transaction may be ascertained from 
the parties' previous course of dealing and usage of trade.63 Where, for example, a 
contract for the purchase of plastic parts provided for delivery approximately 16 to 
22 weeks after the receipt from the buyer of a deposit, and where a variation of 20% 
between the number of weeks quoted and the number of weeks for actual delivery 
was acceptable within the trade, delivery within 18 to 26 weeks after receipt of the 
deposit was in compliance with the delivery terms.64 
As pointed out earlier, the seller's failure to deliver or to make a proper tender of 
delivery within a reasonable time (in circumstances where no time is specified by the 
agreement) constitutes a breach of the contract for which the buyer may invoke the 
remedies available under the UCC.65 The requirement of good faith may require the 
latter to give notice to the seller before he can avail himself of this breach.66 
Early delivery 
the sale: see, Tele- Controls, Inc. v. Ford Industries, Inc., 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967). Nonetheless, 
the requirement of good faith does not go far enough to protect the interests of the non -terminating 
party in the foregoing instances. 
59 UCC, Section 2 -309, Official Comment 1. 
6o Barbarossa & Son, Inc., v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Minn. 1978). 
61 Morin Building Products Co., Inc., v. Volk Construction Inc., 500 F.Supp. 82 (D.C.Mont. 1980). 
62 Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709, 100 Idaho 175 (1979). 
b3 Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976). 
64 Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc., v. General Elec. Co., 588 F.Supp.1280 (D.C.Pa. 1984) 
65 For the details of these remedies, see pp. 61 -79, post. 
66 See UCC, Section 2 -309, Official Comment 5. 
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In contrast with the Iranian civil system, under which the seller is required to deliver 
the goods sold immediately after conclusion of the contract if no time for delivery is 
fixed by the parties concerned, although tender of delivery under the UCC at what is 
called an unreasonable early date is not a breach of contract,67 he will be held liable 
for the breach of the contract if he insists upon delivery at that time and refuses to 
wait until the proper time for delivery. In other words, whilst in such instances the 
seller under the Iranian law68 is bound to deliver the object of the sale as early as 
possible, the UCC holds him responsible for breach of the contract if he does so. 
However, there seems to be little justification for preventing the seller from 
delivering the goods as early as he can in those cases where there is no agreement in 
the contract as to the time of delivery between the parties. This is particularly so in 
those legal systems in which the property in the goods passes to the buyer upon the 
formation of the contract with the seller. In fact, in such instances it is unjust to 
impose on the seller the risk of loss of the property which belongs to the other party 
by preventing him from delivering the goods to the latter, especially when delivery of 
the goods causes no inconvenience to the buyer. 
Quantity of the goods to be delivered 
Unlike the most modern systems, the UCC does not contain any express provision to 
deal specifically with the question of quantity of the goods delivered by the seller. 
Nonetheless, section 2 -106 of the UCC generally requires him to deliver goods in 
consistency with the contract. According to section 2- 106(2) of the UCC: 
"Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are `conforming' or 
conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under 
the contract." 
Therefore, where the seller delivers less or more than the quantity called for by the 
contract, the goods are non -conforming, in which case the buyer may, in accordance 
67 See UCC, Section 2 -309, Official Comment 4. 
68 See pp. 110 -111, post. 
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with section 2 -106 of the UCC, accept the whole or any commercial unit, or, units, or 
reject the whole or any commercial unit or units not accepted. Accordingly, whereas 
under other legal systems under consideration,ó9 the buyer in the case of a shortfall in 
the quantity of the goods delivered by the seller has an option either to reject the 
goods so delivered or to accept all of them on payment of the right proportion of the 
contractual price,70 under the UCC the buyer in such instances has a further option of 
accepting only part of the goods delivered while rejecting the rest of them, provided 
that in doing so he observes the principle of good faith. This principle may 
presumably preclude the buyer from considering the delivery by the seller as non- 
conforming to the contract for shortfall or excess in the quantity of the goods 
delivered where such a shortfall or excess in quantity is trivial. 
The latter option in granting the buyer a discretionary power to accept only part 
of the goods delivered, however, seems to be unjustifiable in the foregoing cases. It 
may be argued that the seller's action in delivering goods which are less than the 
amount provided in the contract is a new offer for the sale of the goods delivered or 
any of their units in accordance with the price and the terms of the original contract 
which could be either accepted or rejected by the buyer. Under such an argument the 
seller would be liable for the breach of the original contract and accordingly the 
buyer may sue him for the damages caused by the shortfall in the quantity of the 
goods delivered as well as for the proportion of the goods which he rejects. But such 
an argument could be rejected on the ground of contradiction with the provisions of 
section 2 -608 of the UCC. Since contrary to the general principle of contract law 
under which neither of the parties is allowed to revoke an offer which has been 
validly accepted by him, in accordance with provisions of section 2 -608 if a lot has 
been accepted by the buyer on the reasonable assumption that its non -conformity as 
to the quantity will be cured, he may revoke the acceptance if the seller fails to cure 
the defect seasonably. Even if the said argument is accepted, it would apply only to 
69 As to the provisions of the English system concerning short delivery, for example, see pp. 18 -19, 
ante. 
70 However, if the seller reasonably cures the defect in quantity of the goods delivered he may recover 
the full purchase price from the buyer. 
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cases where the buyer accepts all of the goods delivered to him, otherwise his action 
in retaining only part of the goods so delivered will be considered as a counter offer 
by him which needs to be accepted by the seller. 
Nevertheless, the UCC's principle of good faith which is to be observed by the 
buyer in the performing of the contract between the parties, would seem to prevent 
him from misusing the discretionary power under section 2 -106. Moreover, the seller 
in the case of rejection of the goods, or any part of them, will in certain 
circumstances have a right to cure his performance by the redelivering the shortfall in 
the quantity to the buyer even if, in contrast with English law, the time set in the 
contract for the delivery of the goods has expired." In other words, while under the 
English system the effect of rejection of the goods by the buyer after the time of 
delivery is to repudiate the contract between the parties, in accordance with the UCC 
his rejection will only suspend its performance by the seller. 
Delivery by instalment 
According to section 2 -307 of the UCC: 
"Unless otherwise agreed all goods called for by a contract for sale must be 
tendered in a single delivery and payment is due only on such tender but where 
the circumstances give either party the right to make or demand delivery in lots 
the price if it can be apportioned may be demanded for each lot." 
This section re- declares the English general rule' that in the absence of any contrary 
agreement, a sale contract requires the seller to deliver at one time, or tender a 
complete delivery, as opposed to effect a delivery by instalments. However, in 
contrast with English law, it also expressly states that there are certain circumstances 
which give rise to a seller's right to perform his duty of delivery under the contract 
by instalments. Accordingly, the quantity of the goods to be delivered, the place at 
See generally Eric C. Schneider, "The seller's right to cure under the Uniform Commercial Code 
and the United Nations Convention on contract for International Sale of Goods" (1989) 7 Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 70. As to the position under English law, see p. 19, 
footnote 77, ante. 
72 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 31(1). See further, pp. 19 -20, ante. 
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which such delivery is to be made, and the buyer's facilities for receiving the goods, 
may be such as to make it literally impossible or commercially impracticable to make 
an actual delivery of all the goods at one time. Under such circumstances, the UCC 
authorises the seller to make, or the buyer to demand delivery in instalments even 
though the contract between the parties is silent on that point. The following is an 
example: the parties call on shipment of fifteen carloads of wheat (which are to be 
resold by the buyer) and only five cars are available at the time when the seller is to 
deliver the goods or the buyer's storage space is limited and he cannot therefore 
receive all the fifteen carloads at once. Delivery may be made by instalments and the 
buyer is not entitled to reject the goods so delivered on the basis of defect in quantity 
alone, provided that the circumstances do not amount to a repudiation or default by 
the seller concerning the expected balance, or do not give the buyer a ground for 
suspending to perform his duty under the contract because of insecurity under the 
provisions of section 2 -609. The seller, however, is bound to deliver the balance of 
the goods within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner according to the 
policy of section 2 -503 on manner of tender of delivery. His failure to comply with 
this requirement to deliver the shortfall in quantity "seasonably "73 would justify the 
buyer in revoking his acceptance under section 2 -608, since he is considered to have 
accepted a lot on the reasonable assumption that non- confoimity as to the quantity of 
the goods delivered will be cured by the seller.'' 
Where the goods accepted are used or otherwise disposed of by the buyer, he 
may nevertheless retain the right to set off, against the seller's claim for the purchase 
price, those damages which he, the buyer, has sustained from the seller's failure to 
deliver the balance. 
73 "Seasonably ", the term used in the UCC, means `in time' and in correct manner. 
74 Section 2 -608 of the U.C.C. states that the buyer may revoke his acceptance only if the non- 
conformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to him. And since in the foregoing instances 
the seller's failure to cure by delivering the remaining parts of the goods amounts to substantial 
impairment of their value, therefore the buyer is entitled to revoke acceptance with the respect of 
those parts of the goods which have already been delivered to him. 
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Excess in quantity of the goods delivered 
In contrast with the other systems under examination, the options which are available 
to a buyer in respect of the delivery of an excess in quantity of goods, are identical to 
those which were mentioned above relating to a shortfall in their quantity. This 
means that where the quantity of the goods delivered is larger than what is provided 
for by the parties in the contract, the buyer under section 2 -106 of the UCC may not 
only, as in English law, accept the goods included in the contract and reject the 
excess in the quantity of the goods delivered or accept all the goods and pay an 
additional price for the éxcess in quantity at the contract rate75 to the seller. 
Alternatively he may reject the whole goods, but, in contrast to the provision in 
English law,76 he may also retain any unit or units of the goods so delivered and 
reject the rest of them. 
The problem with section 2 -106 of the UCC is that in the case of excessive 
delivery it does not require the buyer to accept that quantity of the goods which is, in 
fact, included in the contract. Obviously it is wrong to force the buyer to accept the 
excess in quantity if, for any reason, he does not wish to do so, but it is equally 
wrong and unjust to allow the buyer to reject the whole goods and to sue the seller 
for breach of the contract merely because the quantity of the goods delivered is larger 
than what was provided for by the parties. Furthermore, the buyer's option under 
section 2 -106 to accept the whole excess in quantity or any of its unit or units without 
obtaining the seller's consent in this regard seems hardly justifiable, particularly if 
the market price of the goods is substantially higher than the contractual price at the 
time of delivery and the seller has mistakenly delivered the excess in quantity to the 
buyer. It seems that the problems and injustice caused by section 2 -106 has been 
partly obviated by section 2 -508 which allows the seller to cure the non- conforming 
goods delivered. However, as it is mentioned in the following section, the seller's 
75 See the UCC, Section 2- 607(1), which requires the buyer to pay at the contract rate for any goods 
accepted. 
76 For the provisions of English law and their associated criticism, see pp. 20 -22, ante. 
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right to cure under the UCC is limited to those instances where the buyer rejects the 
goods. 
The seller's right to cure the non -conformity of the goods delivered 
As pointed out earlier, pursuant to the UCC, the seller may in certain circumstances 
cure the defects in the goods delivered to the buyer. This is a novel legal doctrine 
which has no antecedent in either the US pre -UCC or English law." The UCC's 
provision allowing the seller to cure any non -conformities in the goods delivered is a 
significant step in the direction of maintaining the contract entered into by the parties 
concerned, since performance of the contract of sale is their main purpose in dealing 
with each other and this doctrine provides a good opportunity towards preventing the 
buyer from cancelling the binding contract for a non -conformity which can be 
properly cured by the seller. Nonetheless, the UCC provisions which allow the seller 
to cure non -conformities in the goods delivered suffer from certain defects which, in 
the final analysis, tip the balance of interests between the parties in favour of the 
sellers. 
According to section 2- 508(1) of the UCC, the seller has the right after delivery 
of the goods to cure any non -conformity in documents of sale or performance prior to 
the date set for delivery in the contract of sale if he reasonably notifies the buyer of 
his intention to cure.'$ In other words, this section provides the seller with the 
discretionary option of either curing the defects in his delivery of the goods by 
reasonably notifying the buyer that he intends to cure, or of giving compensation to 
the buyer for the damage caused to the latter by his breach. The option to cure the 
non -conformity of the goods delivered in such instances is available to the seller even 
if it causes the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. While the 
seller's option to cure is commendable in the sense that it leads to enforcement of 
" For the position under English law, See p. 19, footnote 77, ante. 
'$ UCC, Section 2- 508(1). 
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contract, it is unjust to permit him to exercise this option where it causes the buyer 
unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense.79 
The UCC does not state whether the seller may re -avail himself of the provisions 
of section 2- 508(1) by re -curing of non -conformities in the goods "within the 
contract time" where his original effort to cure them has failed. Nonetheless, there 
seems to be no reason why the seller should not, as in English law,80 be able in such 
instances to cure the defects in delivery under the foregoing section within the time 
set for performance of the contract, particularly if it does not cause the buyer to suffer 
unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience. 
Moreover, the UCC does not address the issue of whether the seller may invoke 
the provisions of section 2- 508(1) to cure non -conformities in the goods delivered 
where they are rejected by the buyer through revocation of his acceptance under 
section 2 -608. It has been generally held by the courts that the seller's right to cure 
"within the contract time ", under section 2 -508, limits the buyer's right to reject 
under section 2 -602, but not the buyer's right to revoke acceptance pursuant to 
section 2 -608. This means that the seller under the UCC has no right to cure non - 
conformities in the goods delivered where the buyer accepts the goods despite these 
non- conformities.S1 Nevertheless, it is possible for a court to preserve the seller's 
right to cure by deciding, for example, that the buyer did not have a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect the goods delivered and, consequently, no acceptance has 
79 It appears that United States' courts have tended to favour the seller as against the buyer in setting 
the time during which this unfettered right to cure exists. In Traynor v. Walters, 342 F.Supp. 455, 10 
UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 965 (M.D. Pa. 1972), for example, the court extended the contracted for 
performance date six days (from December 8 to December 14) for delivery of Christmas trees. The 
court argued that the buyer's statement that his customers did not need the trees until December 16th 
and the buyer's demand for other trees on December 14th modified the agreement between the 
parties. 
80 See p.19, footnote 77, ante. 
$' See, e.g., Boies v. Norton, 526 S.W.2d 651, 17 UCC 1214 (Tex.Civ.App.1975), (the seller held to 
have no right to cure where the buyer sued him for damages, not `rescission'); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 
F.2d 951, 14 UCC 1318 (1974) (the court argued that since the buyer accepted defective goods, 
therefore, the seller has no right to cure). 
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taken place. Moreover, in accordance with the text of section 2- 608(1)(a) itself, 
where the buyer accepts the goods on the reasonable assumption that their non- 
conformity would be cured, he cannot revoke acceptance before offering the seller a 
reasonable period to cure. 
Obviously, these exceptions to the courts' dicta upon which the seller is 
precluded from curing non -conformities will merely cause uncertainty among parties 
to a contract of sale. This uncertainty could appropriately be obviated by allowing the 
seller to cure the defects in his delivery after acceptance of the goods by the buyer if 
the time for performance of the contract has not expired and it does not cause any 
unreasonable harm to the latter. 
The seller's proper exercise of the right to cure will cause the buyer to lose his 
right to reject. Nevertheless the latter will retain his right under section 2 -714 to 
recover any damage which he has suffered as a consequence of the original non- 
conforming tender. 
Where the time set by the parties for performance of the contract has passed, the 
seller, following section 2- 508(2) of the UCC, may cure the defects in delivery of the 
goods which have been rejected by the buyer only if at the time of delivery he had 
reasonable grounds to believe that non -conforming tender would be acceptable, with 
or without a money allowance.' This is provided that he seasonably notifies the 
buyer of his intention to cure and that he cures with a substitute conforming tender 
within a "further reasonable time. "83 
When the seller is considered to have "reasonable grounds to believe" that a 
tender would have been acceptable is a matter of dispute among commentators on the 
UCC. Professor Nordstrom states that the language of section 2- 508(2) allows the 
seller to cure only if he actually knew of the non -conformity of tender at the time of 
performance." According to his view, if, because of a prior course of dealing or trade 
8' For the cases where such reasonable grounds lie, see UCC, Section 2 -508, Official Comment 2. 
83 UCC., Section 2- 508(2) . 
84 R. Nordstrom, Handbook of the Law of Sales (1970), para. 105, at pp 319 -321. See also Meads v. 
Davis, 22 N.C. App.479, 481, 206 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1974) in which this approach was applied by the 
court. 
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usage, the seller reasonably believed the non -conforming tender would be acceptable 
to the buyer, he may cure the non -conformities within a reasonable time after expiry 
of the time for performance if the latter unexpectedly rejects the goods tendered.' In 
T. W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co,86 the seller was held to be entitled to cure 
when he shipped oil with a 0.92% sulphur content. The court found that the seller 
had a right to cure, as he knew that the buyer could use oil with a sulphur content of 
up to 1 %.87 Citing "decision history" and the "mainstream of scholarly commentary," 
the court rejected Professor Nordstrom's idea that a seller must have knowledge of 
the defect at the time of performance to be able to cure.88 Under this approach, 
nevertheless, if a middleman seller re- dispatches goods without inspecting them and 
they turn out to be non -conforming, he should not be allowed to cure under a literal 
reading of section 2- 508(2) of the UCC. However, it seems illogical to allow the 
seller to cure the defect in delivery, even where he knows the non -conformities, if it 
causes unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expenses to the buyer, or if the 
time of delivery is essential to him . Suppose that the buyer purchases 200 cars from 
the BMW company to be delivered on 25th of April 1997 in order to fulfil his 
obligations towards the sub -purchasers by delivering of the goods to them on 30th of 
April 1997. Now if the original seller delivers only part of the cars sold at the time 
specified in the contract, it would be unreasonable to allow him to cure non - 
confoiuiity by delivering the rest of the cars at a date after 30th of April 1997 if the 
sub -purchasers reject the cars delivered to them on the basis of strict contractual 
terms between them and the original buyer. Moreover, allowing the seller to cure 
non -conformities in the goods delivered would encourage him to deliver non- 
conforming goods in the hope that despite their non -conformities they will be 
accepted without any objection by the buyer. In other words, under this approach the 
seller would make no effort to cure non -conformities even though he knows of them 
before the date of delivery. 
85 R. Nordstrom, supra., note 85, para. 105, at p. 321. 
86 57 N.Y.2d 574, 443 N.E.2d 932, 457 N.Y.S.2d 458, 35 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 12 (1982). 
8' Ibid. 
88 Ibid. At 57, 443 N.E.2d at 939, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 585, 35 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 20. 
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Other commentators, arguing that the foregoing approach would severely limit 
the right of the seller to cure, suggest a test under which he would be able to cure if, 
had he known of the defect, he would have reasonably believed that the buyer would 
accept the goods.89 Nonetheless, the language of the UCC and its Official Comments 
does not support this latter approach.90 Moreover, this approach not only discourages 
the seller (as in the previous approach) to take any steps towards the curing of non - 
conformities which are known to him, but it may even foster him not to inspect the 
goods before their delivery to the buyer. 
A third approach, suggested by Professors White and Summers and followed by 
some courts,91 concludes: 
[A] seller should be found to have had reasonable cause to believe that his 
tender would have been acceptable any time he can convince the court that: 
(1) he was ignorant of the defect despite his good faith and prudent business 
behaviour; or 
(2) he had some reason such as prior course of dealing or trade usage which 
reasonably led him to believe that the goods would be acceptable. 
The problem, however, with this approach is that it does not take into account the 
extent of the hardship and inconvenience which the buyer may have to suffer as a 
consequence of unreasonable delay or unreasonable expenses caused by the seller's 
right to cure. 
A final approach, argued for by Professor Wallach, is that courts do not pay 
attention to the knowledge that the seller has about the non -conformities, but rather 
to the severity of the breach.92 In Bartus v. Riccardi,93 the court argued that the seller 
89 Aÿschmitt & Frisch, "The Perfect Tender Rule -An `acceptable' Interpretation" (1982) 13 University 
of Toledo Law Review 1375 at pp. 1392 -95. 
90 G. M. Travelio, "The U.C.C.'s Three `R's: Rejection, revocation and (the seller's) Right to Cure" 
(1984) 53 University of Cincinnati Law Review, 931 at pp. 945 -946. 
91 See, e.g., Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848, 849 (D.C.1967) (seller had a right to cure a defective 
television set because "a retail dealer would certainly expect and have reasonable ground to believe 
that merchandise like colour television sets, new and delivered as crated at the factory, would be 
acceptable as delivered. "). 
92 Wallach, "The Buyer's right to Return Unsatisfactory Goods - The Uniform Commercial Code 
Remedies of Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance" (1981) 20 Washburn Law Journal 20; See also 
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of a hearing aid who delivered a newer model hearing aid than was described in the 
contract had reasonable grounds to believe that it would be acceptable to the buyer, 
since the model delivered was the improved version of the model ordered by the 
buyer and that the seller therefore had a right to cure under subsection 2- 508(2).94 
Similarly, the court in Appleton State Bank v. Lee,95allowed the seller to cure the 
defective delivery even though he had no knowledge at the time of delivery of the 
non -conformity. In this case the seller mistakenly delivered a sewing machine of the 
wrong brand but which was otherwise identical to the one ordered. The court argued 
that the buyer received what he had bargained for, a $200 sewing machine.96 
According to this view if tender of delivery does not meet the buyer's 
expectations under the contract, the seller will not be allowed to cure the 
performance. As an example, in McKenzie v. Alla -Ohio Coals, Inc,97 the seller sent 
coal with an ash content of 13.5 to 16% under a contract that specified that the ash 
content was not to exceed 7.5 %. The court stated that no seller could have reasonably 
believed that such coal was suitable to the buyer's use as metallurgical coal and 
consequently, held that the seller had no right to cure.98 As can be seen the emphasis 
in such cases is rightly less on the seller's knowledge of the defect or reasonable 
belief in the acceptability of the non -conforming tender than on the basis of the 
parties' agreement. Nevertheless, advocates of this approach have not adequately 
considered the issue of extent of inconvenience which the seller's right to cure non - 
conformities in delivery may cause to the buyer. This problem could be solved by 
arguing that the parties at the time of formation of contract have impliedly agreed 
that the seller cannot cure non -conformities in delivery where it causes the buyer 
Note, "Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code, The Seller's Right to Cure" (1982) 16 Creighton Law 
Review 155. 
93 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 845 (1967). 
94 Ibid., at 6 -7, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 225, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 848. 
95 33 Wis. 2d 690, 148 N.W.2d 1(1967). 
96 Ibid., at 694, 148 N.W.2d at 3. 
97 29 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 852 (D.C. Colo 1979). 
98 Ibid., at 858. 
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unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expenses. In other words, the parties do 
not reasonably expect the seller to be entitled to cure non -conformities in delivery 
where it causes the buyer to suffer unreasonably, while on the other hand the former 
would be allowed to cure even though the delivery is substantially non -conforming if 
it does not unreasonably harm the buyer. 
Section 2- 508(2) of the UCC requires the seller to give seasonable notice to the 
buyer of his intention to cure and then cure within a reasonable time. The 
requirement of "seasonable notice" favours the parties' expectations under the 
contract rather than the seller's reasonable belief that the goods will be accepted. In 
National Fleet Supply, Inc. v. Fairchild,99 the buyer ordered an engine model 270 and 
received a model 250 which could not be used in the buyer's truck. It was held that 
the seller's offer to cure with a credit memorandum more than two months after the 
sale was not reasonable notice.'oo 
In Bevel -Fold, Inc. v. Bose Corp,101 the seller went out of business after 
delivering stereo speaker cabinets which were "substantially non -conforming." The 
court held that the buyer was not bound to wait for the seller's notice of cure before 
having a right to return the cabinets.102 The court argued that "it would be contrary to 
the UCC's rule of reasonableness to require the buyer to use or retain substantially 
non -conforming goods which are incapable of adequate repair.s103 In Marine Mart, 
Inc. v. Pearce,'04 the seller tendered a motorboat which needed major repairs. The 
Arkansas court stated that the "further reasonable time" given to the seller to cure is 
99 450 N.E.2d 1015, 36 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
loo Ibid., at p. 1018, 36 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 486. 
1°1 9 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 402 N.E.2d 1104, 28 UCC Rep. Serve. (Callaghan) 1333 (1980). 
102 Ibid.; see also Davis v. Colonial Mobile homes, 28 N.C. App. 13., 220 S.E.2d. 802, 18 UCC Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 662 (1975), cert. Denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (seller of mobile home told 
the buyer he did not know how long it would take to cure. After three months the buyer moved out 
and the court held that the seller no longer had a right to cure.) 
103 Bevel -Fold, Inc. v. Bose Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 584, 402 N.E.2d 1104, 1108, 28 UCC Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1333, 1339 (1980). 
104 252 Ark. 601, 480 S.W.2d at 133, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1047 (1972). 
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intended to benefit the buyer and an offer to make only minor repairs during a five 
months period from the time the contract was not a seasonable notice of cure.105 
By analogy, the buyer would presumably have no obligation to wait for 
seasonable cure if the goods delivered are substantially less than the amount fixed by 
the parties in the contract and the buyer has a reason to believe that the seller would 
not be able to cure non -conformities within a reasonable time by delivery of the 
shortfall in the quantity or that the time for performance is so essential to the buyer as 
he cannot wait for the seller's notice expressing his intention to cure the non - 
conformities. 
Where defects in the goods tendered are minor or the shortfall in their quality is 
trivial but the delay in cure is clearly unreasonable, the time extended to the seller to 
cure is limited to the reasonable expectations of the buyer. In Ramirez v. Autosport,106 
the buyer of a camper van was told by the seller's agent that the vehicle was not 
ready on the date set in the contract because of minor defects. The buyer called the 
seller several times but was given excuses until, two weeks after the contract 
performance date, the vehicle was said to be ready. In fact, the seller was still 
working on the minor defects and the buyer had to wait another two weeks while the 
seller continued to stall. The court rejected a holding that minor defects do not justify 
rejection by the buyer107 and a holding that the right to cure is limited to trivial 
defects.108 The court stressed the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the 
inconvenience to the buyer rather than the materiality of the original breach.109 
1°5 Ibid., at 607, 480 S.W.2d at 137, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at pp. 1052 -53; see also Jenson v. 
Seigel Mobile Home Group, 105 Idaho 189, 668 P.2d 65, 35 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 804 (1983) 
(seller has right to cure problems with unliveable mobile home only until the buyer finds the seller's 
efforts unsatisfactory and revokes acceptance). Conte v. Dwan Lincoln -Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 
374 A.2d 144, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 899 (1976) (seller's right to cure defective automobile 
does not last for an indefmite time). 
1°6 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345, 33 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 134 (1982). 
107 Gindy Mfg Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 286 A.2d 345, 7 UCC Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1257 (1970). 
108 Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 929 
(1978)(seller had no right to cure paint defects in a car which substantially impaired the car's value). 
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In summary, the right to cure non -conformities of the tendered goods by sellers 
is clearly a significant step towards a right path in the enforcing of a contract which 
has been validly formed by the parties. This, like Iranian law, prevents the buyer 
from misusing his right by sudden rejection of the goods delivered where the seller 
can properly cure non -conformities in them. However, unlike the latter system, the 
right to cure under the UCC may in itself be misused by the seller as against the 
buyer where it causes the latter to sustain unreasonable expenses or unreasonable 
inconvenience. 
The Buyer's Remedies for Breach of the Contract by the Seller 
Like the other legal systems, the UCC regards the seller as being in breach of the 
contract where he fails to deliver or where he delivers goods which are inconsistent 
with the contractual terms concerning their quality, quantity or the time of delivery. 
In the event of breach of the contract by the seller, the UCC confers a variety of 
remedies upon the aggrieved buyer which, depending on the circumstances 
surrounding each case, can be invoked by him. Accordingly, where the goods 
delivered are not in conformity with the contract, the buyer may reject or revoke his 
acceptance if the seller fails to cure the non -conformity. The buyer's rightful 
rejection or his justifiable revocation of acceptance entitles him to resort to the 
remedies identified in section 2 -711. The buyer may avail himself of the same 
remedies where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates the contract. In 
accordance with section 2 -711, the buyer, after recovering of the purchase price or 
part of it paid to the seller, may cover (2 -712) or obtain damages for non -delivery (2- 
713). In addition, section 2- 711(2) allows the buyer in certain cases to recover the 
goods identified in the contract (2 -502) or to secure specific performance or replevin 
(2 -716). 
'09 Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345, 33 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 134 (1982); Cf. 
Erling v. Hornera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 30 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 181 (N.D.1980) (one and 
half years was too long for buyer of mobile home to wait for cure of water condensation problem). 
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The buyer's right to reject or revoke acceptance of non -conforming goods 
The buyer's rights of rejection and revocation of acceptance are considered "goods 
oriented" remedies which have been defined by section 2 -601 and the sections 
following.' They are self -help remedies which permit the buyer to return non- 
conforming goods to the seller. This would relieve the buyer from the obligation to 
pay the contractual price, and entitle him to recover that part of the price he has 
already paid. '' It is to be noted that, like English law, there is a significant economic 
difference between the status of the buyer who rejects and the status of the buyer who 
accepts and then sues the seller for breach of obligation to deliver goods in 
conformity with the contractual terms. This is because the buyer who accepts non- 
conforming goods and sues for breach of warranty under section 2 -714 may recover 
only for injury which is proximately resulted from the non -conformities in the goods. 
By contrast, where the buyer rejects the entire goods he may claim compensation for 
the loss resulting from the seller's failure to perform his end of the contract by a suit 
under sections 2 -712 or 2 -713. He may further escape the bad bargain and throw any 
loss resulting from depreciation of the goods back upon the seller. There are, 
however, instances in which the courts have awarded sellers a sum for the value the 
buyers derived from their use before rejection or revocation. 112 
Section 2 -601 confers the right to reject as follows: 
" # ## 2 -601. Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery 
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in instalment contracts 
(section 2 -612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual 
limitations of remedy (sections 2 -718 and 2 -719), if the goods or tender of 
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
10 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (4th ed. 1995), vol. 1, p. 426. 
"' See UCC, Section 2- 711(1) 
112 See e.g., American Container Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 322, 268 A.2d 313, 7 UCC 1301 (1970); 
Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Diaries, Inc., 28 So.2d 319, 10 UCC 325 (Fla. 
App. 1972); Earling v. Hornera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 30 UCC 181 (N.D. 1980). As to the effect of 
cancellation of the contract by the buyer under Iranian law, see p. 115, post. 
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(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest." 
From sections 2 -601, 2 -602, 2 -508 and 2 -612, one can distil at least the following 
general substantive requirements for the right to reject: (1) absence of acceptance, (2) 
goods that do not conform or a tender of delivery that does not conform, (3) absence 
of an effective and rightful cure by the seller under section 2 -508 and (4) absence of a 
contract term prohibiting rejection. The absence of bad faith under section 1 -203 is a 
further substantive requirement which restricts the buyer's right to reject. 
Where the goods or the tender depart in any important way from the contract, the 
buyer may reject if the seller fails to exercise a right to cure under section 2 -508 and 
if the buyer satisfies the procedural requirements of an effective rejection. The buyer 
who chooses to reject non -conforming goods is required by section 2 -602 of the 
UCC to do so "within a reasonable time" after delivery or tender of the goods. This 
requirement is in many respect similar with English law, under which the seller is 
bound to exercise the option to reject the goods within a fairly short period. In 
contrast to English law, the UCC additionally requires that the buyer "seasonably" 
notify the seller of rejection (section 2 -602) and to state a particular nonconformity 
which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection and for which the goods have been 
rejected (section 2 -605). The reason for this is that the seller should have an 
opportunity to cure. Notification would also permit the seller to assist the buyer in 
minimising the buyer's losses, and to return the goods to the seller early before they 
have substantially depreciated. There are, however, major differences between 
English law and US law concerning the buyer's right to reject. Following section 
15A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), the buyer who does not deal as a 
consumer cannot reject if "the breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable for 
him to do so ", whereas as in Iranian law, the UCC permits him to reject even if the 
seller's breach is slight.13 Secondly, in contrast with the English system under which 
the contract is generally considered to have been repudiated by the buyer's rightful 
13 The perfect tender rule under section 2 -601 is, however, inapplicable to instalment contracts. See, 
UCC, Section 2 -612. As to the position of Iranian law concerning short delivery, see pp. 114 -115, 
post. 
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rejection of the goods,14 in certain circumstances, as pointed out above,15 the UCC, 
grants the seller a right to preserve the contract by curing the non -conformities after 
rejection or revocation by the buyer.16 Moreover, while the buyer following the 
UCC is generally required to act in good faith in rejection or revocation of the 
acceptance, there is, unlike in the Iranian and the French systems, no corresponding 
provisions under English law to prevent him from acting in bad faith concerning 
repudiation of the sale through rejection of the non -conforming goods. Finally, 
unlike English law, where the buyer will lose the right to reject after acceptance a 
non -conforming article, ,section 2 -608 of the UCC allows him to revoke his 
acceptance of the article "whose non -conformity substantially impairs its value to 
him" 17 provided that he has accepted it: 
"(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non -conformity would be cured and it 
has not been seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such non -conformity if his acceptance was reasonably 
induced either by difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by seller's 
"'Ili seems that under English law, the buyer in general is entitled to treat a wrongful delivery as itself 
a breach of contract which justifies repudiation by him. See sections 11(3) and (4) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 both of which appear to assume that rejection of the goods involves repudiation of 
the contract. However, where the time for performance of the contract has not been passed English 
Law allows the seller to cure the breach within the period allowed by the contract after the buyer's 
rejection. See, The Kanchenjunga, supra., Ch.l, note 77, at p. 399, per Lord Goff of Chieveley. See 
further, Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., Ch. 1, note 17 § 8 -048, pp. 401 -402; Devlin, "The 
Treatment of Breach of Contract" (1966) Cambridge Law Journal 192 at p. 194... 
15 See pp. 52 -61, ante. 
16 Pratt v. Winnebago Indusrtries, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 709, 26 UCC 68 (W.D.Pa. 1979). 
I" For more discussion on this issue, see generally Priest, "Breach and Remedy For The Tender of 
Non -conforming Goods Under Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach" (1978) 91 
Harvard Law Review 960 at p. 994. For the cases adopting an objective view of the "to him" 
language, see Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181, 17 UCC 39 (1975); Bic 
Mac Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cowgill, 31 UCC 1619 (Ark. App 1981) (allergic reaction to mobile 
home). For cases where the court mainly relied on the "subjective" standard but in fact viewed the 
situation with some degree of objectivity in deciding whether or not to uphold the buyer's action to 
revoke the acceptance, see Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill.App.3d 530, 3 Ill. Dec. 215, 358 
N.E.2d 382, 20 UCC 1142 (1976); Werner v. Montana, 117 N.H. 721, 378 A.2d 1130, 22 UCC 894 
(1977); Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 527, 578 P.2d 668, 24 UCC 881 (1978); 
Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 49 Md. App. 547, 433 A.2d 1218, 32 UCC 108 (1981); Wright 
v. O'Neal Motors, Inc., 57 N.C. App. 49, 291 S.E.2d 165, 33 UCC 1306 (1982). 
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assurances." 
The buyer who wishes to revoke his acceptance is required by section 2- 608(2) 
to do so within a reasonable time after he discovers, or should have discovered, the 
ground for revocation and before any substantial change in the condition of the goods 
which is not caused by their own defects. 
The advantages of the UCC's provisions over those of English law concerning 
non -conformities in the goods delivered are that, unlike the latter system, the drafters 
of the UCC rightly, on the one hand, try not to deprive the buyer of the right to reject 
where despite discovery of a defect in the goods he accepts them on the reasonable 
assumption that it will be cured18 or where his failure to discover the nonconformity 
was "reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery19 before acceptance or 
by the seller's assurance ", and on the other hand, encourage the parties to preserve 
the contract which has been validly made by them through granting of a right to the 
seller to cure the nonconformity. 
Following section 2- 608(3) of the UCC, a buyer who successfully revokes his 
acceptance has the same rights and duties with regard to accepted goods as if he had 
rejected them. 
The remedies of a buyer who rightfully rejects the non -conforming goods or 
properly revokes his acceptance under the UCC are identical to those granted to him 
under English law for his repudiation of the contract through rightful rejection of the 
goods. This means that the buyer in either of those circumstances may generally 
avoid liability for the price under section 2 -709. Both these remedies generally have 
the virtue of enabling the buyer to avoid liability for the price. Also, in an appropriate 
case, under section 2- 711(1) a buyer who rightfully rejects or who properly revokes 
acceptance may following to section 2- 106(4) of the UCC also cancel the transaction 
18 For example, where the seller states that he will cure the defect. See Polycon Industries, Inc. v. 
Hercules Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316, 26 UCC 917 (E.D.Wis. 1979); Automated Controls, Inc. v. MIC 
Enterprises, Inc., 27 UCC 677 (8th Cir. 1979). A past course of dealing or usage of trade may also 
make it reasonable to conclude that the seller will cure. See Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking 
Corp., 111 N.J.Supper. 383 A.2d 345, 7 UCC 1257 (1970). 
19 Accordingly, the buyer is barred from revocation of his acceptance if he failed to make a 
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with the seller and either recover damages for non -delivery under section 2 -713 or 
cover and claim cover damages under section 2 -712. 
The buyer's right to cover under section 2 -712 
As pointed out above, where the buyer properly rejects or justifiably revokes he may 
resort to the remedy provided in section 2 -712 of the UCC to cover and claim cover 
damages from the seller. The same remedy is available to the buyer if the seller 
repudiates the contract or fails to make delivery to the former. Section 2 -712 states: 
"(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by 
making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase 
of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller. 
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between 
the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or 
consequential damages as hereinafter defined (section 2 -715), but less expenses 
saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from 
any other remedy." 
The provisions of this section, which have no precedent in common law systems, 
have been derived from the civilian systems' and entitle the buyer to purchase 
substitute goods in the event of the seller's breach and to recover from the latter the 
difference between the cost of the substitute goods and the original contract price, 
plus any incidental or consequential damages allowable under section 2 -715, but less 
expenses saved as a result of the seller's breach. 
The major difference between French law and section 2 -712 of the UCC 
concerning the buyer's right to cover is that under the former system the buyer 
cannot avail himself of this remedy without obtaining the court's authority, which 
may be done only if the goods sold have not been ascertained by the parties or if 
direct enforcement of the contract of the contract is not possible for any reason, 
whereas under the UCC, irrespective of whether or not the goods have been 
ascertained to the contract, the buyer may automatically resort to this remedy once he 
reasonable inspection and such would have revealed the nonconformity in the goods purchased. 
'20 See, e.g., French Civil Code, Article 1144 . 
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rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance or where the seller fails to make 
delivery or repudiates the contract between the parties. 
Section 2 -712 is a significant departure from prior US law. As in the English 
system, under the prior law'' if an aggrieved buyer made a cover purchase there was 
no assurance that the court would measure the market at or near the time when he 
made his purchase, and accordingly, the court's contract -market differential formula 
might over or under -compensate him. His actual cost of cover and the market price at 
the time and place of his cover were, at least in theory, irrelevant to the damage suit. 
Nonetheless, the main flaw concerning the cover remedy under section 2 -712 is that, 
like French law, the buyer has to provide the capital for purchasing the replacement 
goods before he could be reimbursed by the seller. 
There are certain interpretative problems with regard to the provisions of section 
2 -712 which require to be considered. The first of these lies in defining the phrases 
"good faith" and "goods in substitution." According to sections 1- 201(19)12' and 1- 
203 the issue of good faith is to be measured upon a subjective standard, that is, 
honesty in fact. Moreover, a merchant buyer under section 2- 103(1)(b) is required to 
observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" and is 
therefore subject to both a subjective and an objective test of good faith. It seems 
desirable to hold the covering to have acted in good faith unless it established that he 
knowingly and without any reason has avoided a less expensive market in favour of a 
more expensive one. This means that the court should not hold him to have acted in 
bad faith where he had a reasonable ground for choosing a more expensive cover (for 
instance, the goods are of better quality or the seller more reliable). 
121 See Uniform Sales Act, Section 67. 
'" In accordance with section 1- 20(19) -good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned. "; see Farmers Elevator Co., v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 238 N.W.2d 290, 18 UCC 
1143 (1976) (buyer's acts in affecting "cover" in two transactions, nine and twenty -two days after 
seller's breach, held in "good faith "); Kiser v. Lemco Indus., Inc., 536 S.W.2d 585, 19 U.CC 1134 
(Tex.Civ.App.1976) (buyer's showing that he covered with purchases from himself at a stated price, 
without more, did not establish "good faith cover "). 
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The standard of reasonableness under section 2 -712 represents a more difficult 
interpretative problem for the buyer. Under this section, cover by the buyer must be 
made without "unreasonable delay" and it must be a "reasonable purchase." The 
Comment 2 to 2 -712, states amongst other things: 
"The test of proper cover is whether at the time and place the buyer acted in 
good faith and in a reasonable manner, and it is immaterial that hindsight may 
later prove that the method of cover used was not the cheapest or most 
effective." 
Accordingly, the unreasonable delay requirement is not intended to limit the time 
necessary for the buyer to, decide how he may best effect the cover. Section 1- 204(2) 
defines reasonable time as follows: 
"What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose 
and circumstances of such action." 
As can be seen, neither the provisions of the UCC nor their official comments give a 
solid basis upon which the buyer could determine whether a given act by him is or is 
not reasonable. The ambiguity of the term "reasonable" upon which the UCC's 
remedy of cover is based, may in turn cause uncertainty for the aggrieved buyer who 
chooses to invoke this remedy. However, if the remedy of cover under section 2 -712 
is to be used by more aggrieved buyers than any other remedy, then one must be 
cautious in finding a buyer's acts, committed in good faith, to be unreasonable. 
Contract- market damages 
Unlike the cover remedy, under section 2 -712 of the UCC, which is an innovation in 
the US commercial law, the market damages formula found in section 2 -713 is 
essentially the same as the common law formula and the formula for buyer's 
damages found in the Uniform Sales Act.'23 The remedy formula in section 2 -713 is 
also similar to that of section 51 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979. The differences 
123 See Childres, "Buyer's Remedies: The danger of Section 2 -713" (1978) 72 Northwestern 
University Law Review 837 at pp. 841 -842. 
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between these two systems is that while the 1979 Act contains no provisions with 
respect to the place where the market price of the goods is to be measured, under the 
UCC the place for the measuring of the market price is the place for tender or, in the 
cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, the place of arrival of the 
goods. Moreover, while section 51(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 requires the 
market price to be measured at the time, or times, of delivery, in accordance with the 
UCC, the time for the measurement of the market price is the time when the buyer 
learned of the breach by the seller. Section 2 -713 of the UCC states: 
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of the market 
price (section 2 -723), the measure of damages for non -delivery or repudiation 
by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the 
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental 
and consequential damages provided in this Article (section 2 -15), but less 
expenses saved in the consequence of the seller's breach. 
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in the case of 
rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival ". 
Accordingly, the contract -market formula is an alternative remedy which is available 
to the buyer in those cases where the seller repudiates the contract or where the buyer 
rightfully rejects or properly revokes the acceptance. 
However, the provisions of the contract- market formula in section 2 -713 suffers 
from a number of major problems which may cause uncertainty for the buyer who 
chooses to use this founula. The first problem relates to the requirement under which 
the market price is to be measured at the time and the place of the `tender' of the 
goods, despite the fact there is no precise definition as to place of tender under the 
UCC. Section 2 -503 of the UCC ( "Manner of Seller's Tender of Delivery") is a good 
starting point to search for a definition in this regard. This section half -heartedly 
defines tender in the "across the counter" sale, but only in the most oblique fashion 
does it deal with place of tender in the common commercial contract in which the 
seller ships to the buyer via a common carrier. An unanswered question is still 
whether the tender takes place when the goods are given to the carrier or only when 
the carrier delivers them to the buyer? According to section 2- 503(2) of the UCC: 
"Where the case is within the next section respecting shipment tender requires 
that the seller comply with its provisions." 
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This section, nevertheless, does not go on to say that tender occurs when the seller 
complies with section 2 -504. Unfortunately, only by implication does one conclude 
that a seller who complies with section 2 -504 has performed his duty in tendering of 
the goods. The implicit meaning of section 2- 503(2) is that a seller who has 
undertaken to ship the goods to a buyer but has no obligation to deliver them at a 
particular destination (that is, one who has contracted to ship the goods "F.O.B. 
seller's plant," not "F.O.B. buyer's plant ") will be considered to have properly 
performed the duty to tender by delivery of the goods to the carrier and contracting 
for proper shipment. 124 It follows that in a "destination contract ", where the seller 
agrees not just to ship the goods but to deliver them "F.O.B. buyer's plant ", tender 
takes place only when the carrier tender the goods in the buyer's city.'' 
The second problem concerns the question of whether the buyer can claim 
damages on the basis of contract -market differential under section 2 -713 when it is 
larger than those of the cover under section 2 -712 while he has actually purchased 
substitute goods for those due from the seller. Professor Peters maintains that an 
aggrieved buyer who purchases goods in substitution of the contract goods may 
disregard the remedy of cover under section 2 -712 and apply for recovery under the 
contract -market differential of section 2- 713.''6 This approach, however, conflicts 
with the general principle of section 1 -106 upon which the purpose of the UCC's 
remedies is to put the aggrieved party in as good position as if the other party had 
performed and no more. Furthermore, Comment 5 to section 2 -713 indicates that a 
buyer who has covered may not use section 2 -712 to recover damages on the basis of 
market -contract differential: 
"The present section provides a remedy which is completely alternative to cover 
under the preceding section and applies only when and to the extent that the 
124 See United California Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc., 546n F. Supp. 945, 34 UCC 849 
(D.Mass.1982); re Ault, 6 Bankr. 58, 30 UCC 1714, (E.D.Tenn.1980). 
125 See Ladex Corp. v. Transportes Aereos Nacionales S.A., 476 So.2d 763, 42 UCC 133, (Fla. App. 
1985). 
'26 See Peters, "Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two ", (1963) 73 Yale Law Journal 199, at p. 260. 
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buyer has not covered. "' 
If the UCC's goal is to put the buyer in the same position as if there had been no 
breach and if the cover remedy under section 2 -712 will accomplish this goal, but 
recovery of the market -contract differential price will do so only by coincidence, then 
there seems to be no reasonable ground not to force the covering buyer to use the 
remedy under the former section. 
Another interpretative question with respect to section 2 -713 is whether the 
aggrieved buyer's remedy under this section is to be limited to no more than what he 
stood to gain had the seller delivered the goods in conformity with the contract. It 
appears that despite the unqualified language of section 2 -713 US courts have 
accepted the idea that a buyer is not entitled to the full contact -market differential 
where there is proof that he expected to gain less than this differential, assuming the 
seller actually delivered the goods. In Allied Canners and Pakers Inc. v. Victor 
Packing Co.,' for example, the Court relied mainly on the principle of section 1- 
106(1) (as good a position as if the other had performed) and concluded that the 
plaintiff/buyer was entitled to cover only its expected resale profits which were less 
than the contract -market differential. The decision, however, is inconsistent with the 
provisions of section 2 -711 of the UCC which grants the aggrieved buyer an option 
to recover damages for non -delivery under section 2 -713 where he wishes to do so. 
Moreover, it is unjustifiable to follow the foregoing decisions in the cases where the 
plaintiff's resale purchaser is likely to insist on upon performance. There is equally 
no justification why the breaching seller's liability in such instances should be 
limited to the buyer's expectancy profit where, unlike the case of Allied Canners and 
Pakers Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., the seller intentionally declines to deliver the 
goods sold. The seller in such instances is set to be substantially better off by, for 
example, reselling of the goods to an alternative customer even after full payment of 
damages to the buyer under the market -contract formula in section 2 -713. 
127 The italics added. 
128 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1567 (Cal. App. 1984); 
see further, H -W -H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d 437, 41 UCC 832 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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Furthermore, the main common goal of the parties in dealing with each other is to 
perform their respective obligations undertaken under the transaction. To prevent the 
buyer from full recovery of his damages under the market -contract formula in the 
foregoing instances may persuade the seller to breach his contract intentionally 
whenever he finds it beneficial to him to do so. 
Finally, assuming that an aggrieved buyer can find the proper place and time to 
measure the market price for the purpose of recovering of damages under section 2- 
713's formula, there is still a question concerning the type of proof of the market 
price which he needs to show in order to prove his damages claim. In accordance 
with Comment 2 to section 2 -713: 
"The market or current price to be used in comparison with the contract price 
under this section is the price for goods of the same kind and in the same branch 
of trade." 
Commodity and securities markets, of course, fit the description of "general market 
price" provided in this official Comment. It would also seem that an aggrieved buyer 
could usually find a general market for widely sold goods, such as new and old cars 
or bicycles. Where the buyer cannot find such a market at the time and the place at 
which the market price is to be measured, section 2 -723 of the UCC allows him 
reasonable leeway in time, in place, and in kinds of substitutes. Official Comment 3 
to section 2 -713 goes even further by approving the use of evidence of spot sale 
prices where there is no available market price. However, a seller may still argue that 
some evidence is too uncertain to be received in a court of law. In fact, there is a 
remarkable number of the instances in which respective aggrieved buyers lost their 
cases either because they could not show adequate evidence of market price or 
because they failed to produce their evidence on time.'' These cases indicate that, in 
contrast with the cover remedy, there is a high possibility that the buyer may lose the 
129 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Norwood Marine, Inc., 58 Mass. App. Dec. 59, 19 UCC 829 (1976); Three - 
Seventy Leasing Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 528 F.2d 993, 19 UCC 132 (5th Cir.1976); Gulf Chem. & 
Metallurgical Corp. v. Sylvan Chem. Corp., 122 N.J. Super. 499, 300 A.2d 878, 12 UCC 117, aff d, 
126 N.J. Super. 261, 314 A.2d 73, 14 UCC 123 (App.Div.1973); H -W -H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 198 
Neb. 153, 251 N.W.2d 888, 21 UCC 794 (1977). 
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case against the breaching seller to recover damages under the contract -market 
formula. 
Incidental and consequential damages of the buyer 
In accordance with sections 2 -711, 2 -712, 2 -713 and 2 -714 of the UCC, an aggrieved 
buyer, in addition to recovery of any proximate or general damages, may also claim 
"incidental and consequential damages" caused by the seller's breach. Incidental and 
consequential damages have been defined by section 2 -715 of the UCC as follows: 
"(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses 
reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of 
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or 
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable 
expenses incident to the delay or other breach. 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could 
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and 
injury to person or property proximately resulting from the breach of warranty." 
In an effort to distinguish between incidental and consequential damages the court in 
Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp.'" stated: 
"While the distinction between the two is not obvious one, the Code makes plain 
that incidental damages are normally incurred when a buyer (or seller) 
repudiates the contract or wrongfully rejects the goods, causing the other to 
incur such expenses as transportation, storing, or reselling the goods. On the 
other hand, consequential damages do not arise within the scope of the 
immediate buyer- seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by the 
non -breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a 
proximate result of the breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the 
breaching party at the time of contracting." 
Incidental damages 
Incidental damages claims, provided for in section 2- 715(1), are limited to expenses 
which are recoverable if the buyer can show that they were incurred incidental to the 
130 372 F.Supp. 503, 508, 14 UCC 66, 667 (E.D.N.Y.1974). 
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seller's breach and that they were reasonable.131 The limitation on recovery of 
incidental damages exists to further the UCC's general policy expressed in section 1- 
106 whereby the aggrieved party is to be placed "in as good a position as if the other 
had fully performed.s132 Where the goods have been rightfully rejected, or the buyer 
has properly revoked his acceptance, incidental damages are fairly easy to identify as 
those expenses incurred in dealing with the goods themselves and in effecting cover. 
In such instances, the buyer may recover, as incidental damages, the cost of their 
inspection as well as storage and transportation expenses.133 Nevertheless, incidental 
damages are not so easy to define where the goods have been retained. To illustrate 
this, the additional expenses sustained by the buyer for locating and transporting the 
goods to the place of delivery from the location to which the seller has wrongfully 
shipped, can be classified as incidental as well as consequential expenses. Generally, 
the category chosen is not significant. Occasionally, however, the categorisation may 
be important for incidental damages are more readily recoverable than consequential 
damages.'" 
Consequential damages 
Consequential damages which are recoverable under section 2- 715(2)(a) of the UCC 
may include sums for lost profits, losses resulting from interruption of the buyer's 
production process, loss of good will, lost interest, and much else. Nevertheless, the 
13' See, e.g., Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F.Supp. 793, 28 UCC 647 (D.Mn.1980). 
132 See, for example, Productora e Importadora de Papel, S.A. de C. V. v. Fleming, 376 Mass, 826, 
383 N.E.2d 1129, 25 UCC 729 (1978). 
'3 See, e.g., Western Conference Resorts, Inc. v. Jeffrey M. Pease, 668 P.2d 973, 977, 36 UCC 131, 
136 (Colo.App.1983); Creusot -Loire Intern., Inc. v. Coppus Engineering Corp., 585 F.Supp. 45, 51, 
39 UCC 186, 195 (S.D.N.Y.1983). 
134 For detail of the restrictions imposed on the buyer's right to recover consequential damages, see 
below pp. 73 -74. See further, Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 (5th Cir. 1973), where a seller's 
contractual exclusion of consequential damages successfully precluded the recovery of those 
damages, but not incidental damages. 
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buyer may recover consequential damages only if he can prove (a) that the damages 
were caused by the seller's breach, (b) that these damages were in contemplation of 
the parties at the time of contract, and (c) that the damages occurred despite his 
normal or reasonable efforts to mitigate them. 
As in the civil law systems,135 the buyer who is claiming consequential damages 
is required by the UCC to show that they were caused by the seller's breach.136 On 
this basis, when the buyer's own negligence is a concurring proximate cause of the 
damages, the court will assess damages in proportion to the respective causal 
contributions.'3' 
The second, and perhaps the most important, limitation on the recovery of 
consequential damages is the requirement of foreseeability of the consequential 
damages at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The doctrine of foreseeability 
which has been derived from the rule in English case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 138 is 
justified on the ground that the breaching party should not be forced to bear 
unexpected liability for the breach. However, this reasoning is not convincing where 
the breach is attributable to the seller's bad faith particularly if the damages were 
reasonably foreseeable by him at the time of the breach. In fact, in contrast with the 
civilian systems, the provisions of both the UCC and English law in such instances 
unjustifiably favour the seller. These provisions, along with the duty to mitigate 
imposed on the aggrieved buyer by both the UCC139 and English law, may, unlike 
'35 As to the French system, for example, see pp. 98 -100, post. 
136 See, e.g., J & J Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 693 F.2d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 1982); Perry v. Lawson 
Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 464, 29 UCC 75, 82 (Okl. 1980) 
137 See, e.g., Indust -Ri -Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par -Pak Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 282, 290, 29 UCC 
794, 804 -5 (Tex. App. 1980). 
138 9 Ex. 341,354 -355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145(1854), 151. See further, pp. 25 -28, 30, ante. 
'39 UCC, Section 2- 715(2). For example, see; Plastic Moldings Corp. v. Park Sherman Co., 606 F.2d 
117 (6th Cir.1979); S.J. Groves & sons v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524 (3rd Cir. 1978); Carl Beasley 
Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F.Supp.325 (E.D. Pa.1973). Unfortunately, the buyer's failure to 
cover as authorised by section 2 -712 has been used as a breach of the duty to mitigate by a number of 
courts to reject his rightful claim to recover the consequential damages that actually resulted from the 
seller's breach. See, e.g., Hayes v. Hettinga, 228 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1975); Wilson v. Hayes, 544 
S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App. 1976); S.J. Groves & Sons v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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civilian systems, encourage the seller wilfully to breach the contract whenever he 
finds it beneficial to him to do so through, for example, reselling the goods to a third 
party for a substantially higher price. 
Specific performance 
While specific performance under the civilian systems is the buyer's prime 
remedy,140 under sections 2 -716 and 2 -502 of the UCC, it could be regarded as a 
secondary remedy which is obtainable only in certain circumstances. The availability 
of specific performance under section 2 -716 (1) is a manifestation of the English 
equity principle'' which holds that where money damages are inadequate to put an 
aggrieved party in the same position as performance would have done, the court of 
Equity will decree that an agreement be specifically performed, even though this 
section omits any express proviso that the damages remedy at law be inadequate.' 
In other words, as Comment 1 to the section 2 -716 reveals, the drafters of UCC 
intended to follow "in general prior policy as to specific performance and injunction 
against breach." But, they also sought "to further a more liberal attitude than some 
courts have shown" toward specific performance by deleting the Uniform Sales Act's 
requirement that the goods be "specific" or "ascertained" and instead authorising the 
courts to instruct a breaching seller to perform the contract specifically "where the 
goods are unique or in other proper circumstances. "143 These changes indicate that 
the drafters of the UCC sought to take a more liberal attitude toward the availability 
of specific performance than existed under the Uniform Sales Act.144 Nonetheless, 
while some courts comply with this attitude, which is also consistent with the 
guideline set in Comment 1 to section 2 -716, others continued to follow the 
140 As to Iranian system, for example, see 122 -127, post. 
14' See pp. 31 -35, ante. 
142 See for further discussion on this issue, White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, op. cit. 
supra., note 110, at pp. 325 -336 
143 The italics added. See generally, H. Greenburg, "Specific Performance under 2 -716 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: a more liberal attitude in the `grand style - (1982) 87 Commercial Law Journal 
583. 
ia4 See, White & Summers, op. cit. supra., note 110, at p. 326. 
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traditional attitude in granting specific performance only where the buyer's remedy at 
law is inadequate.'`' Obviously, the consequence of such a division among the 
decisions of the courts is to further the existing uncertainties between the parties 
concerned. 
The second problem is caused by the ambiguity of the words "unique or in other 
proper circumstances" used in section 2 -716. Surely, specific or ascertained goods 
such as priceless works of art or treasured heirlooms will remain "unique" as 
required by this section, but Comment 2 to section 2 -716 propounds a more liberal 
approach in determining whether the subject matter of a sale is "unique ": 
"The test ... must be made in terms of the total situation which characterises the 
contract. Output and requirements contract involving a particular or peculiarly 
available source or market present today the typical commercial specific 
performance situation." 
Under this approach the courts should take notice of the commercial feasibility of 
replacement in granting specific performance. In the cases of output and requirement 
contracts quoted above, if the seller repudiates the contract and if the described goods 
are available only in a particular or peculiarly available market, the buyer may obtain 
a decree of specific performance because he cannot acquire the described goods 
elsewhere and his money damage remedy would therefore be inadequate to make him 
whole. 
The UCC states that even if the subject matter of the sale is not unique, the buyer 
may still obtain a decree of specific performance if he can show "other proper 
circumstances." Drafters of the UCC failed to clarify which other circumstances are 
to be considered as "proper" to allow the buyer to obtain an injunction against the 
seller's breach. In accordance with Comment 2 to section 2 -716: 
"[T]he relief may also be granted "in other proper circumstances" and inability 
to cover is strong evidence of "other proper circumstances." 
Nevertheless, this Comment does not obviate the existing ambiguity in section 2 -716 
for it fails to define the borders of "uniqueness" as against "other proper 
145 For example, see Pierce -Odom, Inc. v. Evenson, 5 Ark. App. 67, 632 S.W.2d 247, 33 UCC 1693 
(1982); Beckman v. Vassall- Dillworth Lincoln -Mercury, Inc., 321 Pa.Super. 428, 468 A.2d 784, 39 
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circumstances." If, as pointed out above, "uniqueness equals "not obtainable 
elsewhere," then nothing is left for the category "other proper circumstances." As 
White and Summers suggest perhaps the purpose of the drafters in adding the phrase 
"other proper circumstances" in section 2 -716 was "to preserve the traditional power 
of an equity court to provide or withhold specific relief in its sound discretion and 
subject to such traditional defences in equity as clean hands, latches, etc. "146 In the 
case of Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co.,' for example, the court ordered an 
injunction against the seller who had breached a long term contract for the supply of 
propane gas. The breach occurred in the midst of the 1973 -74 energy crisis and in 
view of the long term contract, the uncertain future of energy supplies and the 
unquestionable indication that probably could not find another seller willing to 
supply him propane under such a long term contract, the court concluded that: 
"[E]ven if ... [the buyer] ... could obtain supplies of propane for the affected 
developments through its present contracts or newly negotiated ones, it would 
still face considerable expense and trouble which cannot be estimated in 
advances 148 
Unlike the discretionary remedy of specific performance, in certain limited 
circumstances when the goods have been identified to the contract an aggrieved 
buyer under sections 2- 716(3) and 2 -502 has a right to the goods in the seller's hand. 
In other words, the court is required to grant a decree of replevin if the buyer's case 
fits with the terms of either of these sections. 
Accordingly, unlike the position in English law, where the remedy of specific 
performance is unavailable, the aggrieved buyer may still resort to the provisions of 
section 2- 716(3) of the UCC to replevy the goods identified to the contract if cover 
is, or reasonably appears to be, foreclosed. Where the goods have been shipped under 
reservation (for instance, shipment under negotiable bill of lading to seller's order) 
the buyer may avail himself of the right of replevin only after satisfaction of the 
security interests in them has been tendered. 
UCC 69 (1983); Tower City Grain Co. v. Richman, 232 N.W.2d 61, 17 UCC 1011 (N.D. 1975). 
146 White & Summers, op. cit. supra., note 110, at p. 328. 
147 522 F.2d 33, 17 UCC 447 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1976). 
148 Ibid. At p. 40, 17 UCC at p. 452. See further Stephan's Machine & Tool, Inc. v. D & H Machinery 
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In accordance with section 2- 502(1) of the UCC: 
"Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not been shipped a 
buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of the goods in which he has a 
special property under the provisions of the immediately preceding section may 
on making and keeping good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price 
recover them from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after 
receipt of the first instalment." 
Under this section the buyer who has at least partly paid for the goods identified to 
the contract has a right to get them if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days 
after the receipt of the first instalment on their price. Although the section resolves 
the paradoxical question' of whether the seller's insolvency alone is sufficient to grant 
specific relief to the buyer,' in several ways it prevents the latter from acquiring the 
goods in several ways. First, the buyer must have a special property right in the 
goods identified to the contract. More importantly his right is limited to the situation 
in which the seller becomes insolvent "within ten days after receipt of the first 
instalment of their price." Under these limitations, the buyer will not be able to 
claim the goods if they are not identified to the contract prior or within those ten days 
or if the seller becomes insolvent after receiving of the first instalment of their price. 
Consultants, Inc, 66 Ohio App.2d 197, 417 N.E.2d 579 (1979). 
'49 The implication from the limited remedy afforded the buyer in section 2 -502 suggests that he 
cannot use the seller's insolvency as a ground to invoke the "other proper circumstances" for 
obtaining specific relief against the latter. 
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Chapter 3 
Delivery of the Goods under French Law' 
Under the French system, the obligation to deliver is one of the two principal 
obligations in a contract of sale, which must be fulfilled by the seller.' Article 1604 
of the Civil Code defines delivery as "the transfer of the thing sold into the power 
and possession of the buyer." In accordance with this rule the seller is bound to 
deliver the thing sold to the buyer so as to cause the latter to have it as owner. 
In contrast with English and US law, delivery of non -conforming goods under 
French law does not discharge the seller's duty of delivery undertaken under the 
contract of sale. In other words, non -conformity of the goods with respect of their 
quantity and/or quality entitles the buyer under the French system to sue the seller for 
non -delivery.' 
As in Iranian law,4 unless otherwise expressly agreed by the parties concerned' 
the law extends the seller's obligation to deliver to the accessories which are 
customarily attached to the object of the sale and all things associated with its 
permanent use.6 This includes all legal documents concerning the goods which are 
necessary for their administration without which the free use of the goods by the 
buyer would be scaled down or even disappear. Accordingly, in the cases of the sale 
of pedigree animals, the seller is considered to be bound to deliver to the buyer the 
documents relating the origin of the animal sold. This is because these documents 
relieve the latter from responsibility against the associations or specialised firms or 
' It is to be noted that the translation of the French Civil Code's Articles referred to in this thesis has 
been taken either from B. Nicholas in , The French Law of Contract (Clarendon Press Oxford, 2nd ed. 
1992) or from the translation of the author's student colleagues at Edinburgh University. 
'French Civil Code, Article 1604. 
3 For the concept of the term déliverance under French law, see pp. 135 -136, post. 
Seep. 106, post. 
s Judgement ofJuly 30, 1946, Cour d'appel d'Orléans [1947] Gaz pal. 1.21. 
6 French Civil Code, Article 1615. 
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eventual sub -buyers to prove the authenticity of the quality concerning the origin of 
the animal.' Similarly, the seller, in the case of a second hand vehicle, is considered 
to be liable for delivery of the registration document as an indispensable accessory of 
the vehicle, the absence of which would prevent the buyer from the proper use of the 
vehicle as intended by the parties in the sale.' 
Delivery of a wrong document by the seller is regarded as a failure on his part to 
perform the obligation undertaken in the contract' and entitles the buyer to have 
recourse to one of the remedies provided in the French Code for the breach of the 
seller's duty to deliver the goods.10 
Modes of delivery 
Delivery may take place by any voluntary act of the seller whereby the goods are put 
into the possession of the purchaser or enable him to obtain possession. The term 
includes constructive or symbolical delivery." The parties may agree on the mode of 
the delivery in the contract of the sale. Accordingly, as in the other legal systems, the 
seller may effect his obligation as to the delivery by physical transference or 
movement of the goods sold. This duty is sufficiently performed by the seller who 
gives the purchaser due facilities for removing the goods, or the means of 
immediately appropriating them, and he does not have to take them to the latter. 
Where the buyer is in possession of the goods purchased, the delivery takes 
place by mere will of the parties. As an example, the mere will of the parties is 
sufficient for the performance of the delivery where a depository purchases the thing 
which he holds for the seller, and there is no need for a fresh physical delivery to take 
' See J. Ghestin, Traité Des Contrats: La Vente (1990 Paris) p.735 and the case cited there in note 
102. 
$ See the case of Trib. Grinst. Seine 14 october 1964 précité, Gaz Pa1.1965.1.77 which is cited by J. 
Ghestin in Traité Des Contrats: La Vente (1990 Paris) p.735 note 103. 
9 Cf. Cass. 1 erciv. 31 Janvier 1974, Gaz. Pal. 1974.1. som. P. 77, D. 1974. 384, Bull. Civ. 1974.1.P 
30. 
10 Cass. Corn. 29 octobre 1968, Bull. civ. 1968.4. n.295. 
" French Civil Code, Article 1604. 
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place." The same principle applies when one person has the detention of goods for 
another and the latter sells the goods to a third party. In such a case the delivery takes 
place as soon as the agent, being instructed, holds the goods for the purchaser. This 
rule corresponds to the `attornment' under English law by which delivery of the 
goods may be effected.13 When a possessor makes a declaration in advance indicating 
that he holds goods on behalf of the future cessionary upon the latter receiving 
cession of the right of the ownership, delivery is effected on the date of the cession 
and the cessionary is thereafter entitled to claim the goods from the possessor. 
Delivery may also take place by mutual exchange of the parties intention where 
they agree that the seller will retain the possession of the goods as the buyer's agent. 
Similarly, depending on the nature of the transaction and its surrounding 
circumstances, the setting of a mark upon the goods by the buyer may be equivalent 
to delivery. This method of delivery applies, if at all, to articles of great bulk. 
Accordingly, where logs of timber are sold, marking of them by the purchaser may 
be considered as delivery to him.14 As pointed out earlier, the delivery may be 
constructive. Examples of this method are the delivery of the keys of a warehouse in 
which the goods are stored, or the delivery of a bill of lading for goods on board a 
Where the goods are delivered to a carrier for transmission to the buyer, the 
delivery to the carrier is delivery to the purchaser, since the former is regarded as his 
agent and not the seller's.16 However this rule does not apply where the seller agrees 
to deliver the goods safe at the destination, and it presupposes that the goods are 
delivered to the carrier under a contract of sale and in accordance with its terms and 
that the carrier holds the goods simply for transmission to the buyer. The onus is on 
12 See J. Ghestin, Traité Des Contrats: La Vente (Paris: Librairie de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1990) 
p. 725. 
" See pp. 10 -11, ante. 
14 See J. Ghestin, Traité Des Contrats La Vente (1990 Paris) p.725. It is to be noted that like most 
other legal systems, the effect of delivery under the French law is to pass the risk in the goods to the 
buyer from the time when delivery takes place. This means that the buyer upon delivery of the goods, 
has to pay the full price even though he does not obtain the goods, or goods in promised condition 
provided that they are complied with the contractual requirement at the time of delivery. 
Is French Civil Code, Article 1604. 
16 Cass. civ. 9.2.1926, Gaz. Pal. 1926.1.754, D.1926.1.209, note R. Roger, S. 1926.1.63. 
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the seller of unascertained goods to show that he had appropriated to the contract 
goods which complied with the contract. 
Where goods are shipped by sea and a bill of lading is issued to the seller, the 
carrier holds the goods as custodier for delivery to such person as may be indicated 
by that bill of lading. In other words, the shipper may reserve a jus disponendi over 
the goods and this is inconsistent with delivery to the carrier being regarded as 
delivery to the buyer. 
Expenses of the delivery 
According to Article 1608 of the French Code, the seller, in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary by the parties, must do at his own 
necessary to effect delivery. Accordingly, where the sale is 
goods, he must appropriate to the contract goods of the 
one 
expense what is 
of unascertained 
contract quality and 
description, and in contract condition. Similarly, if the goods require anything to be 
done to them to put them in a deliverable state, or a permit be necessary, or the goods 
are required to be measured, the responsibility for attending to these matters, and the 
expense thereby incurred, falls on the seller. 
Place of delivery 
The parties may expressly or by implication agree on the place where the goods are 
to be delivered. In the latter instance, the intention of the parties as to the place of 
delivery can be deduced from the stipulation in the contract concerning transport of 
the merchandise sold. As an example, the use of the words "arrival station" can be 
considered as an indication of the place of delivery which has been impliedly 
stipulated in the contract by the parties concerned, whereas in the sale of goods 
involving carriage by sea it is normally the departure station which constitutes the 
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place of delivery." Where, however, the parties have made no stipulation as to the 
place of delivery in the contract and there is no usage as to the place of delivery 
concerning that particular goods sold, under Article 1609 of the , the delivery or 
traditio of movables sold must take place at the place where the goods were at the 
time of the sale.18 In accordance with this rule, if a buyer has, for example, purchased 
from a timber merchant pieces of wood to shore up his house, the merchant must 
deliver the wood to the former in his yard where it is, and the buyer must bear the 
cost of taking the timber away. 
That is why delivery, which is incumbent upon the seller, must not be confused 
with the removal of the thing by the buyer. The delivery is at the cost of the seller, 
and it consists in giving the buyer the opportunity of removing the thing. If, 
therefore, the buyer cannot be reasonably expected to take delivery without notice, 
the seller is bound to give that notice, and he must ensure that the place from which 
the goods are to be collected by the buyer is convenient for this purpose.19 In other 
words, if there be anything hindering the removal of the thing, the seller must remove 
the hindrance at his own expense. Thereafter, unless otherwise agreed by the parties 
concerned, the removal of the goods, including the loading, is the responsibility of 
the purchaser. It takes place at his own expense and anything necessary to that end 
must be done by him and not by the seller.'° 
It is to be noted that the rule of Article 1609 concerning the place of delivery 
applies only in the cases where the goods sold are specified. In the event of sale of 
unascertained goods, however, the delivery must, under Article 1247(3)2' of the , take 
place at the place of the business of the seller," provided that they are not to be 
transported to the buyer.'3 In the latter instance, however, that is where the goods are 
' C. app. Douai 20.11.1964, D. 1965.506. 
18 See French Civil Code, Article 1609. 
See also Pothier's treatise on contract of sale, (L.S. Cushing translation, Boston, Mass., 1839), para. 
52. 
19 See Pothier's treatise on the contract of letting and hiring (Durban: Butterworth (Africa), Mulligan 
Translation ed. 1953). 
'0 Ibid. 
'For the full text of Article 1247 of the French Code, see Appendix III. 
22 For the same vile and its associated problems under English law, see pp. 11 -12, ante. 
23 Judgement of December 17, 1952, Cass. civ. III 310. 
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to be transported, the place of tender is usually deemed to be at the place where the 
transportation thereof on behalf of the buyer is to start.'4 
Time of delivery 
As to the time of delivery, French law has the same basic rule as English law that the 
parties are free to fix the time for delivery in their contract and if they fail to do so 
then it is for the court (les juges de fond) to decide on what is a reasonable time 
within which the seller should deliver the goods. There, however, the resemblance 
between the two systems ends and indeed French law proceeds in almost an opposite 
direction to English law. It seems that in this, as in other instances, English law is far 
more geared towards commercial, and, in particular, international trading practice, 
than is French law. 
English law, it will be recalled, holds that in mercantile contracts involving 
carriage of goods by sea a time clause will generally be regarded as a condition of the 
contract, the breach of which entitles the buyer immediately to rescind the sale and to 
claim damages for non -delivery.' Under French law, by contrast, a delay in 
delivering the goods sold is not in itself sufficient to put him in default. The buyer 
must give the seller formal notice (une sommation), or informal notice such, as a 
letter accepted by the juge de fond as being equivalent, requiring the latter to deliver 
the goods." It is the issue of this notice, the mise en demeure, which places the seller 
legally in default and entitles the purchaser to claim damages from the date fixed in 
his letter requiring delivery of the goods by the former. 
This requirement is perhaps not surprising if, under the terms of the contract, the 
period/ time for delivery was only indicative, and it would seem that in the case of 
doubt French courts tend to presume that this was so, rather than that the period/ time 
was mandatory." It is more surprising if there was a firm period/term stated for 
24 Judgement of November 20, 1964, Cour d'appel, Douai, [1965] D.S. Jur. 506. 
25 
See pp. 12 -17, ante. 
26 See French Civil Code, Arts. 1139 and 1146. 
27 J. Ghestin, Traité Des Contrats: La Vente (1990 Paris) p. 721. 
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delivery which is now past. However, this may well be the case since the mere fact 
on its own of the contract containing a firm delivery period /time which has expired 
will not generally be sufficient to put the seller in default.'8 The issue will depend on 
the decision by les juges de fond within their sovereign power as to whether or not 
the provisions of the contract relating to the time for delivery were sufficiently clear 
and rigorous to constitute the tacit intention of the parties to dispense with the need 
for the notice. The inclusion of a penalty clause, the requirement livrable de suit, a 
fixed period for completion under threat of cancellation and an express provision in 
the form of agreement for a firm delivery period overriding the seller's general 
conditions of contract, are some instances where the courts have decided that the 
necessity for the mise en demeure was implicitly renounced by the parties 
concerned.'9 
There are risks in relying on discretion. Buyers, therefore, will normally seek to 
take advantage of one of the exceptions to the rule requiring notice especially that 
allowing the requirement to be excluded by the express terms of the contract where 
they wish to avoid such a risk in their relationships with their sellers. Accordingly, 
the parties are considered to have waived the rule requiring notice where the goods 
can only be delivered within a certain period to be of any use to the purchaser. As an 
example, the seller cannot invoke the notice requirement as a defence against the 
purchaser who claims damages for non -performance of the contract where he 
receives an order from the latter for goods to be resold at a particular fair but fails to 
deliver them by the time the gates of the fair are closed.30 The same rule applies when 
the seller has stated that he does not intend to deliver the goods sold.31 Furthermore, 
when the parties have expressly anticipated in the contract that a mise en demeure is 
not required, the seller cannot rely on the rule requiring the buyer to give the seller 
notice demanding that the latter fulfil his obligations under the contract of sale. This 
28 Weill, A. And Terré, F., Droit civil, les obligations, (4th ed., Paris: Dalloz, 1986) para. 418. They 
refer to the present law as being opposed to the pre -Revolutionary French law which did not put the 
debtor into demeure by reason only of his not having delivered by the firm date and followed in this 
respect the latin maxim dies inteipellat pro homme. 
29 See French Civil Code, Article 1610. 
30 Cass Corn. 2 April 1974, D.1974 IR 152. 
31 Req. 4 January 1927, DH 1927, 65. 
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is the most important exception and one which the buyer will normally seek to 
follow. Nevertheless, it is again for les juges de fond in the exercise of their 
sovereign power to decide as to whether or not the parties have expressed their 
intention with sufficient clarity. 
Where the parties have set a specific date in their contract for delivery of the 
thing sold, such delivery date must be scrupulously respected.3'In such instances, the 
buyer may not demand early delivery33 and the seller may neither unilaterally 
postpone the time of delivery nor obtain a judicial order authorising such 
postponement.34 The buyer, unlike the case where no time for delivery is specified in 
the contract of sale, need not serve a request for delivery on the seller unless an 
express provision in the contract requires him to do so.35 Where, however, the parties 
have specifically agreed on delivery to be made upon the buyer's demand, such 
demand must be made by him within a reasonable period of time.36 
Where the parties to a contract do not stipulate for delivery of the goods at a 
specific date, but "upon production" or "as soon as possible," the seller, nonetheless, 
is bound to deliver the goods within a reasonable time.37 Where the contract of sale 
contains a provision suggesting a non -binding date for delivery, the seller will not, in 
principle, be liable to pay damages to the buyer for failing to deliver the goods on or 
before the non -binding date specified in the contract.38 As a consequence, the buyer, 
in such instances, must serve a demand for delivery on the seller and accord the latter 
a reasonable period of time within which to deliver the goods.39 Unlike the Iranian 
system,40 where the time for delivering of the goods has not been fixed by the 
32 Judgement of June 16, 1952, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1952] Gazette du palais [Gaz. Pal.] II 281. 
33 Judgement ofJanuaiy 14, 1958, Cass. civ. corn., [1958] Bull. Civ. III 20. 
34 Judgement of December 19, 1903 Cour d'appel , [ 1904] Gaz. Pal. I 22. 
35 Judgement ofJanuaiy 17, 1961, Cour d'appel, Rouen, [1962] D.S. Jur. Som. 30. 
36 Judgement of December 9, 1903, Cour d'appel, Besançon, [1904] Gaz. Pal I 22. As pointed out 
earlier, such a reasonable period of time is determined by reference to a trade usage. 
37 Judgement of January 4, 1978, Cour d'appel, Reims, [1978] Revue Trimestrielle de Droit 
Commercial 591. 
38 Judgement of June 15, 1981, Cass. civ. corn., [1981] Bull. Civ. IV 214. It is to be noted, however, 
that the seller was held to have unilaterally and tacitly terminated the contract of sale where he failed 
to perform his obligation to deliver the goods to the buyer for a period of three months after non- 
binding date specified in the sale. See Judgement of June 24, 1980, civ. corn., [1981] D.S. Jur. I.R. 40. 
39 Judgement of June 2, 1958, Cass. civ. corn., [1958] Bull. Civ. III 183. 
4° See pp. 112, post. 
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contract, the parties are usually not presumed to have agreed that the delivery will 
take place immediately.' In such instances, trade usage mostly requires the buyer to 
serve a demand for delivery of the goods on the seller.' Where such a demand is 
served upon the seller, he is bound to observe the delivery date requested by the 
buyer if such date is reasonable under the provisions of the trade usage.' 
In the case of delay by the buyer in asking the seller for delivery, the latter may, 
if he wishes to discharge himself from the obligation undertaken under the contract, 
make a demand upon the buyer to take delivery at the place the goods sold are to be 
delivered.' However, as in English law, delivery of the goods and payment of the 
price are concurrent conditions under the French system; the seller is excused from 
the obligation to deliver the goods to the buyer where the latter refuses to tender the 
purchase price, 4s unless of course the parties agree that the payment be made at a 
latter date. Similarly, where a single contract of sale which calls for multiple 
deliveries is subject to the buyer's payment for deliveries which already have been 
made, the seller may refuse to make subsequent deliveries if the buyer has failed to 
pay for preceding deliveries.46 Nonetheless, where multiple deliveries are to be made 
pursuant to the contract of sale which has not specified that all deliveries are inter- 
related, the buyer's failure to pay for one delivery does not relieve the seller from 
liability for failing to make subsequent deliveries to the buyer.47 
The buyer's action against the seller for non- delivery 
The action the buyer may have against the seller for non -delivery of the goods sold 
lies: (a) where the seller is able to deliver, but refuses to do so; 
(b) where by his own act he has disabled himself from delivering them, as where 
after the contract, he allows them to perish by his own fault; and finally, 
4' Judgement of April 4, 1960, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1960] D.S. Jur. 410. 
42 Judgement ofjune 15, 1981, Cass. civ. corn., [1981] Bull Civ. IV 214. 
43 Judgement of November 27, 1961, Cass. civ. corn., [1961] Bull. Civ. III 380. 
u Pothier's treatise on the law of letting and hiring, op. cit., supra., note 19 . 
45 French Civil Code, Article 1612. 
46 Judgement ofJanuaiy 23, 1961, Cour d'appel, Grenoble, [1961] D.S. Jur. 300 . 
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(c) where, even though at the time when the sale was made he had no power to 
dispose of the goods, he rashly bound himself to do so. This takes place not only 
when he knew that he has no right of disposal over the goods, but even when he 
believes in good faith that the goods belong to him and thus he is entitled to dispose 
of them. In other words, even though one may sell what belongs to another, res 
aliena vendi potest [what belongs to another may be sold], in the sense that, he who 
sells a thing belonging to another, validly contracts the obligation to deliver and 
warrant it to the buyer, but good faith on the part of the seller, even though he has 
good reason to believe that what he is selling belongs to himself, does not relieve him 
from the liability for damage owing to the buyer for non -performance of his 
obligation to deliver the goods to the latter under Article 1603 of the French Code. 
This is because, under the French civil law, in order that an obligation may be valid, 
it is sufficient if the thing which one promises to do be possible in itself, and it is not 
necessary that it be in the power of the promisor to do it. He has to pay for having 
promised what he could not perform. The promisee is entitled to rely upon the 
promise, as what was promised was in itself possible. 
It is otherwise when the seller cannot deliver the thing sold, because it has 
perished or because it has become a res extra commercium, for example, if the thing 
sold has been destroyed by some occurrence other than by the act or fault of the 
seller, as where the cars sold are destroyed in an earthquake. In such instances, the 
seller is discharged from his obligation of delivering the thing sold, for the obligation 
has become impossible to fulfil and impossibilium nulla obligatio est, and the action 
ex conducto does not lie. But the buyer on the other hand, is discharged from the 
obligation of paying the price and if he has paid the price in advance, he can recover 
it, conditione sine causa. 
4' Judgement of July 2, 1924, Cass. civ., [1926] D.P. I 95. 
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The buyer's remedies for non -delivery of the goods by the seller: 
Introduction 
The law prescribes certain remedies to the buyer in the event that the seller fails to 
deliver or improperly delivers the goods called for in the sale contract if the latter has 
no excuse for improper or non -delivery of the goods sold. In such instances the buyer 
may affirm the contract and demand due performance thereunder or avoid the 
contract. Unlike the English law of sale, the buyer is free to elect either of these 
courses of the action; in the event that he initially elects one course of action, he may 
subsequently change his mind and elect the other.48 Nonetheless, one must bear in 
mind that both procedures involve judicial authorisation and the buyer cannot act on 
his own initiative. Thus, whereas the aggrieved buyer under the common law may 
rescind the contract with the seller for non -delivery of the goods merely by giving 
notice to the latter, French law normally requires a court proceeding.49 The only 
exception to this general rule, (i.e., rejection of the self -help rule) under the French 
law is purely defensive and allows the buyer to withhold payment of the price in the 
event of default by the seller to deliver the goods. This exception is called exeptio 
adimpleti contractus and can be used against a seller who demands the payment of 
the price before performing his obligation of delivering the goods in accordance with 
the contractual terms. However, in a particular case, commercial custom may allow 
the purchaser recourse to self -help without being required to refer the case to a court. 
In such instances, judicial control may intervene only ex post, in the event of an 
improper exploitation of the right. This substitution of right by commercial custom is 
sometimes regarded as a form of unilateral automatic rescission 
48 Judgement of July 22, 1953, Cass. Civ. Corn., [1953] Dalloz, Jurisprudence 587. 
49 See, P. Le Tourneau, La Reponsabilité Civile (3rd ed. 1982), no. 1762. 
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Exceptio non adimpleti contractus 
The term exceptio non adimpleti contractus which has been derived from the Roman 
law and its French translation exception d'inexécution, literally means `defence of 
unperformed contract'.50 Nonetheless, the remedy is generally available to a party in 
a bilateral contract in which his obligations are concurrent with those of the other 
party without any need of the court's order and as such it is inconsistent with the 
literal meaning of the term exceptio non adimpleti contractus.'' This is because the 
word exceptio suggests a, defence to an action, whereas it is an essential characteristic 
of the remedy which allows the party to use it without being required to go to court 
(though he may decide to do so).52 
Thus, in a contract of sale the buyer may withhold the price if the seller fails to 
deliver the thing sold.53 The basis of this remedy is the doctrine of cause, since it is 
argued that in a synallagmatic contract each obligation is the cause of the other, and 
therefore, the non -performance of one justifies the non -performance of the other.54 
This remedy, however, is essentially temporary and provisional. In other words, 
despite availability of this remedy to the buyer, he must be prepared to pay the 
purchase price to the seller as soon as the latter delivers the goods to him. It might be 
argued that this situation is inconvenient to the aggrieved buyer as it will tie him up 
under the contract for a long period. The argument, however, is not convincing since 
this is one of the options which can be used by the buyer where he wishes to retain 
the contract of sale without referring the case to a court. This option does not 
preclude the buyer from bringing an action against the seller for the repudiating of 
5o See, B. Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, op. cit. supra., note 1, p. 213. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 The French Civil Code does not expressly provide that the buyer can refuse to pay the price until 
he receives the delivery of the goods purchased. Nevertheless, by analogy to the provisions of Article 
1653, one may achieve this conclusion. According to Article 1653 of the Code the buyer may suspend 
payment of the price where he is threatened or has good cause to fear to be evicted, until the seller 
removes the threat or gives an assurance. The same remedy has been provided by Articles 1612 and 
1613 of the Code to an unpaid seller. According to these articles the seller may withhold delivery of 
the goods sold where the buyer refuses to pay the price. This is parallel to the English rule of unpaid 
seller's lien. See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 41. 
54 See, B. Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, op. cit. supra., note 1, p. 214. 
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the contract altogether or for compelling the latter to perform his obligation in 
delivering of the goods. Accordingly, it can be said that this remedy provides the 
buyer with a means by which he may put pressure on the seller to fulfil his obligation 
under the sale without affecting his other remedies in demanding a court to compel 
the latter to deliver the goods or repudiate the sale with him. There is, in fact, an 
evident relationship between the exceptio and the droit de rétention for both serve 
the same purpose of putting pressure on a debtor by withholding that to which he is 
entitled, and the two are often indistinguishable." The unpaid seller's retention of the 
goods sold, for example, can be seen as an instance of both of the exceptio and of the 
droit de rétention.56 It is to be noted, however, that the concept of exceptio is much 
wider, in that the creditor is not confined to retaining a specific thing to which the 
creditor is entitled.' The right by the buyer to withhold payment of the price under 
Article 1653 of the French Code for being threatened by eviction cannot be classified 
as droit de rétention as a sum of money is not a specific thing.'$ The same is true 
where the performance withheld by the creditor is an act rather than delivery of a 
specific thing.'9 On the other hand, a droit de rétention not only is not confined to 
synallagmatic contracts, for an example, a creditor under a unilateral contract may 
withhold a thing belonging to the debtor where he holds that thing in connection with 
the contract; but it may also apply in the cases where there is, in fact, no contractual 
relationship between the parties, as an example the finder of a property is entitled to 
retain it until he is compensated for the expenditure which he has been incurred for 
preserving of the property.60 
Specific performance 







Unlike English law, under which the buyer's primary remedy for non -delivery of the 
goods by the seller is damages,61 from the point of view of civilian systems the 
aggrieved buyer's primary recourse is, in principle, to have the contract performed by 
the latter. In other words, the effect of the contract of sale under the latter system is to 
constrain the seller to perform what he has undertaken; if he refuses to do so 
voluntarily, the law, in principle, provides the means by which he is compelled to do 
so. The means provided by the law for the performance of the contract may be direct 
or indirect." 
In the case of the sale of a specified item of property, for example, the court will 
issue an order for specific performance of the delivery obligation. The order is to be 
implemented through the court's officer, the huissier, by directly seizing (saisie- 
revendication) of the property sold.ó3 Where the goods sold have not been ascertained 
by the parties or where the direct enforcement of the contract is not possible for one 
reason or the another, Article 1144 of the French Code provides that the court may 
authorise the buyer to obtain performance at the expense of the seller. In other words, 
in the event of failure by the latter to deliver the goods sold, the buyer may be 
authorised to purchase replacement goods, in which case the seller will be forced to 
make good any expenses which he has incurred in obtaining the replacement goods.' 
It is to be noted that French law distinguishes between obligations de donner (to 
transfer ownership) which concerned a contract of sale of goods and obligations de 
faire ou de ne pas faire (to perform an action or abstain from performing an action). 
Article 1144 of the French Code is concerned only with the cases of an obligor's 
failure to perform his obligation de faire (to do) by providing that the obligee may, in 
such circumstances, be authorised "to perform the obligation himself at the expense 
of the obligor." And the court may require "the obligor to advance the sums needed 
for this performance." On this basis, one may argue that the provisions of this article 
61 See pp. 31 -32, ante. 
6' For this reason, the term, which is mostly referred to in French legal writing, is exécution en nature 
(performance in kind) rather than exécution forcée (enforced performance), the latter being only one 
aspect of the former. See B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit. supra., note 1, p. 211. 
63 Ibid., p. 217. 
64 See B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit. supra., note 1, p. 217. 
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do not apply to the case of sale of goods which relate to the obligation de donner. 
This argument, nonetheless, is not entirely correct, since in the case of sale of a thing 
of general character unascertained, the seller's obligation involves with element of 
faire. Therefore, in the event of the seller's failure to deliver the goods provided in 
the contract, the buyer may ask the court to authorise him to buy in the goods at the 
seller's expense. Even in the instances of the sale of an ascertained article, the seller's 
duty in delivering the article sold is strictly an obligation of faire. Accordingly, the 
buyer is entitled to rely on the provisions of Article 1144 of the French Code and 
demand the court to authorise him to buy replacement goods at the expense of the 
seller where the latter refuses to deliver. This remedy is identical with the cover 
remedy under US law' and though widely used, it has the disadvantage of requiring 
the buyer to provide the capital for purchasing the replacement goods before he could 
be reimbursed by the seller. Nevertheless, unlike the position under US law, it is 
possible for the buyer under French law to obtain an immediate advance, through a 
référé66 application6', an emergency procedure which does not prejudice the 
eventual resolution of the issue. 
Clearly, authorising the buyer to purchase replacement goods at the expense of 
the seller's `surrogate performance' in such cases is an example of exécution en 
nature (performance in kind) rather than exécution forcée (enforced performance). 
Unlike the position under US law, this remedy under the French system, as pointed 
out earlier, involves judicial authorisation, that is the buyer must first obtain the 
court's order allowing him to purchase replacement goods from a third party except 
in cases governed by a commercial custom where a notice (mise en demeure) to the 
seller is sufficient and, generally, in the cases of extreme urgency.ó8 It is only in the 
latter instances in which the buyer may, without acquiring the court's prior order, 
65 See pp. 65 -68, ante. 
66 An emergency procedure which does not prejudice the external resolution of the issue. 
67 Where in the case of non -performance of the contract in delivering of the goods, the buyer applies 
for this judicial procedure, the judge des référés, a single judge, may appoint experts to determine the 
sums needed for purchasing of a replacement property, ordering the seller in default to advance the 
required sums. The procedure by voie de référé (interlocutory proceedings) has, however, no effect 
on the final decision of the court. 
68 See B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit. supra., note 1, p. 217 
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enforce the performance of the contract by purchasing a replacement property at the 
expense of the seller. Judicial control may intervene only ex post, in the event of an 
improper exploitation of the right.69 
It is to be noted that the enforcement powers of the French judge are incomplete, 
in the sense that he does not have at his disposal a direct sanction. This is because, 
unlike the English legal system, there is no machinery of imprisonment for contempt 
of court70 to make its order for performance of the contract effective. The device of 
astreinte, however, has largely filled this gap." An astreinte can be described as a 
judgement for a sum of money pronounced by the court with a view to overcoming 
the resistance of a recalcitrant debtor and causing him to execute the court decree. In 
other words, an astreinte is a means of putting economic pressure on the defaulting 
seller to deliver the goods in accordance with the contractual terms. Normally, the 
court orders the payment of a specified sum of money for each day during which the 
seller is in breach of his obligation to fulfil the contract by delivering of the goods 
sold. The sum so specified may be fixed either definitively (an astreinte définitive) 
or provisionally (an astreinte provisoire). In the former case, the court will not alter 
the amount of the astreinte, but in the latter the court reserves to itself the power to 
review the amount, having regard to the seller's conduct in resisting or opposing the 
implementing of the obligation under the contract in delivering of the goods. In 
neither case, however, is the astreinte intended simply to repair the damage likely to 
be suffered, or suffered, by the buyer for non -delivery of the goods. The buyer has a 
right to claim moratory damages for the prejudice he suffers independently of the 
award of an astreinte. The astreinte itself is not measured by loss which has been or 
may be caused by the buyer by reason of delay in delivering the goods and may be 
imposed though there is no such loss.'' 
69 Substitution is sometimes regarded as a form of unilateral automatic recession: P. Letourneau, La 
Responsabilité Civil (3rd ed., 1982), no. 1762. 
70 The law for imprisonment of a debtor for civil purposes was abolished in 1867. 
71 See Nicole Catala, ' Astreintes in French Law' Juridical Review (1959), p. 163 and Juridical Review 
(1961), p. 53. 
72 See Civ. 20.10.59, D. 1959.531. In this case, the court expressly stated that a provisional astreinte 
was "essentially no more than a means of conquering resistance offered to the execution of a decree, 
did not have the purpose of compensating damage occasioned by the delay, and was normally 
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Where the seller fails to comply with the court's order at the end of the period 
fixed in the decree, the court may order a new astreinte and so on. Only in the cases 
where there is no means for compelling the seller to perform his obligation under the 
contract may he (i.e., the buyer) avail himself of substitutionary relief in damages. 
Résolution of the contract 
As pointed out earlier, the buyer may resort to the remedy of exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus where he has not paid the price, but where he has made the payment or 
where he wishes to obtain a definitive release from his obligation in the place of 
temporary bar created by the exceptio, he has a further choice of rescission of the 
contract of sale with damages where appropriate. This remedy is based on the 
fundamental principle of the French law of contract that, in the case of reciprocal 
obligations, if one of the parties has fulfilled, or is prepared to fulfil his part and the 
other party has failed or, refuses, to fulfil his part, the contract between them may be 
set aside by the court without prejudice for any claim for damages.73 
According to Article 1184 of the French Code: 
"A resolutive condition is always implied in synallagmatic contracts to provide 
for the case where one of the parties does not fulfil his obligation (ne satisfera 
point à son engagement). 
In this case the contract is not resolved by the operation of the law (de plein 
droit). The party in whose favour the obligation has not been performed has the 
choice either of forcing the other to perform the agreement, where that is 
possible, or of claiming résolution with damages. 
Résolution must be claimed by action at law and further time for performance 
(un délai) may be granted to the defendant depending on the circumstances." 
The remedy of résolution of the contract is largely similar to the common law 
remedy of rescission or avoidance for breach.74 Nevertheless, as can be seen, there 
are two marked differences between these systems. First, unlike the common law, the 
buyer, under the French system, may not simply treat the seller's breach in delivering 
assessed having regard to the gravity recalcitrant debtor's fault and his resources ". See further, 
Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit supra., note 1, pp. 223 -224. 
73 See Pothier, "Law of Obligations ", p. 674. 
74 See pp. 22 -24, ante. 
96 
the goods as discharging the contract, but he must normally apply to the court for an 
order to set aside the sale contract between the parties, except in certain cases where 
the jurisprudence allows termination of the contract without recourse to the court75 
and, of course, where there is an express clause in the contract providing for 
rescission in which case the buyer may avail himself of the clause if he tenders to 
perform his undertaking under the contract.76 Secondly, in contrast with the common 
law, there are no legal criteria for distinguishing those breaches which are 
sufficiently serious to justify the termination of the sale and those which are not. In 
other words, the French law does not clarify when the court may authorise the 
termination of the sale for non -performance of the contract by the seller particularly 
where inexécution is other than total. The matter lies in the pouvoir souverain of the 
trial judge who, depending on the circumstances of each case and by applying the 
principle of good faith," will determine whether to set aside the contract of sale 
between the parties concerned. 
Where the inexécution is total, the court usually grants résolution as of course, 
though it may accord a délai under Article 1184 al 3, particularly if the 
circumstances shows that the buyer is seeking to take advantage of a temporary 
difficulty in order to escape from a bad bargain.78 Where inexécution is not total, the 
trail judge has discretion to assess the gravity of the seller's failure in delivering of 
the goods to the buyer. This assessment is made to determine whether the failure is: 
"of such importance that résolution should be pronounced immediately or 
whether it would be sufficiently made good by a condemnation in damages. "79 
75 For the cases where the buyer may set aside the contract without recoursing to the court's order; see 
pp. 98 -99, post 
76 See, Judgement of a civil chamber of the Court of Cassation 5.5.1920, S. 1921.1.298. cited in Amos 
& Walton's "Introduction to French Law" (3rd. ed., edited by F. H. Lawson, A. E. Anton, and L. N. 
Brown, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 187. 
77 Bad faith and deliberate breach of the sale by the seller are the factors which may influence the 
court in granting rescission of the contract when he has partly delivered the goods sold to the 
purchaser. See Planiol, M. et Ripert, G. Traité pratique de droit civil (14 vols. 2nd ed. Paris 1952 -60), 
6, § 434. 
78 See B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit. supra., note 1, p. 242. 
791bid., p. 243. 
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The assessment of the trial court is based on the consideration of whether the buyer 
would have entered into the contract with the buyer had he foreseen the in éxecution. 
In other words, in making the assessment the court has to ascertain whether the non- 
conformity in the goods delivered could be the cause of the buyer's obligation in 
payment of the price.80 Moreover, the court will consider the economic circumstances 
in which the claim is made and the conduct of the parties, in order to achieve a proper 
balance between the advantages to the buyer and disadvantage to the seller!' Finally, 
an indication of bad faith on the part of the seller in failing to deliver in conformity 
with the contract may justify the court to pronounce the Résolution of the contract, 
even if the extent of the failure is not considerable. On the other hand, the court may 
dismiss an allegation by the buyer for résolution of the sale if he has not acted in 
accordance with the requirement of the good faith under the French law, even if the 
extent of the breach is grave!' The court's discretion, moreover, is not limited merely 
to the question of whether to grant résolution or not, but it may also order partial 
résolution, with modification of the buyer's obligation, thereby in effect setting the 
contract aside on terms. 83 
As mentioned above, in certain circumstances, the jurisprudence allows the 
buyer to terminate his transaction with the seller without acquiring the court's order. 
Accordingly, he may set aside the contract where there is a special relationship of 
trust or confidence between the parties, where there is an urgent need for protection 
of his interest, or where the breach is so destructive of trust as to make continuance 
of the contractual relationship intolerable. In such cases, as in other cases of extra- 
judicial termination, the seller may challenge the right of the buyer to terminate the 
contract unilaterally, and as such, like the common law, where extra-judicial 
termination of a contract is the norm, the matter is ultimately subject to judicial 
control. Accordingly, the buyer acts at his own risk in unilaterally terminating the 
transaction with the seller without referring the case to the court. 
8o Ibid. 




Similarly, as pointed out earlier, the buyer dispenses with the need for recourse 
to the court to acquire an order allowing him to terminate the transaction of sale 
where there is a clause in the contract which expressly provides for termination. For 
such a clause (referred to, as an echo of its Roman origin, a pacte commissoire) is, in 
general, valid. There are, however, obvious objections, not only because of the 
general French hostility to self -help, but also because of specification of the 
circumstances in which termination will take place is left entirely to the parties. 
There is, therefore, scope for abuse by the dominant party and courts have restrained 
such clauses which apply a restrictive interpretation, and, in the absence of an 
express and categorical formulation, they will presume that the parties have not 
intended to exclude the provisions of article 1184 which require the aggrieved buyer 
to recourse to the court whenever he wishes to terminate the contract." Furthermore, 
even where the contractual provision by the parties are sufficiently explicit to exclude 
the need to have recourse to the court, the buyer must give the seller a mise en 
demeure, unless this also is expressly excluded by the parties in the contract. This 
last possibility is clearly open to abuse, but the Cour de cassation has so far declined 
to regulate it, though any such a provision in the contract is subject to the 
requirement of good faith. 
Damages 
General 
Whatever remedy is chosen by the buyer as against the seller he may also claim 
damages for the loss which he has suffered as a result of the seller's non -fulfilment or 
delay in fulfilment of the contract.' In other words, damages may either constitute 
the principal means of substituting for performance, or may complement the other 
remedies, rescission or specific perfolinance. 
84 Cass req 3.5.1937, DH 1937. 364, S 1937.1.371. 
85 French Civil Code, Article 1611. 
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The broad principles of French law and English law in respect of awarding 
damages to an aggrieved party are the same, for in both systems the purpose of the 
award of damages is to compensate (and no more than compensate) the buyer for a 
loss caused by the seller's failure to fulfil his obligation under the sale. French law 
starts from the proposition that compensation should cover all loss (dommage, 
préjudice) resulting from the non- performance,86 but limit this proposition in all 
cases by the requirement that the loss should be the "immediate and direct 
consequence of the non -performance ",87 and, in the case of non -performance which is 
not attributable to dol, by a further requirement that the loss should have been 
foreseeable at the time when the contract was made.88 Furthermore, under French 
law, the buyer should observe the requirement of mise en demeure (notice to 
perform), otherwise he will be awarded no damage as against the seller for non- 
delivery of the goods by the latter.89 
Dommage or préjudice 
In contrast with the other remedies, the buyer is not entitled to a remedy in damage 
unless he can show that because of non -performance of the contract by the seller he 
(the buyer) has suffered a loss. According to Article 1149 of the French Code, in the 
event of non -delivery of the goods, the buyer may claim damages from the seller for 
actual loss (damnum emergens) which he has suffered and for the loss of gain 
(lucrum cessans) which he has been deprived.90 As an example, the buyer may suffer 
positive damage or damnum emergens91 where the price or the expenses of delivery 
86 Ibid., Article 1149. 
87 Ibid., Article 1151. 
88 Ibid., Article 1150. 
89 Ibid., Article 1146. 
90 Ibid., Article 1149. 
9' This category of damages also includes any commercial trouble and inconvenience which causes to 
the buyer following the seller's failure to deliver the goods on due time. See Cass. Corn. lre civ. 3. 1. 
1965, Bull. Civ. 1965.1. n. 10. 
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of the replacement goods is higher than the one provided for in the contract, and 
negative damage or lucrum cessans if he is deprived of a profitable re- sale.' 
Nonetheless, where the seller's failure to implement his obligation in delivering 
the goods is not due to his bad faith, then he is liable for the damages which could 
have been foreseen at the time when the contract was made, for he is taken to have 
held himself liable only for those damages. In other words, where the seller's fault in 
failing to perform his obligation does not amount to dol (and dol includes faute 
lourde or gross negligence) he is liable for such direct damages as was foreseeable to 
the parties at the time when the contract was made. He, therefore, has no liability for 
the losses which the non -fulfilment of the contract has caused to the purchaser and 
which were not foreseen at the time of the making of the contract, and still less for 
the profits which the non -delivery of the goods has deprived him of, if such profits 
were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.93 This restriction 
in contract (dol apart) to foreseeable damage is justified on the ground that the parties 
can reasonably be supposed to have entered into the agreement on the basis of 
foreseeable risks.' 
When the seller's breach to perform his obligation under the contract is 
attributable to his fraud, he is liable for all damages sustained by the purchaser as a 
consequence of the breach, irrespective of whether or not they could have been 
foreseen by the parties when they made the contract. In as much as the fraud of the 
person which causes prejudice to another, obliges him, sive vellet, sive nolit, to make 
good the prejudice, it is not necessary that the person, who has committed the fraud, 
should have agreed to pay damages caused by his fraud, nor consequently, that the 
damages should have been foreseen by the parties at the time of the contract.' 
92 Cass. corn. 1er juin 1959, J.C.P. 1959, II.11206. 
93 French Civil Code, Article 1150. 
ea See B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit. supra., note 1, p. 229; H, L and J Mazeaud, 
Leçons de droit civil (Berton ed. 1967), s. 629. 
95 See Pothier, "Law of Obligations" § 166. 
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In the event of the seller's fraud, however, he is only liable for the damages of 
which the non -delivery of the goods was the proximate and immediate cause of, and 
not for those which the non -delivery was only the remote and indirect cause of.96 
Conclusion: an assessment of French law 
From the examination of the French system with respect of the seller's duty to 
deliver it will be apparent that the provisions of this system are very similar with 
those of the English system with regard to the expenses of delivery,97 the place of 
delivery,98 and the modes of delivery' of the goods sold, and as such they are subject 
to the same criticisms to those of the latter system. 
Concerning the time of delivery, both French and English law allow the parties 
to agree freely on the time when the goods are to be delivered.10° Despite this 
resemblance between the two systems, they proceed almost opposite directions to 
each other in treating of the issue of the time of delivery. The main criticism to the 
French system concerning the time of delivery is that, unlike the position under other 
legal systems under considerations, the seller's delay in delivering the goods is not in 
itself sufficient to entitle the buyer to sue the seller for breach of the contract unless 
he serves a formal notice to the seller requiring him to deliver the goods. Although 
this approach might be justifiable in a local sale as it may serve the parties to 
maintain the contract between themselves where the seller have mistakenly delayed 
to deliver, it seems there is no such a logic in an international sale where the parties 
cannot easily have an access to each other. This problem along with the fact that an 
aggrieved buyer may not invoke any remedies without referring the case to a court 
highlights the gravity of the confusions and difficulties which the buyer may have to 
face in dealing with the issue of delay in delivery in an international sale under 
96 French Civil Code, Article 1151; See further B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit supra., 
note 1, p. 229. 
97 See pp. 6, 83, ante. 
98 See pp. 11 -12, 83 -85, ante. 
99 See pp. 6 -11, 81 -83, ante. 
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French law. The parties' failure to provide a date for delivery may cause a similar 
problem to the buyer under French law. In contrast with provisions of English law 
under which the seller in such cases is to deliver within a reasonable time, under the 
French system he has no liability with respect of the duty of delivery before receiving 
a notice from the buyer demanding him to deliver the goods within a period of time 
set in the notice. The requirement to send a notice to the seller raises further problem 
as to the manner and the time of the sending and receiving of the notice by the parties 
concerned. 
Further criticism with respect of the French law relates to the provisions dealing 
with the issue of the excess in quantity of the goods delivered, as there is no 
reasonable ground to allow the buyer to reject the whole goods and to sue the seller 
for the breach while he may accept those amount of the goods provided in the 
contract and to deal with the excess as the property of the seller. 
Despite the above criticism, the French systems benefits from some positive 
features particularly with respect of the remedies available to the aggrieved buyer 
which can be considered as advantageous over the Anglo -US systems. One of these 
features related to the principle of good faith which prevents the seller from acting 
fraudulently or hiding any non -conformity in the goods from the buyer when the 
contract is made. In contrast with the position under the Anglo -US systems, under 
French law the seller who fails to comply with this rule is rightly liable for both 
incidental and consequential damages arising from the breach even if the seller could 
not reasonably foresee these damages when he made the contract with the buyer. 
Unlike the position under the two former systems, any contractual clause by which 
the seller attempts to exclude his liability with this respect will be held null and void. 
These provisions together with the principle of spondet artis pertiam10' under which 
a merchant or artisan is presumed to know of any defects in the things he sells 
indicate that the extent of the buyer's protection under French law is considerably 
wider than those of the Anglo -US law. 
'°° See pp. 12 -17, 85 -88, ante. 
101 See pp. 266, 272, 275, post. 
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These provisions along with the fact that specific perfoimance of the contract 
under the French system is the prime remedy of an aggrieved party and that, unlike 
the Anglo -US systems, he has no duty to mitigate the damages caused by the breach 
indicate that the seller may rarely be tempted to breach the contract hoping to resell 
the goods to a third with a higher price or to use them in a more beneficial manner. 
This is because, the seller who intentionally refuses to deliver is in breach of the 
principle of good faith and as such, as pointed out above, is liable for both incidental 
and consequential damages caused by the breach to the buyer. 
In summary, it seems that the remedial provisions under French law have been 
well articulated to maintain the contract and the balance of the parties in the contract. 
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Chapter 4 
The Seller's Duty to Deliver the Goods under Iranian Law 
Introduction 
According to the Iranian Civil law', the seller by entering into a valid contract of sale 
undertakes to deliver the goods to the buyer. In fact, this obligation as an ultimate 
goal of the sale cannot be negated by the parties concerned, for, despite having 
sovereign power in choosing of the terms of their contract under the principle of 
freedom of contract', any agreement by the parties to negate the seller's duty to 
deliver the goods would be inconsistent with the provisions of Article 233(1)3 of the 
Iranian Civil Code and consequently, would annul the contract between them. 
Article 367 of the Iranian Civil Code defines delivery as placing of the thing 
sold "at the disposal of the purchaser so as to grant him an absolute control of it and 
so he can benefit from it in any way he likes." According to this Article, taking 
delivery is effected when the purchaser assumes control of the object of the sale. 
Consequently, as in other legal systems under consideration,' delivery under Iranian 
law may take place without transfer of physical possession of the goods to the buyer, 
provided that they are placed at his sole disposal so as to cause him to have them as 
owner.' For example, where the goods are stocked in the seller's store, the delivery 
takes place by giving the store's key to the buyer. But such a delivery is not valid 
where the seller gives a copy of the key to another person. 
' Iranian Civil Code, Article 362(3). It is to be noted that the Iranian Civil Code's Articles referred to 
in this thesis have been translated mainly by the author himself from the Persian language manuscript. 
Nonetheless, there are occasional instances where the translations of both Professor S. H. Amin, The 
Civil Code of Iran, and M. A. R. Taleghany, The Civil Code of Iran (1995) were used by the author. 
Iranian Civil Code, Article 10. 
3 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 362. 
4 As to the provisions of delivery under French law, for example, see pp. 81 -83, ante. 
5 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 368. 
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As in French law,6 in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary by the parties 
concerned, the duty to deliver under the Iranian legal system requires the seller to 
deliver the accessories which customarily attach to the goods sold and all things 
which are associated with their permanent use, even if there has been no stipulation 
in the contract to this effect and even if the parties were not aware of the common 
usage at the time of the contract.' The requirement includes all legal documents 
concerning the object of the sale, which are necessary for its administration without 
which the free use of the object by the purchaser would be scaled down or would 
even disappear. As an example, the seller of a vehicle is bound to deliver the 
registration documents which are considered as an indispensable accessory of the 
vehicle, without which the buyer would be prevented from the proper use of the 
vehicle as intended by the parties at the time of the sale. In other words, the seller's 
failure to deliver all or some of the documents concerning the article sold would 
entitle the buyer to have recourse to one of the remedies provided by the Code for 
non -performance of the contract by the former. 
According to Article 369 of the Civil Code: 
"Delivery, depending on the different nature of the goods sold, may take place 
in various ways. It must be done in a way to be accepted as valid according to 
common usage." 
In other words, like the English and the French legal systems, delivery can be 
performed by any voluntary act of the seller which puts the object of the sale into the 
possession of the purchaser or enable him (the purchaser) to obtain their possession. 
The term includes constructive or symbolical delivery. 
Modes of delivery 
6 See pp. 80 -81, ante. 
' See Iranian Civil Code, Articles 356. According to Article 383 of the Code: 
"The delivery by the seller should contain all elements which are the parts and 
appurtenances of the thing sold." 
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The parties are free to agree on the mode of the delivery in their contract. The seller 
may fulfil his duty of delivery undertaken under the contract of sale by physical 
transference or movement of the goods sold. Furthermore, the seller is regarded to 
have sufficiently performed his obligation in delivering of the goods vis -à -vis the 
buyer where he gives the latter due facilities for their removal, and he need not to 
take them to the buyer. For example, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary 
by the parties, the seller of specified logs of timber who provides the buyer an access 
to the place where the timber is to be cut down, is considered to have fulfilled the 
duty of delivery. Similarly, the transfer of a bill of lading for goods on board a ship 
to the purchaser may well be regarded as equivalent to delivery. 
Where the goods are in possession of the buyer before being purchased by him, 
their delivery under the contract of sale will be effected by the mere intention of the 
parties pronounced by them at the time of the sale. Accordingly, where a person 
purchases an article which he holds for the seller, delivery would take place upon 
making of the contract by the parties and the law does not require the seller to deliver 
fresh physical possession to the buyer.' This is because, in contrast to the position in 
other legal systems under consideration, Article 374 of the Civil Code' allows the 
buyer to take the goods in his possession after entering into a contract of sale with the 
seller without being authorised by the latter to do so in which case delivery takes 
place as soon as the goods come in the buyer's possession. Of course these 
provisions apply only to the cases where the goods sold are specified otherwise 
where goods of a general nature are sold the buyer cannot take them into his 
possession before they are appropriated to the contract by the seller. 
Where the goods are being detained by a person who is the agent of the seller, 
then the delivery will take place upon the receiving of the latter's instructions by the 
agent to hold them for the buyer. As in the law of South Africa, delivery under the 
Iranian system may also be effected by mutual change of the parties' intentions 
where they agree that the seller will retain the possession of the goods sold as the 
buyer's agent or as their borrower from him. Similarly, depending on the nature of 
s See Iranian Civil Code, Article 373. 
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the transaction between the parties and its surrounding circumstances, the marks set 
by the buyer on the goods may be regarded as delivery of the goods by the seller. 
Accordingly, for example, where logs of timber or live sheep are objects of the sale, 
the setting of marks on them by the buyer may be taken as being equivalent to 
delivery to him. 
Unlike English and French law, under which the seller is regarded as having 
performed the sale by delivering of the goods to a carrier for transmission to the 
buyer, there is no express provision in the Iranian Civil Code to this effect. 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that the same rule is applicable under Iranian law. 
Firstly, since most of the modern systems have this rule either expressly by providing 
in their respective Acts or by the way of common usage, and there is no reason why 
an Iranian court should not apply the same rule particularly when the sale involves 
carriage of goods from, or to, a foreign country. Secondly, the Iranian Civil Code, is 
basically derived from French and Belgian law, with trivial changes, is made 
compatible with Islamic law. Since both the French and Belgian systems consider the 
delivery to the carrier as tantamount to delivery to the purchaser and as this rule is 
not inconsistent with Islamic principles, it is possible to say that the rule is also 
applicable under Iranian law, despite the fact that it has not been expressly provided 
in the Civil Code. In other words, the law regards the carrier as the buyer's agent 
who receives the goods for transmission to the buyer. However, this rule, as in other 
legal systems, should not relieve the seller from liability for performing the contract 
where he carries the goods or where the carrier is his agent. Similarly, the law should 
not consider the seller to have performed the contract by delivering the goods to the 
carrier where the former has undertaken to deliver the goods safely at the destination. 
In such instances, the goods are presumably delivered to the carrier in accordance 
with the terms of the sale and he holds the goods simply for transmission to the 
purchaser. 
Where the goods are to be transported by sea and the carrier issues a bill of 
lading to the seller, he becomes the depositary to the seller for delivery the goods to 
9 For the full provisions of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
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such person as may be indicated by that bill of lading. In fact, in such instances, the 
seller, as the shipper of the goods, may retain a jus disponendi over the goods. 
Obviously, the vesting of such a power in the seller over the object of the sale is 
inconsistent with the foresaid rule that regards the delivery to the carrier as being 
equivalent to delivery to the purchaser. 
Expenses of delivery 
The provisions concerning the expenses which are to be met for delivery of the goods 
to the buyer under Iranian law correspond with those of English and the French 
systems.' These provisions require the seller to do at his own expense what is 
necessary to put the goods in a deliverable state and thereby to effect the duty of 
delivery undertaken under the contract of sale, unless the parties, under the principle 
of freedom of contract, agree that the buyer must bear some or all of the expenses 
mentioned above. Consequently, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in 
the contract, it is the liability of the seller to attend to such matters as the 
appropriation of the goods to the contract in accordance with the contractual quality 
and description where the object of the sale is unascertained goods, getting 
permission from the authorities for their export, and/or measuring them where it is 
necessary, and the expense thereby incurred. 
Place of delivery 
As in the French and English legal systems, the parties under the Iranian law are free 
to choose either expressly or by implication the place of delivery in their contract. In 
the absence of any stipulation as to the place of delivery in the contract, then the 
seller must deliver the goods at the place where a customary usage indicates if there 
is such a customary usage with regard to the place of delivery of the goods sold. 
10 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 381. As to the provisions of English and French law, see pp. 6, 83, 
ante. 
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However, in contrast with the two former systems," if the parties fail to stipulate the 
place where delivery is to take place and if there is no customary usage as to the 
place of delivery, then, under Article 375 of the Iranian Civil Code, the duty of 
delivery must be effected at the place where the contract was made, irrespective of 
whether the goods sold are specific or unascertained.'' In comparison with English 
and French law, it appears that the provisions concerning the place of delivery under 
Article 375 of the Iranian Civil Code have attraction of simplicity. Since, unlike both 
of these systems, Article 375 does not differentiate between specific and 
unascertained goods in so far as the place of delivery is concerned and it might be 
consider easier for a trader to understand and act upon. Moreover, under Article 375 
of the Iranian Code, the purchaser will not be faced such a problem as the one arising 
from the provisions of section 29(2) of the Act 197913 with regard to the place of 
delivery of unascertained goods by the seller where the latter has more than one place 
of business which are possibly situated in different countries. Nonetheless, it seem 
inappropriate to follow the rule under Article 375 of the Iranian Code in an 
international sale particularly where the goods sold are specific. 
Time of delivery under the Iranian law 
Concerning the time of delivery, Article 341 of the Iranian Civil Code,' like both 
English and French law, permits the parties concerned to anticipate in their contract 
the time for effecting delivery of the goods by the seller. Accordingly, where the 
contract requires the seller to deliver the goods before a fixed date, or within a 
stipulated period, he may perform the duty of delivery undertaken under the contract 
at any time before the fixed date or before the expiring of the period which has been 
" As pointed out earlier the delivery under both of these systems is to be effected at the place where 
the article sold was at the time of the contract. See French Civil Code, Article 1609. With regard to 
English law, see the Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 29(2). 
12 For the full provisions of Article 375 of the Iranian Civil Code, see Appendix IV. 
13 The provisions of section 29(2) of the Act 1979 correspond with those of Articles 1609 and 1247(3) 
of the French Civil Code. For the problems concerning the place of delivery under these provisions, 
see pp. 11 -12, ante. 
14 For the full text of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
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provided in the contract. Nonetheless, where the parties agree on a specific date for 
delivery of the article sold, a question arises as to whether the seller can deliver the 
goods before the due date? To answer to this question, it is important to point out 
that, under Iranian law, the property in the goods passes to the buyer at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract of sale and afterwards the seller keeps the goods as a 
depositor for the buyer until the time of delivery. In accordance with the depository 
rule, on the one hand, the seller is entitled to recover from the buyer all the expenses 
which he has encurred for the keeping of the article sold, and, on the other hand, he is 
liable to deliver it to the buyer as its owner. Setting a time for delivery of the goods 
normally provides the seller with an opportunity to perform his duty undertaken 
under the contract, and, accordingly, it is an advantage given to him by the contract. 
Therefore, it could be said that, unlike the position in some other systems, such as 
English law,' the seller, under Iranian law, is not in breach of the sale where he 
delivers the article sold before the time set by the parties for delivery falls due, since, 
in fact, by delivering the goods before the time for delivery, he waives the aforegoing 
advantages granted to him under the contract. This rule will, of course, not apply 
where the buyer can show that he may also benefit from the time set in the contract 
for delivering of the goods or where there is a stipulation in the contract which 
prevents the seller from effecting delivery before the time of delivery. On the other 
hand, it must be observed that although the seller may in a normal case deliver the 
goods before the time of delivery provided in the contract, it does not grant the buyer 
a right to demand early delivery from the seller. 
In contrast with French law,16 neither Iranian nor English law requires the buyer 
to send a notice to the seller asking him to deliver the goods within the time 
stipulated in the contract. This means that under the latter two systems, a mere 
failure by the seller to deliver the goods on the time for delivery is sufficient to 
render him liable vis -à -vis the buyer for breach of the contract. Nevertheless, in 
accordance with Article 226 of the Code, where under the contract the delivery of the 
goods is to be made upon the buyer's demand, then he has no right to claim damages 
15 As to the position in English law, see for example, Bowes v. Shand, (1877) 2 App. Cas. 455. 
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from the seller for delay in performing of the duty of delivery, unless he can show 
that the latter has failed to deliver the goods at the time fixed by him (by the buyer) 
in conformity with the contractual terms.' 
English law,18 the Iranian Civil Code contains no specific provision 
concerning the time when the goods are to be delivered by the seller in those cases 
where the parties also fail to agree on the time of delivery; nonetheless following 
Article 344 of the Iranian Civil Code, it could be deduced that in such instances the 
seller is bound to deliver the goods immediately after the conclusion of the sale. This 
is because, in accordance with the provisions of Article 344, the buyer must pay the 
price at once upon entering into the contract with the seller if the contract contains no 
stipulation as to the time of payment. And since, according to Article 377 of the 
Code, delivery of the goods sold and payment of their price are concurrent, the seller 
must deliver the goods immediately when the sale is made. Nevertheless, it would 
seem that these provisions (i.e., that the seller is bound to deliver the goods at once 
after making the sale where there is no stipulation as to the time of delivery in the 
contract) correspond with those of English law which require the seller, in such 
instances, to deliver the goods at a reasonable time after the parties entered into the 
contract since, there is no justification to force the seller to effect the duty of delivery 
within a shorter period than the one which, depending the type of the goods sold and 
its surrounding circumstances, is reasonably necessary for the fulfilment of this duty. 
The same principle seems to be applicable where the parties stipulate for delivery of 
the goods upon their production, i.e., the delivery is to take place within a reasonable 
time after the goods are produced. Similarly, where the parties agree the delivery to 
take place upon performance of some act by the purchaser, the seller would be in 
default only if he fails to deliver the goods within a reasonable time after completion 
of the stipulated act by the former. 
16 See pp. 102 -103, ante. 
" For the full text of Article 226 of the Iranian Civil Code, see Appendix IV. 
See also N. Katoozian, Moghadameie Hoghooghe Madani "Introduction to Civil Law" (Tehran 3rd 
ed. 1995) at pp. 272-273. 
18 See pp. 15 -16, ante. 
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The fact that under the Iranian Code, delivery of the goods and payment of the 
price are concurrent conditions in a contract of sale, allows the seller to refuse to 
fulfil his duty in delivering the goods to the buyer where the latter fails to tender the 
price to him, unless there is a stipulation in the contract which permits the payment to 
be made at a latter date. Under this principle, where a single contract which requires 
multiple delivery is subject to payment of the price against a delivery which already 
has been made, the seller would not be liable for the delay in delivering of 
subsequent deliveries if he has not been paid for the preceding delivery. Nonetheless, 
although the Iranian law does not expressly provide as to whether or not non- 
payment of the price for one delivery justifies the seller in refusing to make 
subsequent deliveries to the buyer where the parties do not regard all deliveries to be 
inter -related, it could be induced, from Article 282 of the Civil Code,19 that, as in the 
French system, in such instances, the subsequent deliveries could not be delayed, 
provided that the buyer complies with the aforegoing principle in rendering of the 
price with regard to the subsequent deliveries. For in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 282, the buyer may decide that his payment to the seller is in consideration 
of the subsequent deliveries rather than the one delivered before. 
Furthermore, under Article 378 of the Iranian Code,'-° the seller who voluntarily 
delivers the article sold before receiving the price, may not reclaim it from the buyer, 
unless he provides that the latter has gone bankrupt and that he has retained the goods 
so delivered," or by cancellation of the transaction with the buyer when he is vested 
with such an option to do so. 
In the event of the sale of a specified article, if the seller is unable to deliver or if 
despite his ability to deliver, he refuses to do so, then Article 374 of the Civil Code" 
allows the purchaser himself to take the article into his possession at the expenses of 
19 For the full text of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
2° For the full text of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
21 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 380. 
22 This Article provides: 
"For taking possession of the goods, no authorisation is necessary. The buyer 
can take possession of the goods purchased without any authorisation." [Italics 
added]. 
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the seller, provided that he tenders payment of the price in conformity with the 
contractual terms. This would discharge the seller from the duty of delivery 
undertaken under the contract even though he has not given the buyer his 
authorisation for taking the possession of the goods. 
The seller's duty to deliver the right quantity and the right to cure the defect in 
delivery 
As in the other modern- legal systems, the seller under the Iranian law is required to 
deliver the contractually agreed quantity. Article 384'3 of the Iranian Code allows the 
purchaser to cancel the sale if the quantity of the goods delivered is less than the 
agreed amount but if he chooses to accept the goods so delivered he must pay for 
them at the contract rate. The main difference between Iranian law and English law 
in respect of the above instances is that while under the former system the purchaser 
is permitted to cancel the deal with the seller for any shortfall in the quantity of the 
goods delivered, the latter system, by section 30(2A) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
prevents him from rejecting the goods if the shortfall in the quantity is trivial. 
Obviously, the seller under the former approach would have to think twice before 
fixing the quantity of the goods for sale, since in the case of cancelling the sale for a 
shortfall in the quantity of the goods sold he would be liable as against the buyer for 
refunding of the purchase price as well as any costs of the contract and reasonable 
expenses incurred by the latter.'4 This would inevitably reduce litigation between the 
parties to a commercial contract through creating certainty among them. The danger 
under this approach is that the buyer may opt to misuse this rule as an excuse to 
cancel the whole transaction between the parties for a trivial shortfall in the quantity 
of the goods delivered, particularly, when the market price of the goods is falling 
and, therefore, he would like to escape from the bargain with the seller. Nonetheless, 
such a possibility is remote, since the courts have to consider any customary usage 
with respect to each case before applying the aforesaid rule in which they would 
23 
For the full text of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
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noll ually prevent the purchaser from cancelling the sale where the shortfall in 
quantity of the goods is trivial. It seems, however, that the provisions of the English 
law concerning the cases where the shortfall in the quantity of the goods delivered is 
trivial are to be preferred over those of the Iranian law, since there is little or no 
justification in permitting the purchaser to cancel his transaction with the seller for an 
insignificant shortfall in the goods delivered, particularly, in the instances where the 
market price of them are falling. Such an approach is not only consistent with the 
Islamic principle of lozoom é egraié gharardàdha (the necessity of the performance 
of the contracts) but also justly prevents the seller from having to sustain the 
expenses of returning the goods delivered. 
The other important difference between these two systems is that in contrast with 
English law, under which rejection of the goods by the purchaser for the breach of 
the obligation in delivering of no less than the contractually agreed quantity is treated 
as the seller's failure to deliver the goods sold, the cancellation of the sale by the 
buyer for the shortfall in quantity of the goods, under the Iranian law, does not have 
retroactive effect. In other words, under the latter system, the purchaser is considered 
as the owner of the goods upon making of the contract by the parties, and therefore, 
on the one hand, he is entitled to any fruit or profit which has been accrued to the 
goods within the period of making of the contract and its cancellation by him, and, 
on the other hand, he is liable to refund any expenses which the seller has sustained 
for their maintenance in that period. 
Whether or not the seller can cure the defect in delivery by an additional delivery 
where the goods delivered are less than the amount which was stipulated in the 
contract particularly, if the time for delivery is not expired, is a question which has 
not been addressed by the legislators of the Iranian Civil Code. It seems that there is 
no justification for precluding the seller from completing the duty of delivery vis -à- 
vis the buyer undertaken under the contract by delivering the missing part at a later 
stage, even if the contractual time for delivery of the goods has passed provided that 
it does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience. Nonetheless, it is worth 
24 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 386. 
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observing that this doctrine cannot be applied to the cases where, because of the 
shortfall in the quantity of the goods, the purchaser has cancelled the deal, since after 
the cancellation, the transaction between the parties is considered to be dead. There 
is, however, a question as to whether cancellation of the transaction for the shortfall 
in quantity is valid before the expiration of the time for delivery under the contract. It 
may be argued that the answer to this question is negative since, unlike some other 
options, such as the Option of Defect which under Article 435 of the Civil Code the 
buyer must exercise the option by cancelling the contract immediately after 
discovering of the defects in the goods, there is no similar provisions to require the 
buyer to cancel the contract between the parties immediately when he discovers that 
the quantity of the goods delivered is less than the amount agreed by the parties and 
therefore, he cannot cancel the deal before the time of delivery is passed. But this 
argument is not sound for, lack of a provision to require the buyer to cancel the deal 
immediately after it become known to him that the quantity of the goods delivered is 
less than the contractual amount fixed by the parties, does not mean that he is not 
entitled to cancel the transaction with the seller at anytime after discovering of the 
shortfall in quantity of the goods delivered to him. Moreover, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 435, the buyer will lose his option to cancel the sale for the 
defect in the goods if he fails to comply with the requirement in exercising the option 
at once, while lack of similar provisions in respect of a shortfall in quantity allows 
the buyer to cancel the transaction irrespective whether the time for delivery has been 
passed or not. It is submitted, however, that depriving the seller of the right to cure a 
defect in delivery by handing over the difference in quantity between the amount of 
the goods which has been actually delivered and the amount which was fixed by the 
parties in the contract, is unjust and favours the buyer. In other words, the law should 
be amended so as to prevent the buyer cancelling the sale for the shortage in quantity 
of the goods delivered before the expiration of the time of delivery in the contract, 
thereby to allowing the seller to cure the defect by delivering of the shortfall in 
quantity at any time between the time of defective delivery and the contractual time 
for delivery. 
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In contrast with English law, (under which in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary by the parties, the seller is precluded by section 31(1) of the Act 1979'5 from 
delivering the goods in more than one load, where the buyer chooses not to accept 
the goods so delivered), the Iranian Civil Code does not states whether the buyer may 
reject the goods delivered by instalments where there is no stipulation in the contract 
to allow the seller to deliver the goods by instalments within the period fixed in the 
contract. Nonetheless, according to the general provisions applicable to every 
contract under Article 277 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"The obligor cannot force the obligee to accept only a proportion of the object 
of obligation undertaken under the contract, but the court may depending on the 
financial status of the obligee, grant a period of grace or arrange for delivery by 
instalment." 
It appears, at the first glance, that the provisions of this Article prevent the seller 
from delivering the goods by instalments, but such an interpretation of Article 277 is 
improper. In fact, this Article empowers the court to order the seller to cure the defect 
in delivery by granting him a period of grace to deliver the shortfall in the amount of 
the goods at a later stage or by instructing him to deliver the shortfall by instalment. 
Accordingly, as pointed out in the previous paragraph, there is no reasonable ground 
to prevent the seller from delivering of the goods in more than one load in so far as 
delivery takes place before the expiration of the period for delivery stipulated in the 
contract. This means that the seller, under the Iranian legal system, would not be held 
liable for breach of the contractual duty to deliver the goods sold to the buyer where 
he delivers the shortfall in the quantity at later stages before the expiration of the 
period set out by the parties for delivery, even if the buyer declines to accept the 
goods so delivered. Even when the time for delivery of the goods has passed, the 
court may, depending on the surrounding circumstances of each case, still decide to 
allow the seller to deliver the goods by instalment within an additional specified 
period, in which case the buyer is bound to accept the goods so delivered 
25 
For the full text of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
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Excess in quantity of the goods delivered 
Where the amount of the goods delivered is larger than the agreed quantity under the 
contract, then, under the last part of Article 384 of the Iranian Code, the buyer is 
required to accept that part which should have been delivered to him and the excess 
belongs to the seller. In other words, as pointed out earlier elsewhere, unlike other 
legal systems under consideration,'6 in such instances, the Iranian system rightly does 
not grant the purchaser an option to cancel the deal with the seller or to accept the 
whole goods delivered, to him and to pay an additional price for the excess in 
quantity at the contract rate.'' For it seems irrational to impose on the seller liability 
for breaching of the duty to deliver undertaken under the contract merely because the 
amount of the goods delivered is larger than what was agreed in the contract by the 
parties concerned. On the other hand, there is no justification why the buyer should 
be forced either to accept all the goods delivered by the seller and to pay an 
additional price for the excess in the quantity or disavow the contract with the latter 
as required by French law,' in those cases, for example, where he (the buyer) can 
afford to pay only for the same quantity of the goods as provided in the contract or 
where it is no use to him to have a quantity of goods larger than that which he has 
contracted to purchase.'9 
Of course the arguments considered above apply only to the cases where the 
excess in the quantity can be separated safely from what was contracted to be sod 
without causing any damage to the goods delivered. Otherwise, if the article sold is 
one that cannot be divided without inflicting damage to it, such as a rug or a carpet, 
and at the time of delivery it transpires that it is smaller or larger in size than what 
was agreed by the parties in the contract, then, according to Article 385 of the Iranian 
26 As to the provisions of US law in this respect, for example, see pp. 51 -52, ante. 
27 Of course, the purchaser may enter into a new agreement with the seller to accept the excessive part 
of the goods delivered to him in which case he has to furnish the latter with an additional price in 
conformity with the terms of the new agreement. 
28 See French Civil Code, Article 1619. 
29 
This problem in Britain has been obviated by section 30(2) of the 1979 Act under which where the 
seller delivers a quantity of goods larger than he contracted to sell, the buyer may choose to accept the 
goods included in the contract and reject the rest. 
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Code, the buyer in the former case and the seller in the latter one may cancel the 
transaction between the parties. It could be argued that in such instances the main 
purpose of the parties in dealing with each other is the sale of an identified article 
with a fixed size in consideration of the specified price, therefore, if the buyer on 
delivery discovers that the article is shorter than the contractual size, he is given an 
option to cancel the sale as he should not be forced to pay the contractual price in the 
event of a shortage in the size of the article delivered. Nonetheless, where the 
purchaser chooses to accept the article so delivered he must pay the price specified 
by the contract. On the other hand, if in such instances the article, at the time of 
delivery, is found to be larger than the size provided in the contract, then the law 
allows the seller rather than the buyer to cancel the transaction between the parties 
and to recover from the buyer the article so delivered. Perhaps the provisions in 
granting an option to the seller for cancelling of the deal with the buyer are based on 
the assumption that the seller is the only party who may suffer from the deal as the 
price provided by the contract is mostly unsatisfactory as against the article delivered 
if it is discovered to be larger than the size fixed by the parties. Such an assumption, 
however, is not always correct and there are many instances in which the deal may 
cause more damage to the purchaser than to the seller where the article delivered is 
larger than the contractual size. As an example, suppose that a buyer enters into a 
contract to purchasel000 hand knitted Kashan rugs to be used by his customers in 
newly built flats with specified sizes. Suppose further that at the time of delivery, the 
rugs are found to be larger than the sizes fixed in the contract in which case the 
customers would surely decline to accept them from the buyer as they are not 
suitable to be used in the aforesaid flats. This means that the purchaser in such 
instances would, illogically, have to face heavy losses if the seller prefers not to 
cancel the sale. On the contrary, in those instances where the seller rather than the 
buyer suffers a loss as a result of delivery of the article which is larger in size than 
what was contracted to sell, he may rely on the Article 416 to cancel the transaction 
with the buyer if there is evidence to demonstrate that the contractual price of the 
article delivered is incommensurate with its market price at the time of the 
transaction. Therefore, the provision of Article 385 of the Code in granting of an 
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option to the seller to cancel the deal between the parties where the article delivered 
is larger than what was fixed in the contract is surplus if the purpose of its enactment 
has been to protect the seller from enduring a loss in the foregoing instances for this 
purpose can also be achieved through Article 416. If the seller does not endure any 
loss as a result of delivering an article which is larger in size than what he has 
contracted to sell, the discretionary option under Article 385 enabling him to cancel 
the sale at his will would be unreasonable, particularly since he is the most 
blameworthy person in failing to provide the exact size of the article at the time of 
the sale.30 It seems, therefore, appropriate to amend the law by repealing the seller's 
option to cancel the sale under Article 385 and replacing it with an option to the 
purchaser so as to enable the latter to cancel the sale where he can show that delivery 
of the article which is larger in size than what was provided by the parties, has caused 
him to suffer a loss.31 
The buyer's remedies for the seller's default in fulfilling of the duty of delivery 
As in French law, the seller, in accordance with Iranian law, is in breach of the duty 
to deliver under the contract between the parties where, despite his ability to deliver 
the goods in conformity with the contractual terms he declines to do so. Similarly, 
the seller is responsible for breach of the sale for failing to deliver the goods if his 
inability to perform delivery is caused by his own fault, neglect, or mistake. Thus he 
will be held liable as against the buyer when he fails to make delivery to the latter, or 
when, in delivering the goods, he does not observe the contractual requirements 
concerning quantity or quality of goods sold, the place of their delivery and /or the 
time at which they had to be delivered. 
30 The fact that the seller is the most blameworthy person for his failure to notice the exact size of the 
article at the time when he enters into the contract with the buyer has been impliedly recognised by 
the provisions of Article 386 of the Iranian Code under which the seller, in the event of cancellation 
of the deal, is required to refund "over and above the price any costs of the contract and reasonable 
expenses incurred by the buyer." 
31 Under English law, the buyer may, in such instances, sue the seller for failing to deliver goods in 
conformity with the contractual description under section 13(1) of the Act 1979. See pp. 186 -192, 
post. 
120 
Whether the failure to deliver is caused by the seller's fault or by his neglect is 
immaterial as regards the amount of his liability for non -delivery. The only 
difference between these instances is that while in the latter case an exemption clause 
in the contract may discharge the seller from the liability for non -performance of the 
duty of delivery, it has no effect whatsoever on his liability against the buyer where 
he intentionally refuses to deliver the goods sold. However, the seller would be 
exempted from any liability as against the buyer for failing to deliver the goods 
where his inability to deliver is caused by some occurrence other than the seller's 
own act or fault. For example, where an earthquake has destroyed the article sold, or 
where because of a strike in the port of shipment the delivery did not take place at 
due date, the seller is not answerable for breach of the duty of delivery (force 
majeure). The main difference between Iranian and English law is that in the case of 
force majeure the contractual relation between the parties would come to end under 
the latter system and the seller would have no liability whatsoever against the buyer 
thereafter, whereas the relief granted to the seller, in such instances in accordance 
with the former system, is not permanent and he has to deliver the goods in 
conformity with the contract once the condition of force majeure is removed. 
In the case of breach of the duty to deliver the goods by the seller, various 
remedies are available to the buyer under Iranian law which dependent on the type of 
the breach and the surrounding circumstances of each case could be invoked by him. 
These remedies are dealt in the following section. 
Non -delivery 
The buyer's right to retain the price 
As in other modern legal systems,32 payment of the price by the buyer under Iranian 
law is concurrent with the delivery of the goods by the seller. This rule entitles the 
buyer to refrain from paying the price where the seller fails to deliver the goods in 
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accordance with the contract. This remedy which is also available to the buyer for 
delay in delivery where the time of delivery is of the essence of the contract, is 
sounded on the doctrine of cause. According to this doctrine, the obligations of each 
party in a synallagmatic contract, such as a contract of sale are the cause of the 
obligations of the other party, and therefore, non -performance of the contract in 
delivering of the goods by the seller justifies the non -payment of the price by the 
buyer.33 But the buyer cannot avail himself of this remedy where the sale requires 
him to pay the price before receiving of the goods purchased or where he voluntarily 
makes payment to the seller before delivery of the goods. 
Nevertheless, this remedy is temporary and provisional which provides the 
aggrieved buyer with a means of putting pressure on the seller to deliver the goods as 
required by the contract without referring the case to the court. This means that the 
remedy requires the buyer to be prepared to make payment to the seller upon delivery 
of the goods by the latter. However, this remedy does not prevent the buyer from 
having recourse to the other remedies which are available to him under Iranian law. 
Accordingly, the buyer may avoid the sale and sue the seller for damages for non- 
delivery in cases where the time for delivery, which is of the essence of the contract 
between the parties, has been expired, or where, because of the seller's default, he is 
no longer able to deliver the goods sold. 
Specific performance 
In contrast with English law, under which the prime remedy of the buyer in the event 
of non -delivery or non -punctual delivery is to maintain an action against the seller for 
damages for the breach of the duty of delivery undertaken under the contract, in 
Iranian law the buyer, in such instances, may affirm the contract and demand due 
performance thereunder,34 unless the punctual delivery of the goods is essential in the 
32 As to the provisions of English law, for example, see p. 17, ante. 
33 In accordance with this principle, the buyer may recover the price (but not any damage) from the 
seller where the latter cannot fulfil the duty of delivery, because of some outside cause for which he 
could not be held responsible. See Katoozian, supra., note 17, pp. 238 -24 
34 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 376. 
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contract between the parties in which case he may avoid the sale and recover from 
the seller the price as well as the damage which he has sustained in dealing with the 
latter. However, In contrast with English law, no definite rule has been laid down as 
to when delivery time is of essence of a contract, unless the contract itself provides 
for a right of avoidance of the contract upon the seller's failure to deliver the goods at 
the time set by the parties in the contract. The question is one of fact to be decided 
upon the particular circumstances of each case. The test is whether, from the nature 
of the article sold, the position of the parties, the terms of the contract, and other 
circumstances surrounding the deal, it can be inferred that the time of delivery 
stipulated in the contract was regarded as vital by the parties; if so, the seller's 
default in timeous delivery of the goods sold entitles the buyer to avoid the 
transaction; if not, he may merely sue the seller for the damage caused by the delay 
in performing the duty of delivery. For example, where the parties enter into a 
contract for selling special chocolates to be served at the buyer's birthday party on a 
specified date, then non -punctual delivery of the chocolates sold gives rise to a right 
of avoidance of the transaction by the buyer. In fact, unlike Anglo -US tradition, non- 
delivery of the goods under Iranian law does not entitle the buyer to avoid the sale in 
so far as the time of delivery is not essential and there is the possibility of enforcing 
the contract by compelling the seller to deliver the goods sold. For in accordance 
with the principle of necessity of performance of contracts (lozoomé egraié 
gharardàdha) applicable in Iranian law, the parties are essentially required to enforce 
the contract in so far as possible, once it is made by them. This means that the buyer 
may invoke the remedies other than specific performance only if there is no 
possibility of enforcing the sale by requiring the seller to deliver the goods. 
In contrast with French law,35 in the case of the seller's refusal to deliver the 
goods despite his ability to do so, the buyer, in accordance to Article 374 of the 
Iranian Code, may take the goods into his possession, if he can, and, if not, ask the 
court to enforce the sale by instructing the seller to deliver them.36 
35 For the position under French law, see pp. 102 -103, ante. 
36 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 376. 
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Under Article 387 of the Iranian Civil Code, where the goods cannot be 
delivered because they have perished without the fault or negligence of the seller, 
then the sale will be cancelled and the seller is bound to restore the consideration to 
the buyer, but the latter is not entitled to recover any damage for the seller's failure to 
fulfil the duty of delivery, since, damages are recoverable only in the cases where the 
failure is caused by the seller's default. The same rule applies if some occurrence 
other than the seller's own act or fault hampers his ability to deliver. Nevertheless, if, 
in the latter instances, the obstruction in delivering of the goods is removed later, the 
buyer may demand for the enforcement the delivery even if the time set by the parties 
for the delivery has passed, provided of course that he has not already cancelled the 
transaction with the seller.37 
Where the object of the sale is not severable, then its partial delivery by the 
seller would not avail him in reducing his liability vis -à -vis the buyer for breach of 
the duty to deliver undertaken under the transaction with the latter. In such instances, 
the buyer may claim damage from the seller for a delay in delivery where it is 
possible to enforce the contract by demanding the latter to deliver the rest of the thing 
sold. Where the seller cannot deliver the shortfall in the amount of the goods sold, 
the buyer may cancel the transaction and apply for damages for non -delivery. The 
same rules apply where the seller has been unable to deliver all or part of the goods 
sold on time, due to his own fault or negligence. That is, the buyer may claim 
damages for a delay in delivery where the seller's inability to deliver is temporary, 
and, therefore, the buyer can demand that the seller deliver when the cause of this 
inability is obviated, but the buyer may cancel the sale and sue the seller for damages 
where the seller's inability to deliver is permanent, or where, despite a court order to 
deliver the goods sold, the seller refuses to do so. However, if the seller's inability to 
deliver the goods, or part of them, is due to the buyer's action, the latter will have no 
37 The buyer may not cancel the sale where the obstruction is temporary, which may be obviated 
before the time of delivery. It seems that the same rule applies in the above instances even if the time 
for performance of delivery has lapsed, provided, of course, that the time for delivery is not the 
essence of the sale. 
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claim against the seller for non -delivery, although he remains responsible to pay the 
price in conformity with the contractual terms.38 
If it is proved that the seller was unable to deliver the goods at the time of 
delivery, then the transaction between the parties is void ab initio, in which case the 
buyer can recover the price paid to the seller, but he has no right to claim any damage 
for non -delivery or delay in delivery of the object of the transaction. If, in the 
aforegoing instances, the seller could deliver only part of the goods sold, then the 
sale is valid for that part but not for the remainder.39 This may occur only where the 
goods sold are severable, otherwise, like the aforegoing instances, the transaction 
between the parties is invalid and thereupon the purchaser is entitled to claim back 
the price paid to the seller.' 
As pointed out earlier, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in the contract, the 
seller's refusal to deliver would, unlike the French and the English systems, not give 
the buyer a right to cancel the goods where there is the possibility of enforcing the 
contract of sale against the seller by requiring him to deliver the article sold. In such 
instances, if the buyer cannot take the goods purchased into his possession, the 
enforcement of the contract may take place only through the court, or, if the contract 
is contained in a formal document and the legality of its enforcement is not disputed 
by the parties, through the Registration Office or the legal office through which the 
contractual document is made.' 
In the case of the sale of a specified article, for example, the buyer may apply to 
any of these legal public entities to issue an order for specific performance of the 
obligation of delivery. The order must be implemented through the court's officer 
who will dispossess the seller of the property sold and deliver it to the purchaser. 
Where the seller hides the goods sold or hinders their delivery to the buyer, the court, 
like under French law, may put economic pressure on him to break his resistance in 
38 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 389. 
39 Iranian Civil Code, Article 372. 
40 Even where the sale between the parties is severable and the seller can deliver only a portion of the 
goods sold whilst the remaining portion has perished through no fault of his, the buyer may, under the 
"option of sales unfulfilled in part", cancel the whole deal between the parties and thereby claim back 
the price paid to the seller. See Iranian Civil Code, Article 441. 
a' Katoozian, op. cit. supra., note 17, p. 259. 
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executing the court decree concerning his duty of delivery under the contract.42 The 
court normally issues an order requiring the seller to pay a specified amount of 
money for each day's delay in complying with its decree to deliver the goods sold. 
More delay in implementing the obligation of delivery by the seller will result in his 
paying of more money to the buyer. Nevertheless, it appears from the provisions of 
Article 729 of the Iranian Law of Civil Procedure that the court may not review the 
amount payable by the seller for a delay in executing the court's decision requiring 
him to deliver the goods within a fixed period. In other words, under Iranian law, 
there is no provision corresponding with the French rule of astreinte provisional 
whereby the court may reserve to itself the power to review the amount, having 
regard to the seller's resisting or opposing making delivery under the contract. 
However, unlike the criminal law, the provisions of which are to be construed 
narrowly, one may interpret the regulations of this article so broadly as to empower 
the court to review the amount payable to the buyer for the seller's delay in delivery 
in conformity with the court's decision (astreinte provisoire) when it is necessary to 
do so. 
As pointed out earlier, a court's order requiring the seller to pay a fixed amount 
of money to the buyer for each day's delay in delivery of the goods, in accordance 
with the court's decision, is a means used against the seller to overcome his 
resistance to perform his obligations undertaken under the contract of sale, and, 
therefore, it differs from the requirement under which the seller is bound to redress 
any damages which the delay caused to the buyer. For in the former case, the court, 
in defining the amount, will have to regard the seller's conduct and the effect which 
the fine is likely to have on him in agreeing to perform the sale with the buyer, while 
in the latter case, reimbursement of the damages suffered by the buyer is the only 
factor which is to be taken into account in making the decision against the seller.43 
Accordingly, there may be instances in which the seller is required to make a 
payment of some amount to the buyer for refusing to act upon the court's decree in 
42 See the Iranian Law of Civil Procedure, Article 729. 
43 Nonetheless, one must distinguish between the court's order instructing the seller to pay a fixed sum 
for each day's delay in performing the contract by delivering the goods sold and its decision to 
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delivering the goods within the period fixed in the decree, though the buyer sustains 
no loss as a result of the breach. On the other hand, there is possibility that the seller 
will be required to redress the damages which the buyer has suffered as a 
consequence of the seller's breach of his duty to deliver, whilst if it is impossible to 
perform the contract by delivering the goods at a later stage, he will be exempted 
from making a payment for a delay in delivery. 
It is to be noted that, in contrast with French law, the court, under the Iranian 
system, may issue an order against the seller to pay a sum to the buyer for a delay in 
delivery only if the following conditions are met: 
1) The case has been tried by the court and the seller is found to be in breach of the 
contract.44 
2) The aggrieved buyer has demanded the court issue a verdict instructing the seller 
to pay a sum him for the delay in performance of the sale between the parties.45 
3) Only the seller can perform the delivery. Accordingly in the case of the sale of an 
unspecified article the court will not order the seller to pay any sum for delay in 
delivery rather it may issue an order authorising the buyer to buy a replacement 
article, at the expense of the seller if the direct enforcement of the contract through 
delivery, of the goods by the seller for any reason is not possible. 
4) It is within the seller's ability to execute the court's decision by delivering of the 
goods to the buyer in accordance to the contract. Therefore, the court cannot order 
the seller to pay any sum for delay to comply with the court's decision to deliver 
where, because of his default, the goods have perished or where the time of delivery, 
which was the essence of the contract between the parties, has passed. 
5) The court cannot directly enforce the sale through delivery of the goods to the 
buyer by its officer. This means that the seller will be condemned to pay a sum for 
delay only if he resists in executing the court's decision requiring him to deliver 
the object of the sale within the period fixed in the decision.46 
condemn him to pay cash fine . 
as See the Iranian Law of Civil Procedure, Article 729. 
45 See the Iranian Law of Civil Procedure, Article 729. 
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Cancellation or rescission of the contract 
In contrast with French and Anglo -US law,' the general principle of irrevocability of 
contracts (lozoomé egraié gharardàdha) under Iranian law prevents the buyer from 
cancelling the sale for mere non -delivery of the goods by the seller, unless he can 
show that there is no possibility of enforcing the contract between the parties. 
Accordingly, the buyer may cancel the sale and claim back the price paid to the seller 
where, as the result of an incident which is not caused by the seller's fault or 
negligence, the goods, are destroyed before being delivered to the former.48 
Nevertheless, the availability of this remedy to the buyer where the destruction of the 
goods are attributable to the seller's own default, has been the subject matter of long 
dispute among the authorities on the civil law. Opponents of this remedy argue that 
cancellation of a transaction by the buyer is an exception to the general principle of 
irrevocability of contracts (lozoom é egraié gharardàdha) which can be exercised 
only in the cases where the Civil Code has expressly authorised him to do so.49 
Accordingly, in such instances, the buyer, in accordance with Articles 328 and 331 of 
the Civil Code, may only ask the seller to deliver an article similar to the one 
purchased, or if no such a similar article is available, to refund to him its market 
price. This is because the property in the article sold passes to the buyer at the time 
when the parties make the contract and thereafter the seller is considered as custodian 
of the article for the buyer until its delivery to him. However, it is to be noted that 
destruction of the goods is one of the cases in which the duty of delivery cannot be 
fulfilled, and it thereby gives the buyer a right to cancel the sale. This means that the 
seller's liability for non -delivery of the goods, in such instances, would not 
extinguish the buyer's right to cancel the sale between the parties. This approach, 
which has been supported by the majority of the Islamic scholars, is another aspect of 
46 See the Iranian Law of Execution of Decisions, Article 47 and its Note. 
47 As to the position under English law, see pp. 22 -25, ante. 
48 See the Iranian Civil Code, Article 387. 
49 See Said Hassan Emami, Hoghooghe Madani "Civil Law ", vol. 1 (8th ed. 1989, Tehran) at p. 464. 
This view has been also supported by some of the leading Islamic scholars, such as Shikh Mohammad 
Hassan Najafi, Javaher- ol- Kalam, vol. 23 pp. 23, 84, 157 -158; Molla Ahmad Naraghi, Mostanad, p. 
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bilateral contract such as a sale in which the obligations of one of the parties are the 
cause of the obligations by the other. Accordingly, the buyer, in such instances, will 
have an option to cancel the sale and to recover the price from the seller if he has 
already made payment to him or pay the contractual price and sue the latter for the 
replacement of goods destroyed with equivalent ones. This argument may well apply 
to the cases where a third party is responsible for the destruction of the article sold in 
which case the buyer would be entitled to cancel the transaction with the seller and 
claim back the price paid to him or as the owner sue the third party for the 
replacement of the article with a similar one if it replaceable and if not for its market 
price. 
Where the seller refuses to perform his duty under the contract despite his ability 
to do so, and the pressures exercised on him through the court fail to overcome his 
resistance in delivering the goods sold, the buyer, in contrast with both French and 
Anglo -US law, may, as a last resort, cancel the sale with the seller and sue him for 
the damage caused by his breach, if the goods sold are specified by the parties 
concerned.'0 Nonetheless, if, in the above instance the goods are not specified in the 
contract and it is possible for the buyer to purchase replacement goods, the buyer 
cannot cancel the sale but he may ask the court to authorise him to purchase the 
replacement at the seller's expense. 
Whether cancellation of the contract is to be made through the court 
The Iranian Civil Code does not provide whether the buyer needs to apply to the 
court to cancel the sale for non -delivery in the instances where he is allowed to do so. 
Nonetheless, it seems that the buyer may cancel the transaction between the parties 
without referring the case to the court where, because of the destruction of the goods 
or any other reason, the seller will not be able to perform his duty under the 
transaction. However, where there is possibility for the seller to deliver the goods but 
he refuses to do so, the cancellation of the transaction is to take place through the 
392. 
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court after it is established that the seller will not perform his duty vis -à -vis the buyer 
in accordance with the transaction. For otherwise the buyer cannot claim damages 
from the seller for non -delivery 
The buyer's duty to mitigate the damage under Iranian law 
Like their French equivalents, the Iranian provisions concerning the seller's 
breaching of his duty to deliver goods entail no liability whatsoever against the buyer 
to mitigate the damage- caused by the by the breach. In other words, unlike English 
law, under these systems the consequence of the seller's breach is not to impose a 
further duty on the innocent buyer by requiring him to mitigate the damages which 
may arise from the breach. It is the duty of the breaching seller to take appropriate 
action in order to prevent or, to reduce the damage which, the breach may cause to 
the buyer and, in the event of his failure, to the buyer's loss resulted from the breach. 
The advantage of this approach over that of the common law systems is that it 
discourages the seller from wilful breach of the contract, and, as such, it is consistent 
with the Iranian general principle of necessity to perform the contracts (lozoom é 
egraié gharardàdha) which requires the parties to maintain the contract of sale by 
fulfilment of their respective duties in so far it is possible to do so. For this reason, 
the seller who knows that he will be held liable for both incidental and consequential 
damages caused by his breach may have to think twice before breaching of the 
contract. 
Delay in delivery 
As has been indicated above, where the seller refuses to fulfil his duties under the 
contract, the buyer may ask a public official to instruct the seller to do so. If the seller 
accepts such an instruction to deliver the goods he must also redress the damage 
caused to the buyer by the delay. In other words, the seller's delay in delivering the 
s° Katoozian, op. cit. supra., note 17, at p. 254. 
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goods at the time provided by the parties is but a temporary non -performance of the 
contract by him which gives rise to his responsibility for the loss sustained by the 
buyer as a consequence of the delay. 
Damages for delay are recoverable only if the seller can still make delivery to 
the buyer after the elapse of the time fixed by the parties for performance of the 
contract. This means that the seller will have no liability to pay damages for delay if, 
for any reason, it is no longer possible for him to deliver the goods to the buyer 
unless the buyer can show that the seller's inability in delivering of the goods caused 
by his own default. Even where it is within the seller's ability to deliver but he 
declines to do so, despite the legal pressure exercised on him through an authorised 
public body, the court would reject a claim for damages for a delay in delivery by the 
buyer. Similarly, the seller is not liable for any loss caused to the buyer where, under 
the contract, the time of delivery is to be determined by the latter and he fails to act 
upon it. The same rule applies to the cases where the time for delivery is fixed by the 
parties but in accordance with the contractual terms or under a common usage the 
buyer is required to serve a notice for delivery to the seller but he fails to do so. 
Damages 
As in French law,' the seller's default delivering the goods in accordance with the 
contractual terms gives to the buyer a right to claim damages from the former for the 
default. This means that whatever remedies are granted to the buyer, he may also 
claim damages caused by the seller's breach. In fact, damages may either constitute a 
substitution for delivery of the goods sold or may complement the remedy of specific 
performance. 
Article 221 of the Iranian Civil Code generally states: 
"If a party undertakes to perform or to abstain from any act, but fails to carry out 
his undertaking he will be responsible to pay compensation to the other party 
provided that the parties have expressly stipulated for the compensation for such 
losses in the contract or that it is understood in the contract in accordance to the 
51 See pp. 100 -102, ante. 
131 
customary law or that such compensation is by law regarded as guaranteed." 
At a first glance, one may think that, under these provisions, the buyer, in some 
instances, is not entitled to bring an action against the seller for compensation for 
failing to deliver the goods sold if there is no customary law or no stipulation to this 
effect in the contract. However, such interpretation of the Article is incorrect, since, 
as Professor Katoozian observes, it is almost impossible to imagine an instance in 
which the party in breach is not required by the customary law to pay compensation 
to the aggrieved party for the losses caused by the breach.'' In other words, 
irrespective of whether or not the parties have agreed on any stipulation as to the 
compensation at the time of the sale, a seller who is in breach of a contract of sale is 
liable to redress the damage caused to the buyer by his breach. 
Under Article 728 of the Iranian Law of Civil Procedure, the buyer has to prove 
that he has suffered a loss as a result of the seller's breach before he could recover 
damages from the latter,53 unless the parties stipulate in the contract that the seller is 
to pay to the buyer a fixed amount as damage for the delay in delivery or non- 
delivery of the goods sold.' In the latter instances, the seller is bound to pay to the 
buyer the stipulated amount in the contract, even if the loss sustained by the buyer, as 
a consequence of the breach, does not reach that amount. On the other hand, if the 
damages suffered by the buyer for the breach of the duty of delivery is larger than 
what has been stipulated by the parties concerned, he cannot recover the excess from 
the seller.'s 
As in French law,56 the compensation granted to the buyer under Article 728 of 
the Iranian law of Civil Procedure' for breach of the duty of delivery should cover 
both his actual loss caused by the breach and the loss of gain which he has been 
deprived of, provided that both of these losses directly have resulted from the non - 
fulfilment of the duty of delivery in accordance with the contractual terms.'$ In other 
52 See Katoozian, op. cit. supra., note 17, p. 289. 
53 For the full text of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
54 See the Iranian Civil Code, Article 230. 
Ss Ibid. 
56 See pp. 100 -102, ante. 
57 For the full text of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
58 See Article 728 of the Iranian Law Civil Procedure. 
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words, the damages sustained by the buyer are not recoverable from the seller if they 
are not caused directly by the seller's breach of the duty of delivery. As an example, 
where because of the seller's failure to deliver the barley sold under the contract the 
court authorises the buyer to purchase their replacement to feed his cattle and it is 
found that the replacement goods were poisonous and, therefore, caused the buyer's 
cattle to die, the latter may not demand compensation for the loss resulting from the 
death of the cattle, since the loss has not directly resulted from the breach even 
though the buyer would not have suffered this loss if the seller had fulfilled his 
obligations in accordance with the contract.s9 
Further, as Professor Katoozian points out, the seller's liability concerning his 
breach in delivering of the goods sold is limited to the damages which customarily 
are to be reimbursed by him.60 In other words, the seller must compensate only those 
losses which are customarily foreseeable to the parties at the time of the sale.61 
In contrast with French law,' there is no provision in the Iranian Civil Code to 
distinguish between the cases where the seller's failure to perform his obligation of 
delivery of the goods is due to his bad faith and the instances where the failure is the 
result of gross negligence on his part, and, therefore, the seller in either of these 
instances is liable to compensate any damage which has been directly caused by non- 
delivery to the buyer, provided that it is foreseeable to the parties at the time when 
they entered into the contract of sale. Nevertheless, it seems that in the former 
instances the buyer may also be able to recover other damages, even if they were 
unforeseeable at the time of the contract by taking a delictual action against the 
seller, provided that these damages are directly caused by the seller's breach. It must, 
moreover, be pointed out that the seller may be relieved from the liability by an 
exemption clause in the contract if his breach in performing of the duty of delivery is 
caused by his gross negligence, whilst such a clause has no effect whatsoever where 
he declines to deliver the goods in bad faith. 
59 It could be argued that in this instance the buyer's own negligence in purchasing the replacement is 
the main cause of the loss of his chattels and, therefore, he has no right to claim compensation from 
the seller for the loss. 








The ever increasing number of international transactions resulting from the recent 
remarkable developments in technology, the contrast between different legal systems 
(some of which have been examined in this work) and the confusions and 
uncertainties arising from the complexity of the law of sale for the parties in an 
international sale under these systems, led to adoption of the Vienna Convention on 
International Sale of Goods 1980 by the representatives of various national legal 
systems. The provisions of the Convention concerning the seller's duty to deliver are 
the subject matter of discussion in this chapter, the aim of which is to determine 
whether and to what extent these provisions may obviate the aforesaid problems 
referred to in earlier chapters between the parties concerned. 
The Obligation to Deliver under the Vienna Convention on 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
Article 30 of the CISG defines a seller's obligations under a contract of a sale as 
follows: 
"The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any documents relating to them 
and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this 
convention." 
This Article sounds very much like the corresponding Article 18 of the ULIS, which 
established that the seller "shall effect delivery of the goods, hand over any 
documents relating thereto and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the 
contract and the present law." But the two formulations- "the seller must deliver the 
goods" (Article 30 CISG) and "the seller shall effect delivery of the goods" (Article 
18 ULIS)- are so to speak, codificatory worlds apart. The drafters of ULIS attempted 
to encode into the one concept of déliverance a whole range of issues, such as 
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performance and risk of loss (Article 71 ULIS) and limitation of the seller's 
obligations to goods identified to the contract in the case of a sale of unascertained 
goods. In other words, all the elements of due performance were gathered in Article 
18 of ULIS. In a definition of delivery, Article 19(1) prescribed that delivery 
(French déliverance) consisted of handing over the goods which conformed to the 
contract. This means that there was no déliverance and, therefore, no risk passed to 
the buyer where defective goods had been delivered to him even though he had used 
or resold them to a third party. This result proved untenable in various situations. For 
example, it was artificial to say that no delivery had taken place when the goods were 
accepted by the buyer, when he could not reject the goods because of his failure to 
give timely notice of the defects, when he had to accept the goods since the defects 
were not fundamental as required by ULIS, or when the defects in the goods were 
duly cured by the seller. This led the drafters of ULIS to make exceptions to the rule 
in such instances and to give déliverance retroactive effect to the moment when the 
goods were handed over to the first carrier or to the buyer. In an effort to avoid the 
aforegoing problems UNCITRAL abandoned this highly abstract and ill- defined 
concept (Article 19 ULIS) at an early stage,' and the CISG understands "delivery" in 
a purely descriptive sense. Accordingly, Article 30 of the CISG states the essence of 
the seller's obligations are to deliver the goods, hand over any documents and 
transfer the property. But, unlike ULIS, the statement of the seller's obligation under 
this article does not include delivery of goods "in conformity with the contract." 
Likewise, whilst Articles 31 to 34 describe the acts which the seller must do in order 
to fulfil his obligations under Article 30, the duty to deliver goods which "conform 
with the contract" is not included. In other words, the seller under the CISG is 
considered to have fulfilled his obligation to deliver even if the goods delivered do 
not correspond to the description required by the contract. Nonetheless, the seller 
who delivers non -conforming goods is in breach of the contract that may trigger the 
buyer's remedies laid down in Article 45 and following. The question arises as to 
J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (1982) 
pp. 238 -239 . 210. 
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whether the obligation to deliver is performed where the goods placed at the buyer's 
disposal or handed over to the first carrier are entirely different from the ones ordered 
by the buyer. It might be argued that irrespective of whether or not the placing of 
such goods at the buyer's disposal or handing them over to the first carrier constitutes 
delivery, the seller is in breach of the contract and in either case he is liable to the 
buyer under Article 45 and following and, therefore, there is no use in distinguishing 
in between the delivery of merely non -conforming goods and delivery of entirely 
different goods from the ones described in the contract between the parties. However, 
as Professor Schlechtriem observed, the distinction between the two cases "would 
immediately gain practical relevance if the buyer, according to Article 39, lost his 
rights because he failed to give notice of the non -conformity. "' In other words, if in 
such instances the seller is held to have performed his obligation of delivery by 
placing at the buyer's disposal or handing over goods which are entirely different 
from the ones agreed by the parties, then the buyer will lose his right to invoke the 
remedies provided in Article 45 and following where he fails to give timely notice 
specifying the non -conformities in the goods to the seller. On the other hand if the 
placing at the buyer's disposal, or handing over to his agent, such goods does not 
constitutes delivery, then the buyer need not give any notice to the seller and, 
therefore, he can sue the latter for the remedies under the said Articles. Referring to 
the difficulties caused by the distinction between the delivery of merely defective 
goods (a "Peius ") and the "delivery" of an aliud which really is no delivery at all 
under German law, Professor Schlechtriem rejected the Secretariat's Commentary 
that where something entirely different has been delivered there is no delivery within 
the meaning of Article 30 and following, and, accordingly, suggested that the seller 
should be assumed to have fulfilled his obligation of delivery "whenever the goods 
handed over to the buyer or carrier have been selected for the purpose of performing 
the sales contract in question. "3 His view, however, seems to be unsound and even 
Schlechtriem, "The Seller's Obligation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods" in H. Smith, International Sales (New York, 1984) at chapter 6, pp. 12- 
13. 
3 Ibid., at p. 13 
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dangerous for the buyer, since, the seller who intentionally, or by his gross 
negligence, delivers goods which are entirely different from the ones provided for in 
the contract should not be allowed to escape liability for breach of the contract 
simply because of the buyer's failure to give notice specifying the nature of his 
breach. This view is particularly important where the buyer stores the goods in a 
warehouse for a long period without having an opportunity to examine them. Of 
course, such a seller will be automatically liable for his fraud against the buyer under 
civilian systems but this liability does not arise where Anglo -US law is applicable to 
the contract. Moreover, as pointed out above under Article 67(1), the risk of loss 
passes to the buyer as soon as the goods are handed over to the first carrier. In 
accordance with Professor Schlechtriem's view, this means that the buyer has to bear 
any loss caused by accidental damage to, or destruction of, the goods delivered even 
though they were entirely different from the ones described in the contract.' 
The drafters of the CISG have not defined the term "delivery". As in Iranian law, 
however, it may be deduced from the provisions of the CISG that delivery consists of 
the acts which the seller is required to do in order for the purchaser to acquire proper 
possession of the goods bought. Thus, as in various national systems, such as Iranian, 
French and English law, the obligation to deliver may be effected either by actual 
delivery or by constructive delivery of the goods to the buyer or to his agent 
authorised to take their possession. Accordingly, the seller need not always hand over 
the goods to the buyer to fulfil his obligation under Article 30. Delivery may also 
take place "by placing the goods `at the disposal' of the buyer "' through, for 
example, marking of the timber to be fetched by him. 
The most common method of constructive delivery in international trade is the so- 
called sale involving carriage in which the seller is under an obligation to organise 
a In accordance with Article 66 of the CISG: 
"Loss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the buyer does not 
discharge him from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss or damage is 
due to an act or omission of the seller." 
5 O. Lando, in Bianca -Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law (1987) at p. 31. 
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transportation6 and to hand the goods over to the first carrier for transmission to the 
buyer.' In 1992, for example, there was an before the Italian Constitutional Court that 
Article 1510(2) of Italian Civil Code under which the seller is regarded to have 
performed his obligation to deliver by handing over the goods to the carrier, was 
inconsistent with the principle of equality provided for by Article 3 of the Italian 
Constitution. In fact, under the general rule contained in Article 1228 of the Italian 
Civil Code the carrier should be regarded as the agent of the seller, who would be 
liable for the agent's acts. Referring to Articles 31 and 67 of the CISG the 
Constitutional Court rejected this argument by stating, inter alia, that Article 1510(2) 
of the Italian Civil Code reflected a rule generally accepted at international level. In 
other words, like civilian and common law systems, the CISG considers the seller to 
have fulfilled his obligation to deliver by handing over the goods to the first carrier. 
Article 31 speaks of the first carrier because there are usually several carriers 
involved. If only a single carrier is involved in the carriage of the goods sold, then he 
is also the first carrier for the purpose of the CISG even though there is no second 
one. According to Article 67(1), as soon as the seller has handed the goods over to 
the first carrier he not only fulfils his obligation to deliver but he also shifts the risk 
of loss to the buyer.' Nonetheless, this rules is applicable only if the carrier is 
6 The CISG does not expressly provide that the seller in such instances is obliged to arrange for 
transportation, instead Article 32(2) states: 
"If the seller is bound to arrange for carriage of the goods, he must make such 
contracts as are necessary for carriage to the place fixed by means of 
transportation appropriate in the circumstances and according to the usual terms 
for such transportation." 
However, as Professor Schlechtriem noticed it seems that, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary by the parties concerned, "the seller must not only hand over to the first carrier but also 
arrange for the shipment ". See Schlechtriem, "The Seller's Obligation Under the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" in H. Smith, International Sales (New 
York, 1984) at chapter 6, p. 6 -11. 
See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /7 (12 July 1995) Case 91, p. 
3. 
$ As an example, see United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
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operating independently from the seller. Accordingly, delivery does not take place by 
handing the goods over to a carrying company which is run by the seller himself or 
by an agent operating on his behalf.° Whether a forwarding agent is a carrier for the 
purpose of effecting delivery is an issue which is left to be solved by a domestic law. 
In contradiction with the CISG's main purpose in bringing about uniformity at a 
world -wide level in the law of international sales contract, this issue may lead to 
forum shopping by the parties concerned since whilst the legal system of some 
countries, such as Germany, considers a forwarding agent as a carrier, under other 
legal systems, such as those of England and Sweden he may be a carrier depending 
upon his contract with the person who engages him. 
If, in the aforegoing instances, the seller has agreed to send the goods sold, 
Article 32(2) of the CISG requires him not only to hand the goods over to the first 
carrier, but also to conclude the contract necessary for transportation appropriate in 
the circumstances, and according to the usual terms for such transportation. Whether 
the seller is also bound to provide for adequate insurance depends on the terms of the 
contract, including trade usage or any course of dealing between the parties.10 In any 
event, where the contract does not require the seller to provide for insurance under 
Article 32(2) he is, nevertheless, bound, at the buyer's request, to provide him with 
all available information necessary to effect such insurance. 
Following Article 32(1) of the CISG, the seller who, in accordance with the 
contract or the CISG, hands over the goods to a carrier is required to give the buyer 
notice of the consignment specifying the goods if they are not clearly identified to the 
contract by marking on the goods, by shipping documents or otherwise. The CISG 
A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /12 (26 May 1997) Case 163 pp. 2 -3, where the Hungarian Court 
attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry applying the CISG held that the risk in 
the goods passed to the Hungarian buyer when they are handed over by the Yugoslav seller to the first 
carrier. 
9 See, F. Enderlien, Rights and Obligations of the Seller under the UN Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, in Sarcevic P. -and Volken P. (Eds.), International Sale of Goods, 
(1986 New York -London -Rome) at p. 145. 
10 See CISG, Article 9. 
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does not state when the notice is to be given to the buyer. Under some trade terms, 
such as F.O.B., the seller is obliged to give notice to the buyer immediately after the 
goods are handed over to the carrier. Nonetheless, the drafters of the CISG failed to 
clarify when the seller must give notice where the contract contains no provision in 
this regard. This is likely to create an uncertainty for the parties concerned. The issue, 
however, can be obviated by referring the case to the CISG's general principle 
provided in Article 7(2) upon which the seller must give notice of the consignment 
within a reasonable time after delivery. Under the circumstances, this may be a very 
short time. The seller's failure to give notice in time is a breach of the contract which 
entitles the buyer to sue him and seek one or more of the remedies under Article 45 
and following» Moreover, in accordance with Articles 67(2) and 69(3) the risk in 
the goods does not pass to the buyer before they are clearly identified to the contract 
and, consequently, the seller must give notice to the buyer for this identification. 
Another method of constructive delivery may take place by transfer of 
possession of the goods symbolically through handing over to the buyer documents 
which allows him to obtain possession of the goods purchased. This method has been 
approved by Article 30, which expressly indicates that the CISG applies to sales 
transactions that involve delivery of documents. In other words, in some instances, 
such as when the goods are stored by the seller's agent or when they are on board of 
a ship at sea, the seller may perform his obligation of delivery by instructing the 
buyer or by handing over the corresponding documents to him. Where trade terms 
are used they often prescribe which documents are to be handed over to the buyer.' 
Article 34 of the CISG requires the seller to hand over these documents at the time 
and place and in the form provided in the contract. Where the contract is silent, the 
" These remedies includes; to claim damages (Article 46(3)) or, to require delivery of substitute 
goods (Article 46(2)) or, to require repair (Article 45(1)(b)) or, to fix additional period of time for 
performance (Article 47) or, to declare the contract avoided (Article 49). For details of these remedies 
see pp. 157 -180, post. 
12 For example, in the case of a C.I.F. contract, the seller must furnish the buyer with the commercial 
invoice of the goods shipped (INCOTERMS 1990 ed., C.I.F., Al), a clean transport document such 
as a clean negotiable bill of lading (INCOTERMS 1990 ed., C.I.F., A8), and an insurance policy 
(INCOTERMS 1990 ed., C.I.F., A3b). For details of this clause and other clauses under 
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document delivered must conform with trade usage and where there is no trade 
usage, the seller under the principle of good faith must hand over the documents at 
such time and in such form as will enable the buyer to obtain the goods from the 
carrier when they arrive, and to bring them through customs. 
Place of delivery 
Concerning the place of delivery, the parties, under the principle of freedom of the 
contract underlying the -CISG, may freely choose the place where the goods are to be 
delivered.13 Where the parties fail to agree on the place of delivery then the drafters 
of CISG distinguish between three possibilities. They distinguish between a sale, 
which involves carriage,14 and the one in which the seller is required to place the 
goods at the buyer's disposal at a certain place.15 The third possibility arises where 
the parties concerned elect none of the foregoing alternatives, in which case the 
goods must be put at the buyer's disposal at the seller's place of business. 
As mentioned above the place of delivery is usually agreed between the parties 
and therefore, Article 31 of the CISG begins by stating: 
"If the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any other particular place..." 
Parties seldom fail to agree on the place of delivery, for this place is decisive for 
several other topics, e.g., usually passing of risk to the buyer. In some instances, the 
seller may undertake to deliver the goods at the buyer's place of business, a provision 
that may be stipulated by the Incoterms "delivery duty paid (place of buyer's 
business). "16 In other instances, the contract may call upon the seller to deliver the 
goods at the place of business of the buyer's customer, to whom the buyer has 
INCOTERMS 1990, see Jan Ramberg, Guide to incoterms 1990 (1991, ICC Publishing SA). 
13 See CISG, Article 6. 
14 See CISG, Article 31(a). 
15 See CISG, Article 31(b). 
16 For this clause, cf Ramberg, Incoterms 1980, in The Transnational Law of Internationsl 
Commercial Transactions (ed. N. Horn & C. Schmitthoff 1982), pp.137, 138 f .., 142 and 143. 
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already resold the goods. In both of these cases, the seller's obligation involves 
transporting the goods and he will be liable for breach of the contract under Article 
45 and following if the goods are damaged in transit unless he can show that the loss 
or damage in transit was caused by an impediment beyond his control and that he 
could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the 
time of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences." In such 
instances, the risk passes to the buyer in accordance with Article 69 of the CISG.18 
Unfortunately, the contractual stipulation as to delivery of the goods to the 
buyer's or his customer's place of business may have appeared to be so unusual to 
the drafters of the CISG -who may primarily have considered overseas transactions - 
that "the seller's obligation to transport the goods to the buyers place of business" 
has not been specifically provided for in the CISG. Surely, there are many cases in 
international trade in which sellers undertake to deliver the goods either, by their own 
people or through independent carriers, to buyers', or their customers', place of 
business. 
Article 31(b) of CISG covers situation in which the contract calls for the buyer 
to fetch the goods himself Nonetheless, this situation would seem less frequent in 
international trade. On the one hand, this happens where the purchaser, in the absence 
of alternative contractual provisions, is required to pick up specific goods, such as a 
car or a combine, at the place where the parties at the time of the contract knew they 
were located. On the other hand, it may applied to the cases where goods are not yet 
identified or goods which are to be manufactured or produced and which, in the case 
of doubt, are to be placed at the buyer's disposal at the place where they are to be 
drawn from a stockpile or to be manufactured or produced.19 In both cases, the seller 
" CISG, Article 79. It is to be mentioned that the seller's liability for loss or damages to the goods in 
transit in the aforegoing instances can be avoided only if he can rely on Article 79(1) of the CISG, 
where the carriage is performed by the seller's own people, or on Article 79(2), where he avail 
himself of an independent carrier. 
'For the full provisions of this Article, see Appendix V. 
19 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 
1994) Case 47, p. 3. 
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effects his obligation of delivery once he places the goods at the disposal of the buyer 
at the place where they were located at the time of the contract, whilst the risk under 
Article 69(1) of the CISG may pass to the buyer some later time. Similar situation 
may arise when the seller has placed the goods at the disposal of the buyer at a place 
other than the seller's place of business, as required by the contract, and the buyer 
does not yet know that the goods are ready to be fetched by him.'° It seems that the 
seller's obligation as to delivery is terminated by his placing the goods at the buyer's 
disposal," but the risk has not yet passed to the buyer since he has not been aware of 
the fact that the goods have been placed at his disposal as required by Article 69(2). 
Accordingly, if the goods in such circumstances are destroyed, the seller does not 
have to deliver, nor can he claim the purchase price. The seller does not need to 
deliver because he has already performed his obligation to deliver by placing the 
goods at the buyer's disposal at the place provided by the contract, and he is not 
entitled to claim the purchase price because the risk in the goods has not yet passed 
to the buyer. If, after the performance of the obligation of delivery by the seller, the 
goods are destroyed other than accidentally, he may be liable against the buyer for 
damages because of his failure to comply with his duty under Article 85 to take such 
steps as are reasonable in the circumstances of the case to preserve the goods. Article 
31(b) also concerns stored goods and goods at sea. In such instances, the seller is 
bound to "place the goods at the disposal of the buyer" by instructing and/or handing 
over the corresponding documents to him. 
Following both the civilian and common law of sale, Article 31(c) of the CISG 
contains an escape provision whereby the seller, in the case of doubt, is bound to 
place the goods at the buyer's disposal at his place of business. The problems under 
'0 See CISG, Article 69(2). 
21 This view, however, can be criticised on ground of being unjust to allow the seller to discharge 
himself of his obligation as to the delivery by placing the goods at the disposal of the buyer without 
informing the latter of the performance. In fact, it could be said an obligation as to delivery does not 
takes place where the seller places the goods at the buyer's disposal but fails to give such notification 
as is necessary to enable the latter to take them into his possession. See Lando, Obligations of the 
Seller, in Bianca -Bonnel, Commentmy on the International Sales Law (1987) at p. 255. 
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former systems, concerning the cases where the seller has more than one place of 
business or where he has no place of business, have been expressly addressed by 
Article 10 of CISG. Under this Article: 
"(a) if a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that 
which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance, having 
regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at any time 
before or at the conclusion of the contract; 
(b) if a party does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to his 
habitual residence." 
As can be seen, under this Article the criteria for determining the relevant place of 
business is the place with the "closest relationship to the contract and its 
performance ". To find out which place has closest relationship to the contract this 
Article continues that regard is to be given to "the circumstances known to or 
contemplated by the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract ". It 
seems appropriate to reverse the order of application of the these criteria since what 
is contemplated by the parties should reasonably be given priority over those which 
are only known to them. Obviously, adoption of the provisions of Article 10 is a 
significant step towards reducing uncertainties in specifying the place of delivery 
where the contract contains no provision in this regard. It is, however, submitted that 
these provisions, do not go far enough to diminish completely uncertainties between 
the parties in the aforegoing situations. 
As mentioned earlier, when the contract "involves carriage of goods ", the 
delivery takes place by handing the goods over to the first independent carrier 
organisation" which undertakes to carry them for transmission to the buyer. In other 
words, the place of delivery in such instances is the place where the seller puts the 
goods into the possession of the first carrier. As can be seen the initiative in 
delivering of the goods in a sale involving carriage is on the seller. The typical act 
envisaged by Article 31(a) is the seller's taking the goods to the carrier's premises 
where they will be put into the latter's possession for transmission to the buyer. The 
seller, however, may discharge his obligation to deliver by other arrangements, such 
22 See P. Schelechtriem, Commmentary on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) (Oxford: Claredon 
Press, 1998) pp. 226 -235. 
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as to make an agreement with the carrier whereby he undertakes to come to the 
seller's premises to take the goods from a stockpile which the seller has indicated to 
him in advance. In such circumstances, delivery takes place as soon as the carrier 
takes the possession of the goods and the place of delivery is the place where the 
goods are put into possession of the carrier. 
Where the sale involve carriage but it contains trade terms, such as F.O.B., C. & 
F., and C.I.F., the place of delivery is the ship's rail, even though the carriage by sea 
is not the first carriage.'3 In other words, where trade terms are used, Article 31(a) 
will add little, if anything, to the seller's duties provided in the contract. Moreover, 
the trade terms cited above address several questions not covered by Article 31, such 
as whether the seller or the buyer is to liable for providing the export license and for 
payment of export taxes. Despite these advantages which associated with the 
aforesaid trade terms, there has been a dispute over the exact point when loading 
takes place where the term "the ship's rail" is used in the contract of sale involving 
carriage of the goods by sea. To ascertain this point is vital for various parties since: 
(1) it is this point which the seller's duty as to the delivery of the goods to the buyer 
ends and thereafter the latter loses the right to sue him for non -delivery of the goods, 
and 
(2) in the absence of an agreement to the contrary the property and the risk of loss'' 
in the goods passes to the buyer upon delivery of them to the carrier. Therefore, the 
exact point when loading takes place is not only important for the seller and the 
buyer in the contract of sale but also for their respective insurance companies since it 
determines which party's company has to bear the liability for the damages to the 
goods. 
The aforesaid dispute related to the fact that during the loading process the 
goods will normally be swung across "the ship's rail" by a crane or derrick before 
being taken on board for their stowage there and in the case of commodities such as 
23 J.D. Feltham, "The United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods ", 
(1991) Journal of Business Law 413, at 417. 
24 See, for example, Colley v. Overseas Exporters [1921] 3 KB 302. See further, J.D. Feltham, "The 
United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods ", (1991) Journal of 
Business Law 413, at 424. 
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oil or grain, they will be pumped or sucked through a pipe on shore. Therefore, the 
question in the founer case is whether shipment takes place when the cargo is lifted 
to the rail of the ship or when they are taken and being stowed on board. Referring to 
this question in the Pyrene & Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd.,25 Devlin J. 
rightly stated: 
"... the division of loading into two parts is suited to more antiquated methods of 
loading than now generally adopted and the ship's rail has lost much of its 
nineteenth century significance."" 
This statement is a reference to the old view that it was the duty of the seller /shipper 
to perform the first part of the loading by lifting of the cargo to the rail of the ship 
while, the carrier was bound to carry out the second and last part of the loading by 
taking the cargo from the ship's rail on board and stow it. Devlin J. highlighted the 
problem of distinguishing between these two stages of loading by noting that: 
"Only the most enthusiastic lawyer could watch with satisfaction the spectacle 
of the liabilities shifting uneasily as the cargo sways at the end of a derrick 
across a notional perpendicular projecting from the ship's rail." 
In fact , it is very hard and costly to determine the exact point when the goods are lost 
or damaged during the two stages of loading operation . On this basis , Develin J. 
rightly held that in the contract of carriage by sea, the loading operation had to be 
taken as an indivisible whole and therefore, the carrier's liability for negligence 
covers both stages of loading operation irrespective of whether the loss or damages 
in the cargo occurred before or after the crossing of the ship's rail." Nonetheless, the 
question with regard to the contract of sale has been left open; that is whether in 
contracts such as a F.O.B. contract the risk and the property in the goods passes to 
the buyer when they pass the rail of the ship nominated for their transportation or the 
seller's duty as to the delivery is performed only if the goods are safely transferred 
and stowed on board the vessel. Under the former view, the meaning of loading of 
25 [ 1954] 2 QB 402. 
26 Ibid., at p. 419. 
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the goods in the case of sale of goods differs from its meaning in the contract for 
their carriage by sea while in accordance with the latter view, the meaning of loading 
in both the contract of sale and the contract of carriage is the same. However, given 
the fact that the nature of the problem associated to both these contract with respect 
of determining the exact point when the lost or damages to the goods has occurred 
during the process of loading in is the same, the latter approach seems logically 
preferable to the former one as suggested by some commentators.'8 The approach 
conforms with the latest version of Incoterms 1990 which defines the duty of the 
F.O.B. seller to "deliver the goods on board the vessel "79 and has the advantages of 
avoiding both the aforegoing problem and the confusion arising from attributing of 
different legal meanings to the term "loading" under the latter approach?' 
Where the contract contains no such trade terms, and in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary by the parties, the rule of most jurisdictions seems to 
require the seller who is to dispatch the goods to a foreign country to also provide the 
necessary export license and to pay export taxes, whilst, the buyer, on the other hand, 
is bound to procure the necessary import license and to pay import duties. 
The seller is not discharged from obligation to deliver, and the risk will not pass 
to the buyer who does not take delivery where provisions as to the place of 
performance have not been properly observed by the seller. This impliedly entails 
that the seller, like the respective rules of numerous domestic laws, in the absence an 
agreement to the contrary in the contract, should bear any expenses which are 
necessary to put the goods into a deliverable state, notwithstanding the fact that the 
CISG is silent on this issue. 
28See Sasson and Merren, C.I.F. and F.O.B. Contracts, (4th ed. 1995), at para. 562; Schmittoff, 
Export Trade (9th ed. 1990), at p. 26. This view also followed in Colley v. Overseas Exporters [1921] 
3 KB 302, where MacCardie J. held that the risk passed to the buyer when the seller placed the goods 
safely on board the vessel. 
29 See (INCOTERMS 1990 ed. F.O.B., A2). 
30 The same view has been taken by Professor Feltham; see J.D. Feltham, "The United Nations 
Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods ", (1991) Journal of Business Law 413, at 
423. 
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Time for delivery 
The CISG's provisions concerning delivery time have been set in Article 33 under 
which the seller is bound to deliver the goods sold: 
"(a) if a date is fixed by or determinable from the contract, on that date; 
(b) if a period of time is fixed or determinable from the contract, at any time 
within that period unless circumstances indicate that the buyer is to choose a 
date; or 
(c) in any other case, within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the 
contract." 
Both clauses (a) and (b) of this Article reiterate the parties' autonomy in providing 
the time for delivery of the goods by the seller in the contract. Usually the parties 
will agree on the time of delivery in their contract; however, the delivery time can 
also be determinable from the contract if it follows from the established practices or 
usage impliedly made applicable. 
Article 33(b) is similar to Article 13 of the 1905 Scandinavian Sale of Goods 
Act and the English law of sale, and covers cases in which the parties fix a period of 
time within which the delivery is to take place. In such instances, it is, generally, the 
seller who is to choose the time for delivery within that period. Delivery must take 
place by the end of this period. During the period he can discharge his obligation by 
delivering the goods sold and obliging the buyer to take them into his possession. In 
other words, agreement on a period of time often gives the seller the necessary 
flexibility to prepare the goods for delivery and arrange the transport. 
On the other hand, if the circumstances of the contract indicate that the buyer is 
to choose the delivery date, the seller must deliver at the date chosen by the buyer. 
This will be the case where the buyer himself has to arrange for the transportation of 
the goods purchased. Accordingly, the buyer's responsibility, as in the F.O.B. clause, 
to charter a vessel or reserve the necessary space on board a vessel should be taken as 
an indication that the buyer may choose a date of delivery within the agreed period. 
If, for any other reason, e.g. the capacity of his warehouse, the buyer needs to fix 
an exact date to receive the goods purchased, he should reserve the right to choose 
the date of delivery. In such instances, the buyer has to send the necessary shipping 
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instructions to the seller within a reasonable period of time before the time of 
delivery allowing the seller to deliver on time. 
Article 33(c) covers cases where there is no agreement between the parties as to the 
time of delivery and no date or period is determinable from the contract or from 
practices or usage. This Article, which corresponds to the respective rules of 
numerous domestic laws, such as section 2- 309(1) of the UCC and section 29(3) of 
the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, provides that the seller, in such instances, must 
deliver within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the contract.31 What is 
reasonable time is a question of fact, which may differ from one case to another. It 
seems that the provisions of Article 33(c) are also applicable to the cases where the 
contract calls on the seller to deliver in an unascertained time, such as "as soon as 
possible ". Since the circumstances which play a part in construing such an 
unascertained term as "as soon as possible" are also determined by such factors as 
how much time the arrangement of transportation requires; how long it takes for the 
seller to procure or if he is also the manufacturer to produce the goods sold, and so 
forth. Similarly, it may be argued that the rule in Article 33(c) should also cover . the 
cases where the time of delivery has been tied to the occurrence of an uncertain event 
so as to require the seller to perform his obligation within a reasonable time after 
entering into the sale with the buyer. This approach also complies with the general 
principle of good faith which, following Article 7(1), must be observed in the 
interpretation of the CISG.32 Finally, the same rule should apply to the cases where 
the right for fixing of a date for delivery is given to the buyer or to a third person by 
the contract but he fails to do so within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the 
" In contrast with these provisions, Iranian law, like the German system (BGB, Article 271(1)), 
provides for immediate delivery of the goods by the seller after conclusion of the sale between the 
parties. The hardship of such provisions, under the latter system, is somewhat modified by applying 
the principle of the good faith in relationships between the parties whereby the special circumstances 
of the particular case have to be considered. See Schlechtriem, The Sellers Obligation Under the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in H. Smith, 
International Sales (New York, 1984), Ch. 6, pp. 6 -16. 
32 For the full text of Article 7 of the CISG, see Appendix V. 
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contract, i.e., the seller must deliver within a reasonable time after the buyer's failure 
to fix the time for delivery. It may be argued that the seller in such instances should 
be discharged from the obligation to deliver the goods where he has not received a 
notice from the buyer fixing a date for delivery within a reasonable time after the 
conclusion of the contract. Nonetheless, this argument does not comply with the 
parties' common will to preserve the sale by performance of their respective 
obligations under it. Where, however, the period within which the buyer can 
determine the date for delivery is limited under the contract, the seller may discharge 
himself from any liability for not performing the contract if the buyer fails to choose 
a date of delivery within that period. 
In contrast with French law,33 the CISG does not require the buyer to give notice 
to the seller requiring him to deliver the goods at the time fixed in the contract. In 
other words, like both common law and the Iranian legal systems, the mere delay by 
the seller in performing his obligation to deliver is sufficient to allow the buyer to 
discharge himself from further liability under the sale and to resort to the remedies 
provided by the CISG for breach of the contract. The same rule is applicable to the 
cases where, because of the parties' failure to agree on a fixed delivery date, the 
seller is obliged to deliver the goods within a reasonable time after making of the 
contract with the buyer. Nonetheless, this rule does not apply where the contract call 
upon the seller to deliver "on request" or "as required" or on similar terms in which 
case the seller has no obligation to deliver before receiving a notice from the buyer 
asking him to do so. As in English law, however, once the seller receives such a 
notice he must deliver on the time fixed by the buyer in the notice provided that it is 
not unreasonable under circumstances of the case. 
In accordance with Article 52(1) of CISG in the case of early delivery of the 
goods the buyer has an option either to take delivery or refuse to take delivery. This 
rule is consistent with English law, under which delivery of the goods before the date 
set in the contract is considered as breach of the contract which entitles the buyer to 
reject the goods where he wishes to do so. This rule, however, seems to be defective 
33 See p. 102, ante. 
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as there is no justifiable ground why the buyer should not be bound to take delivery 
of the goods in such instances where it does not cause any unreasonable 
inconvenience to him, particularly as he may demand compensation from the seller 
for any damage which he has suffered as a consequence of taking delivery of the 
goods before the date fixed in the contract.34 This approach is consistent with the 
principle of good faith under Article 7(1) of the CISG which the parties are required 
to observe in performance of their respective obligations. 
The CISG does not state whether the seller may redeliver the goods at the 
contractual date where, following Article 52(1) of the CISG, the buyer refuses to take 
delivery of the goods delivered before the date fixed by the parties. The answer to 
this question seems to be positive as it is unreasonable to hold the seller liable for 
breach of the contract whilst he is able and willing to perform his duty to deliver in 
conformity with the contractual terms. 
Quantity of the goods delivered 
Like the respective rules of many local jurisdiction, such as Iranian, French and 
English law, Article 35(1) of the CISG requires the seller to deliver the correct 
quantity of goods.3s 
According to Article 52(2) of the CISG: 
"If the seller delivers quantity of goods greater than that provided for in the 
contract, the buyer may take delivery or refuse to take delivery of the excess 
quantity. If the buyer takes delivery of all or part of the excess quantity, he must 
pay for it at the contract rate." 
In other words, unlike US, English, and French law, the CISG in such instances 
rightly binds the buyer to take delivery of the goods included in the contract, whilst 
allowing him to refuse or to take delivery of all or part of the excess quantity. It is 
irrational to allow the buyer to reject the whole goods delivered simply because their 
39 For the case decided under CISG see, United Nations General Assembly, 
A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 1996) Case 141 p. 10. 
3' For the full text of this Article, see Appendix V. 
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quantity is larger than the contractual amount and then to sue the seller for non- 
delivery whilst he has an opportunity to take delivery of the amount provided in the 
contract. On the other hand, it is equally wrong, in such instances, to force the buyer 
either to accept or to reject the whole amount delivered to him if for any reason he 
does not wish to take delivery of the excess in quantity. 
The CISG's provision requiring the buyer to accept the goods included in the 
contract if the amount is identical to that of Iranian law. But whilst, Article 384 of the 
Iranian Code states that excess in quantity belongs to the seller, the CISG grants the 
buyer an option to reject the excess or take delivery of all or part of it and pay 
additional price at the contract rate for that part of the excess which is accepted by 
him. Delivery of the excess in quantity by the seller could be regarded as an offer to 
sell all or any part of it to the buyer at the contract rate that can be accepted by the 
latter. Considering the high cost of returning of the excess in quantity of goods 
delivered to the seller in an international sale, it appears reasonable to let the buyer to 
accept the excess in quantity or any part of it at the contractual rate. Nonetheless, 
these grounds seem unconvincing, and therefore the buyer's option under the CISG 
unjustifiably favour him in those cases where both the excess in quantity and the 
market price of the goods delivered are substantially higher than what provided for in 
the contract. This is so, particularly if there is evidence which indicates that the buyer 
knew or he should not reasonably have been unaware that the seller has mistakenly 
delivered the excess in quantity to him. However, given the fact that the other 
provisions of the CISG generally favour the seller, the buyer's option in such a rare 
instances may be justifiable. 
Unlike the various European Civil Law Codes, Article 37 of the CISG rightly 
permits the seller who delivers before the date for performance, to deliver up to that 
date a missing part or a missing quantity of the goods provided that "exercise of this 
right does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable 
expense ".36 The rule is further progress towards maintaining of the contract and 
promoting of the principles of fairness and good faith in national and international 
36 For the full text of this Article, see Appendix V. 
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trade.37 Nonetheless, the application of this rule has been restricted by the provisions 
of Article 52 (1), under which the buyer may refuse to take delivery of the goods 
delivered before the date fixed in the contract. It seems that there is little or no 
reasonable ground for not requiring the buyer to take the delivery of the goods which 
have been delivered before the date fixed in the contract if it causes no unreasonable 
inconvenience to him and if he can recover any damages caused by the early 
performance, while in the event of non -refusal of early performance he is bound to 
allow the seller to deliver the missing part of the goods or remedy their non- 
conformity up to the date of delivery and in some circumstances even after the date 
for delivery under Article 48. Under these provisions of Article 52(1), the rule in 
Article 37 applies only to the cases where either the parties have set a period 
allowing the seller to deliver at any time within that period, or where the buyer has 
not refused to take delivery of the goods delivered before the time agreed between 
the parties. However, it seems that even in the event of the buyer's refusal of an early 
performance by the seller, the latter may still be able to integrate the delivered goods 
with any missing part and to redeliver them at the time of delivery fixed in the 
contract. In other words, the seller's violation in early performance of the contract 
should not be construed as a fundamental breach of the contract, in the sense of 
Article 27 CISG, so as to entitle the buyer to avoid the contract and thereby to 
deprive the seller from redelivering of the goods at the time fixed in the contract. 
In contrast with Iranian law,38 under which any shortfall in quantity of the goods 
entitles the buyer either to cancel the sale or accept the goods delivered and pay for 
them at the contract rate, Article 51(1) of the CISG 39 states that the seller's breach in 
such circumstances triggers the uniform remedies under Article 46 and the following 
for the shortfall,40 whilst the buyer is bound to pay for the delivered part of the goods 
at the contractual rate.41 
37 Bianca, Cure before date for delivery, in Bianca -Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales 
Law (Giuffré . Milan. 1987) p. 37. 
38 See further p. 114 -115, ante. 
39 For the full text of this Article, see Appendix V. 
49 These remedies entitle the buyer either to claim damages for the shortfall under Article 46(3), to fix 
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As in French and English law, the buyer may avoid the contract in its entirety 
only if the shortfall constitutes fundamental breach of the contract,' and if he gives 
notice to the seller specifying the nature of the breach within a reasonable time after 
he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it.43 This was the case, for example, 
where a German seller not only failed to deliver the goods within the contractual 
time, but also refused to do so within an additional period of two weeks set by the 
Egyptian buyer for delivery. Instead, the seller shortly after that period offered the 
buyer shipment of the goods against advanced payment. The buyer refused this offer 
and seven weeks after fixing the additional delivery period declared the contract 
avoided. The German court considering the CISG, held that the buyer was right to do 
so. According to the court, the seller had breached the contract by refusing to deliver 
the goods within the time fixed by the contract (Art. 33(b) of CISG), thus giving the 
buyer to fix an additional period of time (Arts. 49(1)(b) and 47(1) of CISG). 
Consequently, the buyer was entitled to avoid the contract even if the additional 
period of two weeks was perhaps too short for delivery. 44 A Russian tribunal reached 
a similar decision under CISG against the Russian seller who failed to carry out his 
obligation of delivery of a specific quantity of chemical products within a period of 
time specified in the contract (fourth quarter of 1992) with a German buyer. In this 
case the buyer from January to May 1993 repeatedly demanded that the seller deliver 
the goods sold and informed his readiness to extend the time limit for delivery. In 
May 1993, the buyer avoided the contract with the seller and purchased replacement 
an additional period of time for delivery of the shortfall under Article 47(1), or to avoid the contract 
with respect of the shortfall under Article 49(2)(b)(ii) if the seller fails to deliver within that additional 
period. For a detail discussion of these remedies, see pp. 162 -179, post. 
4' For example, in one case the court, applying the CISG, held the defendant, a German seller, to be 
responsible to refund the buyer the price of the three missing printing machines at the contractual rate. 
See, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 1996) pp. 6 -7. 
42 See, CISG, Article 51(2). 
43 See, CISG, Article 39. 
44 United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 1996) pp. 6 -7. The 
court further found that the fact that the seller had offered shipment against advance payment was 
irrelevant since advance payment of the full contract price was contrary to the contractual terms 
agreed between the parties concerned. Ibid. 
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goods from a third person for those specified in the original contract. The tribunal 
decided that as a result of the seller's breach the buyer was entitled to avoid the 
contract and to apply for damages caused by the breach.' 
Further restriction for the buyer's ability to avoid under the CISG has been 
imposed by Articles 34, 37 and 48 which, in certain circumstances, grant the seller a 
right to cure the lack of conformity in the goods before the buyer can avoid the 
contract. Nonetheless, unlike the French system, where the buyer under the CISG is 
entitled to avoid the contract he needs not to obtain a court's authority to do so. 
The seller's right to cure 
The seller's right to cure a non -conforming tender prior to the date of performance is 
found in CISG Articles 34 and 37. These Articles, like UCC' and English law47 give 
the seller an unfettered right to cure any non-conformity in documents of sale or 
performance if the seller has delivered the documents or non -conforming goods prior 
to the contractual date for delivery.48 But the right under both those Articles is limited 
to the cure that is effected before the date for delivery fixed in the contract and, 
unlike the latter system, can only be exercised if it "does not cause the buyer 
unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense." In any case, the buyer retains 
the right to claim damages. In fact, the purpose of the rules in both Articles 34 and 37 
is to save the contract from destruction on technical and trivial grounds without 
disturbing the balance of the parties' respective interests in dealing with each other. 
45 United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 1996) Case 140, 
pp. 9 -10. 
46 UCC, Section 2- 508(1). 
47 Barry Nicholas, "The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law" (1989) 105 Law Quaterly 
Review 201, 224. 
48 See CISG, Articles 34 and 37. 
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Like the UCC,49 the CISG under certain conditions permits the seller to cure the 
lack of conformity in the goods after the date for delivery. Accordingly, Article 48(1) 
of the CISG states: 
"Subject to Article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at 
his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without 
unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience 
or uncertainty or reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the 
buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in 
this Convention." 
As can be seen, this article starts with the words, "subject to Article 49, the seller 
may ... remedy .... ". Article 49 grants the buyer a right to avoid the contract where 
the seller's failure to perform any of his obligation amounts to a fundamental breach 
of the contract, or where the seller has failed to deliver the goods within the 
additional period of time fixed by the buyer or has declared that he will not deliver 
within the period so fixed.50 This means that the seller's right to cure the lack of 
conformity in the goods delivered after the date for delivery depends on whether the 
buyer has rightfully avoided the transaction in accordance with Article 49. 
Accordingly, in contrast with section 2- 508(2) of the UCC whereby the seller's right 
to cure depends on whether he reasonably believed that a non -conforming tender was 
acceptable, under the CISG the seller may cure only if two conditions are met, 
namely, the buyer has not rightfully avoided the contract and that curing the non- 
conformity would not cause him unreasonable inconvenience. 
Nonetheless, the condition of non -avoidance raises the fundamental question of 
whether the buyer's right to avoid the sale under Article 49 or the seller's right to 
cure under Article 48 should prevail. Under Article 44(1)51 of the Draft Convention 
the seller is allowed to cure a late or non -conforming tender "unless the buyer has 
declared the contract avoided in accordance with Article 45." This provision, which 
favoured a buyer's right to avoid, was of concern to numerous delegates at the 
49 See pp. 52 -61, ante. 
5° For the full provisions of Article 49 of the CISG , see Appendix V. 
51 For the full provisions of Article 44(1) of the Draft Convention, see Appendix V. 
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Conference who sought delete these limiting words.' After considering three 
alternative proposals, the Conference finally adopted Article 48(1) of the CISG 
which begins with the words "Subject to Article 49, the seller may... remedy.... "53 
Referring to this procedure, Professor Honnold argues that the change in words 
leaves little doubt that the seller's right to cure prevails over the buyer's right to 
avoid.54 To find otherwise, he maintains, would make meaningless the seller's right 
to cure.55 Professor Honnold's view is not shared by other prominent authors, such as 
Professor Ziegel who argues that: 
"there is no requirement in the Convention requiring an injured party to give a 
breaching party an opportunity to cure before exercising the right of 
avoidance. "56 
Neither of these views, however, seems satisfactory in its entirety. To give the buyer 
an unqualified right to avoid the contract immediately under Article 49(1)(a) without 
paying the slightest attention to the seller's ability and willingness to replace or 
repair the defects in the goods delivered even if his ability and willingness have been 
expressly confirmed, can hardly be a justifiable approach: under this approach the 
buyer is the only person who by deciding the fate of the contract can equally 
determine the seller's right to cure. In other words, this approach would put the seller 
at the buyer's mercy and empowers the latter to speculate without observing his duty 
52 See, United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (Vienna, 10 
March -11 April 1980), Official Records, New York, 1981, at 341 -44, 351 -53. 
53 See, Ziegel, "Buyer's Remedies", in International Sales (Galeston and Smith ed. 1984) § 9.03 at 9- 
22. 
54 J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Conventions, note 
1, at § 296. 
55 Ibid. at 312 n. 16. Honnold argues: 
"Avoidance under Art. 49(1) is applicable to a wide range of circumstances 
other than cure, whereas the cure provisions of Art. 48(1) could be frustrated by 
an unqualified application of Art. 49(1). In such situations, a general provision 
yields to a specific. The same result follows from the conclusion that an offer to 
cure prevents a breach from becoming `fundamental'. 
56 Ziegel, Buyer's Remedies, in International Sales (Galeston and Smith, eds., 1984) § 9.03 at 9 -23. 
See further, Barry Nicholas, "The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law" (1989) 105 Law 
Quaterly Review 201, 224. 
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to mitigate losses under Article 77. On the other hand, it is equally untenable and 
even dangerous to prevent the buyer from avoiding the contract until the seller makes 
known that he is able or willing to cure. For this approach puts the buyer in a 
completely paralysed situation. He has to wait and see and lose time before he can 
take any action. He has to go out of his way, making efforts to investigate whether he 
is likely to have a real chance of receiving an effort to cure. He is put at the mercy of 
a distant seller who may or may not be communicative or co- operative. Such an 
interpretation would be inconsistent with the obligation of good faith under Article 7, 
which is to be observed in an international sale. Similarly, this interpretation is 
inconsistent with the requirement of Articles 49(2)(a) and 49(2)(I) under which the 
buyer will lose his right to avoid the contract where he fails to do so within a 
reasonable time after he knew or ought to have known of the breach. Presumably 
because under this interpretation the buyer should wait a reasonable time to clarify 
whether the seller is able or willing to cure while by the end of this time he will lose 
the right to avoid the contract for the fundamental breach. 
Perhaps a more convincing approach is to require the buyer to refrain from 
avoiding the contract for a while only if he has a clear ground to suggest that the 
seller will cure. Such a ground is obtainable from prior experience with the seller, 
from a special notice, or from general conditions of the contract. This solution serves 
the interests of both parties by freeing an aggrieved buyer who has already suffered 
the seller's fundamental breach of contract from the entire range of uncertainties as to 
the same seller's ability and willingness to cure, and meanwhile requiring him to 
respect the seller's right to cure when there is a reasonable indication that he will 
cure. 
As mentioned above, unlike the UCC the seller's right to cure after the time for 
delivery depends on a second condition namely, he must be able to cure without 
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience. In the words of Article 48(1), the 
seller may cure any lack of conformity in the goods delivered "if he can do so 
without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of the expenses 
advanced by the buyer." Delay and uncertainty of reimbursement used in this Article 
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are two common examples of inconvenience to the buyer. What is unreasonable 
inconvenience is a question of fact which may vary from case to case. 
When the all conditions mentioned above are satisfied, how the seller will 
exercise his right to cure depends on the type of his failure and on the nature of the 
goods. Usually cure takes place by repairing or replacing deficient part of the goods 
or by delivering the shortfall in their quantities. 
Where the time for delivery has passed and all or part of the goods do not arrive 
in time, the question arises whether and if so how the delay in delivery can be cured. 
Of course, time that has passed cannot be recalled.57 But the question here is not 
"curing a delay" which indeed is impossible, rather it concerns how to cure the non- 
performance of the obligation to deliver which is certainly feasible. Accordingly, 
where the delivery time is not so essential as to eliminate or to reduce substantially 
the use of the goods delivered after that time for the buyer, belated delivery by the 
seller will effectively and wholly remedy the grievance. 
Where the seller fails to fulfil the conditions set in paragraph (1) of Article 48, 
he may still cure any non -conformity under paragraphs (2) to (4) of the same Article. 
To do so, he must send to the buyer either a request (paragraph (2)) or a notice 
(paragraph (3)) both of which are effective only if received by the buyer. In 
accordance with Paragraph (2), the seller's request must contain a question asking the 
buyer to clarify whether he will accept late performance within the period specified 
in the request. The buyer's failure to reply to the seller's inquiry within a reasonable 
time after receiving either the request or the notice allows the latter to cure within the 
period of time specified in the notice or in the request and therefore, the buyer will be 
bared from resorting to any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the 
seller. 
Pursuant to Article 46 (2) of the, the buyer may demand substitute goods upon 
showing that the seller's tender constitutes fundamental breach. At the Vienna 
Conference, the US delegation raised the issue of whether, under the draft 
57 See Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
supra., note 1 at p. 310. 
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Convention, the seller's right to cure by repair prevailed over the buyer's right to 
require substitute goods.58 Professor Fransworth from US asked: 
"[w]hat would happen if the buyer, claiming his rights under [Draft] article 42 
required substitute goods and the seller, basing himself on [Draft] article 44, 
offered to remedy [by repair] ? "59 
It seemed reasonable to the US delegation that the buyer's right to substitute goods 
subordinate to the seller's right to cure and they proposed an amendment to make this 
clear.60 But the Conference, rejecting this proposal, adopted the final language of 
CISG Article 48(1) which makes the seller's right to cure a late or non -conforming 
fundamental breach dependent only on whether he can do so within a reasonable time 
without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty about 
reimbursement of expenses. By adoption of this language the question of whether 
the CISG places a serious limit on the seller's right to cure by giving the buyer the 
right to dictate the terms of the cure under Article 48 with a demand for substitute 
goods has been left open to debate. 
Professor Honnold suggests that the question of whether a breach is fundamental 
should be decided in the light of all circumstances including the effect of a rightful 
offer to cure.ó1 He maintains that where "cure is feasible and an offer of cure can be 
expected, one cannot conclude that the breach is "fundamental".62 If this construction 
were correct, then there would be no fundamental breach to enable the buyer to 
demand performance by replacement under Article 46(2) in so far as the seller could 
cure. Similarly, this construction would bar the buyer from avoiding the contract 
under Article 49 (1). However, this construction does not seem to be correct, since it 
58 See, United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (Vienna, 10 
March -11 April 1980), Official Records, New York, 1981, at p. 344. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. at p. 114. "Revise the first sentence of paragraph (1) of article 44 to read as follows: (1) Unless 
the buyer has declared the contract avoided in accordance with article 45 and regardless of any right 
of the buyer under article 42 the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy ...." 
61 See, Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention 
supra., note 1, at pp. 214 -312. 
6' Ibid. at p. 312. 
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renders the buyer's right to require substitute goods under Article virtually 
meaningless by restricting its scope of application to the few cases where repair is 
impossible. Such a reduction was certainly not in the mind of the drafters, who had 
originally dedicated all of Article 46 to the right to require substitute goods.63 
An opposite view has been taken by Professor Schlechtriem who contends that 
in the case of fundamental breach the seller's rights to cure should yield to the 
buyer's right to require substitute goods.64 This view can view can be reinforced by 
the fact that pursuant to Article 77 of the CISG the buyer in choosing his remedy 
must observe the duty to mitigate losses.65 Now if the seller can meet the buyer's 
expectations to the same degree both by repairing and by delivering substitute goods, 
then the decisive consideration will be costs and as a consequence, the buyer cannot 
demand substitute goods if the costs of disposing of the goods delivered and 
replacing them are higher than those of repair. 
The buyer's remedies for breach of the contract under the CISG 
Under the CISG the notion of breach of the contract covers all failures of a party to 
perform any of his obligations arising from the contract, a usage of trade or the CISG 
itself. This means that, unlike many civil law codifications, as well as English law 
63 See, Secretariat's Commentary, United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Interational Sales 
of Goods (Vienna, 10 March -11 April 1980), Official Records, I, New York, 1981, at p. 38 -39; see 
also United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (Vienna, 10 March 
-11 April 1980), Official Records, II, New York, 1981, at p. 332 -333. 
64 See, P. Schlechtriem, "The Seller's Obligations Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods ", in Galston N.M. -Smit H. (Ed.), International Sales: The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (New York: M. Bender, 1984), 
Ch. 6, pp. 6 -29. 
65 See, however, H. Kastely, "The right to require performance in International Sales: Towards an 
International interpretation of the Vienna Convention" (1988) 63 Washington Law Review 607 . 
Professor Kastely refers to "the language of Article 77, the structure of the Convention, and the 
Convention's drafting history" and concludes that this article is applicable only to a damages claim 
and, therefore, it does not bar the buyer from choosing any of his remedial rights under the CISG. 
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which, distinguish between various types of violation of contract, the CISG, like US 
law, acknowledges only one notion of breach. Accordingly, contrary to many 
national laws, such as the Iranian, English and French systems, the CISG provides a 
unique and coherent system of remedies with many similarities to and just as many 
points of departure from, national remedial systems. Clearly, the method adopted by 
the CISG simplifies the law for the parties to understand and thereby promotes 
certainty among them. 
The CISG contains two alternative remedial systems. In one, the exchange 
contemplated by the contract is completed despite the breach by the seller. The goods 
end up with the buyer and the seller receives the price, either because the seller 
performs his obligation to deliver (although defectively) or because the court orders 
him to deliver. Monetary damages66 or a reduction in the contractual price67 
compensate the aggrieved buyer for ways in which the completed exchange falls 
short of that contemplated. 
In the CISG's other scheme the exchange is not completed through avoidance of 
the contract by the aggrieved buyer with the consequence that the buyer does not end 
up with the seller's goods and the seller has no right to the price from the buyer. In 
other words, if the contract is avoided the contemplated exchange either will not 
occur or it will be undone, triggering remedial provisions very similar to the Article 2 
remedies of the UCC that apply when goods are not accepted or acceptance is 
revoked.68 Thus the buyer who avoids a contract governed by the CISG can escape a 
bad bargain or look for coveró9 or market price differential damages70 to compensate 
for a lost favourable exchange. 
Ibid., at pp. 620 -621. 
66 For a case under the CISG in this respect: see United Nations General Assembly, 
A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 1996) Case 141, pp. 10 -11. 
67 CISG, Article 50. As to the importance of the remedy of the price reduction under this Article, see 
Peter Schlechtriem, "Some Observations on the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods" in The Frontiers of Liability (Oxford University Press, 1994), vol. 2 (P. 
Birks, ed.) 29, 44-45. 
68 See pp. 61 -79, ante. 
69 See CISG, Article 75. 
70 CISG, Article 76. 
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The key to the CISG's rules regarding avoidance is "fundamental breach." If the 
seller's failure to perform any of his obligation amounts to a fundamental breach, the 
buyer will have a right to avoid the contract." Subject to one exception," if the seller 
has not committed a fundamental breach, the aggrieved buyer may not avoid the 
contract. Accordingly, the role of the notion of "fundamental breach" concerning the 
aggrieved buyer to avoid under the CISG is almost similar to that of breach of an 
express warranty with a serious consequence for the buyer or breach of "condition" 
notion in English law under which the buyer may reject the goods.73 
The CISG defines "fundamental breach in terms of materiality and foreseeability 
of its consequences -that is the breach is "fundamental if it results in such detriment to 
the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under 
the contract," provided this result is foreseeable.' This was the case, for example, in 
one case, where an Italian manufacturer had agreed to produce 130 pairs of shoes in 
accordance with specifications provided by the German buyer to be used as a basis 
for further orders from him. At a trade fair, the producer displayed some shoes 
produced in conformity with those specifications and bearing the same trademark of 
which the buyer was the licensee. One day after the manufacturer refused to remove 
those shoes from the trade fair as demanded by the buyer, the latter advised the 
manufacturer by telex that he determined to discontinue the relationship and would 
not pay for the 130 sample shoes as they were no longer of any value to the buyer. 
The German court of appeal found the CISG was the applicable law of the contract, 
and held that the buyer had timely and effectively avoided the contract. The court 
argued that the seller's breach of the ancillary duty of preserving exclusivity 
constituted a fundamental breach of the contract under Article 25 of the CISG for it 
" CISG, Article 49(1)(a). 
72 This exception is the CISG's Nachfrist provisions under Article 49(1)(b) which will be discussed 
latter in this chapter. 
73 See pp. 22 -24, ante. 
74 See, CISG, Article 25 
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endangered the purpose of the contract to such a degree that, as was foreseeable to 
the manufacturer, the buyer had no more interest in the contract.75 
Whether or not the contract is avoided, the CISG, like the French system, allows 
an aggrieved buyer also to claim damages caused by the breach. But unlike the 
French and other civil law systems, the remedy of damages under the CISG is 
independent of any fault on the part of the seller. In other words, here the CISG 
follows the Anglo -US law approach whereby any objective breach by the seller to 
perform any of his obligation enables the buyer to apply for damages. This means 
that the buyer, unlike the civilian tradition, will unfortunately be deprived from 
recovering those damages which were not foreseeable at the time of the contract even 
if they are caused by the seller's intentional breach of the contract. 76 
Specific performance and remedies where the buyer retains the goods 
As mentioned above, tinder Article 49(1)(a) of the CISG, a fundamental breach by 
the seller provides the buyer with a right to avoid the contract. Like rejection of the 
goods for breach of condition under English law, avoidance terminates the obligation 
to exchange goods for price and triggers the aggrieved buyer's right to cover or 
market -price damages. There is, however, no provision in the CISG to require an 
aggrieved buyer to avoid the contract where a fundamental breach has occurred. This 
means, that even in the case of fundamental breach the buyer may opt for the set of 
remedies that contemplate completion of the basic exchange. 
Where the goods are in possession of the buyer, non -avoidance produces results 
similar to those of English sale law where the buyer elects to treat the breach of the 
condition as a breach of warranty by not rejecting of the goods," and to those under 
Article 2 of the UCC where the buyer has accepted and not revoked, that is the seller 
75 See, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /1 (17 May 1993) Case 1 pp. 
2 -3; Uniform Law Review, 1991, I, 382. 
76 See J.D. Feltham, "The United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of 
Goods ", (1981) Journal of Business Law 346, at pp. 358 -359. 
77 See English Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 11(4). See further, pp. 24 -25, ante. 
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has a right to the price,78 the buyer keeps the goods and recovers damages for the 
damages caused by the breach.79 However, under the CISG, like various civilian 
legal systems, the non -avoiding buyer who receives non -conforming goods has 
certain remedies not available under Anglo-US law. For instance, the buyer may 
demand substitute goods when non -conformity constitutes a fundamental breach.80 In 
addition, the buyer may require the seller to repair any lack of conformity unless that 
would be unreasonable in the circumstances surrounding the case.81 Finally, pursuant 
to Article 50 of the CISG, a non -avoiding buyer may reduce the price in proportion 
to the loss in value caused by a lack of conformity in the goods.' In 1989, for 
example, an Italian seller claimed the balance of amounts due under the contract for 
the sale of shoes to the German buyer. The German buyer counterclaimed a price 
reduction for lack of conformity in the goods with the specification provided in the 
contract. Referring to the German private international law, the court found that the 
CISG as part of Italian law was applicable to the contract and held that the buyer, 
pursuant to Article 50 of CISG, was entitled to reduce the price of the goods in the 
same proportion as the value that the goods actually delivered had at the time of 
delivery bore to the value which conforming goods would have had at that time. 83 
78 See, CISG, Article 62; UCC, Section 2- 709(1)(a). 
79 For the full provisions of Article 74 of the CISG , see Appendix V. 
80 See CISG, Article 46(2). 
8' See CISG, Article 46(3). 
Under Article 2 of the UCC, the court may issue an order instructing the seller to remedy a non- 
conformity in the goods delivered where the circumstances justify specific performance under section 
2- 716(1). See, e.g., Colorado -Ute Elec. Ass's v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152 (D.colo.1981). 
The court's power to order specific performance may also include the power to require delivery of 
substitute goods if, for instance, the seller was the sole source of supply, and the goods which he had 
delivered could not be repaired. Unlike the remedies provided in Article 46(2) and (3) of the CISG, 
however, an order requiring the repair or delivery of substitute goods under Article 2 of the UCC is 
presumably limited to situations falling within section 2- 716(1) that is, "where the goods are unique 
or in other proper circumstances." 
82 For a detailed discussion of the price reduction remedy under Article 50: see Bergsten & Miller, 
"The Remedy of Reduction of Price "(1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 255. 
83 United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 1994) Case 46 pp. 2 -3; 
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An aggrieved buyer's non -avoidance option under Article 46(1) of the CISG 
entitles him to require the seller to perform or to complete the performance of any of 
his obligations undertaken under the contract. This means that irrespective of 
whether the seller has failed to deliver or he has delivered non -conforming goods, the 
buyer may avail himself of the non -avoidance scheme of remedies under which 
goods are to be exchanged for a price. 
Despite the broad language of Article 46(1), an aggrieved buyer's right to 
performance is subject to several significant limitations. The first major limitation on 
the buyer's right to compel the seller to perform his obligation has been imposed by 
the provision of Article 46(1) itself This provision, unlike French law,84 states that 
the right to performance cannot be enforced if the buyer has resorted to an 
inconsistent alternative remedy. Accordingly, the buyer who avoids the contract 
under Article 49 will lose his right to require performance by the seller of his 
obligation, in which case the buyer may seek only damages.85 Similarly, the buyer 
who has "reduced the price" under Article 50 cannot avail himself of the remedy of 
specific performance. 
The second important limitation to the buyer's right of specific performance 
derives from Article 28 of the CISG which states: 
"a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific performance unless the 
court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not 
governed by this Convention." 
The word "would" in this Article indicates that the court must order specific 
performance only if the domestic law of the forum court requires an order of specific 
performance in a similar contract of sale.8ó This means that the court may reject the 
Referred to by Piltz in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1994, p. 1101. 
84 See p. 90, ante. 
85 See Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: Some Common Law 
Perspectives, in International Sales: The United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the 
International Sales of Goods (1984) at p. 9 -9. 
86 The CISG's various limitations on the right to performance would apply even if the court's 
domestic law would allow specific performance: see J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales 
Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, supra., note 1 § 195, at p. 225. 
167 
buyer's application under the CISG to obtain specific performance, even if it is 
authorised (but not required) under its domestic law to order specific performance of 
a similar contract. The negative phrasing of Article 28, on the other hand, suggests 
that the court, under the CISG, has discretion to issue an order compelling the 
breaching seller to perform specifically the contract even if the domestic law of the 
forum court does not require an order of specific performance in similar instances.87 
In fact, the purpose of the drafters in adopting Article 28's provision was to avoid 
forcing national courts to issue orders, which were not authorised or were considered 
unwise under domestic laws. Accordingly, the outcome of an action to obtain a 
decree of specific relief by the buyer under the CISG will depend not only on the 
geographical location of the court before which the action is being brought but also 
on the discretionary view of an individual trial judge who considers the case. 
Regretfully, both of these factors are inconsistent with the declared goal of the CISG 
to establish uniformity and certainty in the law governing international sales. 
In addition to the express limitations within Articles 46 and 28, Article 7 
implicitly requires that the right to performance be exercised in good faith. Under 
this Article in interpreting the CISG, regard should be had to "the observance of good 
faith in international trade. "88 Although, the principle of good faith is not clearly 
defined and its placement in the CISG is problematic,89 it is appropriate to interpret 
the buyer's right to performance granted in Article 46 consistently with the general 
obligation of good faith so as to prevent him from inflicting undue pain or 
punishment on the breaching party. This may prove to be a significant limitation 
where, for example, the buyer delays an action for performance in order to speculate 
on the market, or where he pursues specific performance for the purpose of harassing 
87 Gonzalez, "Remedies Under the U.N. Convention for the International Sale of Goods" (1984) 2 
International Tax & Business Law, 79 at p. 97. But see J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International 
Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, supra., note 1 § 195, at p. 225. 
88 For the full provisions of Article 7 of the Vienna CISG, see Appendix V. 
89 See Eörsi, "General Provisions" in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1984) at pp. 2 -1, 2 -6 to 2 -8. 
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the breaching seller or in circumstances where specific performance will be 
particularly onerous to the latter.90 
The buyer's option to avoid the contract 
As mentioned above, under Article 49(1) of the CISG, the buyer has a right to avoid 
the contract whenever the seller commits a fundamental breach91 or fails to deliver in 
response to a Nachfrist ultimatum under Article 47.9' 
Nachfrist is a procedure through which an aggrieved party can make the other 
side's failure to perform its basic obligations by a particular date the equivalent of 
fundamental breach.93 For example, in a contract for the sale of nine used printing 
machines the German seller agreed to deliver upon two shipments, the first including 
six and the second three machines to the buyer in Egypt. Concerning the containing 
three machines, after the seller's failure to deliver on the contractual date, the buyer 
fixed a final period of two weeks of delivery. The seller having declined to deliver 
within that period, offered shortly afterwards to deliver on a new contractual term 
namely, against advanced payment of the price. The buyer refused this and declared 
the contract avoided as far as the missing machines were concerned. The court found 
that the CISG was applicable as both parties had their places of business in different 
CISG contracting States, and argued that the seller had breached the contract by not 
delivering the machines within the time fixed by the contract (Article 33(b), thus 
giving the buyer the right to fix an additional period of time under Articles 49(1)(b) 
and to declare the contract avoided after the seller's failure to deliver within the 
90 See J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
supra., note 1 § 95, at p. 125, § 193, at pp. 222 -23, § 285, at p. 302. 
91 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 
1994) Case 50 pp. 4 -5. 
92 See, J.D. Feltham, "The United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of 
Goods ", (1981) Journal of Business Law 346, at 355 -356 
93 See, F.M.B. Reynolds Q.C., "A Note of Caution" in The Frontiers of Liability (Oxford University 
Press, 1994), vol.2 (P. Birks ed.) 18, 22. 
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additional period.' On the other hand, where the German buyer failed to take 
delivery of the goods alleging that the Italian seller effected delivery only after expiry 
of the delivery period agreed between the parties, the German court applying CISG 
as the law of the seller's country and awarded the seller the full price, including 
interest at the statutory rate in Italy plus additional interest as damages. The court 
argued that even if, as alleged by the buyer, delivery took place after expiry of the 
contractual period, the buyer did not effectively avoid the contract by refusing 
acceptance of the goods without having fixed an additional period under Article 
49(1)(b) within which the seller had to deliver.' In accordance with the CISG and 
the cases decided under its provisions, in the absence of a contrary agreement by the 
parties concerned, delay in delivery of the goods in itself, unlike some national 
systems, does not constitute fundamental breach of the contract without setting of an 
additional period within which the seller had to deliver. Only the seller's failure to 
deliver within this additional period entitles the buyer to avoid the contract and ask 
for damages caused by the breach. 
Avoidance relieves both parties of executory performance obligations.96 This 
means that the buyer, like the Iranian system, in such instances, is entitled to recover 
whatever amounts were "paid under the contracti97 from the seller, whilst, he has an 
obligation to return to the latter the goods98 and "all benefits which he has derived 
from the goods or part of them... "99 Thus in the case of delivery of the goods, the 
avoiding buyer must preserve100 and return them, although he may retain them until 
94 See, United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 1996) Case 
136, pp. 6 -7. 
95 See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /1 (17 May 1993) Case 7, p. 
5. See further, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /6 (10 April 1995) 
Case 79, p. 2. 
96 See CISG, Article 81(1). 
97 See CISG, Article 81(2). An avoiding buyer can also claim interest over the price from the date of 
payment under Article 84(1). 
98 See CISG, Article 81(2). 
99 See CISG, Article 84(2). 
'°° See Articles 86 -88 of the CISG which detail the avoiding buyer's obligation to preserve the goods. 
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reimbursed for reasonable expenses of preservation.101 Indeed, subject to certain 
broad exceptions,10'the buyer loses the right to avoid where he is unable to return the 
goods "substantially in the condition" in which he received them. Accordingly, in 
one case the defendant, a German buyer, refused to pay the purchase price asserting 
that the goods delivered by the plaintiff, an Italian seller, were not in conformity with 
the contractual specifications. It was held that the defendant had lost the right to 
declare the contract avoided since by reselling the goods to a third party he made 
restitution of the goods to the plaintiff impossible. 
The buyer will lose the right to avoid if he fails to send a notice of avoidance 
within a reasonable time after he knew or should have known of the breach.'03 
Similarly, the buyer cannot avail himself of the right to avoid the contract for non- 
conformity in the goods delivered unless he does so after the expiry of any additional 
period set by him in accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 47, or after the seller 
states that he will not perform his obligations to remedy the non -conformity within 
such an additional period.104 The same rule applies, i.e., the buyer cannot exercise his 
right to avoid the contract where he fails to do so after expiration of the period of 
time fixed by the seller for the performance of his obligations in accordance with 
Article 48(2) or after the buyer himself declares that he will not accept performance 
within that period.10' Furthermore, the buyer will lose his right to avoid the sale on 
the basis of non -conformity in the goods unless he complies with Article 39's 
requirement by sending notice to the seller "specifying the nature of the lack of 
conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have 
discovered iä106 or at the latest, within two years from the date of delivery unless the 
101 See CISG, Article 86(1). 
102 See CISG, Article 82 for those exceptional cases where The buyer retains the right to avoid despite 
his inability to restore the goods to the seller. 
103 CISG, Article 49(2)(b)(í.). 
104 CISG, Article 49(2)(b)(ii). 
los CISG, Article 49(2)(b)(iii). 
106 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /6 (10 April 
1995) Case 81, p. 3; United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /7 (12 July 
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seller clearly waives his right or is estopped by his behaviour to raise that defence. In 
1994, for example, a German buyer concluded a contract for the purchase of rolled 
metal which was found to be defective. The buyer sent to the seller notice of lack of 
conformity of the goods with the contract specification, but the seller refused to pay 
damages, alleging that the notice was not timely. It was found that the buyer had not 
complied with the requirements of Articles 38 and 39 of the CISG in examining of 
the goods and giving notice of non -conformity to the seller. Moreover, the buyer's 
allegation that the seller had waived his right to raise the defence that notice of non- 
conformity was not timely given, was rejected because there was no clear evidence to 
indicate that the seller waived this right. However, after receiving the notice, the 
seller had continued to ask the buyer to provide information on the status of the 
complaint and had pursued negotiations with a view to reach a settlement. This 
behaviour of the seller led the buyer to believe that he would not raise the defence of 
untimely notice and, therefore, it was held that the seller was estopped from raising 
that defence. It was argued that, whilst estoppel was not expressly settled by CISG, it 
formed a general principle underlying CISG ( "venire contra factum proprium "); 
Articles 7(2), 16(2)(b) and 29(2) of CISG).107 
Successful avoidance of the contract by an aggrieved buyer entitles him to 
damages measured by the market price of the goods or the price paid in a substitute 
transaction ( "cover ").108 
Where a seller makes a partially non -conforming or insufficient delivery, the 
buyer, following Article 51(1) of the CISG, has a right to "partial avoidance" only if 
(a) the defects in the non -conforming goods, or the delay in the missing goods 
constitute a fundamental breach with respect to those goods or (b) the seller failed to 
deliver missing goods within the time fixed in a Nachfrist notice under Article 47.109 
1995) Case 94, p. 5. 
107 See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /7 (12 July 1995) Case 94, p. 
5. 
108 See CISG, Articles 75 and 76. 
109 See J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
supra., note 1, at pp. 328 -30. 
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In other words, while Article 49(1) permits the buyer to avoid the whole sale only if 
the seller has committed a fundamental breach or has failed to deliver within the time 
fixed in a Nachfrist notice, Article 51(1) of the CISG extends the scope of the 
application of this rule to cover a non -conforming or missing portion of a delivery. 
The buyer's partial avoidance eliminates his obligation to pay for the missing or 
defective goods10 and allows him to claim cover or market -price damages therefor. "' 
This rule, which apparently applies to deliveries under both instalment and single 
delivery contracts, resembles to the provisions of Article 2 of the UCC under which 
the buyer is allowed to reject or revoke acceptance as to "commercial units" of 
goods "' and to recover from the seller market -price or cover damages for missing 
portion of a delivery. 13 On the other hand, immaterial non -conformities in a portion 
of delivery do not allow the buyer to reject or withhold payment for a non- 
conforming portion, although he may invoke his non -avoidance remedies, other than 
a claim for substitute delivery,14 with respect to a non -conforming portion (for 
example, he may demand the seller to repair "' or he may claim damages16). In 
contrast with these provisions, a buyer in a single delivery contract, under section 2- 
601 of the UCC, has a theoretical right to reject any "commercial unit" of tendered 
goods even if the seller has committed only an immaterial breach. 
Article 51(2) of the CISG allows the buyer to avoid the contract "in its entirety" 
only if the seller's default for insufficient or partially non -conforming delivery 
"amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract." At first glance, it appears that the 
provision of this Article is redundant for, Article 49(1) clarifies that, absent the use of 
the Nachfrist procedure, the buyer may avoid the contract only if the seller's breach 
10 See CISG, Article 81. 
"' See CISG, Articles 75 and 76. 
112 See UCC, Sections 2- 601(c) and 2- 608(1). 
"' See UCC, Section 2- 711(1). 
"4 Since this remedy also is available only if the seller committed fundamental breach. See CISG, 
Article, 46(2). 
"' See CISG, Article 46(3) 
16 See CISG, Articles 45(1)(b) and 74. 
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is fundamental. Nothing in Article 49(1) suggests that this rule does not apply when 
the seller's breach related to insufficient or non -conforming delivery. Nonetheless, 
Article 51(2) is not mere verbiage and, as Professor Honnold notes one of the 
purpose of this article is: 
"[t]o make clear that paragraph (1) does not force the buyer to sort out the non- 
conforming goods for separate handling The buyer may "avoid" (reject) as to 
the entire delivery if the breach as to part causes detriment that is so substantial 
as to constitute a "fundamental breach" of the contract as a whole. "'" 
Moreover, Article 51(2)'s provision in allowing an aggrieved buyer to avoid the 
entire contract "only" if the failure constitutes fundamental breach of the contract, 
entails that the buyer cannot use the Nachfrist procedure to create grounds for 
avoiding the contract in its entirety where the seller fails to deliver a trivial portion of 
the goods. The unavailability of Nachfrist whenever the seller has made partial 
delivery is troubling. Suppose, that the seller delivers only 20 of the 500 sacks of 
wheat that he has sold, but indicates that he will deliver the balance in future. In 
accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 5118 the buyer is bound to accept the 
portion of the goods delivered, whilst paragraph (2) of this Article deprives him of 
the advantages of the Nachfrist procedure. This means that the buyer has no choice 
but to wait until it is sure that the seller's delay in completing delivery amounts to a 
fundamental breach before he can avoid the entire contract.19 
Concerning instalment contracts, Article 73(1) of the CISG permits the buyer to 
avoid the contract "with respect to [an] instalment" if the seller's default amounts to 
"fundamental breach of contract with respect to that instalment. "''0 The purpose of 
this provision like that of Article 51(1) is to allow an aggrieved party to treat each 
instalment of an instalment contract as a severable contract for the purposes of 
avoidance. This means that the buyer may avoid the contract with respect to an 
"' See J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
supra., note 1 at p. 330. 
18 For the full provisions of Article 51 of the CISG, see Appendix V. 
19 Of course, the buyer may use the Nachfrist procedure to create a ground for avoidance of the 
contract with respect of the undelivered portion of the goods. See CISG, Article 51. 
'2° For the full provisions of Article 73 of the CISG, see Appendix V. 
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instalment where the missing or non -conforming goods amount to fundamental 
breach of that instalment even if the seller's default would not constitute fundamental 
breach of the entire contract. 
Thus a buyer who receives an instalment delivery containing non -conforming 
goods or a shortfall in their quantity may have three avoidance options. Following 
Article 51(1), he may avoid the contract with respect to the missing or non- 
conforming goods provided the seller's default "results in such detriment ... as 
substantially to deprive [the buyer] of what he is entitled to expect" as to those 
goods. Under Article 73(1), the buyer is entitled to avoid the instalment if the delay 
in full delivery or the non -conformity in the goods amounts to a fundamental breach 
with respect to the instalment. Finally, pursuant to Article 49(1), the buyer can avoid 
the entire contract if the seller's breach is fundamental as to the entire contract. 
Under Article 73(2) if default with respect to any instalment gives the aggrieved 
buyer "good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of contract will occur 
with respect to future instalments," he "may declare the contract avoided for the 
future" provided he does so "within a reasonable time. "'' But this Article does not 
state as from when the reasonable time begins to run. A comment to a draft of the 
CISG suggests that the time runs from the seller's "failure to perform. "' Where the 
non -conformity could not be discovered immediately, however, it would be 
preferable to measure reasonableness from the time when the buyer detected or 
should have detected the non- conformity.13 Neither of these approaches, 
nevertheless, is suitable if the past defaults involves non- delivery14 or if "good 
grounds" to anticipate a fundamental breach as to future instalments under Article 
121 This provision represents a marked change from the substantive standards and procedures that the 
CISG applies to anticipatory breaches in other contexts. See J. Honnold, Uniform Law for 
International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, supra., note 1 p. 406. 
''-'- See, Secretariat's Commentary, United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International 
Sales of Goods (Vienna, 10 March -11 April 1980), Official Records, I, New York, 1981, p. 54. 
'23 See CISG, Article 39(1). 
'4 See J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
supra., note 1, n.3 at p. 330. 
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73(2) arose only after a series of non -conforming instalments.'' Perhaps the best 
solution is to measure reasonableness from the time the aggrieved buyer acquired 
`good grounds' to anticipate serious problems with future instalments. Although such 
a standard is very uncertain, it offers the only hope for dealing with variety of 
circumstances that will arise. 
Another point with respect of Article 73(2) is that it deals only with avoidance to 
future performance and, accordingly, does not address avoidance of an entire 
instalment contract. If the seller's breach in a completed delivery is fundamental with 
regard to that delivery and gives the buyer good grounds to anticipate a fundamental 
breach as to future instalments, however, the past delivery can be avoided under 
Article 73(1) and the future instalments can be avoided under Article 73(2). Except 
for this situation, a party who wishes to avoid an entire instalment contract must 
establish that defaults as to past deliveries constitute a fundamental breach of the 
entire contract,16 or that the party can avoid under the general anticipatory provisions 
of Articles 71 and 72. 
As pointed out above, the key to the CISG's system of remedies is avoidance 
and non -avoidance of the contract and the key to the avoidance machinery is 
"fundamental breach." Article 25 of the CISG defines fundamental breach as a 
breach that: 
"results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of 
what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did 
not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances 
would not have foreseen such a result." 
15 Article 73(2) speaks of "one party's failure to perform any of his obligation in respect of any 
instalment" (emphasis added). This language permits the aggrieved party to treat defaults in several 
instalment as cumulative. See Secretariat's Commentary, United Nations Conference on Contracts for 
the International Sales of Goods (Vienna, 10 March -11 April 1980), Official Records, I, New York, 
1981, at p. 54. Compare Official Comment 6 to UCC, Section 2 -612 ( "defects in prior instalment are 
cumulative in effect, so that acceptance does not wash out the defect `waived "') 
126 See also CISG, Article 49(1)(a). 
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These provisions have already generated issues among the commentators of the 
CISG.'27 Professor Ziegel argues that Article 25's definition of fundamental breach 
may require that the aggrieved buyer's loss be more than material.128 If this argument 
is accepted, a breach that satisfied section 2- 608(1)1229 of the UCC material breach 
standard "substantial impairment of value" might not be "fundamental" within the 
meaning of the CISG. The provisions of Articles 71 and 72, which deal with 
anticipatory non -performance under the CISG, may support the aforegoing argument. 
These Articles distinguish between a threat of a fundamental breach and a threatened 
failure to perform a "substantial part" of a party's obligations. The latter event allows 
the other party to suspend his performance, whereas the former one grants him a 
more radical power to avoid the contract. This distinction suggests that a 
"substantial" breach does not necessarily amounts to a "fundamental" breach. 
A further problem under the provisions of Article 25 concerns the correct time 
for determining the breaching seller's foreseeability of the consequence of his breach. 
The Article does not state whether foreseeability should be measured at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract or at the time of breach. The legislative history of this 
Article reveals that the omission was intentional, designed to permit courts to decide 
the issue on a case by case basis.130 Professor Honnold suggests, consistently with 
this history, that the wilfulness of default is a factor for the decision - maker to 
127 See, e.g., Will, "Fundamental Breach" in Bianca -Bonel, Commentary on the International Sales 
Law (1987) at pp. 208 -12. Professor Will notes that the term "fundamental breach" is the CISG 
innovation, which as a prerequisite for avoiding a contract has "no familiar parentage in other 
jurisdictions." Ibid. 
128 See Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: some Common Law 
perspectives, in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1984), § 9.03[2][a], [b]. 
129 Section 2- 608(1) confers an aggrieved buyer a right to revoke his acceptance of non -conforming 
goods, an action equivalent to avoidance under the CISG, if the non -conformity "substantially impairs 
[their] value to him." 
130 See Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: some Common Law 
perspectives, in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1984), § 9.03[d] at 9 -19. 
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consider- i.e., foreseeability should be determined at the time of wilful breach. Where 
serious loss was unavoidable by the time it became foreseeable to the breaching 
party, on the other hand, Professor Honnold suggests that the breach should not be 
considered fundamental. 
Not everybody shares Professor Honnold's view concerning foreseeability. 
According to Professor Ziegel, for example, foreseeability should always be 
measured as of the time of the contract formation.131 Referring to the provisions of 
Article 74, which limit an aggrieved buyer's damages to losses foreseeable "at the 
time of contracting ", Professor Ziegel argues that it would be "anomalous" if the 
buyer could take the radical step of avoiding the contract on the ground of 
consequences for which he could not even recover damages.13' He contends that 
consequences foreseeable at the time of breach, but not at the time of contract 
formation are too remote to justify avoidance.'33 
The UCC, however, contains a precedent for the "anomaly" feared by Professor 
Ziegel. Like the CISG,, section 2- 715(2)(a) of the UCC limits consequential damages 
to losses foreseeable at the time of contract, whilst section 2- 608(1) allows the buyer 
to revoke acceptance of non -conforming goods, an action equivalent to avoidance 
under the CISG, if the non -conformity "substantially impairs [their] value to him." 
The Official Comment 2 of section 2 -608 describes the standard as follows: 
"[T]he test is not what the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting; 
the question is whether the non -conformity is such as will in fact cause a 
substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the seller had no advance 
knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances." 
Accordingly, the US sales law expressly rejects the notion that the substantial 
impairment required for revocation of acceptance must have been foreseeable by the 
131 See Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: some Common Law 
perspectives, in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1984), § 9.03[d] at pp. 9 -19 to 9 -20. 
132 Ibid, § 9.03[d] at 9 -20. 
133 Ibid. 
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seller at the time of formation of the contract, and it does so even though the seller is 
liable in damages only for losses foreseeable at that time. 
Professor Ziegel's alleged `anomaly,' furthermore disappears upon considering 
the different purposes of the foreseeability requirements in Articles 25 and 74 of the 
CISG. The foreseeability limitation on damages is designed to limit the financial 
exposure of the parties to a sale contract by excluding liability for remote 
consequences. The purpose of the foreseeability requirement in the definition of 
fundamental breach, in contrast, is to limit avoidance to appropriate circumstances. It 
may make sense to provide that the breaching seller is not responsible in damages for 
losses that become foreseeable only after conclusion of the contract, when the 
contractual terms cannot unilaterally be adjusted to account for newly- discovered 
risk. This logic, however, does not require that an aggrieved buyer be forced to 
maintain a contractual relationship where the seller should have known, at the time of 
the wilful breach, that his action would cause substantial hardship to the buyer. 
Damages upon avoidance of the contract 
The buyer who successfully avoids a sale contract may seek damages which he has 
sustained as a consequence of the seller's breach, provided that they were foreseeable 
by the latter at the contracting time.' In accordance with Article 75 of the CISG, 
such damages are equal to the difference between the contract price and the price in 
the substitute transaction as well as incidental and/or consequential damages under 
Article 74.1' 
The buyer may avail himself of the cover remedy under Article 75 only if the 
cover purchase was made in a reasonable manner; that is, he has purchased the 
substitute goods at the lowest possible price in the circumstances. Where, for 
example, a German buyer avoided the contract with a Russian seller as a 
consequence of the latter's failure to deliver the goods sold, the Tribunal of 
134 For the full provisions of this Article, see Appendix V. 
135 For the full provisions of Article 75of the CISG, see Appendix V. 
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International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian Federation Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in consistent with the provisions of Article 74 CISG 
awarded the buyer damages on the basis of the difference between the contract price 
and the replacement purchase price, since the seller failed to establish that the buyer 
could purchase the goods at a lower price when making the second purchase in 
replacement of the first.136 Thus, the substitute purchase need not be on identical 
terms of sale concerning such matters as quantity, manner of payment or time of 
delivery as long as the transaction that was in fact in substitution for the transaction 
was avoided. 
Similarly, the buyer may invoke the remedial provision of Article 75 only if he 
has purchased the substitute goods within a reasonable time after avoidance of the 
contract with the seller. Hence, the "reasonable time" starts to run from the moment 
when the buyer declares the contract avoided. 
The buyer's right to claim damages under Article 75 appears almost 
indistinguishable from the one under section 2 -712 of the UCC. But Article 75 does 
not specify the adjustment mentioned in section 2- 712(2) for expenses saved by the 
aggrieved buyer claiming damages as a result of breach. However, equitable 
considerations require one to construe the phrase "price in the substitute transaction" 
to permit the same adjustment under Article 75, given that increased transportation 
costs and similar items of extra expense associated with a substitute transaction 
would constitute losses suffered "as a consequence of breach" and thus recoverable 
under Article 74 of the CISG. 
It should be noted that the buyer is not bound to wait a reasonable period of time 
under Article 75 in order to recover cover damages from the seller. He has an option 
to claim damages immediately after they are accrued in which case the damages will 
be calculated on the basis of the difference between the contract price and the market 
price at the time of avoidance under Article 76, and, if applicable, on the basis of 
incidental and consequential damages under Article 74. The same remedy is 
136 See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 1996) pp. 9- 
10. 
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available where the buyer fails to purchase substitute goods in a reasonable manner 
or within a reasonable time after avoidance, i.e., he has to claim damages under 
Articles 76 and 74. The buyer who has failed to avail himself of the cover remedy, 
however, may be responsible for breach of the duty to take measures to mitigate the 
loss. 137 
Article 76(1) of the CISG allows an injured buyer who has not entered into a 
substitute transaction to recover damages measured by "the difference between the 
contractual price and the current (i.e., market) price" as well as any incidental and /or 
consequential damages resulted from the seller's breach. The market -price damage 
under this Article is generally measured "at the time of avoidance ", unless the 
aggrieved buyer avoids the contract after "taking over the goods" in which case the 
reference point is "the time of such taking over." The latter alternative prevents an 
avoiding buyer who has received delivery from manipulating the time of avoidance 
in order to increase the seller's liability.13s 
As to the place where the current price is to be measured, Article 76(2) refers to 
"the place where delivery of the goods should have been made," or alternatively "if 
there is no current price at that place," then at a reasonable substitute location, 
"making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods." 
Sections 2- 708(1) and 2- 713(2) of the UCC point to the same place for measuring 
market -price damages, unless the aggrieved buyer has rejected or revoked acceptance 
after the goods arrived in which case in accordance with section 2- 713(2) of the UCC 
the market -price damages will be determined at the place of their arrival. Like the 
Iranian Civil Code, the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, however, does not specify the 
place where the buyer's market -price damages is to be determined. 
The buyer's remedies in the case of non -avoidance of the sale 
137 See CISG, Article 77. 
138 See V. Knapp, "Damages" in Bianca -Bonnel, Commentary on the International Sales Law, (1987) 
at p. 556. 
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There are some instances in which, despite the seller's breach, the contract is not 
avoided either because the breach is not fundamental and the Nachfrist procedure has 
not been used to create grounds for avoidance, or because, notwithstanding the 
breach being fundamental, the aggrieved buyer chooses not to avoid the contract. In 
such instances, the buyer may pursue his "non- avoidance" remedies if he complies 
with certain procedure under the CISG. 
In the case of delivery of non -confon ling goods, for example, the buyer under 
Article 39 of the CISG "loses the right to rely" on the lack of conformity if he fails to 
give "notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity ",139 unless, in 
accordance to Article 40, "lack of conformity relates to facts of which he [the seller] 
knew or could not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer." In 
a series of contracts for the sale of goods on F.O.B. terms, for example, the buyer 
disputed, both prior to shipment and upon arrival, the conformity of the goods 
covered under one of the contracts with certain contract specifications. The buyer 
treated the goods in order to make them more saleable and sold them at a loss. The 
seller claimed full payment of the purchase price, and the buyer in his counterclaim 
demanded compensation from the seller for the damages caused by delivering of the 
non -conforming goods with the contract specifications. The arbitral tribunal, 
applying the CISG, found that the buyer complied with the requirements of the CISG 
to examine the goods properly (Art. 38(1)) and to notify the seller accordingly (Art. 
39(1)). Following Article 40 of the CISG, the tribunal held that the seller at any rate 
would not be entitled to raise the objection of the buyer's failure to comply with the 
requirements of Articles 38 and 39 of CISG for the reason that the seller knew or 
could not have been unaware of the non -conformity of the goods with the contract 
specifications.'4° The notice must be within a shorter time of (i) "a reasonable time 
after [the buyer] has discovered [the non -conformity] or ought to have discovered 
iä141 and (ii) two years from the date of delivery to the buy er unless the two years 
139 See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 1994) Case 
48, pp. 3 -4; United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /6 (10 April 1995) p. 3. 
14° United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 1994) Case 45 p. 2. 
14' See CISG, Article 39(1). The time when the buyer ought to discover non -conformities in the goods 
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limitation is "inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee.i14' Furthermore, 
where the buyer alleges breach of the warranties against a third party's claims of 
ownership (Article 41) or infringement of any right or claim of a third party based on 
industrial property or other intellectual property (Article 42), the CISG requires 
notice "specifying the right or claim of the third party ",143 unless the seller was aware 
of the third party's right or claim and knew its "nature. "14 
An aggrieved buyer's compliance with these procedures entitles him to non - 
avoidance remedies where for the reasons mentioned above the contract is not 
avoided.'' The aggrieved buyer's remedies other than damages i.e., his right to 
specific performance, substitute goods, repair, or reductions in price have previously 
been described. To the extent these remedies do not fully protect his expectation 
under the contract, Article 74 of the CISG authorises recovery of damages measured 
by "the loss, including loss of profit, suffered ... as a consequence of breach.' 
Damages under this provision, which are also available where the buyer has avoided 
the contract, are subject to familiar common law limitations involving 
foreseeability147 and mitigation of damages.'48 These limitations are applicable even 
if the breach is caused by the seller's fraud. This is unfortunate, since it makes sense 
to protect the parties against an unpredictable loss caused by their respective 
incidental breach, but this logic is not relevant where the breach by either of the 
parties is caused by his fraud. Obviously, the seller does not wilfully breach any of 
his obligations unless he can gain from the breach and therefore the law should hold 
will be influenced by Article 38, which governs the buyer's obligation to examine the goods. See J. 
Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention, supra., 
note 1, at p. 281. 
142 CISG, Article 39(2). 
143 CISG, Article 43(1). 
144 Ibid, Article 43(2). 
145 See pp. 176 -177, ante. 
146 For the full text of Article 74, see Appendix V. 
147 Ibid. See further, Barry Nicholas, "The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law" (1989) 105 
Law Quaterly Review 201, 230. 
148 CISG, Article 77. 
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him responsible for the consequence of his breach even if it was unforeseeable before 
the breach. This means that the CISG's limitations on the aggrieved buyer's right to 
recover full damages caused by the seller's intentional breach has but the effect of 
allowing the breaching party to gain at the expense of the buyer. Clearly, this 
approach discourages the seller from performing his obligations when he can gain 
from his breach and as such it is inconsistent with both the CISG's principle of good 
faith which is to be observed by the parties and its fundamental goal in maintaining 




The seller's obligation as to the quality of the goods under English 
Law 
Introduction 
In contrast with the civilian systems under consideration, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
makes a misleading distinction between implied terms concerning quality of the 
goods on the one hand' and duties of the seller on the other.' For, "implied Willis" 
and "duties" are not distinct concepts. To state that there is an implied term on the 
part of the seller to warrant that the goods shall be fit for their purpose (section 
14(3))and of satisfactory quality (sections 14(2A)and (2B))is merely another way of 
imposing on him the duty of tendering goods which are fit for their purpose and 
satisfactory. Accordingly, the duty to deliver the goods is not a distinct and isolated 
obligation on the part of the seller but encompasses all his obligations, express and 
implied, as against the buyer with the respect to the goods including implied terms as 
to the title in them(section 12), their correspondence with the contractual description 
and sample (sectionsl3(1) and (2)), their satisfactory quality (section 14(2A) and 
(2B)) and their fitness for purpose (section 14(3))for which they have been sold. One 
may even go further by remarking that, subject to any express stipulations by the 
parties in the contract, the status of these implied terms as conditions is relevant only 
to the buyer's right to reject; for if he elects to accept a defective tender, the broken 
implied condition sinks to the level of a warranty, thus restricting the buyer to a 
See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Sections 12 -15. 
2 Ibid. Sections 27 -33. 
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remedy in damages, whilst if the buyer rejects the tender on the ground of non- 
compliance of the tender with one of the conditions, the case becomes one of non- 
delivery which entitles him to treat the contract as repudiated if he can show that time 
of delivery was, or has becomes of the essence and has expired without a proper re- 
tender by the seller. In other words, it is a repudiatory failure by the seller and not a 
non -compliance of the goods with a statutory implied condition, which create a 
ground for the buyer to treat the contract as discharged. Accordingly, in contrast with 
Iranian law, the seller's failure to deliver can occur either because he tenders no 
goods at all, or because the goods tendered are properly rejected by the buyer on the 
ground of non -conformity with the contact. 
As in the other legal systems under consideration, one of the seller's main 
obligation under English law is to deliver goods which conform with the contractual 
requirements concerning their quality and fitness. This obligation is imposed on the 
seller either by the terms agreed by the parties in the contract or by the terms implied 
by the law into the contract to give it minimum of business efficacy,' doubtless in 
accordance with the paramount intentions of the parties to create a workable 
contractual agreement.' Initially, the parties relationship was governed by the maxim 
of caveat emptor; that is the common law offered no protection to the purchaser as to 
the quality and fitness of the goods purchased where the contract contained no 
express provision in this respect.' Therefore, the implied terms with regard to quality 
and fitness in sections 13 -15 of 1893 Act was a significant step in the abandonment 
of the original common law maxim of caveat emptor. But weakness in the 
codification of these sections and growing concern with regard to sellers' freedom to 
contract out of the terms implied by law by a disclaimer clause led the legislators to 
pass the Supply of Goods (implied terms) Act 1973 which remodelled sections 13 -15 
3 See, Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. Ltd. [1957] AC 555; The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64. 
4 See, Hillas & Co. Ltd v. Arcos [1932] All ER 494. In this case, Lord Tomlin states: 
"[T]he problem for a court of construction must always be so to balance matters 
that, without violation of essential principle, the dealings of men may so far as 
possible be treated as effective, and that the law may not incur the reproach of 
being destroyer of bargains." Ibid. at p. 499. 
5 See, W. H. Hamilton, "The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor" (1928) 40 Yale Law Journal 1133. 
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of the original Act and restricted a seller's right to disclaim his obligations arising 
from the terms implied by the law. Further development concerning implied terms 
was made by the consolidated Sale of Goods Act 1979, which incorporated the 
amendments made by 1973 Act into the rest of the Sale of Goods Act with some 
minor alterations, but no change of substance. The Sale and Supply of Goods Act 
1994 has made further modification in respect of the quality warranties.' The three 
primary term laid down in the Act now appear in sections 13, 14(2) and 14(3). 
The seller's liability for latent defects 
Apart from the protection afforded under these sections, a buyer is left on his own to 
take a precautionary step to safeguard his interests by examining goods carefully 
before their purchase or by securing from the seller an express warranty, caveat 
emptor.7 Thus, unlike Iranian and French law,' the buyer has no recourse against the 
seller for the damages resulting from latent defects in the goods in so far as they are 
in conformity with the contractual descriptions (section 14(3)) and where the seller is 
selling in the course of business if they are satisfactory within the context of section 
14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), even though the seller has 
wilfully hidden the defects from the buyer. In fact, while the seller under the civilian 
systems cannot exclude his liability as to a latent defect by a contractual exemption 
clause where he knew of the defects before the sale, following English law he has no 
liability for such a defect even if there is no exclusionary provision in the contract, 
provided that the defect does not render the goods unsatisfactory where the sale is 
taken place in the seller's course of business. This is because, as Professor Bridge 
pointed out, existence of a latent defect in the goods sold is not sufficient under the 
English system to render the seller liable for infringement of section 14(2).9 
6 This Act has also amended the rules on acceptance and rejection of the goods by the buyer. 
' See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14(1). 
s As to the position under French law, for example, see pp. 261 -264, post. 
9 M.G. Bridge, the Sale of Goods (1997), at p. 309. Nonetheless, the seller may be liable in tort if he is 
also the manufacturer of the goods sold provided that the defect is hidden and unknown to the 
customer or consumer. See, Grant v. Australian knitting Mills, Ltd. [1936] A.C. 85. 
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The seller's liability concerning price- worthiness of the goods 
Similarly, the Act does not contain correspondent provisions with those of the 
Iranian legal system to require the seller to deliver goods in a quality which is 
commensurate with the contractual price.10 This means that the buyer will have no 
recourse against the seller under English law, even if at the time of the contract he 
did not know the market price of the goods and, therefore, the price set in the 
contract is substantially higher than the market price. This, together with the non - 
liability of the seller for latent defect, indicates that the protections afforded to the 
buyer under English law are far less than those of the civilian systems, particularly 
Iranian law. In fact, under the civilian systems, the relationship between the parties is 
based on the general principle of good faith which is to be observed by them both in 
making of the contract and its performance. This principle not only requires the seller 
to disclose any latent defect which he knows before entering into a contract, but also 
holds him liable against the buyer even if the defect was not known to him at the 
time of the contract. Under Iranian law, the principle of good faith, further, requires 
the seller to deliver goods which are also commensurate with the price. Unlike 
Anglo -US law, these provisions would obviate any anxiety in a potential buyer by 
assuring him that he would not be left unprotected in a bad bargain against the seller. 
Such a potential buyer, therefore, may not hesitate to enter into a contract with the 
seller even if his information about the thing which he purchases is not enough. Such 
an approach would, in other words, obviate any obstacle concerning free flow of 
goods in the market. 
10 Before the assimilation of the law by the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the Scottish law, like the various 
civil law systems, required the seller to reveal any hidden defects to the buyer and to supply "price - 
worthy" goods to him. See, M.P. Brown, Treatise on the Law of Sale (1821), p. 285; J. J. Gow, 
"Warrandice in Sale of Goods: Nature and State of the Goods" (1963) Juridical Review 31; Elaine E. 
Sutherland, "Remedying an Evil? Warrandice of Quality At Common Law in Scotland" (1987) 
Juridical Review 24. 
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Express warranties 
It is relatively common for the parties in a contract of sale to provide an express 
terms with regard to the description, quality and fitness of the goods sold." As in the 
other legal systems under consideration, any deviation by the seller from such an 
express term, however trifling is, subject to the rule of de minimis, no doubt breach 
of the contract entitling the buyer to some remedy against the seller. The problem, 
however, under English law is that, in contrast with the Iranian system, 
unfortunately, not every statement by the seller with regard to the goods is taken to 
be an express warranty, but there are many instances in which such statements are 
considered as mere puffing, the breach of which gives rise to no liability against the 
seller. The case of Walker v. Milner,' for example, involved the sale of a safe which 
was stated by the seller as "strong, holdfast, thiefproof'. The court decided that there 
was no liability on such a statement, even though a burglar gave evidence that he 
broke into the safe within half an hour with ordinary implements, despite the fact that 
police looked through the window every 10 minutes. 
As in the case of the UCC,13 the drafters of the UK Act, however, have failed to 
provide any standard to specify where statements concerning the goods are 
considered as an express warranty, the breach of which renders the seller liable 
against the buyer. Such a position not only creates an uncertainty to the buyer, but it 
may also encourage the seller to make false statements as to the goods hoping to sell 
them with a higher price and to escape from liability for breach of a warranty by 
asserting that the statements were mere puffing or reflection of his opinion about the 
goods. 
The question may be posed as to why the seller should be allowed to make an 
statement concerning the quality of the goods which he knows to be false. The 
answer to this question lies in the fact that he will benefit from such a false statement 
by persuading the buyer to enter into a sale with conditions that are favourable to 
" See generally, Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., Part 1, Ch. 1, note 17, pp. 461 -487. 
'' (1866)4 F. & F.747. See also Lambert v. Lewis [1982] A.C. 225, 262(C.Á.) where the court decided 
that no warranty of quality attaches to the word "foolproof' used in the contract. 
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him. If this view is correct, then the law should logically require the seller to accept 
his liability regarding the consequences of the statements, which are proved to be 
false. 
Even where a statement by the seller is not regarded as his mere opinion about 
the goods, it does not necessarily constitute an express warranty under English law. 
This is the case where the seller undertakes to deliver goods in accordance with the 
contractual description or sample. In such instances, in contrast with the UCC, the 
seller's statements concerning the description are considered as implied terms under 
section 14(2) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 even though descriptive words by 
the seller are indirect declaration of his will and thus are implied -in -fact promises 
and, as such, they must be taken as express warranties rather than implied -in -law 
promises. The reason for considering the seller's descriptive words in the contract as 
implied -in -law warranties rather than express promises by the drafters of the Act 
1979 seems to lie in the historical background of the common law under which 
descriptions of the goods did not initially create any obligation against the seller with 
regard to the quality or fitness of the goods. The distinction between the two cases is 
not just an academic one but it has practical impact on the parties since, in the 
absence of an express provision as to the remedy for breach, an express term of the 
contract will often be treated as an innominate term, rather than a condition, the 
breach of which will only entitle the buyer to apply for damages, unless the nature 
and consequences of the breach are of such gravity as to justify to reject the goods 
and repudiate the whole contract, whereas descriptive terms are considered as 
conditions and, therefore, any deviation from them, however trifling, under the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 (until it was modified by the 1994 Act), justified rejection of the 
goods. 
Section 14 (2) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), draws a 
distinction between consumer and non -consumer contracts and states that the buyer, 
in a non -consumer sale, is not any longer entitled to reject the goods for trivial 
defects. Obviously, this modifications will bring the statutory implied terms closer to 
13 See pp. 235- 239,post. 
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innominate express terms where the buyer, only in the case of a substantial breach, 
may reject the sale. Nonetheless, unlike the UCC, this modifications fails to 
eliminate the distinction between conditions and warranties with innominate terms, 
or to equate the seller's descriptionary words as express terms. Therefore, the 
difficulties over the need to distinguish the contractual provisions between express 
and implied terms will certainly continue to cause uncertainties among the parties 
concerned. 
Implied terms concerning the quality of the goods sold 
Correspondence with contractual description 
According to section 13(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979,14 in a contract of sale 
there is an implied term that the goods shall correspond with their description. These 
provision prompt two fundamental questions. First, which words constitute 
description under the English law; and, secondly, when will a sale of goods be 
considered to have taken place by description? 
Contractual description and mere representation by the seller 
Concerning the first question, one should refer to the traditional common law 
distinction between mere representations on the one hand, and terms of the contract 
on the other hand, as the Act does not go any way to obliterate this distinction. For 
example, in T & J Harrison v. Knowles and Foster,'' the buyer purchased two ships 
from the seller. In the particulars supplied to the former, each of the ships was stated 
by the seller to have a dead -weight capacity of 460 tons, but no reference was made 
to this in the actual memorandum of sale. The buyer discovered that the capacity of 
each ship was only 360 tons. The Court of Appeal held that the seller's statement 
14 For the provision of this section, see Appendix II. 
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about the capacity was a mere representation and, therefore, he did not infringe 
section 13(1) of the Act.16 Similarly, in the New Zealand case of Taylor v. Combined 
Buyers Ltd.," Salmond J held that traditional distinction between mere 
representations and terms of the contract is not affected by section 13(1). More 
recently, in Harlingdon & Leinster Enterprises Ltd. v. Christopher Hull Fine Art 
Ltd.'s it was decided that the sale of painting as a `Gabriel Minter' (a German 
expressionist painter) was not sale by description. Referring to the facts that the 
plaintiff dealers were specialists in German expressionist painting, and the defendant 
dealer was not, and that the plaintiffs had inspected the painting, Nourse LJ observed: 
"For all practical purpose, I would say that there cannot be a contract for the sale 
of goods by description where it is not within the reasonable contemplation of 
the parties that the buyer is not relying on the description. "19 
In Beale v. Taylor,'-0 on the other hand, the Court of Appeal appears to have 
come very close to disregarding the distinction between mere representations and 
contractual terms by giving a wide application to section 13 of the Act. In this case, 
the plaintiff entered into a contract for the purchase of a car which was advertised by 
the seller as a "Herald, convertible, white, 1961." It was held that the words "1961 
Herald" were part of the contractual description. 
It seems, however, that the decisive fact in both types of the aforegoing cases is 
the same; that is whether or not the buyer could reasonably be held to have relied on 
the seller's statement with regard to the goods sold. Only if the answer to this 
question is affirmative then the statements may constitute part of the description of 
the goods within section 13 of the Act. In Beale v. Taylor, for example, the seller 
obtained a price well above the fair value and it was reasonable the buyer to assume 
that all the seller's statements as to the goods were correct, whilst in Harlingdon & 
15 [1918] 1 KB 608. 
16 See also Howard Marine & Dredging Co Ltd v. A Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd. [1978] QB 
574 in which the court on similar facts awarded damages to the plaintiff under section 2(1) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1969. 
" [ 1924] NZLR 627. 
18 [1991] 1 QB 564. 
19 Ibid., at p. 574. 
20 [1967] 1 WLR 1193. 
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Leinster Enterprises Ltd. v. Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd.11 the court found that the 
buyer did not rely on the description of the goods. In other words, like the UCC, the 
seller's liability with regard to the descriptive words in the contract, under English 
law, is limited to the cases where the buyer has relied on the descriptive words. 
Descriptive words must concern with the Identity of the goods 
Even if the seller's descriptive words become part of the contractual terms they do 
not automatically fall within ambit of section 13. Only those words which meet 
certain criteria may give rise to the seller's liability under this section, whilst others 
may give rise to liability by way of warranty or innominate, or intermediate term.22 
This issue was discussed in the cases of Ashington Piggeries v. Christopher Hill 
Ltd.,23 and Reardon Smith Lines Ltd. v. Hansen Tangen,24 and the House of Lords, in 
both of these cases, seems to have accepted that the only descriptive words which are 
to be dealt with under section 13 of the Act are words which identify the object of the 
contract. Lord Diplock in the case of Ashington Piggeries v. Christopher Hill Ltd, for 
example, stated:25 
" The `description' by which unascertained goods are sold is, in my view, 
confined to those words in the contract which were intended by the parties to 
identify the kind of goods which were to be supplied. It is open to the parties to 
use a description as broad or as narrow as they choose. But ultimately the test is 
whether the buyer could fairly and reasonably refuse to accept the physical 
goods proffered to him on the ground that their failure to correspond with what 
was said about them makes them goods of a different kind from those he had 
agreed to buy. The key to s. 13 is identification." [Italics added] 
However, the concept of the words of identification is in itself troublesome. In the 
Reardon Smith Lines case, the appellant entered into a contract with the shipbuilders 
21 [1991] 1 QB 564. 
22 See, P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., Part 1, Ch. 1, note 73, at p. 117 and the cases 
cited there. See also Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., Partl, Ch. 1, note 17, pp. 496 -497. 
23 [1972] AC 441. 
24 [1976] 
1 WLR 986; [1976] 3 All ER 570. 
25 [1972] AC 441, 503. There are, however, some cases in which the courts adopted a tendency to 
overlook the above distinction and treat all descriptive words as though they must create liability 
under section 13 of the Act; see, for example, Arcos Ltd. v. E A Ronaasen & Son [1933] AC 470, 470 
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to build a vessel to a certain specification at a particular yard (Yard No. 354 at Osaka 
Zosen) but the ship was in fact built in another yard. It was argued by the appellant 
that the words requiring the ship to be built at the particular yard specified were 
words of identification, for these words were the only means by which it was 
possible to identify the vessel being built at a particular yard with the specification 
provided in the contract. The House of Lords rejected this argument. Lord 
Wilberforce maintained that the idea of words of "identity" or "identification" have 
two different meanings.'6 Under his view, only those words which state or identify an 
essential part of the description of the goods are to be considered words of identity in 
this special sense, and, thus, are the subject matter of the implied condition in section 
13.27 Words that merely help to identify the place where the goods are stored, are not 
the words of identity in this special sense. Lord Wilberforce went on to express his 
dissatisfaction with the excessive technicality of some of the cases under section 13, 
such as Re Moore and Co. Ltd. and Landauer & Co.,28 and suggested that it would be 
better if section 13 was confined to descriptive words which relate to a "substantial 
ingredient of the `identity' of the thing sold ", leaving the other words to give rise to 
liability for breach of warranty or of an innominate or intermediate term. 
It is important to point out that Lord Wimberforce's view as to the concept of 
words of identification not only excludes the application of section 13 to words 
which do not constitute a substantial ingredient of the thing sold but it also resolved 
the existing doubt concerning possible applicability of this section in a sale of 
specific thing.79 In other words, the seller's liability under section 13 depends solely 
on whether or not the descriptive statements help the buyer to identify a substantial 
per Lord Atkin ; Re Moore & Co. Ltd. and Landauer & Co. [1921] 2 KB 519, 524 per Lord Scrutton. 
26 [ 1976] 3 All ER 570, 576. 
'-' Ibid. 
28 [1921] 2 KB 519. 
29 Accordingly, the description condition was infringed where a "breeding bull" turned out to be 
infertile. See Elder Smith Goldsborough Mort Ltd v. McBride [1976] 2 NSWLR 631. See further 
Steele v. Maurer (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 85, in which the seller was held to be liable for infringement of 
description condition where semen from particular Simmental bull was ordered, but that from a 
Brown Swiss bull delivered instead; Tower Equipment Rental Ltd v. Joint Venture Equipment Sales 
Ltd (1975) 9 OR (2d) 453 where the seller was found to be in breach of section 13(1) in delivering a 
tower crane, described as "like new" and just over 2 years old, but turned to be 10 years old as well as 
defective. 
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ingredient of the goods and, accordingly, it is immaterial whether the goods are 
specified or described.30 This view is consistent with section 13(3) of the Act which 
makes it clear that exposing goods for sale or hire does not prevent a sale of goods 
from being a sale by description. 
Extension of the law of description to cover specified goods may be taken as a 
significant step towards alignment of the law on description with the law on express 
warranty. 
Reliance 
Further limitation with regard to application of section 13(1) has been done by the 
introduction of reliance into description of the thing sold. Reliance is a feature of 
fitness for purpose under section 14(3) whereby the buyer must establish to have 
relied on the seller's skill and judgement for the seller to be liable; thus, its extension 
to cover the sales by description through the decision of the court in Harlingdon and 
Leinster Enterprises Ltd v. Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd31 case is an innovation. The 
seller, in this case, sold a painting which was unequivocally stated to be the work of a 
German expressionist, Gabriele Munter. Unlike the buyer, who was expert in 
German expressionist art, the seller was not, and he relied upon an attribution in an 
earlier auction catalogue in his statement as to the painting. It was found, as a fact at 
trial, that the buyer did not rely upon the seller's statement but upon his own 
examination of the painting, which turned out to be forgery. By a majority, the Court 
of Appeal rejected the buyer's claim to hold the seller liable under section 13(1). Of 
30 See Stoljar, "Conditions, Warranty and Descriptions of quality in Sale of Goods -I ", op. cit., supra., 
note 69, at p. 445. In his article Stoljar concludes that: 
"[t]he distinction between sale by description and sale by specific goods 
contains a completely false antithesis. For this distinction is based upon further 
distinction between identified and non -identified goods. But, ..., the logical 
antithesis, so far as it goes, is not between specific and described goods, but 
between goods identified, wholly or partly by description, and goods identified 
by acquaintance." 
[1991] 1QB 564. 
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the majority judges, Nourse LT thought the sale was not by description. Furthermore, 
for the seller to be in breach of section 13(1) his statement should have passed the 
test of a contractual condition, which it failed to do because of the buyer's lack of 
reliance.' The other majority judge, Slade LT, saw description as depending upon a 
common contractual intention that the disputed statement be a term of the contract. 
Reliance was not a necessary requirement of section 13(1) liability, but its absence, 
in the present case, was enough to disqualify the statement from constituting part of 
the description.' 
The introduction of the principle of reliance into description can be regarded as a 
further attempt to put the law on description in line with the law on express 
warranty.34 If the court in Harlingdon and Leinster is successful in their attempt to 
integrate description into the law governing express warranties, there seems little 
point to retain sale by description under section 13(1) as a separate head of liability 
by a seller.' It seems, however, there is no reasonable justification for excluding the 
seller from liability for failing to supply goods in conformity with his statements, 
irrespective of whether the statements constitute an express warranty or a description 
under section 13(1) on the basis of the buyer's non -reliance on the statements. This is 
because the contractual price is based on the parties' understanding that the goods 
will comply with the statements. In other words, part of the contractual price received 
by the seller is based on the consideration of conformity of the goods with 
contractual statements. Therefore, in the case of non -conformity of the goods, the 
seller should be liable even if the buyer knew nothing about the statements until after 
the conclusion of the contract. 
3' Ibid., at p. 574. 
33 Ibid., at pp. 584 -585. 
3a For under the common law, an affirmation of fact or a promise by the seller with regard to the 
goods constitutes an express warranty only if the buyer has relied on it at the time of the contract. For 
the similar provision under section 12 of the US Uniform Sales Act, see Appendix I. 
35 The drafters of the Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods 1981 have removed description as a separate 
source of liability against the seller. 
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Examination of the goods 
There is doubt whether the seller is exempted from liability where the buyer, at the 
time of the sale, examines the goods and thereby he either discovers or should have 
discovered that the description is inaccurate. Nonetheless, if the buyer's reliance on 
the description is essential for holding the seller liable under section 13(1) of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979, then the seller's offer to the buyer to examine the goods may be 
taken to exclude the seller's liability against a non -conformity of the goods with the 
description, where the buyer should have reasonably discovered the non -conformity 
by the examination of the goods. Of course, the buyer's examination of the goods at 
the time of the formation of the contract which led to his actual detection of the non- 
conformity of the goods with the descriptions in the contract would exclude the 
seller's liability as to the non -conformity. However, in the absence of an express 
agreement by the parties, it appears that the law should not burden the buyer with a 
duty to examine the goods prior to the conclusion of the contract, and, in the case of 
the examination, the law should not deprive him of the right to sue the seller for 
breach of section 13 of the Act if the buyer did not actually detect the non -conformity 
of the goods with the description by the examination. This is because the buyer's aim 
in examining of the goods is not normally to confirm the accuracy of the description 
but to get to know the other attributes which are not included in the description. 
Pursuant to section 6 of the Act 1977, any contractual clause to restrict the 
seller's liability under section 13(1) is invalid against a person dealing as consumer, 
while in a non -consumer sale, such an exclusionary clause by the seller is permissible 
only to the extent that is "fair and reasonable ". Unfortunately, however, the limitation 
that an exclusionary clause is valid only where it is "fair and reasonable" does not 
apply to an international sale of goods contract. 36 
36 Under Articles 414 and 448 of the Iranian Civil Code in contrast, the seller may exclude his liability 
concerning description of specified goods only if they are generic and unascertained. 
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Satisfactory quality 
The next implied term under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended) is that the 
goods supplied by the seller must be of satisfactory quality.37 This is an alteration of 
the former condition under section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 requiring goods 
to be of "merchantable quality ". And although, unlike a sale by description under 
section 13(1), it does not apply to every contract of sale,38 but, on the other hand, it 
provides the buyer with a greater degree of protection since, the goods which 
correspond with their description may not be of satisfactory quality. 
In contrast with the civilian systems, under which the warranty against latent 
defect arises from the parties' sale agreement, the requirement that the goods 
supplied must be of satisfactory quality, as well as the other implied terms with 
regard to quality and fitness of the goods, is imposed by the law and, therefore, it 
applies only where the goods are sold by the seller in the course of business.39 This 
is, it seems, because only in such instances the buyer could have relied by 
implication on the knowledge and skill of the seller in purchasing of the goods, even 
though the law does not expressly require him to prove his reliance in all these 
instances. Thus, a private seller who is not selling in the course of business is not 
subject to liability as to quality of the goods under section 14(2), even if the defects 
in the goods virtually render the goods useless. It is established that mere seller's 
involvement in a business activity is not enough for a sale to be done "in the course 
of business ", unless the buyer can show that the sale is integral to the business 
activity, rather than incidental to it.`t0 This provision, along with the inapplicability 
of the civilian principles that the seller must act in "good faith" by revealing of any 
defect known to him to the buyer and that the goods supplied by him must be "price - 
worthy", demonstrates that, unfortunately the maxim of caveat emptor still plays a 
3' See Section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended). 
38 In contrast with English law of sale, the original law requirement that the goods must be of 
"merchantable" quality has not been replaced by the UCC and this requirement applies where the 
goods are sold by a merchant. 
39 See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit. supra., Partl, Ch. 1, note 17, § 11 -045, at pp. 514 -516. 
40 See, P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., Part 1, Ch. 1, note 73, at p. 132. 
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major role in relationship between the parties under English law. As Lord Justice 
Clerk in the pre -unification Scottish case of John Anson Whealler v. James Methuem 
4' observed, when a buyer "sends an order for goods, without a word as to their 
quality, he is entitled to such an article, as the price entitled him to expect, of good, 
sound fair quality.i' For, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, the price set 
between the parties is based on the understanding that the goods are free of any 
defect and price -worthy irrespective of whether the seller is selling in the course of 
business or not. 
Where a private seller sells through an agent who is acting in the course of 
business, he is not exonerated from liability under section 14(2), unless the buyer is 
aware of this, or reasonable steps are taken to bring it to his notice before the 
conclusion of the sale.43 In the Scottish case of Boyter v. Thomson,44 the defender 
advised a firm to sell a cabin cruiser on his behalf under a brokerage and agency 
agreement to the pursuer who knew that the boat was being sold under a brokerage 
scheme, but thought that it was owned by the firm. The pursuer was not told that the 
name of the owner, nor that the owner was not selling in the course of business, nor 
that the firm was selling as the agent of the owner. The court of appeal held that the 
section 14(5) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 allows the buyer to bring an action for 
breach of the sections 14(2) and (3) against the principal since the defender failed to 
bring to the buyer's notice that he was not selling in the course of business.45 
The Seller's defences against the requirement that the goods must be of 
Satisfactory quality 
41 (1843) 5 D. 402. 
42 Ibid., at p. 406. 
43 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14(5). Under section 15(2)(c) of the Act, there are no 
corresponding provisions to those of section 14(2) limiting the applicability of implied term 
concerning sales by sample to those instances where the seller sells "in the course of business" 
44 [1995]2 AC 628 (H.L. (Sc.)), [1995] 3 All ER 135. 
45 Ibid., at p. 632 per Lord Jauceyof Tullichettle. 
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Like the law of warranty against latent defects under civilian systems, the seller is 
discharged from the liability under section 14(2) concerning the defects which he 
draws to the buyer's attention, and in the case of examination of the goods by the 
buyer with respect to those defects which that examination ought to have revealed 
before the conclusion of the contract.46 Moreover, pursuant to section 14(2C)(c) of 
the 1979 Act, in the case of sale by sample, the implied condition that the goods are 
satisfactory is excluded if the defects would have been detected on a reasonable 
examination of the sample, even if, imlike previous case, the buyer has actually failed 
to make such examination.47 In fact, as in a sale by sample the buyer is supposed to 
have reasonably examined the sample before the conclusion of the sale, his complaint 
with respect to the defect which could have reasonably discovered by that 
examination will be rej ected.48 The implied condition will well be excluded where 
the buyer in fact examines the sample and discovers the defect which renders the 
goods unsatisfactory and he, "notwithstanding and with knowledge of that defect in 
the sample, is content to take a delivery which corresponds with the sample and gets 
such a delivery. "49 On the other hand, if the defects in the goods are not discoverable 
by any reasonable examination, the seller will be responsible for breach of the 
implied condition to supply goods of satisfactory quality irrespective of whether or 
not the buyer in fact carried out such an examination on the goods.' 
46 For the full provisions of section 14 (2C) of the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), 
see Appendix II. As an example, the court in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Limited, supra., note 
9 held that the seller was liable for the breach of section 14 of the South Australia Sale of Goods Act 
1895 (identical with section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893) since the presence of the 
deterious chemical in the goods purchased by the buyer was hidden and latent defect which could not 
be detected by any examination that could reasonably be made. 
47 Ibid. Unlike the UCC, under which in the case of sale by sample, the seller's obligation to supply 
goods in conformity with the sample is regarded as an express warranty, English law considers this 
obligation as implied warranty imposed by the law. 
48 Before amendment of law by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 it was argued that where the implied 
condition of merchantable quality was excluded under section 15(2)(c) concerning the defects which 
examination of the sample would have revealed, the buyer might still sue the seller under section 
14(2) as to defects which could not be detected by actual examination. However, the amendment of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 clearly in both section 14(2) and section 15 states that in the event of a 
sale by sample, it is what a reasonable examination of the sample ought to have been revealed and not 
any actual examination. 
49 Houndsditch Warehouse Co. Ltd. v. Waltex Ltd. [1944] 2 All ER 518, 519. 
50 See, for example, Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd, supra., note 9. 
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A particular problem arose in R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd v. United 
Dominions Trust,' where the plaintiff company bought a car on conditional sale for 
the private use of its director. The defendant delivered the car a few days before the 
contract being legally concluded between the parties, as they had not yet signed of 
the relevant documents. Before signing of the said documents, the plaintiff 
discovered that the roof was leaking and the defendants undertook to repair it some 
days latter. After numerous attempts the defendants did not succeed to repair the car 
satisfactorily and, consequently, the plaintiff rejected the car on the basis of the 
breach of implied condition as to quality and fitness. The defendant argued that the 
examination and discovery of the defect by the plaintiff before conclusion of the 
contract excluded his liability (the defendant liability) under section 14(2)(b) of the 
1979 Act with respect to that defect. The Court of Appeal felt that if that was the 
result of the statutory wording, it would be a trap for a buyer who took delivery 
before making a concluded contract. Nonetheless, no decision was taken on this 
ground, instead the seller was held liable for breach of section 14(3) concerning the 
implied condition as to fitness of the goods for a particular purpose for which they 
were purchased. section 35(6) of the 1979 Act (as amended) provides that the goods 
are not deemed to have been accepted by the buyer who merely ask for or agrees to 
their repairs, but as can be seen this provision does not go far enough to address the 
foregoing problem. 
Obviously, no problem would arise if before the conclusion of the sale, the seller 
undertakes to repair the defects in the goods, for in such instances he would be liable 
for breach of a separate collateral contract or of an express term of the contract where 
he fails to comply with his undertaking. But in R & B Customs Brokers the seller 
undertook to repair the leak after the contract was made, and thus there was no 
separate collateral contract or warranty on the ground of his undertaking under 
English law. 
The above problem, however, has been properly resolved under the UCC by 
considering the seller's post -contractual statements with regard to the goods as a 
51 [1988] 1 All ER 847. 
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modification of the contractual warranty which, unlike English law, need not be 
supported by consideration.' This approach is consistent with Iranian and French 
law, both of which allow the parties to adjust the provisions of the contract in favour 
of either of the parties after its conclusion without any need for consideration. 
The scope of the application of the term "satisfactory" 
The application of the implied condition as to the merchantability of the goods under 
section 14(2) of thé 1979 Act was extended to cover not only the goods actually 
bought by the buyer and passing to him, but packages or containers in which the 
goods are sold, even if they remain the property of the seller.' It equally applied to 
new and used goods,54 and to natural commodities, such as grain," and to complex 
manufactured goods and to goods purchased for resale as well as to goods purchased 
for private consumption.56 These provisions, which are also consistent with those of 
civilian systems with respect of the warranty against latent defects in the goods sold, 
have not been altered by the 1994 Act. 
The extent of the seller's liability under section 14(2) 
The reasonableness requirement 
52 See UCC, Section 2 -313, Comment 7. 
53 See, e.g., Geddling v. Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668; Beecham Foods Ltd v. North Supplies (Edmonton) 
Ltd [1959] 2 All ER 336, 1 WLR 643; Wilson v. Rikett Cockerell & Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 598. 
54 As to the application of the implied condition of merchantable quality to used goods see Lutton v. 
Saville Tractors (Belfast) Ltd [1986] 12 NIJB 1, where Carswell J held that in the case of sale of a 
second -hand car, it should be "reliable and capable of giving good service and fair performance ". See 
further, Business Appliances Specialists Ltd v. Nationwide Credit Corpn Ltd [1988] RTR 32, in which 
the court of Appeal argued that the test for application of merchantability to a second -hand vehicle is 
precisely the same as the one to be applied to a new one; that is whether the vehicle was as fit for their 
purpose as it was reasonable to expect. 
ss Wallis v. Russell [1902] 2 IR. 585. 
56 Bristol Tramways Co. Ltd v. Fiat Motors Ltd [1910] 2 KB 831, 840 
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The extent of the seller's obligation under section 14(2) depends largely upon the 
meaning to be attached to the term `satisfactory quality'. However, this term like its 
predecessor `merchantable quality' is vague. In fact, as Professor Atiyah points out, 
statements such as `mercantile quality'S7 and `satisfactory quality78 "heavily rely on 
the test of reasonableness" which despite having substantial flexibility for applying 
to very varied transactions which come within the law of the sale of goods, is 
"somewhat circular in practice "59 and consequently, they offer little guidance as what 
kind of defects or damages may render the goods unsatisfactory. Professor Atiyah 
rightly rejects the court's argument in Rogers v. Parish (Scarborough) Ltd60 which 
assumed that the application of the statutory definition of merchantable quality under 
old section 14(6) was a question of fact and points out that the existence of the 
element of reasonableness in both the definition of "merchantable quality" and 
"satisfactory quality" demonstrates that questions of evaluation are necessarily 
involve in both instances.61 This entails that the detailed analysis and illustration in 
the earlier cases are to be available for the evaluation of each case by the parties 
concerned, otherwise every case is to be disposed of by appealing to the court 
something which is quite unacceptable in such a large and important area of law as 
this.6' 
57 For the definition of the term `merchantable quality', under section 14(6) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979, see Appendix II. 
58 For the definition of the term "satisfactory under sections 14(2A) and 14(2B) of the Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), see Appendix II. 
59 See, P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., Part 1, Ch. 1, note 73, at p.140. Professor 
Atiyah states: 
"what is the buyer entitled to expect under the contract? Answer - goods of 
satisfactory/merchantable quality. What is satisfactory /merchantable quality? 
Answer - goods of that quality (roughly peaking) which is reasonable to expect. 
what would the buyer reasonably expect? Answer - goods suitable for 
reasonable use. What is reasonable use? Answer - the sort of use which a 
reasonable buyer would intend. And so on." Ibid. 
eo [1987] QB 933. 
61 See, P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., Part 1, Ch. 1, note 73, at pp. 140 - 41. 
6' Ibid. At p. 141. 
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The issue of fitness for purpose 
Prior to the first enactment of a definition of merchantable quality in 1973, it was 
established by some cases that multi -purpose goods were of merchantable quality if 
fit for at least one purpose in the range of ordinary purposes;63 and, thus, the buyer 
seeking added protection had to communicate his particular purpose to the seller to 
invoke separate implied teirn of reasonable fitness. Where the goods did not satisfy 
the buyer's non -communicative purpose, it was always a difficult matter to determine 
whether there were' other existing purpose in the range of ordinary purposes. An 
expensive vehicle could not be said to be of merchantable quality just because it was 
saleable as scrap, since the price and the description of the vehicle exclude scrap 
from its range of ordinary purpose. In Jones v. Padgettó4 a dealer sold a quantity of 
indigo cloth to another dealer who also carried on a business as a tailor. The buyer 
intended to have the cloth made up for servants' liveries, but he did not inform this to 
the seller. Because of a latent defect, the cloth proved to be unsuitable for making 
liveries but, it could be used for other ordinary purposes. The court rejected the 
buyer's claim that the defect rendered the cloth unmerchantable. 
The enactment of the statutory definition of merchantable quality in 1973 raised 
the question whether the seller could still enjoy the previous immunity if the goods 
were fit for one of their ordinary purpose. In Aswan Engineering Establishment Co v. 
Lupdine Ltd, ' the sellers of waterproofing compound in plastic pails for export to 
Kuwait were found liable against the buyers for the loss of waterproofing compound 
caused by the collapse of plastic containers which occurred when they were staked in 
intense heat and pressure when exposed for a lengthy period to the Kuwait sun. The 
seller, in turn, sought to recover damages for breach of section 14(2)66 from the 
63 See, e.g., James Drummond and Sons v. E. H. Van Ingen & Co (1887) 12 App. Cas. 284; Kendall 
(Kendall) & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31. 
64 (1890) 24 QBD 650. The court in Kendall (Kendall) & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd [1969] 2 
AC 3 lconfirmed the reasoning of the above decision and extended its application to cover dangerous 
goods. 
65 [1987] 
1 WLR 1; [1987] 1 All ER 135. 
66 Their claim was also based on breach of section 14(3) as well as in tort which do not concern the 
present discussion. 
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manufacturing sellers of the containers who conceded that the containers has been 
described in the contract as heavy duty pails for export shipment.' The Court of 
Appeal rejected the plaintiff's argument that the law was changed by 1973 enactment 
because now the goods had to be "as fit for the purpose or purposes ", meaning all 
purposes "for which goods of that kind are commonly bought as it is reasonable to 
expect" and held that the goods satisfied the requirement that they should be of 
merchantable quality. Lloyd LJ concluded that, if the legislators had wished to 
change the law in the radical way argued for by the claimant they would have 
mentioned it in the relevant section of the Act.68 In a concurring judgement, Nicholls 
LJ observed that it would be unreasonable to impose liability when the containers 
were perfectly adequate for the job in all but the most unusual conditions. Perhaps 
the best reason for taking this decision was that the export to Kuwait was a special 
purpose, which the claimant failed to disclose to the seller.69 
How to define a purpose or purposes of goods supplied by a seller is an issue 
which was not settled, in the Aswan case. The court treated export to Europe and to 
Kuwait as separate purposes, but it may be argued that there is but one purpose, 
packaging sealant for export. If this were so, then the focus would shift to whether 
the container was reasonably fit for that purpose or not. If Europe and Kuwait are 
separate purposes, then why should not further differentiation occur so that different 
countries with different peculiar climates in different seasons in Europe be 
distinguished. The new definition of satisfactory quality addresses this thorny 
problem by including 
"in appropriate cases... fitness for all purposes for which the goods of the kind 
in question are commonly supplied ".70 
What is the "appropriate cases" where the goods are to be of satisfactory 
67 Supra., note 65, p. 25. 
68 This conclusion was supported by Fox U. 
69 Supra., note 65, p. 15. See also Kendall (Kendall) & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd, supra., 
note 64 in which the court argued that since the goods were usable for one of the main purposes for 
which such goods are commonly bought; it would be unreasonable to say that because the goods were 
unsuitable for only one of these possible uses the goods were to be treated un- merchantable. 
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quality 
Accordingly, under the section 14(2B)(a) the Act 1979, the buyer is entitled to 
expect that the goods would be fit for all ordinary purposes as defined by the 
description and the price paid." However, whilst the new definition of satisfactory 
quality under this section states that the seller only in "appropriate cases" would be 
liable for all ordinary purposes, the Act does not clarify what cases are considered 
appropriate for rendering the seller liable against the buyer. This may cause a 
considerable uncertainty among the parties concerned. It may be argued that the 
result in the Aswan case should stand, given the extremity of the conditions in which 
the container collapsed. 
Safety of the goods 
Under the new law, safety of the goods is one of the factors to be taken into account 
in deciding whether they are of "satisfactory quality" under section 14(2B)(d). It is 
established law that the goods which cannot be safely used are not of satisfactory 
quality.'' 
Latent defects 
A major point which is to be considered is the issue of the latent defect in the goods 
and its impact over the problem of satisfactoriness of the quality. Whilst under the 
civilian systems, any defect hidden in the goods entitles the buyer to cancel the sale 
70 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14(2B)(a) (as amended). (Italic added). 
71 See Law corn. No. 160, para. 3.36. 
7' See Section 14(2B)(d) of the Act 1979 (as amended). Although the previous defmition of section 
14(2) of this Act contained no provisions to this effect, there were some cases which mostly related to 
sale of cars and in which the sellers were held that to be liable for breach of condition to supply goods 
of merchantable quality where they could not be safely used. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Panaon Motors 
(Golders Green) Ltd. [1987] 2 All ER 220; Lee v. York Coach & Marine [1977] RTR 35. 
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and to recover the price paid to the seller, English law allows him to do so only if 
such a defect renders the goods unsatisfactory under section 14(2). This means that, 
unlike the former systems, the presence of a defect in the goods in itself is not 
sufficient for the buyer to reject the goods under English law.73 On the other hand, 
the mere fact that the goods appear all right and saleable in the market is not equally 
sufficient to render them of satisfactory quality within the context of section 14(2). 
To find out whether the goods were merchantable under the previous provisions there 
was an assumption that all latent defects were fully known and the new provisions 
have made no change in this respect.74 There are many instances in which goods, 
such as drugs and medicines, may be dangerous and thus unsatisfactory if they are 
sold without providing adequate information, whilst equally they would be perfectly 
satisfactory if such information is given to the buyer at the time of the sale.75 But, 
unfortunately, not all cases have followed this common sense in dealing with the 
issue of merchantability. For example, in Kendall (Henry) & Sons v. William Lillico 
& Sons Ltd,76 the ground nut extraction sold to the buyer was held to be merchantable 
for it was fit for its most common use, namely for compounding into animal feeding 
stuffs. Any feeding stuff containing the extraction was suitable for feeding cattle and 
other animals rather than pheasant and partridge chicks. In fact, it transpired that the 
animal feeding stuff made from ground nut extraction was not only unsuitable to feed 
pheasants and partridge chicks, but also dangerous and poisonous to them. Surely, 
the buyers could avoid any damages sustained as a result reselling of feeding stuff 
produced with the toxic ground nut extraction to his sub -buyers had the seller at the 
time of the contract informed them of this fact, since, the buyer could simply have 
labelled the feeding stuff containing the ground nut extraction by a phrase such as 
"not suitable for pheasant and partridge chicks ". Notwithstanding the damage 
sustained by the buyers as a consequence of the seller's failure to inform them of the 
poisonous nature of the extraction, the House of Lords held that these facts did not 
73 See M. G. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., note 9, p. 309. 
74 See Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd, supra., note 9, at p. 100 per Lord Wright. 
75 Willis v. FMCMachineìy & Chemical Ltd (1976) 68 DLR (3rd) 127; Vacwell Engineering Co Ltd 
v. BDH Chemicals [1969] 3 All ER 1681. 
76 [ 1969] 2 AC 31. 
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render the goods of unmerchantable quality. The House based its decision on the 
"acceptability" test by finding that the buyer with full knowledge of all the facts 
would have accepted the goods in discharge of the contract without substantial 
abatement of the price. It seems, however, hard to justify this reasoning. It might be 
thought that the acceptability test adopted by the court, in this case, resembles the 
Iranian law tradition under which the goods delivered must be price- worthy. 
However, this conception is not correct. This is because, the acceptability test can 
only be used against the buyer to deprive him from recovering damages for the 
defects in the goods while the priceworthy requirement entitles him to reject where 
the contractual price of the goods is substantially higher than their market price at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. 
The factor of the price 
The decision in Kendall case demonstrates that the issue of the satisfactory quality 
under section 14(2) will require account to be taken of the price." One may reach to 
the same conclusion by considering the case of B. S. Brown & Son Ltd v. Craiks 
Ltd.78 In this case, a quantity of `fibro Plain Cloth' was sold according to detailed 
technical specifications79 which did not disclose the precise purpose of the buyers. 
The contractual price was 36.25d. per yard and the buyers' aim, unknown to the 
sellers, was to use the cloth for making dresses. The buyers discovered that the cloth 
was not suitable for making of dresses, and thus sought damages on the ground that 
the cloth was unmerchantable. It was argued for the buyers that the price paid took 
the cloth out of the range of industrial wear and limited its ordinary purpose to dress 
manufacturing. As a fact the price was found to be low for the dress fabrics but at the 
top end for industrial fabrics, without being unreasonably high. It was held that this 
fact did not render the goods unmerchantable for the price paid was still within the 
range of industrial fabrics. The Brown case is significant in that House of Lords did 
77 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14 (2A) (as amended). 
78 [ 1970] 1 All ER 823. 
79 Ibid., at p. 829: 
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accept that the price, even in the absence of helpful descriptive language, might 
define the range of ordinary purposes for the application of the merchantable quality 
standard. 
What grade of quality satisfies the requirement of satisfactory quality 
There are many instances in which infinitely variable qualities may be available for 
the kind of goods sold. Unlike the UCC, which requires the seller to deliver a "fair 
average quality" within the contract description,80 the term "satisfactory ", like its 
predecessor "merchantable ", under English law, does not connote that the goods are 
to be of any particular grade of quality. As Salmond J pointed noted in the New 
Zealand case of Taylor v. Combined Buyers Ltd:81 
" The term `merchantable' does not mean of good, or fair, or average quality. 
Goods may be of inferior or even bad quality but yet fulfil the legal requirement 
of merchantablé quality. For goods may be in the market in any grade, good, 
bad or indifferent, and yet equally merchantable. On a sale of goods there is no 
implied condition that they are of any particular grade or standard. If the buyer 
wishes to guard himself in this respect he must expressly bargain for the 
particular grade or standard that he requires. If he does not do so, caveat emptor; 
and he must accept the goods, however inferior in quality, so long as they 
conform to the description under which they sold and are of merchantable 
quality-the term `quality' including state or condition." 
Similarly, in Kendall v. Lillico,82 Lord Reid pointed out that where goods are sold in 
the market under some general description, of which there may be several different 
qualities available, the seller may satisfy his duty by providing the goods which 
comply with the lowest quality under which goods of that description can commonly 
be sold.S3 Nonetheless, where different grade of quality of goods of general 
description are fit for different common use of the goods of that description, it seems 
that fulfilment of the requirement of satisfactory quality may following to the dicta 
of the Brown case depend almost entirely on the contractual price. For as pointed out 
80 See UCC, Section 2- 314(2). See further, p. 249 -250, post. 
8' [1924] NZLR 627, 645. 
82 
[1969] 2 AC 31, 79 -80. 
83 See further the Australian case of Goerge Wills & Co Ltd v. Davids Pty Ltd (1956 -57) 98 CLR 77. 
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earlier, a higher price paid by the buyer indicates that he is entitled to receive 
something more than the lowest quality available in the market. In other words, in 
contrast with the Iranian system under which apart from the warranty against latent 
defects, the quality of the goods supplied by the seller must be commensurate with 
the price, the seller following English law only in the instances mentioned above may 
be liable for breach of the implied condition under section 14(2) if the quality of the 
goods supplied is not commensurate with the price.84 
Durability of the goods 
Durability is another factor of satisfactory quality, which has attracted specific 
mention in section 14(2B)(e) of the Act 1994. It requires the goods delivered to have 
capacity to remain in satisfactory condition for a reasonable period of time. The issue 
of durability was raised in Mash and Murrell v. Joseph I Emmanuel, 85 where the 
sellers in Cyprus entered into an agreement for the sale of a quantity of potatoes C. & 
F. Liverpool. Although the potatoes were sound at the time of loading, they were 
rotten by the time of the arrival of the ship. The seller was rightly held to be in breach 
of the condition of merchantability implied by section 14(2). Diplock J pointed out 
that in such a sale the goods must be loaded in "such a state that they could endure 
the normal journey and be in a merchantable condition on arrival. "86 
As to what is a reasonable time during which, if the goods cease from being of 
satisfactory quality, the seller will be liable for infringement of section 14(2B)(e), is a 
question of fact which depends on the nature of the goods and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case, including the price received by the seller. Thus, a buyer 
who pays higher price for a high -quality article can reasonably expect it to last longer 
than the cheaper one purchased at a low price. Nonetheless, the fact that the goods 
was price -worthy at the time of the sale should not be taken as an excuse by a trial 
court to deprive the buyer from his right to acquire durable goods under section 14 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended). This was unfortunately the case in 
84 See Goldup v. John Manson Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 257. 
85 [1961] 
1 All ER 485. See also The Rio Sun [1985] 1 Lloyds Rep 350. 
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Thain v. Anniesland Trade Centre,87 where the purchaser of a five year old car which 
had travelled about 80,000 miles, raised an action against the seller, asserting that the 
car was not of satisfactory quality in terms of section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act as 
only after two weeks after using the car he detected a defect with the result that the 
car could no longer be used. The court held against the purchaser arguing that the 
price paid for the second hand car of its age and mileage was reasonable and that in 
buying the car of this age and mileage the buyer immediately assumed the risk of 
repair and therefore, durability "was simply not a quality that a reasonable person 
would demand of it ".88 
On the face of it, this may suggest that the factor of durability, like the Iranian 
system,89 requires the quality of the goods to be commensurate in every case with 
their contractual price. This construction, nonetheless, is not correct, as there are 
many cases in which the goods supplied may be durable but not price- worthy. 
However, there is doubt whether the contrary might be the case; i.e., it is unclear 
whether a price -worthy article might be considered not durable within the meaning of 
section 14(2B) as to render it of unsatisfactory quality.' 
The buyer's right when only part of the goods are of satisfactory quality 
Like Iranian law, where only part of the goods delivered are unsatisfactory, English 
law allows the buyer to reject the whole goods where he wishes to do so. 
Nevertheless, this remedy is not available to him under English law if the breach is 
so trivial as to permit the seller to invoke the de minimis rule.91 
86 [1961 ] 1 All ER 485, at p. 488. 
87 1997 SLT (Sh Ct) 102. 
88 Ibid., p. 106 
89 See pp. 281 -285, post. 
90 See Goldup v. John Manson Ltd, supra., note 86 where it was held that if the price is commensurate 
with the quality in fact supplied, the goods will be Satisfactory (formerly merchantable). 
91 See Jackson v. Rotax Motor & Cycle Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 937. 
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Fitness of the goods for the buyer's particular purpose 
The seller who sells in the course of business is not only responsible to supply goods 
which are of satisfactory quality as discussed before, but under section 14(3), he is 
also bound to make sure that the goods are fit for any "particular purpose" for which 
they are being purchased and which was made known to him either expressly or by 
implication by the buyer at the time of the sale.92 
The implied condition that the goods must be fit for the buyer's particular 
purpose is a significant protection, which has been provided alike by both US and 
English law, but has no correspondence under the civilian systems. As other implied 
terms, this protection particularly depends on the principle of reliance by the buyer 
on the seller's skill and judgement. Accordingly, the buyer cannot avail himself of 
this protection if there is any evidence to indicate that "he does not rely, or that it is 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill or judgement of the seller" with respect to 
the suitability of the goods for the particular purpose for which they are required.93 
The language of the section 14(3) connotes that the law presumed the buyer's 
reliance if he can show that he has made known to the seller the purpose for which 
the goods are being bought, unless the latter positively disproves the reliance, or 
unless he can show that the buyer could not have reasonably relied on his skill or 
judgement. Nonetheless, unlike the UCC,94 under the UK Act, it is not enough for the 
presumption of the reliance that the seller himself has reason to know the particular 
purpose for which the buyer acquiring the goods. However, as Professor Goode 
notes the question of reliance has been interpreted by the English courts very 
literally, and, "if the particular is known to the seller or is apparent from the 
circumstances of the contract, this will suffice as an implied communication of the 
purpose by the buyer"." 
92 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14(3). 
93 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14(3). 
94 See UCC, Section 2 -315. 
95 Goode, Commercial Law (2 "d ed. 1995), at p. 334; see further, Slater v. Finning Ltd. AC 473, 486- 
487 (H.L.(Sc.)) per Lord Steyn. 
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When the buyer could be said to have relied on the seller's skill or judgement is 
a question of fact, but the use of the term "unreasonable ", in this respect, 
demonstrates that an element of evaluation must also be involved. The fact that both 
the seller and the buyer run their own respective businesses in the same commodity 
market does not necessarily mean that the buyer cannot rely on the seller, although it 
no doubt tends against the inference of such reliance.96 Accordingly, a merchant - 
buyer may be found to have relied on the seller where, for example, he makes known 
to the seller his particular purpose in purchasing the goods and the seller recommends 
them to him. Similarly, the seller who is also the manufacturer of the goods sold 
could hardly dispute the buyer's reliance.97 On the other hand, it is unreasonable to 
hold the buyer to have relied on the seller where the latter in effect has disclaimed his 
responsibility and has merely proffered his advice for what it is worth.98 Moreover, 
where the goods are sold for export to other countries, the mere fact that the seller 
knows that the goods are being purchased for import to a foreign country is not 
sufficient under English law to show that the buyer relies on the skill or judgement of 
the seller concerning suitability of the goods in that particular country. For in such a 
case it is the buyer but not the seller who suppose to know the necessary knowledge 
of the conditions in the country of import, and therefore, his reliance on the seller 
may be held to be unreasonable. In Tehran- Europe Corpn Ltd v. S. T. Belton 
(Tractors) Ltd99 for example, the buyers, an Iranian company, bought air compressors 
from English sellers through an English intermediary. The seller knew that the goods 
were destined for resale in Iran.'0° When it transpired that, under Iranian law, the 
goods could not be resold as "new and unused ", the court rejected the buyer's claim 
that the sellers were liable, on the basis that the buyers knew all and the sellers 
nothing about the Iranian market. 
96 Kendall (Kendall) & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd, supra., note 63, p. 124. 
97Ibid., p. 95. 
98 See Law Commission Report, Exemption Clauses: First Report, para. 37. 
99 [1968] 2 QB 545. 
100 Ibid. 554 (Denning MR). 
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The fact that the buyer has only partially relied on the seller's skill or judgement 
does not preclude him from asserting a breach of section 14(3),101 provided that the 
reliance in question is "such as to constitute a substantial and effective inducement 
which leads the buyer to agree to purchase the commoditys102 and that unfitness of 
the commodity is attributable to some fact within the seller's sphere of expertise on 
which the buyer relied.103 Section 14(3) does not contain any provision equivalent to 
section 14(2C)(b), which excludes the seller's liability for unsatisfactory goods as 
regards matters that an examination conducted by the buyer ought to have revealed. 
Nevertheless, there is a danger that such an examination may be considered as an 
evidence to negate the buyer's reliance on the seller's skill or judgement for the 
purpose of section 14(3). 
The word "reasonably," under section 14(3), indicates that fitness for purpose is 
a relative concept. Whether goods are reasonably fit for their purpose known to the 
seller is to be determined objectively, and does not in any way depend on the degree 
of diligence or care which the seller has exercised. Accordingly, the fact that the 
goods are unfit through some latent defects which are undiscoverable by any amount 
of diligence and care does not discharge the seller from being liable for breach of 
section 14(3), since it does not in any way make the goods more suitable for their 
purpose than if no care had been exercised by the seller.104 Similarly, the fact that the 
idea of an implied condition is based on the seller's skill and judgement does not 
entails that he complies with its requirement by the exercise of all reasonable care 
and skill. As Lord Reid pointed out in Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & 
sons Ltd:1°5 
" If the law were always logical one would suppose that a buyer, who has 
obtained a right to rely on the seller's skill and judgement, would only obtain 
thereby an assurance that the proper skill and judgement had been exercised and 
101 See, e.g., Cammell Laird & Co Ltd v. Manganese Bronze & Brass Co Ltd [1934] AC 402, at p. 
414, per Lord Warrington. 
102 Medway Oil & Storage Co Ltd v. Silica Gel. Corpn (1928) 33 Corn Cas 195, 196 per Lord 
Summer. 
103 Ashington Piggeries Ltd v. Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441. 
104 Randall v. Newson (1877) 2 QBD 102; Kendall (Kendall) & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons Ltd, 
supra., note 63. 
los Ibid. at p. 84. 
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would only had been exercised and would only be entitled to a remedy if a 
defect in the goods was due to failure to exercise such skill and judgement. But 
the law has always gone farther than that. By getting the seller to undertake to 
use his skill and judgement the buyer gets under section 14(1) an assurance that 
the goods will be reasonably fit for his purpose and that covers not only defects 
which the seller ought to have detected but also defects which are latent in the 
sense that even the utmost skill and judgement on the part of the seller would 
not have detected them." 
Implied terms that the goods must correspond with sample 
As in the French, Iranian and the systems, under English law the seller in the case of 
sale by sample is obliged to deliver goods in conformity with the sample in quality. 
But whilst under all the former systems this obligation constitutes part of the seller's 
express warranties which arises from the contract, English law considers it as an 
obligation which has been impliedly imposed by the law. 
As in Iranian and French law, there is no statutory definition of a sale by sample 
under English law. The governing provision on sale by sample is section 15, which 
was the subject of a number of consequential amendments under the Sale and Supply 
of Goods Act 1994.106 According to section 15(1): 
"A contract of a sale is a contract for sale by sample where there is an express or 
implied terms to that effect in the contract." 
This provision indicates that the mere fact that a sample is provided for inspection by 
the buyer during negotiation for a sale is not sufficient to make the sale a sale by 
sample. It is necessary that the sample displayed be intended to form the contractual 
'6 For example, the buyer's right to compare the bulk with the sample has now been written into 
section 34 which deals with examination of the goods sold. The first two subsections of section as 
amended by the 1994 Act provides: 
"(1) A contract of sale is a contract for sale by sample where there is an express 
or implied term to that effect in the contract. 
(2) In the case of contract for sale by sample there is an implied term 
(a) that the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality; 
(b) that the buyer will have reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with 
the sample [this subsection has been repealed by the Sale and Supply of Goods 
act 1994 but the equivalent provision is now to be found in section 35(2)(a)]; 
(c) that the goods will be free from any defect, making their quality 
unsatisfactory." 
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basis of a comparison with the bulk of the goods subsequently tendered. A sale by 
sample, in other words, takes place only where there is an express or implied term of 
the contract to that effect.107 Accordingly, in Gardiner v. Gray,108 the plaintiff's claim 
that the sale took place by sample was rejected on the ground that: 
"sample was not produced as a warranty that the bulk correspond with it but to 
enable the purchaser to form a reasonable judgement of the commodity ".109 
What is the function of a sample under the English law is a question which has been 
considered by Lord Macnaghten in James Drummond and Sons v. E. H. Van Ingen & 
Co Ltd: 
"The office of a sample is to present to the eye the real meaning and intention of 
the parties with regard to the subject matter of the contract which, owing to the 
imperfections of language, it may be difficult or impossible to express in 
words.i10 
Thus, the proffering of a sample amounts to a non -verbal demonstration of the goods 
that the seller under the contract is required to deliver. "' The sample may be 
extracted from the bulk, or it may be entirely separate from that bulk. 
Once the sale is by sample, the seller, as in the other legal systems, is obliged to 
make sure that the bulk tendered corresponds with the sample in quality.112 
Compliance with a sample sometimes arises collaterally to other issues. In 
Champanhac & Co. Ltd v. Waller & Co. Ltd,13 for instance, the seller contracted to 
sell a quantity of balloons with "all faults and imperfections ", a phrase apt to exclude 
107 This provision caused an uncertainty in the cases where contracts are reduced to writing, and the 
writing did not refer to a sample. In contrast with the Iranian law, in such cases parole evidence is not 
normally considered as an adequate evidence for proving that the sale has taken place by sample. See 
for instance, Meyer v. Everth (1814) 4 Camp. 22; Ginner v. King (1890) 7 TLR 140. But where the 
contractual description of the goods has no common or definite trade such evidence may be 
admissible to identify description with a sample. Accordingly, in the Australian case of Cameron & 
Co v. Slutzkin Ply Ltd (1923) 32 CLR 81, the seller sold "matchless No. 2475 39/40 white voil" under 
a written contract. The buyer was held to be entitled to identify the product by reference to a sample, 
despite the parties did not mention the sample in their contract. 
t08 (1815) 4 Camp. 144. 
10° Ibid,. p. 145 per Lord Ellenborough. 
10 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 284, 297. 
"' See S. Williston, Sales (rev. Ed. 1948), para. 250. 
12 S. 15(2)(a). See Russell v. Nicolopulo (1860) 8 CB (NS) 362, 2 LT 185, 141 ER 1206; E. and S. 
Ruben Ltd v. Faire Brothers Ltd [1949] -1 KB 254 (the fact that it is easy for the buyer to correct the 
fault is no defence). 
13 [ 1948] 2 All ER 724. 
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his liability concerning merchantable quality,14 but not his separate obligation to 
supply a bulk in compliance with the sample in quality. 
Of course, the parties may agree to require the seller to deliver goods which over 
and above description and satisfactory quality, contain enhancing quality present in 
the sample but are undetectable on an ordinary examination. But, unlike Iranian law, 
in the absence of such an agreement, the seller, in the event of a sale by sample, is 
not liable if the bulk does not correspond in quality with the sample, except as to 
those qualities, whether of the sample or of the bulk, that would be apparent from 
such examination as is normal in the trade. In this connection Lord Macnaghten 
states: 
"The sample speaks for itself. But it cannot be treated as saying more than such 
a sample would tell a merchant of the class to which the buyer belongs, using 
due care and diligence, and appealing to it in the ordinary way and with the 
knowledge possessed by merchants of that class at the time. No doubt the 
sample might be made to say a great deal more. Pulled to pieces and examined 
by unusual tests which curiosity and suspicion might suggest, it would doubtless 
reveal every secret of its construction. But that is not the way business is done in 
this country. "' 15 
Accordingly, in Steels & Busks v. Bleecker Bik & Co. Ltd,16 a quantity of pale crepe 
rubber was supplied that, because of a preservative added in the course of its 
manufacture, stained material with which it came into contact. The court dismissed 
the claim that the seller was in breach of section 15(2)(a) for although the 
preservative was not present in the sample, its absence from the bulk could only have 
been verified by an extraordinary examination. "' 
As other implied terms under English system, this view seems to have been 
grounded on the principle of reliance which, in itself, is one the element of the law of 
tort under this system. In contrast, the seller's obligation as to quality of the goods in 
the case of sale by a sample under civilian as well as US law arises from the contract 
114 Now satisfactory quality under section 15(2)(c) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
"5 James Drummond and Sons v. E. H. Van Ingen & Co Ltd, supra., note 61, p. 297. 
"6 [1956] 1 Lloyds Rep. 228. See also F. E. Hoolcway & Co Ltd v. Alfred Isaac & Sons [1954] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 491. 
It seems that the seller in this case could be held liable under section 15(2)(c) if the presence of 
preservative rendered the goods of un- merchantable quality (now unsatisfactory quality). 
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and therefore, he will be liable for any non -conformity of the bulk with the sample 
even if such an non -conformity cannot be discovered by ordinary examination. 
In accordance with section 15(2)(c) in the case of a sale by sample, the seller 
will be liable for any latent defect which renders the goods unsatisfactory and which 
is not detectable by a reasonable examination of the sample. But his liability does not 
extend to those defects, which would be apparent on actual examination of the 
sample regardless of, whether the buyer in fact carried out such examination. "8 
118 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14(2C)(c) (as amended). 
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Chapter 2 
Warranty of Quality under United States Law 
Early US law bears the imprint of the English legacy of caveat emptor; the seller's 
liability as to the quality of the goods was limited to the cases of breach of an express 
warranty through which he had fraudulently induced the buyer to enter into the 
contract with him.' The doctrine of caveat emptor was supported by the fear of 
stifling the rapidly growing field of commerce and shaped by the fact that 
commercial transactions were conducted in face to face dealings.' 
Nonetheless, as a consequence of the change in the nature of commercial 
transactions the doctrine of caveat emptor began to lose its authority. During the 
nineteenth century mass production and contracts of sale for future delivery of 
standard goods between distant parties became the norm. Goods became more 
specialised and diverse; thus, the assumption that each party to the contract had equal 
bargaining power and equal commercial experience was no longer appropriate. 
Transcontinental bargains became routine and the purchaser's opportunity to inspect 
the goods before the sale upon which the principle of caveat emptor is based, was 
rendered increasingly suspect. These changes resulted in a gradual retreat of the 
maxim of caveat emptor? As a consequence of this retreat the early common law 
requirement that all promises must be explicit was amended and accordingly, the 
existence of implied -in -fact warranty was recognised. Also during the nineteenth 
century a new concept was developed in the common law whereby even in the 
' Garrok v. Heytesbery, Y.B. Trin 11 Rich. 2, pl. (1387); Sexias v. Wood, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. 1804). 
See further, Williston, Sales (2nd ed. 1924) vol. 1, p. 368; A. W. B. Simpson, A History of Common 
Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1975) 246; Ames, 
"The History of Assumpsit", (1888) 2 Harvard Law Review 1. 
2 See, for example, Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73 (1851) per Justice Paige at p. 89. See further, 
Sullivan, "Innovation in the law of warranty: The Burden of Reform" (1980) 32 Hastings Law 
Journal 341 at p. 346 -50. 
3 See generally Sullivan, supra, note 2, at p. 347 -51; Kessler, "The Protection of the Consumer Under 
Modern Sale Law, Part I, Comparative Study" (1964) 74 Yale Law Journal 262, 267 -68. 
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absence of any agreement or representation or description in the contract, the goods 
delivered by the seller must be merchantable (implied -in -law warranty). This 
requirement, however, was not applicable to all cases, nor in all jurisdiction. Even 
those jurisdictions which adopted the concept of merchantability it was always 
deemed "exceptions" to the general principle of caveat emptor. 
Throughout these changes, in contrast with the civilian systems, the concept of 
reliance by the buyer was considered as paramount under both implied and express 
warranties. Accordingly, where the buyer was given an opportunity to inspect the 
goods there would be no implied -in -law warranty as to defects, which ought to be 
disclosed by such inspection.' Similarly, equal skill in the buyer would preclude him 
from protection afforded by the law as, in such a case he could not assert reliance 
upon the seller's skill.6 In the case of latent defects, there obviously might be 
justifiable reliance by the buyer even if he inspected the goods before being accepted 
by him, and the warranty arose.' Williston, however, reported a tendency in the US 
cases to hold that inspection itself at the time of the bargain precludes the existence 
of any implied warranty, regardless of whether or not the defects are latent.' 
Moreover, the fact that warranty in common law developed out of tort and had not 
yet become fully contractual precluded the aggrieved buyer from recovering damages 
on the basis of breach of warranties in some of the US jurisdiction without showing a 
proof of the seller's negligence.' Finally, under the traditional US law, the seller 
could exclude the possibility of any implication of warranty or restrict the liability 
for its breach by stating that the seller has no personal knowledge of the goods sold, 
or by providing in the contract that goods are not warranted, or that they are sold as 
"it is ".10 Any of these contractual clauses effectively excluded the seller's liability for 
the breach of express or implied warranties even if, unlike the civilian tradition, the 
For example, the implied warranty that the goods delivered must be of merchantable quality was not 
applied to the cases where the seller was not manufacturer or dealer. 
5 Williston, supra, note 1, at p. 453. 
6 Ibid., at p. 456. 
Ibid., at p. 454. 
Ibid. 
9 Ibid., at pp. 466 -468. 
19 Ibid., at p. 
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defects where know to the seller but he failed either negligently or fraudulently to 
reveal them to the buyer when the contract was made. 
Warranty of Quality under Uniform Sales Act 1903 
The need for a maximum of clarity and certainty in certain fields of commercial 
activity and an urgent demand for uniformity of the law in different jurisdictions of 
the United States by the end of the 19th century led the Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws to approve the Uniform Sales Act in 1903. The intention of the legislators 
in approving this Act was to codify the "existing" common law. Nevertheless, the 
trend of limitation on the applicability of the principle of caveat emptor was greatly 
accelerated by its approval." 
The Uniform Sales Act 1903 in main followed the UK Sale of Goods Act 1893, 
nonetheless, there are some outstanding difference between these two enactments. 
One of the difference between these Acts related to the use of the terms "warranty" 
and "condition ". Under section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act 1903, the term 
"warranty" is very broad in meaning and refers to promises that is regarded as 
"condition" under English law.12 This section regards a warranty as a promise, either 
express or implied -in -fact (from affirmation of fact). On the other hand, in contrast 
with the UK Act 1979, the term "condition" is used by the Act 1903 for the 
happening of some event about which the seller has made no promise. According to 
section 11(1) of the Act 1903, non -performance of a condition which has been 
promised by a party to happen may be treated as breach of warranty. 
The Uniform Sales Act does not use the expression of "implied -in- fact", 
nevertheless, there is a tacit recognition that the seller is liable for making of 
voluntary declaration of will even though it may be indirect rather than express, in 
11 See A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, Williston on Sales 608 (4th ed. 1974) . As an example by adoption 
of the Uniform Sales Act, those jurisdictions in which the seller's liability on an implied -in -law 
warranty was limited to the situations where involved his fault, were forced to retreat this requirement 
and to regard it as not more material in cases of implied -in -law warranty than in cases of express 
warranty. 
12 See A. Squillante & J. Fonseca, Williston on Sales (4th ed. 1974) p. 366. 
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the same manner as he makes an express promise. In other words, affirmation of fact 
and expressly promissory words are to produce the same remedy to the buyer. 
The other main features of the Act 1903 includes the following: 
(1) The tort aspects of the warranty observed in its common law origin were 
retained; the affirmation of fact or the promise is regarded as a warranty only if its 
natural tendency is to induce the purchaser to buy the goods and only if he purchases 
the goods by relying thereon. 
(2) Although the Act discarded the old common law requirement of the seller's 
intent to warrant, it retained the troublesome distinction between affirmation of fact 
and what is called mere statement of the seller's opinion. 
(3) In contrast with the English system where the distinction developed by cases 
between present sales and contract to sell has been retained and developed by the 
courts, the drafters of the Act 1903 succeed to eliminate this distinction with regard 
to the quality of the goods sold.13 
(4) As in the UK Act 1979, under sections 14 and 16 of the Act 1903, the 
warranties arising from "sales by description" and "sales by sample" have been 
designated mistakenly as "implied" rather than "express ". Obviously, the seller, by 
describing of the goods in the contract or by agreeing to sell them in accordance with 
a the sample, indirectly declares his will that the goods delivered will correspond 
with the description and /or with the sample, and as such like any affirmation of fact 
are implied -in -fact in the sale which should be regarded as express warranties. It is to 
be noted that since express and implied (in fact and in law) warranties are treated 
alike by the Act 1903, this inaccuracy of analysis is not important in practice under 
the common law. However, it makes a considerable difference in those jurisdictions 
where it is held that implied warranties are eliminated by express warranties,' or 
where the remedies available to the buyer for the breach of express warranties differs 
from those for breach of implied warranties. 
13 Llewellyn, "On Warranty of Quality, and Society", (1936- 1937) 36 Columbia Law Review 699. 
14 See, for example, the case of Slinger v. Totten, 38 S.D. 249, 160 N.W. 1008 (1917) in South 
Dakota. 
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(5) Finally, under section 15(2) of the Act1903, the warranty of merchantability 
applies only to cases where the goods are purchased by description from the 
seller who deals in the goods of that description, although he does not need to 
be the grower or manufacturer for the warranty to arise. 
Warranty of quality of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
The inadequacy of the remedies afforded under the Uniform Sales Act and the 
common desire for improving the protection of the buyer and as well as the need for 
a uniform modern code of commercial law to govern commercial transactions in the 
United States of America' led to adoption of the UCC in replacement of the Uniform 
Sales Act. Although most of the substance of the Uniform Sales Act has been 
incorporated into Article 2 of the UCC, it has been completely rewritten, with the 
making of numerous revisions and the insertion many new provisions. In this chapter 
it is intended to explore the law of warranty of quality under the new US commercial 
code in order to find out if there has been any progress in achieving of these goals. 
Express warranties 
An express warranty is a representation made by the seller to a buyer that relates to 
the quality or performance of the goods sold. The seller is required to deliver goods 
that conform to his representations in the sale, unless he can show that those 
representations did not create an enforceable express warranty. 
Express warranties under the UCC are governed by section 2 -313, which 
provides that: 
"(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
15 See Stasney "III, UCC Implied Warranty of Merchantability and Used Goods" (1974) 26 Baylor 
Law Review 632 at p. 633. 
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creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or 
model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use 
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific 
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the 
goods or statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation 
of the goods does not create a warranty." 
As can be seen, the UCC is identical with the Uniform Sales Act in stating that the 
express warranty consists of "any affirmation of fact or any promise relating to the 
goods" which contributes to and is instrumental in concluding the transaction. An 
affirmation of fact or promise relating to the subject matter of the sale represents the 
most common way of making an express warranty under the common law. These 
types of express warranties can be created by written sales contracts,16 
advertisements," owner's manuals,18 brochures,19 repairs logbooks,2° or oral 
representations.21 
The scope of express warranties under the UCC, however, has been expanded to 
include any description of the goods, as well as any sample or model which is made 
16 See, e.g., the case of Massey -Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259, 1261 -1262, 36 UCC Rep. 
437, 440 (Ala. 1983) in which the court found that the express warranty included in the sale 
agreement. 
l' See, e.g., Pake v. Byrd, 55 N.C. App. 552 -553, 286 S.E.2d 588, 589, 33 UCC Rep. 835, 836 -837 
(1982) (An advertisement by the seller that the tractor was in "good condition" was held to constitute 
an express warranty); McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d756, 760, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806, 810, 28 UCC 
Rep. 66, 70 -71 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (The seller's advertisement that the car was in "very good 
condition" held to be an express warranty); Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N. W. 2d 826, 829, 41 UCC Rep. 
1623, 1626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (advertisement stated house was registered was found as an 
express warranty). 
18 See for example, Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315, 321, 34 UCC Rep. 71, 74 -75 
(Me. 1982). In this case, it was expressed that statements in the owner's manual affirming quality of 
the goods could be affirmation of fact. Nevertheless, because of the lack of the buyer's reliance on 
those statements, he was held not to be entitled to sue the seller for breach of express warranty in the 
sale. 
19 See Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 21 -22, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 396 -397, 42 UCC Rep. 
386, 391 -392 (1985). In this case, the statement describing the boat as "seaworthy" and "well 
equipped" in the brochure was regarded by the court as constituting an express warranty by the seller. 
20 See Limited Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 56, 29 UCC Rep. 1497, 1502 -1503 (8th Cir. 
1980), in which the inspection and repair history of aircraft given in the logbook was held to 
constitute an express warranty. 
21 In the case of Leininger v. Sola, 314 N.W.2d 39, 43 -44, 33 UCC Rep. 191, 197 -198 (N.D. 1981), 
for example, the seller was held to be liable for an express warranty resulting from his oral statement 
that the cows sold were pregnant. 
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part of the basis of the bargain by the parties to the transaction.22 This expansion in 
the scope of the express warranty is a realistic appraisal of the making of the contract 
of the sale. A contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and 
described. Like affirmations of fact, descriptions may exist in brochures,23 owner's 
manuals,24 advertisements,25 and sales agreements.26 Additionally, they may exist in 
invoices27 and letters' received by the purchaser. Moreover, unlike affirmations of 
fact, an express warranty by description can be created by the purchaser by providing 
specifications to which the goods purchased must conform. In the case of Northern 
States Power Co., v. ITT Meyer Indutries,Z9 for example, the court decided that the 
buyer's proposed technical specifications adopted in the sale contract created an 
express warranty by description. 
According to section 2- 313(c) of the UCC, samples or models presented to the 
buyer are, unlike the Sale of Goods Act 1979, considered to form express warranties 
in the sale. The official commentary distinguishes a sample from a model: "This 
section includes both a 'sample' actually drawn from the bulk of goods which is the 
22 A language variation exists in Code, Section 2 -313 (1) whereby clause (a) states, "promise 
....becomes part of the basis of the bargain," whereas clauses (b) and (c) read "description, sample or 
model ...is made part of the basis of the bargain." This variation should not be significant as the 
essential fact is the agreement made by the parties and embraces the element in question. 
23 In the case of Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 22, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397, 42 UCC Rep. 
386, 391 (1985), for example, a statement in the brochure which described the boat as "picture of 
sure -footed seaworthiness" was found to form express warranty by description. Similarly, in AFA 
Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 224, 228 -29, 30 UCC Rep. 81, 85 -86 (N.D. 111.1980), 
specifications of the product in bulletins distributed by the seller were considered as express 
warranties created by descriptions. 
24 See Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315,321, 34 UCC Rep. 71, 74 -75 (Me.1982), e.g., 
in which the owner's manual description of the goods where considered as constituting express 
warranty. 
25 For example, in Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Home Group, 105 Idaho 189, 195, 668 P.2d UCC Rep. 
804, 814 (1983), the seller was held to be liable for breach of express warranty by description resulted 
from his advertising material which made numerous descriptions of mobile home features. 
26 In the case of In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 34 UCC Rep. 29, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), e.g., the 
specifications of the goods purchased were provided in the sale agreement. 
27 See, e.g., Superior Wire & Paper Prods., Ltd. v. Talcott Tool & Mach., Inc., 184 Conn. 10, 18 -19, 
144 A.2d 43, 47 -48, 31 UCC Rep. 101, 107 -108 (1981) in which the court held that an invoice giving 
a product's specifications generally creates an express warranty but when an invoice contains 
conflicting descriptions, the existence of warranty is a question which is to be decided by the jury. 
28 AS an example, in Motley v. Fluid Power of Memphis, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 222, 224 -225, 35 UCC 
Rep. 1141, 1143 -1144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), the letter describing operation of clothing press 
machine was found to have created express warranty by description. 
29 777 F.2d 405, 411 -412, 42 UCC Rep. 1, 10 -11 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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subject matter of the sale, and a 'model' which is offered for inspection when the 
subject matter is not at hand and which has not been drawn from the bulk of the 
goods.i30 In Amtel, Inc. v. Arnold Industries, Inc.,' for example, the seller produced 
threaded steel cones as a component for the buyer's log- splitting machine. The buyer 
approved a test -run batch and ordered 1,500 cones. The court held that the case 
"involve[d] a 'model,' rather than a 'sample,' for when the cones in the 'test run' were 
produced, the bulk of the goods ultimately sold had not yet even been created. "32 
However, a sample drawn from the bulk of the goods sold "must be regarded as 
describing values of the goods contracted for unless it is accompanied by an 
unmistakable denial of such responsibility," whereas "the merchantable presumption 
that [a model] ...has become a literal description of the subject matter is not so 
strong.i33 In other words, an express warranty can be created more easily by samples 
than by models. 
Both a pre -UCC decision34 and the UCC are in accord that such formal words as 
"warrant" or "guarantee" are not necessary for the creation of an express warranty, 
nor that the seller has a specific intention to make a warranty.' Furthermore, no 
particular word or form of expression is necessary to create an express warranty, and 
a positive assertion by the seller of a matter of fact, which becomes part of the "basis 
of the bargain ", constitutes a warranty. However, according to section 2- 313(2) of the 
UCC: 
"[Ain affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to 
be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a 
warranty." 
30 UCC, Sec.2 -313, Comment 6. 
3131 UCC Rep. 48 (D. Conn. 1980). 
32 Ibid., at p. 56; see also Automated Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enters., Inc., 27 UCC Rep. 661, 669 (D. 
Neb. 1978), affd, 559 F.2d 288, 27 UCC Rep. 677 (8th Cir. 1979), in which in -house test of an 
electronic control system demonstrated to the buyer was found to be a sample. Similarly, lining 
materials supplied to the buyer in the case of AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 224, 
228, 30 UCC Rep. 81,85 -88 (N.D. Ill. 1980) was held to be a sample. 
33 UCC, Sec.2 -313 Comment 6. 
34 Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427 (1941). 
35 UCC, Sec.2- 313(2) 
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In other words, the law has explicitly recognised that some of the statements made by 
the seller are only puffing which create no liability for the seller in the contract of 
sale. Like its predecessor, however, the UCC provides no clear standard for 
determining when a statement is one of the fact amounting a warranty, or is a 
statement of opinion under section 2- 313(2). Of course there are some factors which 
might be helpful in suggesting that a statement is a warranty as opposed to only a 
"puff'. The specificity of the statement made by the seller, for example, is an 
important factor in determining whether or not the statement constitutes an express 
warranty. The more specific a statement, the more likely it be considered as a 
warranty. Similarly, a written statement is more likely to pass as a warranty than an 
oral one, and a written statement in the contract of the parties is more likely to pass 
as a warranty than a written statement in an advertisement. Nevertheless, a careful 
study of the cases in this regard reveals that none of these and other similar factors 
are decisive for the courts and that the puffing -warranty distinction is highly 
intractable.36 According to these cases, it is very difficult to label a seller's statements 
as puffs or not puffs without carefully examining such factors as the nature of the 
defect (was it obvious or not) and the buyer's and seller's relative knowledge.37 The 
36 For example, in Frederickson v. Hackney, 159 Minn. 234, 198 N.W. 806 (1924) (statements by the 
seller that a bull calf would "put the buyer on the map" and that "his father was the greatest living 
dairy bull" were found to be only trade talk, not a warranty of productive capacity), while, in Wat 
Henry Pontiac Co., v. Bradely, 202 Ok1.82, 210 P.2d 348 (1949), an oral statements of the salesman 
of a used car purporting that the car is in "A -1 shape" and "mechanically perfect" held to be express 
warranties, despite the fact that such an oral statements by used car salesman could be said to be 
notoriously unreliable, archetypal puffs. See further, Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Moushon, 93 Ill. 
App.2d 280, 235 N.E.2d 263, 5 UCC 363 (1968) (the seller's representation that quality of the 
explosive was good, that good results would be obtained, etc., held to be only an expression of the 
seller "opinion "); Continental Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. K & K Sand Gravel, Inc., 755 F.2d 87, 40 UCC 
387 (7th Cir.1985) (statement that the goods were "in good order, condition, and repair" created 
express warranty); Wullschleger & Co., Inc. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F.Supp. 373, 41 UCC 1213 
(S.D.N.Y.1985) ( statement by the seller that fabric was of "first quality" found to be an express 
warranty). 
37 In determining whether affirmations or representations constitute a warranty or a statement of the 
seller's opinion or judgement, it has been stated in Keller v. Flynn, 346 Ill. App. 499, 105 N.E.2d 532 
(1952), that the decisive test is whether the seller assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is 
ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgement on a matter of which the seller special knowledge, 
and on which the buyer may be expected to have an opinion and to exercise his judgement. This test 
has been followed by the post -Code cases such as General Supply & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Phillips, 
490 S.W.2d 913, 12 UCC 35 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 
633 F.2d 34, 30 UCC 462 (7th Cir. 1980); Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 669 F.2d 1286, 33 
UCC 174 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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cases also suggest that the nature of the buyer's reliance is not as irrelevant as the 
UCC and comments38 appear to say it is. Some cases have gone even further by 
considering the puff -warrant question as a backdoor means of examining the nature 
and reasonableness of the buyer's reliance on the statements of the seller in the 
contract.39 This approach was adopted, e.g., in the case of Price Brothers Co. v. 
Philadelphia Gear Corp.,' where the trial court argued: 
"In order to determine whether the pre -contract statements... were in fact a basis 
of the bargain and thus an express warranty, or whether they were merely a 
seller's 'puffing', the court should consider the reasonableness of the buyer in 
believing the seller, and the reliance placed on the seller's statements by the 
buyer."' 
In this case the court tried to propose an objective approach in considering whether 
the seller's statements constitute a basis of bargain or they are merely a puffing by 
him. Nonetheless, this approach does not seems to be tenable as any statement with 
regard to the quality of the goods by the seller is, in one way or other, effective in 
inducing the buyer to purchase the goods. It is absurd to say that a statement made by 
prudent seller is not beneficial to him at all. Accordingly, it is unjust and irrational to 
allow the seller to escape from liability where he fails to deliver goods which 
conform to his own statements made in the contract by asserting that the statements 
are only his "opinion" as opposed to warranties. In short, the recognition by the UCC 
that some statements are not warranties has been the cause of much uncertainty in the 
commercial field, which in the final analysis tips the balance of interests between the 
parties in favour of the seller. 
The UCC emphasises that express warranties are created by the seller during the 
facts of negotiation, as contrasted with the Uniform Sales Act definition of an 
express warranty. In fact, the precise time when statements of fact about the goods 
are made "is not materiali' under the UCC. Rather, the sole question is whether such 
38 UCC, Section 2 -313, Comment 3. For the full text of this Official Comment see Appendeix I. 
39 The pre -UCC requirement of reliance was replaced by the section 2 -313 of the UCC with the 
ambivalent requirement of "part of the basis of the bargain ". 
4° Price Brothers Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416,31 UCC 469, 474 (6th Cir.1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099, 102 S.Ct. 674, 70 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). 
41 Ibid. 
42 UCC, Sec. 2 -313 Comment 7. 
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affirmations of fact "are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract.i43 Comment 3 to 
section 2 -313 states that: "affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods 
during a bargain are regarded as part of the description..." and, thus, create express 
warranty under the UCC. 
As pointed out earlier, an advertisement can be part of the basis of the bargain as 
it is fair that it be so. It has been, however, argued that an advertisement is not 
normally considered to have been made "during a bargain," in the usual case, and 
therefore, no statement in an advertisement would be qualified to form part of the 
contract under the language of Comment 3. It is suggested that in such 
circumstances, the plaintiff - purchaser should be required to demonstrate that he 
knew and relied upon an advertisement in making the purchase. This view was 
adopted by the trial court in Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp.44 In this case, the court 
eventually decided that the language in the seller's catalogue which stated that the 
floor -covering product would "absorb considerable flex without cracking" created an 
express warranty under section 2 -313 of the UCC.45 The court argued that "...the 
catalogue, advertisement or brochure must at least been read "46 by the buyer before 
they could be regarded as constituting an express warranty in the contract of sale "as 
the UCC requires the proposed express warranty be part of the basis of the bargain.i47 
One may respond to this argument by pointing out that the seller is the only person 
who normally gets benefit from his advertisement concerning the quality of the 
goods. Consequently, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the 
seller should reasonably bear also the responsibility if it transpires that goods do not 
correspond with the advertisement. In fact, the price of the quality of the goods 
represented by the advertisement is included in the purchase price paid by the buyer 
even though he did not notice the representation. Therefore, the fact that the buyer 
did not know about the advertisement before the conclusion of the contract should 
" Ibid. 
44 553 S.W.2d 257, 19 UCC 464 (Mo. App.1976). 
45 Ibid. at 263, 19 UCC at 471. 
46 Ibid., at 262, 19 UCC at 470 
47 Ibid. 
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not be taken as an excuse to deprive him from the protection afforded to him under 
the UCC. 
Statements with regard to the quality of the goods made by the seller after the 
conclusion of the sale have also been a source of uncertainty and dispute among the 
commentators of the UCC.48 The problem is caused by the ambiguity of the UCC's 
requirement of "the basis of the bargain ", under section 2 -313, since it is unclear 
whether this requirement incorporates the pre -UCC test of the buyer's reliance.49 It 
might be argued that after the conclusion of the sale, no additional statement by the 
seller could be made part of the basis of the bargain of the parties. Since the buyer 
has already agreed to the transaction and, therefore, he may not assert his reliance on 
the additional statement in making the deal with the seller. One may appropriately 
respond to this argument by pointing out that in the merchandising world a buyer, 
even one already legally obligated to purchase, has greater rights whilst he is still 
standing at the seller's counter than he does some time later. As an example, a buyer 
may decide not to use his statutory right to reject the defective goods when he 
receives a further statement from the seller assuring the buyer the quality of the 
goods, or indicating that they may also be used for a particular purpose. Under 
section 2- 607(2) of the UCC, such a buyer would lose his right to reject after 
acceptance of the goods. In such circumstances, it would seem inconceivable not to 
consider the seller's post -sale statement as an express warranty since by this 
statement he induced the buyer not to use his statutory right to reject the defective 
goods. 
A novel solution to the problem of post -sale statements by the seller has been 
provided by Comment 7 to section 2 -313: 
48 See, e.g., Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dunlop tire & Rubber Corp., 63 N.C. App. 292, 304 S.E.2d 
773, 36 UCC 1169 (1983), review denied, 310 N.C. 624, 315 S.E.2d 689 (1984) (recommendations 
on ways to increase tire life made by the seller two years after the sale was held not constitute an 
express warranty); Terry v. Moore, 448 P.2d 601 (Wyo.1968) (a driller's statement made after 
conclusion of the contract and after completion of drilling, that a well would produce a certain output 
held not express warranty since it was not considered to form part of the basis of the bargain as 
required by section 2 -313 of the UCC) 
49 See Murray, "Basis of the Bargain ": Transcending Classical Concepts, (1982) 66 Minnesota Law 
Review, 283. 
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"If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking 
delivery asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty becomes a 
modification and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise 
reasonable and in order (section 2- 209)." 
Under Comment 7, in other words, the parties will have a new bargain which is based 
partly on the modified warranty which, unlike the traditional common law, does not 
need to be supported by consideration when the seller utters a description or 
affirmation after conclusion of the sale. 
The basis of the bargain 
The pre -UCC requirements of inducement of and reliance by the buyers have been 
replaced by the drafters of section 2 -313 with the theory of the "basis of the 
bargain".' This section considers the promises, affirmations, descriptions, samples, 
or models as creating an express warranty when they become "part of the basis of the 
bargain" without expressly requiring the buyer to demonstrate his actual reliance on 
them. The deliberate exclusion of the reliance requirement from the definition of an 
express warranty signalled a significant change from the Uniform Sales Act which 
appears to have been made in line with the policy of extension of the protection 
afforded to the buyer under the traditional common law. Section 2 -313 and the 
Official Comments, however, failed to clarify when the seller's statements are 
regarded to have become "part of the basis of the bargain" between the parties as it is 
required by the UCC, leaving courts without a specific standard to apply in breach - 
of- express warranty cases. In confronting the mysterious clause of "the basis of the 
bargain" some courts simply ignore the UCC's deletion of reliance and hold that 
reliance continues as a requirement, while others assert that under this clause the 
buyer does not need to rely on the representations made by the seller in order that 
they become part of the deal between the parties. It is intended in this section to 
discuss the problem of the various interpretations of the basis -of -the- bargain clause, 
devoting particular attention to those tests purporting to incorporate the 
so See Andrew M. Baker et al, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions" (1978) 64 
231 
commentary's "no particular reliance" provisions.' The section will continue to 
present its own interpretation of the basis -of -the- bargain requirement. Finally, the 
section will propose a standard for applying the requirement in express warranty 
cases. The discussion incorporates the goals of the section 2 -313, which are to extend 
the traditional common law protection of the buyer by easing his burden of proof in a 
suit against the seller for breach of an express warranty and by protecting the former 
expectations created by the seller's representations. 
Reliance and basis of the bargain test 
As pointed out earlier, ambiguity of the "basis of the bargain" clause under section 2- 
313 of the UCC caused some of the courts to maintain the buyer's reliance as a 
necessary factor in creating an express warranty in the sale. These courts are, 
however, divided on the nature of the requirement of the buyer's reliance on the 
statements made by the seller in respect of the quality of the subject matter of the 
sale. Some courts interpret the basis of the bargain clause as shifting to the seller the 
burden of proving the buyer's reliance. Others reject a reliance requirement but 
substitute an awareness or inducement standard. 
Shifting the burden of proof to the seller 
As pointed out earlier, in addressing the issue of the "reliance" some courts and 
commentators refer to the official commentary of the UCC and maintain that by the 
exchange of the "basis of the bargain" language for the old "reliance" language, the 
drafters of the UCC merely shifted to the seller the burden of proving the buyer's 
reliance. The relevant provision states: 
"In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during 
a bargain are regarded as part of the description of the goods; hence no 
Cornell Law Review 30, 50. 
51 See UCC, Section 2 -313 Comment 3. 
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particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them 
into the fabric of the agreementi5'- 
This construction rests primarily on comment 3's statement that "any fact which is to 
take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative 
proof.i53 In the case of Indust -Ri -Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par -Pak Co.54 the court 
adopted this view by ruling that the seller, who showed proof of the buyer's lack of 
reliance was entitled to a jury introduction on reliance.55 The court pointed out that 
the UCC does not require an affirmative reliance test,56 nevertheless, after 
confronting the difficult problem of the buyer who knew that the seller's 
representation was false, the court stated that such a "representation cannot be part of 
the basis of the bargain ", and, accordingly, "in some instances a jury instruction on 
lack of reliance may be germane to the basis of the bargain issue.i57 The court 
ordered the instruction to place the burden of proving the buyer's lack of reliance on 
the seller. 
The reasoning of the court in this case contains several flaws. The court on the one 
hand rejected the requirement of reliance,' while on the other hand, it allowed the 
seller to escape from the liability for breach of an express warranty resulting from his 
statements by showing that the buyer failed to rely on the statements.59 Under the 
court's reasoning in Indust -Ri -Chen, the buyer still risks losing his claim if the seller 
can demonstrate a lack of reliance. Therefore, in order to succeed on his warranty claim 
the buyer must have relied on the statements made by the seller in the contract. 
The decision in Indust -Ri -Chem is mainly based on the argument that comment 3's 
"clear affirmative proofi60 requirement for removing a seller's representation from the 
agreement meant proof that the buyer failed to rely. Because the previous line in 
52 UCC, Section 2 -313 Comment 3. 
53 UCC, Section 2 -313 Comment 3. 
54 602 S.W.2d 282, 29 UCC Rep. 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). 
55 Ibid., at 293 -294, 29 UCC Rep. at 810 -811. 
56 Ibid., at 293, 29 UCC Rep. at 809. 
57 Ibid., at 293, 29 UCC Rep. at 810 (emphasis added). 
58 Ibid., at 293, 29 UCC Rep. at 811. 
59 Ibid., at 294, 29 UCC Rep. at 811. 
60 UCC, Section 2 -313 Comment 3. 
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Comment 3 states that "no particular reliance on such statements need be shown,"G' 
however, the assertion that lack of reliance by the buyer on the statements made by the 
seller will rebut the statements from being part of the agreement between the parties 
appears un- plausible. Rather, the seller is required by the "affirmative proof' clause to 
show that the buyer could not reasonably have understood the statements to be within 
the context of the transaction. This standard can be satisfied by evidence, which shows 
that the buyer knew that the seller's statements about the quality of the goods were false 
or mistaken,62 or that the latter had effectively withdrawn his statements from the 
agreement.63 As Professor Murray pointed out, in such instances, the buyer does not 
expect the goods to conform to these statements.ó4 For such statements never enter into 
the agreement between the parties, as is required by section 2 -313 of the UCC, not 
because the buyer failed to rely, but "the buyer's knowledge forecloses any such 
expectation.i65 Of course, there is no reliance by the buyer who knew that the seller's 
statements concerning the quality of the goods were false or mistaken, nevertheless, the 
Indust -Ri -Chem court's reliance analysis needlessly creates the possibility that the other 
classes of buyers may have their warranty protection curtailed. 
The consideration standard 
The section 2 -313's test of "the basis of the bargain" and its Comment 3 have been 
interpreted by other courts as requiring the buyer at least to consider the seller's 
statements concerning the quality of the goods before entering into the contract of the 
sale with the latter. In other words, only in the cases where these statements have 
been taken into consideration prior to the conclusion of the sale, would the buyer be 
61 Ibid. 
62 See Price Bros. Co., v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F2d 416, 422 -23, 31 UCC Rep. 469, 474 -475 
(6th Cir. 1981). In this case, the buyer's expertise and familiarity with the product was found to 
preclude the seller's statements concerning the quality of product from becoming part of "the basis of 
the bargain" as required by section 2 -313 for creating of an express warranty 
63 See, e.g., McGhee v. GMC Truck & Coach Division, 98 Mich. App. 495, 500, 296 N.W.2d 286, 
289, 30 UCC Rep. 121, 125 (1980), in which case the court concluded that the buyer, who was an 
experienced truck mechanic understood that no warranties were given on tractor's running parts. 
64 See J. E. Murray, op. cit. supra., note 49, at pp. 294 -295. 
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able to establish his warranty claim against the seller.66 Nonetheless, the courts are 
divided on how to apply the consideration test. Some courts apply the consideration 
test objectively, requiring only that the representations be noticed by the buyer before 
completion of the sale.67 The other courts apply this test subjectively requiring the 
buyer to show that he has been at least partly induced by the seller's representations 
to purchase the goods.68 Both of these standards, however, seem to be inconsistent 
with the provisions of the UCC and its official comments. 
Comment 3 of the section 2 -313 states that, a seller's affirmations of fact "are 
regarded as part of the description of those goods" and as such become part of the basis 
of the bargain under the UCC. In other words, by presuming that all statements with 
regard to the quality of the goods by the seller create express warranties and by 
providing that "no particular reliance on such statements need be shown" by the buyer, 
the language of this comment has virtually eliminated the pre -UCC requirement of the 
reliance. Since the UCC does not require the buyer to show his reliance on the seller's 
representation, he should not need to know that such representation exists. As Professor 
Nordstrom expresses Comment 3 has, in fact, directed the inquiry of whether an 
express warranty was made away from the buyer's awareness of the representation and 
towards a factual examination of the seller's representations.69 The seller who creates an 
express warranty by affirmation of fact, description, or sample or model, therefore, 
should not escape liability simply because the buyer, fortuitously, failed to hear the 
representation or to see a brochure or advertisement describing the product. Once the 
seller injects the express warranty into the bargain with the buyer, Comment 3 creates a 
presumption that the latter has relied on the warranty.70 The seller should not be 
65 Ibid., at p. 295. 
66 See Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.M. 645, 652, 662 P.2d 646, 653, 35 UCC Rep. 1472, 1477 
(1983). 
67 See, for example, Massey- Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259, 1261; 36 UCC Rep. 437, 440 
(Ala.1983) See Ibid., at 1261, 36 UCC Rep. at p. 440. 
68 See, for example, Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 23; 220 Cal. Rptr.392, 398; 42 UCC 
Rep. 386, 393 (1985). 
69 See R. Nordstrom, Handbook of the Law of Sales (1970) § 68, at 208 -210. 
70 See Murray, supra., note 49 at 210. 
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allowed to rebut this presumption, unless he can show that the buyer could not have 
understood these representations to be express warranty." 
Similarly, the inducement requirement cannot be reconciled with the language of 
Comment 3. Since the buyer could not be said to have been induced by the 
representations without reliance on the representations in making of his decision while, 
as mentioned above, this Comment has virtually eliminated both the need for the buyer 
reliance and the need for him to know that the representation existed.' If the buyer is 
not required even to know that the representations exists, then he certainly has no duty 
to show that he has been induced by the seller's representations, since one cannot rely 
on something which is not known to him. Moreover, the inducement standard defeats 
section 2 -313's goal of easing the buyer's burden of proof. As mentioned earlier, this 
section relieved the buyer from the pre -UCC burden of proving that he relied on the 
seller's representations by removing the term "reliance" and replacing it with a 
requirement that these representations become part of the "the basis of the bargain" 
between the parties. Comment 3 of this section shifted the burden of proof to the seller 
by stating that: "any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the 
agreement requires clear affirmative proof." This clause requires the buyer only to 
show that "the seller made a statement of fact relating to the goods. It is presumed that 
such a statement becomes part of the 'agreement.ii73 In other words, under section 2- 
313 of the UCC, the buyer is required only to show that the seller made a representation 
concerning the quality of the product and, therefore, he has no duty to show to what 
extent, if any, the representations entered into his decision to purchase the goods. 
71 According to Professor Nordstrom: "The words used by the seller must be read in the way in which 
the buyer should reasonably have understood them." See R. Nordstrom, supra., note 69, § 68, at 210. 
72 See R. Nordstrom, supra., note 69, § 68, at pp. 208 -209. Professor Nordstrom noticed that 
decisions of those courts that regard representations unknown to the buyer as being part of the basis of 
the bargain under section 2 -313 and thereby creating of an express warranty states, are consistent with 
the UCC. According to him: 
"The court's task is to determine whether that injury was caused by the defect in 
the product, and any statements made by the seller designed to induce the public 
to buy his product are relevant in making determination." 'bid, at 209. 
In other word, Professor Nordstrom asserted that the inquiry of inducement by the seller's 
representations must be shifted from the individual purchaser at issue to the public at large. 
73 Murray, supra., note 49, at p.287. 
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In short, the consideration test is inconsistent with the goal of the section 2 -313 in 
easing the buyer's burden to prove that the seller's statements with respect of the quality 
of the goods created an express warranty. Under the consideration standard, the buyer 
is essentially required to establish that he relied on the representations made by the 
seller in the contract of sale. By replacing the pre -UCC principle of the reliance by the 
buyer under section 2 -313, however, the buyer should not even be required to prove 
that he purchased with any knowledge of the seller's representations. 
The doctrine of no- reliance on the seller's representations 
The cases, which have so far been examined, indicate that despite the courts' attempt 
in interpreting Comment 3 in making of their decisions, they actually failed to 
articulate a standard to apply the basis of the bargain provision under the UCC.74 One 
may achieve this goal only by defining the phrase "part of the basis of the bargain" as 
used in section 2 -313. It appears that the drafters of the UCC intended the phrase to 
mean an inclusion of the seller's representations in the "commercial relationship" 
between the parties. The representations made by the seller will, accordingly, create 
an express warranty whenever they enter into commercial relationship between him 
and the buyer. 
This definition is based primarily on the section 2 -313's usage of the term 
"bargain" which is extended beyond the bounds of the traditional concept of 
"contract ". As Professor Nordstrom puts it: 
"A 'bargain' is not something that occurs at a particular moment in time, and is 
forever fixed as to its content; instead, it describes the commercial relationship 
between the parties in regard to this product ... The Code's word is 'bargain' - a 
process which can extend beyond moment in time that the offeree utters the 
magic words, 'I accept."' 
In other words, the drafters of section 2 -313 of the UCC have extended its scope to 
cover the entire span of the parties' commercial relationship. This relationship can 
74 In this regard, Professor Murray states: "A summary of the case law adumbration of "the basis of 
the bargain" reveals mass confusion and little assistance" See Murray, supra., note 49 at p.287. 
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begin before the start of negotiations by the parties for making an agreement of sale 
or after completion of the sale agreement.76 
The provision of the basis of the bargain, as used in section 2 -313 of the UCC. is 
an objective requirement under which the court should determine whether the seller 
provided a representation concerning the quality of the goods. The buyer should not 
need to prove that he entered into agreement of the sale with the knowledge of, or 
reliance on, the representations made by the seller, because, as Comment 3 
demonstrates, the drafters of the UCC have intended to eliminate completely the need 
for reliance on, or consideration of, the seller's representations by the buyer. The 
mere affirmation or description or display of sample or model relating to the goods 
by the seller creates an express warranty". Once the buyer proves this, he may 
recover damages from the seller if he discovers that the goods delivered do not 
conform to seller's representations. 
This expansive notion of bargain has been supported by Comment 7 which, 
unlike English law, ratifies the existence of post -sale warranties by expressing that 
the "precise time" when the representations is made by the seller is irrelevant. 
Accordingly, like pre -sale representations, the seller's post -sale representation 
concerning the product's quality may create an express warranty without being relied 
on by the buyer of the goods. 
Under Comment 7 it is further provided: " If language is used after the closing of 
the deal ... the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by 
consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order.i78 In other words, it could be 
assumed that a post -sale representation creates an express warranty, which, unlike the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, does not require the support of a consideration, by the 
buyer. According to Professor Nordstrom, the modification requires no consideration 
because "it is reasonable to assume that a buyer would agree to an expansion of his 
warranty protection."' Unlike this view, however, some courts have found that post- 
75 R. Nordstrom, supra., note 69, § 67 at p. 206 -207. 
76 Ibid, at p. 206. 
77 Murray, Supra., note 49 at p. 287. 
78 UCC Section 2 -313 Comment 7. 
79 R. Nordstrom, supra., note 69, § 67, at p. 207. 
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sale representations would not create express warranties, as they were not relied on 
by the buyer in purchasing of the goods.80 In the case of the Global Truck & 
Equipment Co., v. Palmer Machine Works, Inc.', e.g., the court argued that a sales 
brochure describing the features of the goods did not become part of the basis of the 
bargain as required by section 2 -313 for creating an express warranty, for the buyer 
received the brochure only after the conclusion of the contract. "If the buyer is not 
aware of the affirmation of fact and there is no evidence of any reliance on such 
affirmation, then it would seem that the mutual assent requirement' is not met such 
that a binding modification does not exist. ".83 This decision, however, contradicts 
with both Comments 3 and 7, under which the seller's representations, irrespective of 
the buyer's reliance or the precise time when they made, are considered to constitute 
part of the basis of the bargain by the parties as required by section 2 -313 for creating 
of express warranties. 
According to Professor Murray, the courts should enforce the warranties 
resulting from the - post -sale representations to protect the buyer's "reasonable 
expectations that a seller's statements create, regardless of when those statements 
were made or when the buyer learned of them.i84 The same argument applies to the 
warranties created by the seller's pre- contract representations, which did not come 
into the buyer's notice until after entering into the contract of sale.85 The buyer who 
receives an owner's manual or other product description with the purchase "will feel 
oppressed and unfairly surprised if the goods do not contain the features represented 
8° See e.g., Anderson v. Heron Eng. Co., 198 Colo. 391, 394, 604 P.2d 674, 676 (1979); Global Truck 
& Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 641, 642 UCC Rep. 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986). 
but see Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421, 1424 -25, 41 UCC Rep. 1233, 1237 (4th Cir. 
1985) ( the seller's post -sale representations created valid express warranty because purchase was 
conditioned on subsequent inspection of the goods by the seller); Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 
1235, 1240 -41, 39 UCC Rep. 427, 434 -35 (10th Cir. 1984) (It was held that that a post -sale 
representation may be regarded as part of the basis of the bargain if it was relied on by the buyer). 
81 628 F. Supp. 641, 42 UCC Rep. 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986). 
82 The court in Global Truck case required mutual assent of the buyer and the seller because it 
considered a bargain under section 2 -313 of the UCC as a contractual relationship between the parties. 
Under the court's view, in other words, a contract is valid only if each party is aware of its terms or 
modifications and agree to include those terms into the contract. See UCC, Sections 1 -201 (3), 2- 
204(1). 
B3 628 F. Supp. at p. 652, 42 UCC Rep. at p. 1262. 
84 Murray, supra., note 49, at p. 318. 
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in the sales literature.i86 In other words, the buyer's reasonable expectations about the 
product's quality and the truth of the seller's representations, justifies upholding un- 
relied -upon express warranties. 
One may further argue that, as in the case with the pre- contract statement, the 
seller normally gains from his post- contract representation concerning the quality of 
the goods and as such he should not be allowed to escape liability for not delivering 
the goods in conformity with the representation simply by showing that the buyer 
did not know of the warranty. 
In summary, in the light of Comments 3 and 7, the buyer under section 2 -313's 
clause of the basis -of -the- bargain is not required to rely on, consider, or even know 
about the representations made by the seller in an agreement of sale. Clearly, this 
expansive definition of section 2 -313's basis -of -the- bargain promotes the protections 
afforded to the buyer under Uniform Sales Act by relieving him of the burden of 
proving his reliance on the seller's statements. According to this definition, a court 
should enforce the seller's representations where it considers them as constituting an 
affirmation of fact rather than "merely [an affirmation] of the value of the goods or a 
statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion.i87 Under this standard, in other 
words, the buyer needs merely to show that the seller made a representation 
concerning the quality of the goods sold. Once this is done, then the law, in the light 
of Comment 8 to section 2 -313, presumes that: "all of the statements of the seller ... 
[are part of the basis of the bargain] unless good reason is shown to the contrary". In 
other words, courts consider the seller's representations to have created an express 
warranty unless the seller has proof that the buyer could not have understood the 
representations to be an express warranty. The seller can meet this burden by 
showing either that his representations amounted only to his opinions on the article 
value or that the buyer was aware that the representations were false or mistaken. 
This standard is supported by Comment 4 to section 2 -313 which states that: "the 
whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in 
85 Ibid., at pp. 321-323. 
86 Ibid., at p. 322 
87 UCC, Section 2-313(2). 
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essence agreed to sell. ' 88 As Professor Murray has put it, "it is interesting that the 
comment emphasises the search for what 'the seller has in essence agreed to sell,' and 
not what the buyer has agreed to buy.i89 A court's inquiry should, therefore, focus on 
the seller's conduct, i.e., whether he made representations relating to the product's 
quality, and not on the physical product purchased by the buyer. 
Negating of the seller's liability for breach of express warranties 
Like the civilian concept of express warranty the expansive definition of section 2- 
313's basis -of -the- bargain clause proposed in the previous section does not require 
the buyer to rely on the representation concerning the product's quality made by the 
seller. This means that the latter is liable to deliver goods, which conform to his 
representations provided in the contract even if the buyer did not rely on these 
representations in purchasing the goods. In some instances, however, the seller may 
avoid this liability by rebutting the warranty's existence. In other words, despite the 
making of representations relating to the product's quality by the seller, under certain 
circumstances he may be held not to be liable for non -conformity of the goods with 
the representations. Under US law, courts generally allow two groups of factors to 
rebut the existence of an express warranty. Unlike the civilian tradition, the first 
group looks at the seller's representations directly to see whether they are 
affirmations of fact or simply opinions as to the product's value. The second group 
which is common between both the civilian systems and the UCC looks at the 
circumstances surrounding the bargain to determine whether the buyer knew that the 
seller's representations could not have warranted the goods. 
Statements as expression of the opinions or "puffing" 
fl8 UCC, Section 2 -313 comment 4. 
89 Murray, supra., note 49, at p. 290. 
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Under section 2- 313(2) of the UCC, the seller may negate his liability as to the 
product's quality by showing that the affirmations, descriptions, samples, or models 
provided in the contract were merely the expression of his own opinion about the 
goods rather than affirmations of facts concerning their quality and as such they did 
not become part of the basis of the bargain to create an express warranty under the 
UCC. According to section 2- 313(2): 
"an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be 
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a 
warranty." 
This section, in other words, allows the seller to escape liability for failing to deliver 
goods which conform to his own representations by arguing that the representations 
were merely the expression of his own opinion or commendation concerning the 
goods and, therefore, the buyer must not have reasonably construed them as an 
express warranty. This means that the buyer may sometimes be deprived of his basic 
right in demanding his counterpart to provide goods in conformity with the 
contractual representations which he has paid for even if he relied on the 
representations in purchasing the goods. 
Furthermore, the wording of this section is ambiguous and has been the source 
of much litigation between the parties concerned since it does not provide any precise 
criteria as when the representations relating to the product are to be regarded as a 
mere affirmation of the value of the goods or opinion of the seller about them. 
Specificity, hedging, experimental goods, and buyer knowledge are the factors, 
which has been generally used by the courts to construe the seller's representations as 
an opinion rather than an affirmation of fact.90 
Specificity of the seller's representations is regarded as one of the elements in 
deciding whether an express warranty exists. It has been suggested that: "The more 
specific a quality statement, the more likely it becomes an express warranty "91 and that 
"Specific representations that goods are fit for a buyer's particular purpose usually create 
90 See generally, Andrew M. Baker et al, op. Cit., supra., note 50. 
91 Ibid, at p. 61. 
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express warranties of fitness for that purpose.s92 In other words, it is unlikely that the 
buyer may succeed in his warranty claim against the seller if the words used by the latter 
in describing the goods are general. However, it is not clear how specific a 
representation has to be in order to become an express warranty under the UCC.93 
Hedging refers to an equivocal statement relating to the quality of the goods made 
by the seller in a contract of sale. It is argued that in the case of hedging there is no 
express warranty to be enforced against the seller, that is, by providing an ambiguous 
statement in the contract the seller indicated that he was unwilling to commit himself 
fully to the product's quality. In Perfetti v. McGhan Medical,94 for example, a 
mammary prosthesis manufacturer included a flyer in the product's packaging which 
read: "McGhan Medical Corporation is aware of the potential for leakage in inflatable 
implants over an undefined time period. Considering the chemical and physical 
properties of the material used in the manufacturer of the inflatable implants, deflation is 
not expected. However, long term result cannot be guaranteed by the manufacturer. "95 
The buyer rightly argued that the last line warranted the product's short-term lifespan by 
negative implication. The court, however, rejected this argument by stating that: 
"Whatever the meaning of 'long term', the affirmation also negates less than a 
long -term result; it is affirmatively stated that leakage can occur over an 
undefined period of rime. "96 
The decision in Perfetti indicates that a seller may safely lure a buyer into a bargain 
by adorning his quality representations in equivocal words and yet escape from any 
liability vis -à -vis the buyer for non -conformity of the goods with the representations. 
In other words, this decision demonstrates that, unlike French civil law, in the cases 
92 Ibid. 
93 As a consequence, the courts have sometimes reached contradictory decisions with respect of the 
similar words used by the seller in different cases. In McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 422 
N.Y.S.2d 806, 28 UCC Rep. 66 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979), e.g., an advertisement by the seller that 
described the car in "Good condition" was held to create an express warranty, whereas, the court in 
Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 UCC Rep. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972), decided that no warranty attaches to 
the seller's representation in the manual describing the corn seed as "very good standability, can stand 
high population under adequate fertility program, good blight tolerance, [and] high test weight." 
94 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646, 35 UCC Rep. 1472 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P2d 
645 (1983). 
95 Ibid., at 651, 662 P.2d at 652, 35 UCC Rep. at 1476. 
96 Ibid., at 652, 662 P.2d at 652, 35 UCC Rep.at 1477. 
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of doubt the buyer under section 2- 313(2) of the UCC will most likely fail in his 
warranty claim against the seller. 
Similarly, it has been decided that no express warranty attaches to 
representations relating to unproven or untested product under the UCC. To illustrate, 
U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.,97 a manufacturer entered into an 
agreement to produce resinated cotton pads through an "unproven process.s98 
Although the parties agreed on an "express warranty against defects in material and 
workmanship," they also provided that "in view of the variables present effecting 
[sic] the capacity of the machine, no guarantee can be extended.s99 The contract also 
contained a clause, which precisely described the machine. The court stated that 
because of the experimental nature of the machine no express warranty was created 
by the description.100 The court's holding has been praised by some commentators as 
one which "promotes sound social policy.9,101 They argue that: if "affirmations and 
descriptions of experimental machines generally created express warranties, 
manufacturers might hesitate to produce and market new products.i102 This argument, 
however, does not seem to be tenable since it is based on the policy of inducing a 
manufacturer to produce and market new products at the expense of an individual 
buyer. 
The buyer's knowledge is another factor which may help a US court to 
distinguish between an affirmation of fact and a mere opinion. It has been stated that: 
"The decisive test for whether a given representation is a warranty or merely an 
expression of the seller's opinion is whether the seller asserts a fact of which the 
buyer is ignorant or merely states an opinion or judgement on a matter of which 
the seller has no special knowledge and on which the buyer may be expected 
also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgement "103 
97 509 F.2d 1043, 16 UCC Rep. 1 (6th Cir.1975), affig 358 F. Supp. 449, 13 UCC Rep. 245 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972). 
98 Ibid., at p. 1046, 16 UCC Rep. At p. 3. 
99 Ibid., at p. 1045, 16 UCC Rep. At p. 2. 
1°° Ibid., at p. 1046, 16 UCC Rep. At pp. 3 -4. 
101 See "Andrew M. Baker et al, op. cit., supra., note 50, at p. 65. 
1 °2 Ibid. 
1°3 Keller v. Flynn, 346 Ill App. 499, 105 N.E.2d 532 (1952); Royal Business Mach., Inc., v. Lorraine 
Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 41, 30 UCC Rep. 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1980); Peterson v. North Am. Plant Breeders, 
218 Neb. 258, 262 -263, 3534 N.W.2d 625, 630 39 UCC Rep.1637, 1642 (1984). 
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This test, however, is not particularly helpful in making the distinction between fact 
and opinion, since it does not focus on the representations actually made by the 
seller. Instead, it looks to the knowledge of the parties and states that any 
representation made to an ignorant buyer create express warranty simply because the 
buyer is ignorant. Conversely, the test permits a seller with little knowledge to make 
specific representations relating to the goods without being liable for creating of an 
express warranty. The test fails because it does not objectively consider whether a 
reasonable buyer could understand the representations to create an express warranty 
on their face. It might be argued that the buyer's knowledge might preclude a 
warranty from attaching to a clear affirmation of fact. This argument, however, does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all statements made to an ignorant buyer 
create express warranties and all statements made by an ignorant seller do not give 
rise to an express warranty. 
In the fairly recent Californian case of Keith y Buchanan, ̀ 04 the court of appeal 
tried to ease the buyer's efforts to demonstrate that the seller's representations 
amounted to an express warranty rather than a mere opinion: 
"Recent decisions have evidenced a trend toward narrowing the scope of 
representations which are considered opinion,... resulting in an expansion of 
liability that flows from broad statements of manufacturers or retailers as to the 
quality of their products.... It has been even suggested that in the age of 
consumerism all seller's statements, except the most blatant sales pitch, may give 
rise to an express warranty. "105 
The court adopted Comment 8 to Section 2 -313 as the standard to distinguish 
between fact and opinion, holding that: 
"[s]tatements made by a seller during the course of negotiation over a contract 
are presumptively affirmations of fact unless it can be demonstrated that the 
buyer could only have reasonably considered the statement as a statement of the 
seller opinion." 06 
104 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 UCC Rep. 386 (1985), at p. 390 (citing R. M. 
Alderman & R. F. Dole, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code (2nd. ed. 1983) 
vol. 1, 89). 
105 Ibid., at p.21, 220 Cal. Rptr. at p. 396, 42 UCC Rep. at p. 390 (citing E. Alderman & B. Dole, A 
Transactional guide to the Uniform Commercial Code (2nd. ed. 1983) vol. 1, 89). 
106 Ibid., at 21, 220 Cal. Rptr. At 396, 42 UCC Rep. At 391. 
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It may be argued, however, that in the commercial relationships between the parties it 
is hard to imagine that statements made by the seller are merely the reflection of his 
own opinions as to the product's value and that they have no influence whatsoever 
over the buyer in the course of dealing with the former. Surely, the seller would not 
make any statement as to the quality of the goods if it were not beneficial to him. 
Accordingly, it is unjust to allow the seller who benefits from such a statement to 
escape from the liability if the goods are not in accordance with the statement. 
The buyer's knowledge that the statements concerning the goods' quality were 
untrue 
The seller's liability as to the quality of the goods may also be avoided if he can 
prove that the buyer knew that the representations were untrue. Since the buyer's 
knowledge of the defects in the goods will naturally preclude him from 
understanding that an express warranty was created by the seller's representations. An 
examination of the buyer's knowledge requires a court to focus on the circumstances 
surrounding the bargain, rather the representations made by the seller. In other words, 
unlike the objective standard applicable to the seller's opinions, the inquiry as to the 
buyer's knowledge requires a subjective standard, since in the latter case the court 
must examine the knowledge possessed by the individual buyer in question. 
The seller can show that the buyer had knowledge about the falsity of the seller's 
representations with regard to the goods' quality before entering the bargain107 or that 
the buyer acquired such knowledge during the course of the parties' commercial 
relationship.108 To illustrate, in Price Brothers Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.,' the 
seller erroneously represented that the components ordered by the buyer would meet 
107 See, e.g., Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan. App.2d 776, 786, 635 P.2d 1248, 1256, 32 UCC 
Rep. 834, 844 -845 (1981) (farmer's knowledge about pesticide prevented seller's affirmation from 
becoming part of the basis of the bargain); Scainae v Holstein, 103 A.D.2d 880, 880, 477 N.Y.S.2d 
903, 904, 38 UCC Rep. 1595, 1595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (buyer's knowledge of car's transmission 
defect prevented newspaper advertisement stating excellent condition from creating warranty). 
108 See Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. Lorranie Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 43 -44, 30 UCC Rep. 462, 471 -472 
(1980) 
109 649 F.2d 416, 31 UCC Rep. 469 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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the specifications listed in the buyer's purchase order. It was found that the seller's 
erroneous assurances that the components would conform to the purchase order's 
specifications did not create an express warranty for `Price Brothers' experts should 
have recognised this error as either `puffing' or falsehood. "10 The court's use of the 
phrase -should have recognised" should not be confused with an objective standard 
for examining buyer knowledge. The court discussed the buyer's representative's 
personal familiarity with the product at issue: "The expertise of Price Brothers' 
representatives, and their familiarity with the requirements of Price Brothers' pipe 
wrapping machine enabled them to make an independent assessment of the adequacy 
of the proposed components for the tasks assigned to them. " ' The court used the 
phrase "should have known" not to invoke a reasonable man standard, but to hold 
these buyers' to a standard commensurate with their established knowledge of the 
product. The court looked only at the knowledge of the buyer in question. The 
buyer's knowledge of untruthfulness of the representations made by the seller can 
also be established by showing that the former inspected the goods and discovered 
the patent defects in them before entering into the contract with the seller. ' In the 
case of Keith v. Buchanan,'" the court held that although the buyer had experts 
inspect a boat, the warranty of seaworthiness was not waived because no water 
testing took place. "' "[A]n examination or inspection by the buyer of the goods does 
not necessarily discharge the seller from an express warranty if the defect was not 
actually discovered and waived. ""' Because the inspection was limited, the buyer 
could not have discovered the boat's unseaworthiness. The decision has correctly 
resolved the pre -UCC question of whether or not a seller should be liable for his 
statements about the quality of the goods if the buyer fails to carry out the offer to 
inspect the goods before conclusion of the deal between the parties. The law should 
11° Ibid., at 423, 31 UCC Rep. at 474 -475. 
111 Ibid., 31 UCC Rep. At 475. 
112 See Jensen y Seigel Mobile Haines Group, 105 Idaho 189, 194 -195, 668 P.2d 65, 70 -71, 35 UCC 
Rep. 804, 813 -818 (1983). 
'-l' 173 Cal. App. ad at 24, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 UCC Rep. at 393 -394. 
114 Ibid., 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 UCC Rep. at 393. 
115 Ibid., 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 UCC Rep. at 393. 
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not require the buyer to examine the goods where there is an express warranty in the 
contract. 
Similarly, it could be argued that, unlike Anglo -US law, in the case of the 
existence of an express warranty, the buyer should not be charged for failing to detect 
the defects which are covered by the seller's representations where he inspects the 
goods even if the defects are normally discoverable by such inspection. Since, in 
such instances, the buyer has no duty to inspect for the detection of defects covered 
by an express warranty and he will normally examine the goods to discover of those 
particulars which are not covered by the provisions of the contract. 
Like the civilian tradition,16 the good faith standard of section 1 -203 prevents 
the buyer "from remaining silent in the face of known overstatements of performance 
by [the seller] and then asserting that those falsehoods were a basis of the bargain. "' 
The buyer who knows that the representations made by the seller are mistaken has a 
duty to inform the seller of his over statements. Under these circumstances, the 
sellers' representations are not reasonably understood to become part of the basis of 
the bargain as required by section 2 -313 to create an express warranty. Similarly, the 
seller's representations do not become part of the basis of the bargain if the seller can 
show that he withdrew them before completing the deal with the buyer. As an 
example, in the case of McGhee v. GMC Truck & Coach Division"' it was noticed 
that the seller's representations concerning the quality of the truck sold by the 
contract of sale were explicitly withdrawn by him from the contract. The court 
argued that the parties "so structured the terms of the sale as to lay the risk of hidden 
mechanical defects on the plaintiff, who admittedly understood this to be the case.i19 
Therefore, the said court rejected the buyer's assertion that the seller's statements 
describing the truck as being in a good condition created an express warranty. 
116 Unlike the common law, however, the transaction under the civil law principle of good faith may 
be void ab initio if either of the parties fails to observe the principle of goods faith in their agreement. 
11' See Price Brothers Co. y Philadelphia Gear Corp., 31 UCC Rep. (6th Cir. 1981) at 475. 
118 (8 Mich. App. 495, 296 N.W.2d 286, 30 UCC Rep. 121 (1980). It was partly in the contract that: 
"[T]here are no express warranties and no representations, promises or statements have been made by 
said seller in respect of said property unless endorsed hereon or incorporated herein by reference 
hereon ..." Ibid., at 499 -500, 296 N.W. 2d at 289, 30 UCC Rep. at 124. 
119 Ibid., at 504, 296 N.W.2d at 291, 30 UCC Rep. at 125. 
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In short, the basis -of -the- bargain standard under section 2 -313 has eliminated the 
pre -UCC requirement of reliance by the buyer on the seller's representations 
regarding the product's quality in establishing an express warranty in the contract of 
sale. Like the civilian tradition, under the new system any statement about the 
condition of the goods by the seller is presumed to have created an express warranty 
even if it is made after the conclusion of the contract. In other words, unlike English 
law, a post -sale statement by the seller will automatically become part of the basis of 
the bargain between the parties and it could be enforced against him without being 
relied on or supported by a new consideration by the buyer. On this basis, the buyer 
need only show that the seller made statements relating to the goods. Under certain 
circumstances, however, the law allows the seller to refute his statements create an 
express warranty under section 2 -313 of the UCC. Accordingly, the seller can escape 
liability by proving that the buyer knew, or, unlike Iranian law, he should have 
known of the untruthfulness of the seller's representations. Similarly, unlike the 
civilian tradition, the seller may discharge his liability concerning his representations 
by arguing that the representations were merely the reflection of his own opinion as 
to the product's value and, as such, they did not constitute an express warranty. 
Implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
There are two implied warranties in the UCC: the implied warranty of 
merchantability10 and the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.''-' Each 
is wholly distinct from each other. The implied warranty of merchantability applies 
to goods used for their ordinary purpose, whereas the implied warranty of fitness for 
particular purpose applies when the buyer uses goods for purposes to which they are 
not ordinarily put.' 
Like the civilian warranty against latent defects, the seller's liability as to the 
merchantability of the goods and their fitness for a particular purpose, under both the 
120 UCC, Section 2 -314. 
121 UCC, Section 2 -315. 
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US and the English systems, is regarded as being imposed by the law and therefore, 
they do not arise from the agreement of the parties.123 Commentators have mentioned 
several reasons for imposing the implied warranties on the sale of goods. These 
reasons include: 
"(a) Public policy which requires that the party which puts goods into the stream 
of commerce should bear the risk of harm caused by defective goods, rather than 
the person injured by it; (b) the fact that the one party has induced the reliance 
of the consumer on his skill and knowledge; (c) the fact that the former is in a 
better position to control the antecedents which affect the quality of the product; 
and (d) the fact that he is better able to distribute the loss. "t24 
Among these rationales, the fact that the buyer ought to be able reasonably to rely on 
the knowledgeable seller is perhaps the most important one which has also been 
adopted, either expressly or by implication, by the drafters of both implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose, under section 2 -315, and the implied warranty of 
merchantability, under section 2- 314.125 Such a policy is analogous to common law 
tort principles imposing liability on the person possessing knowledge of a hazard 
because he has a greater chance to protect against its dangers.126 Implied warranties in 
this context are much closer to tort law than to contract law, while, in fact, these 
warranties arise from the parties' agreement. 
This policy has led the courts to conclude that in the absence of fraud or an 
express warranty the rule of caveat emptor applies to all contracts of sale of personal 
property where the buyer has an opportunity for examination or inspection of the 
122 UCC, Section 2 -315, Comment 2. 
123 See MacAndews & Forbes Co. v Mechanical Mfg. Co., 367 Ill. 288, 11 N.E.2d 382 (1937). It is 
stated that an implied warranty under the common law " `is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit 
intercourse of tort and contract' -a contractual term promising quality but imposed by law rather than 
by agreement." See Andrew M. Baker et al, supra., note 50, at p. 68. 
124 See Note, "The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions" (1968) 10 Boston 
College Industrial & Commercial Law Review 127, at pp. 140 -141. 
125 Although section 2 -314 of the UCC does not expressly require the buyer to prove his reliance on 
the seller's knowledge in his warranty claim of merchantability, it expressly states that the latter is 
liable for such a warranty only if he is a merchant "with respect to goods of that kind" involved in the 
transaction between the parties. See Andrew M. Baker et al, "Article Two Warranties in Commercial 
Transactions: An Update" (1987) 72 Cornel Law Review 1159, 1191. This construction of section 2- 
314 has also been approved by the case law. See further, Wingo v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 1 UCC Rep. 2d 
389, 391 (W.D. Va. 1986); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F.Supp.552, 567, 39 UCC Rep. 450, 
455 (W.D. Va.1984). 
126 See generally, Henderson J. A. & Richard N. P., The Torts Process (2nd ed., Boston : Little, 
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property purchased,''' even though no test or inspection is actually made,' 
presumably because in such instances the buyer cannot prove that he has relied on the 
seller's knowledge. This means that the buyer would be unjustifiably deprived of any 
remedy as against the seller even if it transpires later that the goods were worthless at 
the time of purchase simply because he failed to examine the goods or in the case of 
their examination he failed to detect the defects upon examination. Clearly, this 
policy would tip the balance in favour a seller who also, in most instances, enjoys of 
a superior bargaining power in dealing with a buyer. Under this policy, a seller would 
prefer to conceal the defects in his products with the expectation that the buyer would 
fail to discover them. One may justify the courts' decision by arguing that it was the 
buyer's failure which caused the damage, and therefore, he is the one who should 
bear the consequences of his failure. This argument, however, does not seem to be 
tenable since a good faith seller would not reasonably expect to be paid for 
something which is worthless as it is unreasonable to expect the buyer to pay for it. 
In other words, by making a sale the seller impliedly undertakes to deliver goods, 
which are free from latent defects. Accordingly, unless otherwise expressly agreed by 
the parties the law should hold the seller liable vis -à -vis the buyer if it transpires that 
the goods sold are defective even though the latter has failed to discover the defects 
by an inspection or a test on the goods. It might be said that the parties have 
impliedly agreed to exclude the implied warranties by providing an opportunity to 
the buyer to examine the goods before their purchase. However, there is no 
justification why the law should require the buyer to test the goods where there is an 
agreement that the goods purchased must not be defective. In other words, in the 
absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the buyer has no duty to examine 
the goods before conclusion of the sale. For the same reason, even if such an 
examination is taken place the buyer should not be charged for failing to detect the 
defects by arguing that he should have reasonably discovered these defects by the 
Brown, 1981) at pp. 508 -09. 
127 Bansbach v. Allied Mach. & Welding Co., 334 Ill. App. 76, 78 N.E.2d 344 (1948). 
128 Grass v Steinberg, 331 Ill. App. 378, 73 N.E.2d 331 (1947). 
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examination. Of course, the buyer in good faith is bound to reveal to the seller any 
defect, which has been detected by the examination. 
Implied warranty of merchantability 
Scope of application 
The implied warranty of merchantability as the most important warranty under US 
law''-9 has been codified by section 2 -314 of the UCC, which in part reads: 
"Unless excluded or modified (section 2 -316), a warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind." 
As can be seen, in contrast with the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended)130 the 
section has broadened the scope of the warranty by omitting the pre -UCC 
qualification that the sale be by "description ".131 This omission has relieved the 
courts of the difficult problem of defining what is a sale by description.13' Another 
omission is the clause pertaining to whether the seller be manufacturer or grower or 
not. The absence of these words does not restrict the applicability of the section to 
only those two classifications.'3' 
Despite these changes, however, the drafters of the UCC failed to extend the 
protection afforded by the implied warranty of merchantability to cover all 
purchasers of goods. Only those purchasers who deal with a "merchant with respect 
to goods of that kind" may afford such protection. Others have been given no relief 
as against their seller's even if it is established that their products were worthless 
129 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, op. cit. supra., Part 1, Ch. 2, note 110, § 9 -7, 
at 510 
10 See, Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section (2A). 
131 See Uniform Sales Act, Section 15(2). 
132 The terminology, "bought by description, has never been clearly defined by the US courts. In fact, 
it has been admitted that the term is somewhat indefinite. See Bonenberger et al. v. Pittsburgh 
Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942). 
133 UCC, Section 2 -314, Comment 2. Prior to the Uniform Sales Act, the majority of the jurisdictions 
held that the implied warranty of merchantability was not applicable where the seller was merely a 
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when they were sold. Surely, this policy contradicts with the drafters' intention in 
designating of the implied warranty of merchantability "to protect the buyer of goods 
from bearing the burden of loss where merchandise...does not confoiui standards. "' 
One of the consequences of this policy is an increase of the litigation between the 
parties concerned. The courts must confront the difficult problem of determining 
whether a particular seller is a merchant under section 2 -314. This would, in turn, 
diminish the mutual trust between the parties in this field of law and would cause to 
slow down free flow of products in a society. 
Definition of merchantability 
The buyer may not recover damages unless, amongst others, he can show that the 
goods were not merchantable at the time of the sale.13' Like the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 (as amended),136 section 2- 314(2) of the UCC sets out certain guide posts as an 
aid in determining whether the goods are merchantable. 
"Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trader the contract description; and 
(b) are fair average quality in the trade and within the description; and 
(c) are fit for the purpose for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality 
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labelled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the containers or 
label if any." 
These UCC specifications are not intended to exhaust the meaning of merchantable 
or to lessen the effect of any of its characteristics, which are not specially mentioned. 
The words "must at least such as" were used with the intention to leave open other 
dealer. See, e.g., Sellers v. Stevenson, 163 Pa. 262, 29AT1. 715 (1894). 
134 W Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 
1984) § 97, 651 
135 The buyer is, further required to prove that: (1) a breach of the warranty proximately caused 
damages to the plaintiff or his property; and (2) notice was given to the seller of injury or damages. 
16 See, Sale of Goods Act 1979, Sections 14(2A) and 14(2B). 
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possible attributes of merchantability.137 Nevertheless, the courts are unwilling to 
impose additional standards, instead they prefer to expand those listed in section 2- 
314(2) to cover unforeseen attributes.138 
The courts use an objective standard in deciding whether the article sold 
conforms to section 2- 314(2)'s standards.139 In other words, reasonableness, not 
perfection, lies at the heart of the merchantability within the context of section 2- 
314(2). For example, in Sessa v. riegle,140 the plaintiff purchased a race horse named 
Tarport Conaway from a merchant for $25,000. The plaintiff soon discovered 
tendinitis in the horse's front legs. This disease soon vanished, only to be replaced by 
lameness in the hind legs. After treatment and rest, the undaunted animal won three 
of the thirteen races it entered, earning $1,306, which was a disappointing return on 
the plaintiffs investment of $25,000. The court held that the alleged defects at the 
time of the sale do not render the horse unmerchantable: 
"The standard established does not require that goods be outstanding or superior. 
It is only necessary that they be of reasonable quality within expected variations 
and fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used .... 
Even with tendinitis and intermittent claudication Tarport Conaway met this 
standard. The tendinitis was merely temporary and of no long term effect. The 
intermittent claudication did not prevent him from becoming a creditable if 
unspectacular race horse. After rest and recuperation, he won three races in 
thirteen starts in 1975. Certainly he did not live up to Sessa's hopes for preferred 
pacer, but such disappointments are an age old story in the horse racing 
business. Anyone who dares to deal in standardbreds knows that whether you 
pay $25,00.00 or $250,000.00, a given horse may prove to be a second 
Hambletonian or a humble hayburner. Consequently, since Tarport Conaway 
was able to hold his own with other standardbreds, he was reasonably fit for the 
ordinary purpose for which race horses are used, and was merchantable. "141 
As can be seen, unlike the civilian tradition of warranty against latent defects,142 the 
existence of a latent defect in the goods at the time of the sale does not necessarily 
render the seller liable for breach of section 2- 314(2) of the UCC. 
137 UCC, section 2 -314, Comment 6. 
138 Andrew M. Baker et al, op. cit. supra, note 125, p. 1207. 
139 Ibid., at pp. 1207 -1213. 
14° 427 F. Supp.760, 21 UCC Rep. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978). 
141 Ibid. at pp. 769 -770, 21 UCC Rep. At pp 758 -759. 
142 As to the position under French Law, for example, See pp. 259 -262, post. 
254 
Pass without objection in the trade 
Under the section 2- 314(2)(a) of the UCC, the goods are not merchantable unless 
they "pass without objection in the trade under the contract description." In other 
words, the goods delivered by the merchant- seller must be of quality to meet 
whatever standard or custom prevails in the trade for goods of that kind. 
Accordingly, the court in Ambasador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co.,' held that, to be 
merchantable, steel must have a carbon content of 1010 to 1020, since such was the 
custom and usage pf the trade. It was stated by the court that: 
"[P]laintiff breached the implied warranty of merchantability in selling to 
defendant steel of a different quality than ordinarily sold in the custom and 
usage of the steel business, and not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used."'" 
In commercial transactions, the courts often link the ordinary purpose of the goods to 
the expectations in the trade. As an example, in Latimer v. William Muller & Son, 
Inc.,145 the trial court found that seeds that had a general reputation in the trade for 
being disease -free did not meet the standard of passing without objection if they were 
highly contaminated with bacteria. 
Concerning consumer goods, the courts have interpreted the above standard to 
encompass public expectations. Accordingly, in Thomas v. Ruddell Lease- sales, 
Inc. ,146 the court noticed that a used Corvette delivered to the buyer had been wrecked 
and repaired prior to the agreement of sale. It was decided that the Corvette failed to 
"pass without objection in the trade" since the public generally rejects wrecked, 
although subsequently repaired, Corvettes. 
It is to be remembered that although section 14(2B) concerning the standards of 
satisfactoriness of the goods under the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended) 
contains no provision equivalent to the standard in section 2- 314(2)(a) nonetheless, 
"3 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275, 9 UCC Rep. 1019 (1971). '' Ibid., at p. 502, 190 N.W.2d at p. 279, 9 UCC Rep. at p. 1023. 
ias 149 Mich. App. 620, 632 -634, 386 N.W.2d 618, 623 -624, 1 UCC Rep. 2d 1128, 1134 -1135 
(1986). 
146 43 Wash. App. 208, 716 P.2d 911, 1 UCC Rep. 2d 394 (1986), 
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similar provisions to that of section 2- 314(2)(a) have been provided by section 14(4) 
of the Act. Accordingly, as Professor Atiyah observes:'' 
"Where the transaction is connected with a particular trade, custom and usage of 
that trade must be considered as part of the background against which the parties 
contracted." 
Fair average quality (fungible goods) 
According to section 2- 314(2)(b), fungible goods must be of "fair average quality" 
within the contract description. Comment 7 to this section states: 
-Fair average'... means goods centring around the middle belt of quality, not 
the least or the worst that can be understood in the particular trade by the 
designation, but such as can pass `without objection.' Of course a fair 
percentage of the least is permissible but the goods are not 'fair average' if they 
are all of the least or worst quality possible under the description." 
The price at which the goods are sold could be served as an excellent index of the 
quality intended. 
The courts often use this section in connection with section 2- 314(2)(a) as it is 
recommended by Comment 7 to section 2 -314. This is because both of them refer "to 
the standards of that line of the trade which fits the transaction and the seller's 
business. "148 
It is to be noted that, unfortunately, there is no provision equivalent to section 2- 
314(2)(b) under the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 and accordingly, the seller bears no 
liability against the buyer even if the quality of the goods delivered is the least or 
worst quality possible under the description.149 
Fit for ordinary purposes 
147 See P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., Part 1, Ch. 1, note 73, at p. 180 and the cases 
cited there. 
148 UCC, Section 2 -314, Comment 7. 
149 See Kendall v. Lillico [1969] 2 AC 31, 79 -80 per Lord Reid. See further, pp. 203 -204, ante. 
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As to section 2- 314(2)(c), fitness for ordinary purpose is a fundamental concept of 
merchantability.150 This provision has settled the pre -UCC troubling question of 
whether merchantability means only saleable or did it includes use and consumption. 
Merchantable is no longer synonymous with saleable. Under the provisions of this 
section, the goods must be reasonably fit for their usual, intended purpose. The seller 
is considered to be in breach of this standard, unless the goods are reasonably safe for 
their ordinary use151 and are reasonably capable of performing their ordinary 
functions.'52 
According to Comment 8 to section 2 -314, the fitness for ordinary purpose 
requirement equally applies to both goods sold for resale and those sold to the 
customer.'53 
An article's ordinary purpose is one which could reasonably be foreseen by the 
seller. In other words, the buyer would have no relief against the seller for breach of 
the implied warranty if he uses the article in a manner, which is unforeseeable to the 
latter. On this basis, it was decided that a dump -truck that overturned when used to 
haul clay was not used for an ordinary purpose since the manufacturer could not 
reasonably foresee that the truck would be used for other than it intended purpose of 
hauling wash rock.154 Moreover, the buyer cannot sue the seller for harm caused by 
deliberate misuse of the goods totally unrelated to any normal or intended use.'55 
150 See R. Nordstorm, Handbook of the Law of Sales (1970). According to Professor Nordstrom, 
fitness for ordinary purposes "is the key thought - the heart - of the merchantability warranty." Ibid., 
at p. 235. 
151 As an example, in the case of Tateka v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis.2d 140, 271 N.W.2d 653, 25 UCC 
Rep. 680 (1978), a car with a single defect which caused a substantial safety hazard was held 
unmerchantable since it failed to meet the standard provided by section (2)(C). See further, Maybank, 
46 N.C. App. at 692, 266 S.E.2d at 412, 29 UCC Rep. at 73. 
152 In Perry v. Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 29 UCC Rep. 75 (Okra. 1980), for example, 
the court found that frequent breakdown of combine rendered it unfit for the ordinary purpose and, 
therefore, the seller was held to be in breach of implied warranty. 
153 For the full text of Comment 8 to section 2 -314, see Appendix I. 
154 Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 649 -50, 42 UCC Rep. 
1250, 1259 (N.D. Miss. 1986). 
155 In Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 29 UCC Rep. 487 (1st Cir. 1980), thus, it was 
held that the manufacturer- seller did not need to design beer bottle to withstand deliberate misuse by 
throwing bottle against telephone pole. 
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There has been a dispute over the issue of whether the implied warranty of 
merchantability applies to used or second hand goods, since the UCC provides no 
express provision to this effect. In the case of Chaq Oil Company v. Gardener 
Machinery Corporation,''6 the buyer of a "Crawler- tractor" sued the seller for 
damages caused by the alleged breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the case, arguing that implied warranty 
of merchantability is not applicable in the case of goods purchased with the 
knowledge that they are used goods. However, like English law, the majority of the 
jurisdictions do not agree with this decision.' In Overland Bond & Investment 
Corporation v. Howard,18 for example, the Illinois Court of Appeal, by referring to 
section 2- 314(1), rightly stated that the implied warranty of merchantability depends 
not on whether the goods were new or used but on whether "... the seller is a 
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. "19 After making the position clear that 
the section 2 -314 makes no specific distinction between new or used articles, the sale 
of which give rise to implied warranties, the court went on to make the distinction 
that the merchantability warranty in the second -hand sale is not identical with the 
merchantability warranty in the new car sale.160 In this regard, the court made specific 
reference to Comment 3 to section 2 -314 which, in part, states that: 
"[a] contract for the sale of second -hand goods, however, involves only such 
obligation as appropriate to such goods for that is their contract description." To 
qualify as merchantable, the court referring to section 2 -314, said "the goods 
must be at least such as ... are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods 
are used. "161 
Adequately contained, packaged, and labelled 
156 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
157 See, e.g., Smith Sharpenstein, 44 Okla. Bar Assen. J. 3568, 13 UCC Rep. 609 (Okla. Ct. of App. 
1973); Williams v. College Dodge, Inc ,11 UCC Rep. 958 (Mich. D.C. 1972); Georia Timberlands, 
Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, I88 S.E.2d 108, 10 UCC Rep. 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1972); Baker v. City of Seattle, 484 P.2d 405, 9 UCC Rep. 226 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1971). 
158 9 Ill. App.3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168, 11 UCC Rep. 945 (Ill. App. Ct. (1972). 
159 Ibid. at p. 949. 
160 Ibid., at p. 950; See also, Comment, (1971) 42 Colorado Law Review 473. 
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According to section 2- 314(2)(e), the goods must be "adequately contained, 
packaged, and labelled as the agreement may require." In other words, like the UK 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), the implied warranty of merchantability under 
the UCC covers both the quality of the goods and their packages. 
Generally, the purpose of adequate packaging is to protect the goods as well as 
the people using the goods from harm. Accordingly, inadequately packaged goods 
may render the seller liable for breach his implied warranty of merchantability. As an 
example, the court in Pugh v. IC. Whitney & Co.,162 held that the seller, who shipped 
automobile parts that had sharp projections in a box without any covering on the 
projections or warning about them, breached section 2- 314(2)(e) of the UCC. 
According to the court the seller at the time of the sale had impliedly undertaken: 
"that the package was reasonably safe to open and that the receiver of the 
package could safely introduced his hand into the package and extract the 
merchandise and that the potentially dangerous parts of the product were 
covered and- protected.s163 
Similarly, the seller's failure to label the goods adequately "as the agreement may 
requirei164 may render them unmerchantable. In Agricultural Servis Association v. 
Ferry -Morse Seed Co.,' for example, the court held that mislabelled okra seed 
delivered by the seller was unmerchantable. To find out whether the goods are 
adequately labelled, one has to pay due consideration to the particular circumstances 
of the transaction between the parties. In Carnes Constraction Co. v. Richards & 
Supply Co.,166 for example, a buyer ordered bathrooms hardware of a particular 
brand. The goods delivered in large cartons marked with the correct brand name, but 
the cartons contained individual packages marked with another brand name. Apart 
from packages the goods appeared unidentifiable. The buyer notified the seller of the 
problem and rejected the goods before receiving an assurance from the seller that 
161 Ibid. 
1629 UCC Rep. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
163 Ibid., at p. 231. 
164 UCC, Section 2- 314(2)(e) (emphasis added). 
"551 F.2d 1057, 1065, 21 UCC Rep. 443, 452 (6th Cir 1977). 
166 10 UCC Rep. 797 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972). 
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they were the correct brand. The seller contended that he did not encroach section 2- 
314(2)(e) by arguing that the correct label were on the large shipping cartons, that no 
labelling requirement appeared in the buyer's order, and that even without labels the 
fixtures could be identified by persons in the trade. On the other hand, the buyer 
insisted "that the brand of bathroom fixtures cannot be identified by characteristics 
and customarily are put in labelled individual cartons.i167 The court found that 
reasonable inferences could be drawn from the circumstances of the case in support 
of the either party's contentions, and, accordingly, decided to maintain the jury's 
verdict in favour of the seller.168 
It appears that the protection afforded to a buyer under the UCC's implied 
warranty of merchantability is far less than the one given by the seller's warranty 
against latent defects under the civilian systems. As an example, while the warranty 
against latent defects impliedly arises from the parties' agreement and, therefore, 
applies to every sale of goods contract, the UCC's implied warranty of 
merchantability is imposed only on the seller who is a merchant "with respect to the 
goods of that kind ".169 Moreover, there might be instances in which the goods are 
defective but not unmerchantable or unsatisfactory within the context of Anglo -US 
law in so far as the defects do not affect the ordinary utility of the goods. 
Accordingly, the defects which substantially reduced the price of the goods rather 
than their usual utility are covered by the civilian implied warranty against latent 
defect,170 whereas, the buyer has no this defect under Anglo -US law. 
Finally, unlike the UCC, the principle of good faith applicable to the formation 
of contract under the civilian systems binds the seller to reveal any defects in the 
goods to the buyer at the time of the contract. This provision is very important, 
particularly where the seller of the goods is a professional person, since, in such 
instances, he is deemed to know all the latent defect in the goods sold with the 
consequence that he will be liable for any damages caused by the defects even if such 
167 Ibid., at p. 801. 
168 Ibid., at p. 802. 
169 UCC, Section 2 -314 (1). 
17° As to the provisions of the French law in this respect, see pp. 258 -261, post. 
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damages were not predictable to the parties at the time of the contract."' This 
protection is available to the buyer even if he has an opportunity to inspect the goods 
but either he did not carry out the inspection, or he failed to detect the defects even 
though such an inspection reasonably lead the buyer to detect the defects. This is 
because the seller is considered to have acted fraudulently in concealing of the 
defects whilst the buyer's failure amounts to negligence, with the consequence that 
the law would prevail the negligence buyer to the fraudulent seller. "' 
Implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose 
The other principal implied warranty under the UCC is that of fitness for a particular 
purpose. According to section 2 -315 of this UCC: 
"Where the seller at the time of the contracting has reason to know any 
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying 
on the seller's skill or judgement to select or furnish suitable goods, there is 
unless excluded or modified under next section an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose." 
As can be seen, there are three statutory prerequisites to the creation of this warranty. 
First, the seller must have knowledge, or reason to know, of the particular purpose 
for which the goods are bought. Second, he must also have knowledge or reason to 
know that his buyer is relying on his skill or judgement to furnish appropriate goods. 
Finally, the buyer must actually rely on the seller's skill or judgement in selecting or 
furnishing the article. As to the first requirement, the warranty arises when the seller 
has reason to know, as contrasted with the weaker language of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 "buyer... makes known. "13 In other words, in contrast with the UK Act 1979, 
the UCC, does not require the buyer's actual communication of his particular purpose 
and reliance to the seller. It is sufficient if the circumstances are such that the seller 
"' As to the position under French law, see pp. 101, 268, 271. 
172 A German court followed this argument in one case which was governed by the CISG. See United 
Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /12 (26 May 1997), Case 168 pp. 5 -6, the 
fact of which is given at p. 312, post 
173 Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 14(3). 
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has reason to realise the intended purpose and the reliance.14 Nonetheless, the courts 
in the UK interpret this requirement under section 14(3) of the Act 1979 literally and, 
therefore, in practice, if the seller was aware of the buyer's particular purpose or he 
would have inferred it from the circumstances of the contract, this will be taken as an 
implied communication of the purpose by the buyer.15 
Onus of burden 
The main difference between these two systems is that, under section 14(3) of the 
UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, where the buyer acquainted the seller of his particular 
purpose, there is prima facie an implied condition that the goods delivered are fit for 
the above purpose, unless the seller can prove that the buyer did not rely, or that it 
was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill or judgement.16 In contrast 
with the UK Act 1979, the UCC imposes the onus on the buyer to prove his reliance 
on the seller's skill or judgement. ' In other words, under the UCC, the fact that the 
buyer has acquainted the seller of his particular purpose does not relieve him from 
the burden to prove his actual reliance on the seller's skill and expertise in purchase 
of the goods where he seeks to sue the seller for infringement of section 2 -315. In the 
17 UCC, Section 2 -315, Comment 1. The seller is presumed to have knowledge only where such a 
presumption is reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the seller in Standard Structure 
Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164, 40 UCC Rep. 1245 (D. Conn. 1984), was held 
not to be liable for implied warranty for particular purpose as the buyer had refused to disclose 
purpose of component part because of secret design. 
In deciding whether the buyer has actually relied on the seller's skill or judgement to furnish 
appropriate article, courts often examine the comparative knowledge of the seller and the buyer in 
respect of the article sold. See, for instance, Dotts v. Benett, 382 N.W.2d 85, 42 UCC Rep. 1273 (Iowa 
1986). 
15 Slater v. Finning Ltd., supra., note 95, p. 487 per Lord Steyn; Asshington Piggeries Ltd. v. 
Christopher Hill Ltd. [1972] AC 441, 477 per Lord Guest; see also, Goode, Commercial Law, (2 "d ed. 
1995), at p. 334. 
16 See, Tehran -Europe Co. Ltd. v. S. T. Belton (Tractors) Ltd. [1968] 2 QB 545, 554 per Lord 
Denning M.R.; Hardwick [1969] 2 AC 31, 115 per Lord Pearce. 
'77 UCC, Section 2 -315 Comment 1; see, e.g., Kirk v. Stineway Drug Store Co., 38 App. 2d 415, 187 
N.E.2d 307 (1963) (householder's reliance on seller's skill and judgement in purchase of stepladder 
presented factual issue for jury); Streich v. Hilton- Davis, Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 692 p.2d 440 
(Mont. 1984) (commercial seed potato grower and buyer's reliance on manufacturer's skill and 
expertise in producing potato sprout suppressant utilised by grower presented factual issue for jury). 
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case of Beam v. Cullett,18 the court of appeals held that "absent evidence that 
plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendants judgement in selecting the truck ... there 
was no implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose."' 
Scope of application 
On the other hand, unlike section 14(3) of the UK Act 1979, section 2 -315 of the 
UCC does not limit the application of this warranty to the situations in which the 
seller is a merchant or selling the goods in a course of business. Though the warranty 
of fitness normally will arise only where the seller is a merchant, i.e., one who deals 
in goods of the kind or has knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods, it can arise in 
sales by non -merchants if the circumstances are such as to satisfy the statutory 
prerequisites of knowledge and reliance. Thus, the warranty of fitness under the UCC 
has broader coverage of sellers than that the one under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
It is to be noted that this warranty is peculiar to the common law systems and 
there is not such an implied warranty under the civilian legal systems. Nonetheless, it 
might be argued that the buyer's action in disclosing his particular purpose to the 
seller, in fact, constitutes part of his offer to purchase. And the seller is bound to act 
upon this offer where he declines to reject or to amend it. In other words, under the 
civilian systems the warranty for particular purpose arises from the parties' 
agreement and it does not need to be supported by the common law statutory 
prerequisites. One may draw the same conclusion by considering the civilian 
principle of good faith which is applicable to the contract between the parties. For the 
seller who knows the buyer's purpose for which the goods are bought is in breach of 
this principle if he fails to reveal to the buyer any defect in the goods which may 
render them unsuitable for that particular purpose. As a consequence, the buyer, 
under civilian systems, may bring an action for breach of contract against the seller 
18 Beam v. Cullett (1980) Or. App. 47, 615 P.2d 1196. 
19 Ibid., at pp. 50-51, 615 P.2d at p. 1198. 
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where the goods are not fit for the buyer's intended purpose if it was known to the 
seller at the time of the contract. 
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Chapter 3 
The seller's Obligation as to the Quality of the goods under French 
Law 
Introduction 
The doctrine of caveat emptor in its original sense which was applicable in England' 
in the early 17th Century and by which the seller was liable for defective goods only 
if he had given an express warranty knowing that it was false, has never been 
accepted in any other legal systems. In other words, even the early legal systems 
protected the buyer against latent defects in the goods sold.' Nonetheless, the 
protections afforded to the buyer under these systems were not as adequate as the 
modern civil laws are. Under Roman law, however, the seller initially was liable only 
for fraud or breach of express warranty.' Nonetheless, the concept of fraud, or dolus, 
was broad enough to include the seller's active dissimulation or trickery played on 
the buyer as well as his deliberate abstention in revealing of the defects in the goods 
to the latter. Given the fact that the seller who sells as a merchant or artisan is 
assumed to know of any defects in the thing sold, this means that such a seller was 
liable against a latent defect even if he knew nothing about the defect when he 
entered into the contract with the buyer. Furthermore, in contrast with the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, the seller's liability under the express warranty covered both 
"promisa" and "dicta ".4 This means that he had to bear the liability not only where he 
' Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 [1601]. See further, pp. 181 -182, 193, 213 -214, ante. 
2 For the provisions with respect of quality of the goods under Babylonian law, for example, see 
C.H.W. Johns, Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters (1904) 234. 
3 J.B. Moyle, The Contract of Sale in Civil Law: with references to the laws of England, Scotland and 
France (1892) 189; Buckland, the main institutions of Roman private law (Cambridge (Eng.): The 
University Press, 1931) 272. 
4 Moyle, op. cit. Supra., note 3, at p. 190; Buckland, op. cit. supra., note 3 at p.272. 
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gave warranty by expressly promissory words (premise) but also where made a 
representation or even description of the goods sold (dicta).' In other words, in all 
instances of fraud, express warranty, implied -in -fact warranty the law protected the 
buyer to recover damages not only for the reduced value in the goods sold but also 
for the consequential loss.6 These provision, however, did not go far enough to 
protect the aggrieved buyer in those cases where the seller was neither selling as a 
merchant or artisan nor he was aware of the latent defect at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract. Accordingly, implied warranty in the sense that the seller was taken 
to have implicitly warranted against latent defects impairing their normal utility by 
the contract of sale, even in the cases where the defects were not known to him liable 
against, introduced into Roman law in about the first quarter of the second century 
B.C. by proclamation of the edicts of the aediles.7 
Implied warranty against hidden defects under French law 
As in the other continental civil systems, the warranty of quality under the French law 
of sale has been very much influenced by the Roman law conceptualism'. Accordingly, 
beside the express and implied -in -fact warranties the Code has imposed an obligation 
on the seller to warrant that the goods sold are free from any defects which impair their 
utility. Article 1641 of the French Code states that: 
"A vendor is bound to warrant against the hidden defects of the thing sold which 
tender it unfit for the use of which it was intended, or which impair its use to 
such extent that the purchaser would not have acquired it, or would only have 
given a smaller price if he had known of them." 
5 Ibid. at p. 191. 
6 R. Zimmermann, The law of obligations: Roman foundations of the civilian tradition (Cape Town: 
Juta, 1990). 
' Moyle, op. cit. Supra., note 3, at pp. 194 -195; Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods in South Africa, op. cit. 
supra., note 39, part 1, chapter 1, at p. 130. 
s The warranty of quality in a sale under the French law Civil Code of 1804 is, in fact, the reflection 
of the treaties of the famous pre -Code commentators, Pothier and Domat, which in turn reflect the 
Roman law warranty of quality. See Pothier's treatise on contract of sale, (Boston, Mass., L.S. 
Cushing's translation, 1839); 1 Domat, Civil Law (Strahan's Tr. Cushing's 2nd ed. 1839). 
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Like the Roman law, under these provisions the seller, apart from any fraud or express 
or implied -in -fact warranty, is in fact liable against every latent defects in the thing sold 
which applying the standards of reasonable person, may be said to render the article 
unfit for the purpose for which it was purchased, or so imperfect for such purpose as 
the buyer would not have bought it at that price had he known of the defects. 
To afford a remedy to the buyer, the defects must be in existence at the time of 
sale or, in the case of generic sales, at the time of the appropriation unless it has been 
expressly stipulated that the object of the sale will continue to be free from defects in 
which case the seller will be responsible for defects arising after the sale. 
The buyer may invoke the protection afforded by the Art. 1641 only if the defects 
were latent in the sense that a person of average competence would not have noticed 
them upon an ordinary inspection. This is because under article 1642 of the Civil Code 
the seller has been excluded from any liability for the apparent defects which the buyer 
could have ascertained for himself.10 It is assumed that in the cases of the apparent 
defects the buyer has waived the right to sue the seller for the defects. The test whether 
a defect was latent or not is an objective one, and therefore ignorance, credulity or 
inexperience of the buyer would have no effect on the seller's liabilities towards him if 
the defect in the thing sold were such as the ordinary prudent man would have 
discovered them by an ordinary inspection. Precisely how far the ordinary prudent 
person would be expected to go will depend on the circumstances in which the sale 
was taken place. The buyer of a very old car, for example, would be expected to give a 
rather more through examination than if he was buying a new one. He is considered to 
have waived the right to complain about such defects as would have been revealed 
although not about defects, which would not have been detected even, had he inspected 
more thoroughly. However, the defects are considered to be hidden within the meaning 
of the article 1641 if anything more than an ordinary inspection would be required to 
ascertain them. This is the case, for example, where the defects would not be detected 
by any means other than by complete or partial destruction of the thing purchased. 
Similarly, the defects, which could be discovered only through expert knowledge or 
9 Morrow, "Warranty of Quality: a Comparative Survey" (1940) XIV Tulane Law Review 529, 531. 
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scientific method, are treated as a latent one for there is no obligation on the part of the 
buyer to employ such methods in inspecting of the goods. 
The seller's knowledge of existence of defect irrelevant 
Like the aedilitian edicts, Article 1643 of the French Civil Code provides that: 
"He [the seller] is responsible for the hidden defects, even if he did not know of 
them, unless it has been stipulated that he would not be bound by any warranty 
in such case " 
This means the seller's knowledge or ignorance of the latent defects is not material for 
existence of his liability for such defects, although it may affect the extent of his 
liability in this respect. Since this liability has been imported into the contract by the 
law and it arises from the mere fact of the sale itself. In other words, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties the mere fact that the seller was in perfect good faith in dealing 
with the buyer in the sense that he was unaware of the latent defects in the goods will 
not relieve him of liability for the defects. 
Exclusion of the seller's liability for the hidden defects 
The seller's liability for latent defects may be negated by inserting a non -warranty 
clause in the contract of sale. But such a non -warranty clause is valid only if he did not 
know the defects at the time of the sale. Article 1643 Of the Civil Code does not 
specifically deal with the situation where the seller was in bad faith in excluding his 
responsibility for the latent defects by a non -warranty clause despite the fact that these 
defects were known to him before the sale. Nevertheless, the majority of the French 
authorities, by referring to Article 1628 of the Civil Code (on warranty against 
eviction) defend the idea that in such a case the insertion of the non -warranty clause in 
the contract is not valid. According to article 1628: 
"Even if it is stated that the vendor is not to be subject to any warranty, he 
10 For the full provisions of Article 1642 of the French Civil Code, see Appendix III. 
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nevertheless remains liable to warranty against his personal act: any agreement 
to the contrary is void." 
It is, in fact, said that knowledge of the defects by the seller and his failure in disclosing 
of them to the buyer is fraud and the law does not permit him to contract out of his 
liability for fraud ". There is a ground which maintains that the non -warranty clause 
which takes the form of stipulating expressly that the buyer purchases the goods "at his 
own risk and peril" is effective against him even if the seller is not in good faith. This 
notion is based on analogy to Article 1629 of the Civil Code (also on warranty against 
eviction) which provides: 
"Even in the case of a stipulation of no warranty, the vendor is bound in case of 
ejectment to return the price, unless the purchaser knew at the time of the sale 
the danger of being ejected or unless he made the purchase at his own risk and 
peril. "(Emphasis added) 
It seems, however, that even where the buyer has purchased the goods "at his own risk 
and peril" he might still sue the seller if he can prove that the latter were guilty of 
active fraud (as distinguished from mere non -disclosure)''. 
It is to be remembered, further, that under the Roman maxim of spondet artis 
pertiam which both the French doctrine and the French jurisprudence have frequently 
used a merchant or artisan is presumed to know of any defects in the things he sells13 
This means that under the French law merchants and artisans are restricted severely 
to contract out their liability for the defects by a non -warranty clause. Since, as 
pointed out, such contractual clauses are effective only if the seller does not know the 
existence of the defects when he sells the goods. 
Effect of the buyer's delay on his right to bring redhibitory action against the 
seller 
To the same effect see Swiss Code of obligations, Art. 199; German Civil Code, Arts. 464, 476. The 
South African law recognises this general principle of the civil law. See Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods 
in South Africa, op. cit. supra., note 39, part 1, chapter 1, at p. 141. 
12 See French Civil Code, Art. 1110. 
" Pothier, op. cit. supra., note 8, p. 131; Morrow, op. cit. supra note 9, p. 539. 
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As mentioned, the seller has no liability vis -à -vis the buyer for the defective goods in 
the cases where the defects are apparent or where they would be ascertained by the 
exercise of reasonable care. In such instances the buyer is required to notice the defects 
and reject the goods at the time when the sale is made or, at least at his first opportunity 
to inspect. The buyer who has failed to comply with these requirements will be taken to 
have elected to accept the goods as they are so far as their patent condition are 
concerned. 
A rather different and difficult question is whether the buyer is under a duty to 
inspect or examine the goods for latent defects within reasonable time or be held to 
have lost the protection afforded by the Code when eventually the defect emerges. The 
view that there is such a duty might be criticised by arguing that the seller is the man 
who has defaulted in the contract by delivering of the defective goods. This default 
should not be taken to penalise the innocent purchaser by imposing on him a burden, 
which he would not have otherwise to bear. In response, it might be pointed out that 
the argument does not correspond with the principle of good faith upon which the 
contract of sale is based. Since the buyer's laches in inspecting of the goods for the 
hidden defects and his delay in rejecting of them upon detection of such defects will 
irrationally prejudice the seller. In other words, the purchaser would loss the right to 
rescind the contract or claim for any damages where he fails to ascertain the defects 
and offer to return the goods within a reasonable time after the defects are or should 
have been detected. Nevertheless, if there is an established custom of trade according 
to which the goods purchased can be stored for sometimes without being inspected, the 
buyer may sue his seller for the redhibitory defects when they are eventually 
discovered provided he can demonstrate that his failure to reject the goods timeously 
was due to his compliance with the custom of trade.' 
According to Article 1648 of the French Civil Code: 
The action resulting from defects which render the sale void must be brought by 
the purchaser within a brief delay according to the nature of the defects and the 
custom of the place where the sale was made." 
14 Morrow, op. cit. supra., note 9, at p. 532. 
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Once a defect warranting rejection is discovered the buyer has, within a "brief delay ", 
to elect whether he will return the goods or keep them and claim a reduction of the 
price. If he does not elect to reject within this period he losses his right to do so, 
although he will not necessarily lose his right to claim reduction of price while 
retaining the goods. 
Unlike the Roman law and other modern civil codes'', however, the lengths of the 
prescriptive periods for the redhibitory actions and the action quanti minoris have not 
been specified, but are placed in the discretion of the judge and may vary depending 
upon the custom of the place where the sale was made. 
This wide discretionary power in the lower court judge and the reference of the 
problem of prescription of the actions for defects of quality to the customary law have 
been the cause of much confusion in this phase of the French law. Clearly, under 
provisions of Article 1648 the purchaser has a duty to institute suit against the seller 
within a "brief delay, therefore, a complaint made or proof of defect offered the seller 
is not enough for the fulfilment of such duty. Nonetheless, there has been dispute over 
the time from which the delay can be calculated and while under some authorities the 
delay begins to run from the day of the sale or perhaps from the day of delivery if the 
delivery is not accompanied with the sale, the others insist that the delay must be 
computed from the time when the defects are detected by the buyer.' 6 
It is to be noted, however, that in the cases of express contractual warranty against 
the defects the buyer has to resort to the usual prescription of actions for breach of 
contract". It must, further, be remembered that the prescription period for fraud is ten 
years.' 8 
The buyer's remedies for the breach of warranty of quality 
Article 1644 Of the French Code states that: 
15 See e.g., Article 477 of the German Civil Code; Article 210 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. 
16 Morrow, op. cit. supra., note 9, at p. 545. 
17 See Cass. -req., 20 juin 1932, S. 1932. 1. 343 and note. 
18 Art.1304, French Civil Code; See further, p. 275, post. 
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"In the cases specified in Article 1641 and 1643 the buyer may elect either to 
return the thing and have the price repaid to him, or to keep the thing and have 
such part of the price repaid as shall be decided by expert." 
That is, where latent defects destroying or impairing the use of the goods purchased are 
discovered by the purchaser he will have an option to resolve the sale and to recover 
the purchase price from the seller or retain the defective goods and sue the latter for 
diminution of the price. As can be seen, the remedies available to the purchaser for a 
latent defect under these provisions clearly correspond with the remedies offered to 
him by the Roman law for adulation defects. The purchaser is entirely free to bring 
either of the actions which he wishes against the seller in any of the three cases 
enumerated in Article 1641 of the Civil Code. Under that Article the buyer will be 
protected in the cases a) where the latent defects destroy the utility or effectiveness of 
the goods for the purpose for which it has been purchased or for which it is commonly 
used or, b) where the defects impair the use of the goods to such extent that he would 
not have purchased them had he known of the defects or, c) where the defects impair 
the use to such extent that he would have paid only a smaller price they were known to 
him at the time of the sale. In any of these three circumstances, the buyer is entitled 
either to resolve the sale or to ask for reduction of the price in a proportion determined 
by special officers of the court who are experts and act as appraisers. In contrast with 
the Iranian system, he will continue to retain this option until the time when one 
remedy or the other is obtained. Until that time, in other words he can shift from one 
remedy to the another19. 
Like the Roman law, the ideal in the case redhibition is restoration to the status 
quo. The buyer, who chooses to avail himself of this remedy, must be able to restore 
the seller to his original position by returning the goods in the condition in which he 
received them before. Thus the buyer can not obtain redhibition where he has 
encumbered the property has with real rights unless after removing of the 
encumbrances or compensating the seller for them. Moreover, where the defective 
goods have been used up by the buyer or where they have been alienated by him and 
can not be returned he cannot obtain redhibition, although he may still avail himself of 
19 Ibid., at p. 536. 
272 
the action quanti minoris. Nevertheless, this rule is not an absolute one and in certain 
situation it is relaxed where equitable considerations so require. Article 1647 of the 
French Code states: 
"If the thing which had defects perishes owing to its bad condition, the loss falls 
upon the vendor and he is bound towards the purchaser to return the price and to 
make the other amends specified in the two aforegoing articles'. But if the loss 
happens by accident, it falls upon the purchaser." 
Therefore, the purchaser is not required to restore something, which has been destroyed 
due to the defect complained of, or something which has been perished in the course of 
its normal use and from which the buyer has derived no benefit because of the defect. 
For in such circumstances it is, in fact, the seller who has to bear the blame either for 
breach of contract or for latent defects and consequently, the law ought not permit him 
to retain the price against the buyer who has obtained little or no benefit yet is unable 
to return the property for any of the aforegoing reasons. 
Unlike the Roman law, however, the French Code has adopted a rule which 
precludes the buyer from his right in bringing of redhibitory action in the cases of 
accidental destruction of the defective goods. This is unfortunate as in practice it is 
often very difficult, if not impossible, to discover whether the goods perished by 
accident or by the reason of latent defects in themselves. 
The jurisprudence has developed a third remedy, which has not been referred to in 
the Code. According to the astreinte the seller in the case of sale of defective goods 
like any other obligors in the instances of inadequate performance of obligations under 
the French law, is bound to complete his duties by repairing of the defects in the goods. 
In other words, the buyer of defective goods may, instead of suing the seller for 
redhibition or reduction of the price, seek for a court order requiring the latter to repair 
them within a certain time where such defects are repairable and it is perfectly 
reasonable to have them repaired. The court will enforce this remedy by imposing a 
large pecuniary penalty upon the seller who declines to comply with the requirement - 
usually a fixed sum for each specific period that the seller delays''. 
° These two articles, i.e. Articles 1645 and 1646 will be discussed latter. 
2' See Brodeur, "The Injunction in French Jurisprudence" (1940) 14 Tulane Law Review 211. 
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There is an additional ground for the buyer to take action against the seller where 
he is not satisfied with the defective article delivered by the latter. The buyer may seek 
to have the contract declared void for the article's mistake as to the substantive qualities 
and its ability to perform in the expected manner. The existence of the latent defect 
does not prevent the buyer basing his action on the mistake as to the substantive 
qualities of the goods." As it will be seen later redhibitory defects as defined by Article 
1646 of the French are, in fact, merely a special application in the field of sales of the 
broad concept of error in substantia in the general field of obligations which renders 
the consent of the buyer null and whereby allows him to avoid his transaction with the 
seller.73 The only point of divergence from the analogy to the principles of vices of 
consent is found in Article 1648 which requires the redhibitory action and the action 
quanti minoris to be brought within a "brief delay" whereas an action of resolution for 
error or fraud is ten years under Article 1304 of the Civil Code. 
Amount recoverable on redhibition 
The amount recoverable by the purchaser in the case of redhibition under the French 
law is very much depend on whether or not the seller was acted in good faith in dealing 
with the former. In other words, although the seller's responsibility for latent defects 
exists independently of his knowledge or ignorance of the defect his state of mind is 
material as regards the extent of his liability against the buyer. Accordingly, Article 
1645 of the Civil Code states that: 
"If the vendor knew of the thing, he is bound not only to return the price which 
he has received, but he is also liable to the purchaser for all damages." 
The drafters of the French Code have, in fact, intended to penalise the bad faith vendor 
who sells the goods knowing their defective nature to the extent of not only returning of 
the price to the purchaser but also of paying the latter damages. On the other hand, 
according to Article 1646 of the French Code: 
'2 Cour de Cassation, 3rd Civil Chamber, 18 May 1988, IR 155. 
23 See supra., notes 82 -88. 
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"If the vendor was ignorant of the defects of the thing, he shall only be bound to 
return the price and to reimburse to the purchaser the expenses occasioned by 
the sale (fair occasiones par la vente)." 
In other words, where the seller was in good faith in the sense that he did not know of 
the defect at the time of the sale he has no liability against the damages sustained by 
the buyer in the sale. The phrase "expenses occasioned by the sale" in this article may 
well refer to the expenses which the purchaser ordinarily must pay for drawing the 
contract and the other charges relating to the sale under Article 159324 . 
The purchaser is generally required to prove knowledge of the defects on the part 
of the seller before the latter can be required to indemnify him for the damages caused 
by the defects. This is likely to produce a harsh result against the purchaser since it is 
very difficult for him to establish such knowledge by the seller in most instances. It 
means that in such instances the seller will have no liability against the damages caused 
by the defects even if he has acted in bad faith in the sense that he knew of the defects 
at the time of the sale. The fact that the purchaser might sue in tort under Articles 1382 
and 1383 of the Code does not also go far enough to afford him much relief since such 
a remedy is available only if he can demonstrate "fault" on the part of the seller.' 
Nevertheless, the purchaser may resort to the Roman maxim of spondet artis 
peritiam and bring an action for damages under Article 1645 without being obliged to 
prove knowledge of the defects by the seller, in the cases where manufacturers or 
professional dealers sell the goods. For sellers in such cases are presumed to know of 
the defects in their goods sold and thus liable for all damages under Article 1645. 
It is to be noted, however, that the French jurisprudence has been so developed as 
to allow the purchaser to sue for damages even where the seller was not aware of the 
defects in the goods. This development has been obtained by means of what is called as 
"misinterpretation" of Article 164626. The Courts have broadened the historical 
meaning of the phrase "expenses occasioned by the sale" by asserting that it refers to 
damages, which the sale of defective goods has caused the purchaser. This 
24 For the provisions of Article 1593 of the French Code, see Appendix III. 
25 For the provisions of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Code, see Appendix III. 
26 Morrow, op. cit. supra., note 9, at p.539. 
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development in the jurisprudence did not take place until nearly half a century after the 
adoption of the Code Napoleon. The reason for such development has been said to 
have based on the fact that originally goods were not sold very frequently for the 
purpose of resale, but the expansion of the trade and commerce resulted in reselling of 
goods by more and more buyers who had to suffer in various ways if goods turned out 
to be defective. This phenomenon led the courts to hold that the buyer must be 
indemnified by the seller in such cases, irrespective of the fact that the latter may have 
been in good faith and not responsible in damages under a restrictive interpretation of 
Article 1646 of the Code. It was argued that the various type of injury sustained by the 
buyer were "expenses occasioned by the sale ", for which the seller was bound to 
reimburse the buyer under Article 1645. 
In 1847, the Court of Cassation for the first time used such interpretation of 
Article 1646. The buyer purchased a special kind of fertiliser for the purpose of 
reselling it to farmers. The fertiliser was defective and unfit for use. The farmers 
obtained redhibition of their contract with the buyer. The latter, in turn resolved the 
sale with the original seller and sought for the return of the price and the "expenses 
occasioned by the sale ", and also the expenses occasioned by the resale which he had 
been bound to reimburse to the sub -buyer. This demand was accepted by the judges of 
the Court who based their decision on Article 1646 arguing that the items in the 
demand were not "damages" which were specifically denied, but were expenses 
occasioned by the sale.'' 
In 1852, the buyer who obtained redhibition of the sale of a house for latent 
defects was held to be entitled to recover from the innocent seller not only the price but 
also the increased value of the house caused by improvements the buyer had made 
upon it after the sale's. In approving the decision by the Dalloz report on the case, it 
was pointed out that any other result would allow unjust enrichment of the seller, and 
that analogy to Articles of the Code on warranty against eviction'9 also supports the 
conclusion. Further, this note demonstrated for the first time that one may distinguish 
27 Cass. -req., 29 juin 1847, S. 48. 1. 9. 
28 Cass. -civ., 29 mars 1852, D. 52. 1.65 and note. See also S.52. 1. 321. 
29 E.g., Article 1634. See also Articles 861, 2175, of the French Civil Code. 
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between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans as elements of damages- interest,30 and 
that a bona fide seller might validly be compelled to reimburse the buyer for the former 
but not for the latter, without violence to Articles 1645 -1646. 
In 1859 the Court of Cassation gave an even more extensive interpretation to the 
phrase "expenses occasioned by the sale ". In that year a buyer in obtaining redhibilition 
of the sale of copper sheathing was granted to recover both the price and also the costs 
of removing the defective sheathing and replacing it. In other words, the court did not 
consider these costs as damages but as expenses occasioned by the sale under Article 
1646.3' 
Again, in 1870 the Court of Cassation used Article 1646 as a basis of its decision 
in a case involving the sale of defective starch. In that case the buyer resold the starch 
to the sub -buyers and by reason of its defects became involved in several lawsuits with 
them, incurring travelling expenses in settling these lawsuits, as well as injury to his 
commercial reputation. A lower court decided that he could recover these items from 
the original seller. This decision was approved by the Court of Cassation which also 
relied on the delictual Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code. 
In another case in 1886, involving the sale of seed which because of its redhibitory 
defects did not germinate the Court of Rouen again relied on Article 1646 and, in an 
unprecedented decision, allowed the buyer to recover the price, the expenditure made 
by him in preparing the soil for planting, and also "the profit which he lost by failing to 
make a crop ". In fact, this decision goes beyond any other French cases in so far as it 
requires the good faith seller to reimburse the buyer for lucrum cessans, or loss of 
profit by the buyer, as "expenses occasioned by the salei'. 
The decision which climaxed this line of cases came in 1925. A buyer of a 
defective automobile brought a redhibilitory action against the manufacturer- seller who 
disproved fault or any knowledge of the defect on his part at the time of the sale. The 
seller held to be liable for damages sustained by the buyer including the expenditure, 
30 Article 1149 of the French Civil Code. See Fuller and Perdue, "The Reliance Interests in Contract 
Damages" (1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 52, 55. 
Cass. -req., 4 janvier 1859, S. 59. 1. 936. 
32 Rouen, 22 mai 1886, S. 88. 2. 166. 
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which the latter had to pay to the victim of the accident.33 The Court of Cassation 
considered such expenditure as part of the "expenses occasioned by the sale ", within 
Article 1646 of the Code. The decision, in other words, goes beyond the prior cases in 
so far as it requires the seller to reimburse the buyer for tort liability incurred by the 
latter as a result of the defect, whereas under the previous cases he was liable only for 
the contractual damages sustained by the buyer in the sale. The Dalloz report of the 
case34 has an statement from M. Celice, counsel for the buyer, in which he argued that 
changed economic situation justified disregarding the historical background of the 
codal text, that there was no need to invoke the delictual Articles of 1382 and 1383 and 
that the notion of spondet peritian artis was superfluous. It appears that the Court of 
Cassation has accepted this view, basing its decision solely on Article 1646. The 
method, which was used by the court in reaching the decision, has been severely 
criticised by M. Josserand in a note which is also included in the Dalloz report?' 
Referring to the historical background of Articles 1645 and 1646, he argued that a 
clear -cut distinction was intended between good faith and bad faith seller and that the 
courts since 1847 have not genuinely interpreted Article 1646. According to him, the 
court should have based its decision on the Pothier's Roman doctrine of spondet 
pertiam artis under which such sellers as the manufacturer -seller in the current case are 
presumed to know of all defects in their wares sold. Accordingly, the seller in this case 
would be liable as a bad faith seller for all damages caused by the defect to the buyer 
under Article 1646. 
At the first glance it appears that the distinction between the respective liabilities 
of good and bad faith sellers under Articles 1645 and 1646 of the Code has been wiped 
out by the French jurisdiction. It is to be pointed out, however, that this view is not, 
strictly speaking, true since Article 1645 requires the seller to reimburse the buyer for 
all damages, both the damnum emergens and the lucrum cessans of the civil law, those 
sustained both through actual loss or expenditure and by way of failure to achieve 
Cass. -req., 21 octobre 1925, S. 1925. 1. 198, D. 1926. 1. 9. 
34 D. 1926. 1. 9. 
35 Ibid. 
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anticipated profits3ó whereas, in all the cases in which good faith sellers have been 
condemned for damages under Article 1646, they have been compelled to repay only 
the damnum emergens, but not the lucrum cessans.37 Accordingly, it could be said that 
the French law to a limited extent has retained the distinction intended in the Articles 
1645 and 1646. That is where the good faith seller is held to be liable under Article 
1646, his liability does not extends to lucrum cessans, or the buyer's loss of profits.38 
Express warranty under French law 
It is to be noted that the preceding remarks are by way of comment upon Articles 1641- 
1649 which imposes a very broad implied -in -law warranty upon the seller whereby he 
is bound to deliver goods which are free from latent defects. In other words, the 
warranty imposed by these Articles will protect the buyer against such defects even if 
there has been no express or implied -in -fact representations about the goods in the sale. 
In view of the broad protection of buyer afforded by the law it is not surprising that the 
common law "express warranty" has not been resorted to frequently by them. For the 
same reason it appears that the French legislators have omitted to address the issue of 
the express warranties by the seller39 and that the commentators have chosen to say 
nothing about the so- called garantie de fait (warranty -in -fact, as distinguished from the 
implied -in -law warranty imposed by the Civil Code upon the seller).40 
Of course, under the general principle of freedom of contract the parties are 
allowed to agree on a warranty (garantie de fait) other than the one imposed by the 
law, which may increase or decrease the seller's responsibility as to the quality of the 
36 Cass. -req., 17 mars 1926. S. 1926. 1. 371 
37 Except in the case, Limoges, 20 avril 1887, S. 88. 2. 156. 
38 See Celice and Josserand, D. 1926. 1. 9. 
39 See Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) vol. 5, 4117. "Express warranties are not mentioned in the 
Code. They do not seem to occur frequently and their legal effects are doubtful." 
a0 See M. Planiol et G. Ripert, Traité Pratique de droit civil francais X (1932) p. 147. Contrary to the 
French Civil Code, the subject of express warranty has been dealt with by Article 459(2) of the 
German Civil Code. similarly, the omission of the French Code with regard to express warranty is 
repaired by Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) Section 922 under which the seller must warrant that the 
goods will have both the stipulated and/or the customarily required characteristic. Accord: Article 197 
of Swiss Code of Obligations. 
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goods sold. The notion that the parties may freely agree on any warranty concerning 
quality of the goods can also analogously be deduced from the provision of Article 
1627, on the warranty against eviction, which states that: 
"the parties may, by special agreement, add to this legal obligation or reduce its 
effect: they may even agree that the seller shall not be subject to any 
warranty. "41 
However, a problem may arise in the cases where an express stipulation is used to 
broaden the legal warranty of the Code which is already so liberal in protecting the 
buyer against any redhibitory defect in the goods. Redhibitory defects are those which 
impair use. The contract may well provide that the goods shall possess certain qualities, 
the absent of which might not necessarily affect their intended use, and the presence of 
which may enhance its value or desirability without increasing its utility. In such 
circumstances it might be argued that the parties have intended to replace the legal 
warranty of Article 1641 with the contractual warranty which has been expressly 
agreed upon by them in the sale with the result that the buyer would not be able to avail 
himself from the right to invoke the redhibitory protection of the Code.' Of course, the 
intention of the parties is a question of fact in any given case43, therefore, it is not 
possible to make a precise statement. However, the review of the cases will indicate 
that the French courts are more likely to consider such an agreement by the parties as a 
special warranty which has contractually substituted for the implied -in -law warranty 
imposed by the Code. Consequently, none of the provisions of Articles 1641 -1649 will 
be applicable to the case. In 1883, e. g., a constructor seller of machinery expressly 
warranted it against "all defects of material and of working ".44 The argument that the 
parties had excluded the operation of Articles 1641 -1649 of the Code by agreeing upon 
insertion of the express warranty in their contract, was upheld by the court which 
ordered specific performance of the express warranty but refused to awarded any 
41 The issue of exclusion of legal warranty of the Code concerning the quality of the goods by the 
seller under the Article 1643 has been referred to previously. 
42 See Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. note 40, n 140, p. 147. 
43 Ibid.; See also Cabs. -cay., 17 november 1902, D.1902. 1. 566. 
44 Cabs. -re., 25 juin 1883, S.85. 1. 422. 
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damage to the buyer for its breach by the seller.``5 It appears, in other words, that the 
interests of the buyer under the French law are likely to be more safeguarded by relying 
on the implied -in -law warranty imposed by Article 1641 rather than providing for 
warranty of quality by contract. 
Further problem arises in connection with situations where the seller warrants that 
the object of the sale will remain in good working order for specific period of time 
(garantie de bon fonctionment).46 It seems that the buyer usually resorts to the doctrine 
of astreinte as a remedy against the seller where such a warranty in the contract is 
breached. That is he may ask the court to order the seller to repair or to replace the 
article that is not functioning properly.47 In fact, in the case of breach of such a 
contractual warranty the court will enforce a type of specific performance by penalising 
the seller severely for every day of his non -performance with the effect that Articles 
1641 -1649 will ordinarily be excluded from application." 
It seems that recourse to the general Articles of the French Code on the 
performance vel non is necessary if express and implied -in -fact warranties under the 
French law are to be considered properly, since as pointed out earlier, the Code is silent 
on the issue of express warranty made by a seller. If the seller by such a contractual 
warranty is considered to have made promises (express or implied -in -fact) to deliver 
goods of certain qualities or having certain characteristics, it is then clear that he is 
liable for damages to the buyer in so far as he has failed to fulfil those promises.49 A 
fundamental question for the buyer is whether he is entitled to avoid the sale and to 
claim damages for the breach of a promise. According to Article 1184 of the French 
Civil Code: 
"A resolutory condition is always implied in synallagmatic contracts, in case one 
45 Relying upon an analogy to Article 1152, the court argued that agreement for liquidated damages 
will not be disturbed. For a similar case see also Cabs. -cay., 20 december 1887, D. 89. 1. 76. See 
further Paris, 9 december 1930, S.1931. 2. 70. 
46 P. Kelly, European Product Liability (Butterworths 1992), Ch. 5. pp. 109 -110; Planiol et Ripert, op. 
cit. supra., note 40, n 14o, p. 147. 
Ibid. 
48 Accordingly, the action against the seller for failing to perform this contractual warranty is not 
subject to the limitation period provided under Article 1648 of the Code. See Cour de Cassation, 
commercial Chamber, 2 May 1990, JCP 1990, IV, 246. 
49 See Article 1146 et seq., French Civil Code. 
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of the two contracting parties does not fulfil his engagement. 
In such case the contract is not cancelled as a matter of right. The party 
complaining that the obligation has not been fulfilled has the choice either 
between compelling the other party to carry out the agreement when it possible, 
or demanding its cancellation, with damages. 
The cancellation must be applied for in court and the defendant may be given 
time, according to circumstances." 
This means that the seller's failure to carry out his promises (express or implied -in -fact) 
in delivering of goods of certain qualities or free from defects will give rise to a right in 
the buyer whereby he may apply for specific performance or for resolution of the 
contract with damages. If the buyer has not yet paid the purchase price he is no longer 
required to do so; and if he has already paid the price, he may recover it from the seller. 
In either case he is entitled to damages also.50 Article 1184 has established a wide 
discretionary power in the court over the issue of resolution of the contract. This means 
that only through the court's decision an aggrieved buyer may avoid the contract. The 
court will, in the first instance, decide whether the contract has been broken and if so 
whether the breach is substantial or non -substantial and trivial in nature. In most 
instances of potential breach of warranty there has been a partial performance. That is 
the goods have been delivered by the seller, but he has failed to fulfil completely his 
promises about them, or he has been merely unsuccessful in performing of collateral 
promises, rather than the principal ones. In contrast with Anglo -US law, French law 
has made no attempt to formulate specific iron -clad rule about the issue of substantial 
performance and, therefore, the matter is left to be decided within discretion of the 
court. In the case of non -substantial breach the buyer will be granted only damages, 
and not avoidance of the sale. Nevertheless, if the breach is substantial and material, 
although merely partial, the court will allow the buyer both to avoid the sale and to 
recover damages from the seller.51 However, the parties may limit the court's discretion 
strictly to the question of whether the contract has been breached by providing that in 
the case of non -performance there shall be a dissolution de plein droit.5'- 
so For a detailed discussion of non -performance of a promise by the parties see Monroe, "The Implied 
Resolutory Condition for Non -performance of a Contract" (1938) 12 Tulane Law Review 376; 
Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) vol. 3 at p. 2539. 
51 See Williston , op. cit. supra., note 50, at p. 2549. and authorities there cited. 
52 See Williston, op. cit. supra., note 50, at p. 2547 
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It is to be noted that an action based on Article 1184 against the seller for non- 
performance of his obligation to deliver goods conforming to the purchaser's order or 
contractual provisions is not subject to the same rules as the liability for hidden defects 
and does not have to be initiated within the short limitation period required by Article 
1648 of the Code.'3 In accordance with the general rules of contract liability, the 
limitation period in such instances is ten years starting from the time when the damage 
occurred if the action is against a professional seller and thirty years if it is taken 
against a private seller. It has, however, been held that a contractual clause stipulating 
for a shorter limitation period is valid if it agreed between the parties who are 
professionals54 in the same area of expertise." 
The basis of the seller' liability for breach of warranty 
Unlike the common law of warranty which had its origin in tort, the civil law of 
warranty has been analysed always from the contractual point of view. The civil law of 
warranty is but the application to a specialised type of contract of general rules of 
conventional obligations and the vices of consent.'6 
Concerning express and implied -in -fact warranties under the civil law, the 
conception is one of liability on the part of the seller for breach of a promise given in 
exchange for another promise. That is, if a contract has been made as to the qualities of 
the goods, based upon either direct or indirect declarations of will of the parties, all of 
the consequences follow which ordinarily result from such agreement simply because 
they have been made, and quite irrespective of such common law prerequisites as 
"deceit" or "reliance ". Under the modern French law, although express and implied -in- 
fact warranties receive little attention by the Civil Code, the controlling concepts are 
those which relate to the non -execution of promissory obligations generally. Therefore, 
53 Cour de Cassation, General Assembly, 7 February 1986, JCP 1986, II 20616; 1st Civil Chamber, 5 
November 1985, Bull Cav I, no 287 and 13 December 1989, Bull Cav I, no 393. 
54 I.e. suppliers, distributors or producers. The French court has consistently assumed that a 
professional seller has been aware of the defect in the goods sold 
55 Cour de Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 5 July 1988, unpublished, no 86- 19342. 
se Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra., note 40, pp. 124, 198; Colin A. et Capitant H., Cours èlèinentaire 
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the buyer may acquire damages for breach of express or implied -in -fact warranty of 
quality by invoking of Article 1146 of the French Civil Code, which generally deals 
with damages for breach of promises. In such instances (i.e., where the seller is in 
breach of express or implied -in -fact warranty) the buyer has his option of specific 
performance or of resolution of the contract with damages irrespective of whether the 
breach of express or implied -in -fact warranty amounts to non -substantial performance 
of the contract of sale or not, since even in the former case the buyer may assert the 
implied resolutory condition of Article 1184 and ask the court for dissolution of the 
contract''. In other words, there is nothing peculiar about express or implied -in -fact 
warranty which distinguishes it from the ordinary promise, certain consequences 
follow simply because the parties has entered into the contract by an exchange of 
promises and the seller has failed to fulfil one of his promises. 
With regard to the civilian implied -in -law warranty of quality, it is said that the 
seller has made no declaration of will (direct or indirect), therefore there has been no 
promise on his part to be breached by delivering of the goods which suffers from latent 
defects yet it has been deemed to be wise to impose a legal obligation upon him. 
Promises are exchanged in any sale: the seller promises to deliver certain agreed article 
and the buyer agrees to pay for it.58 But in many instances nothing is said or done about 
the quality of the article. Like any other contract, however, the sale is not perfect 
without consent of the parties thereto and may be avoided by them.'9 It is to be noted 
that under the civilian tradition this is not considered as breach of contract, but 
resolution because of a vice of consent, a basic conception of the civil law of 
conventional obligations.60 As to implied -in -law warranty, it has been argued that the 
defect in the article makes the object of the sale other than that agreed upon by the 
parties. This vitiates the consent of the buyer and renders the contract of sale imperfect. 
In other words, conceptually warranty of quality is but a particular application of the 
de droit civil francais II (7e èd. 1932) p.534. 
57 See Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra., note 40, p. 126. 
58 Art. 1582, French Civil Code. 
59 "Three circumstances concur to the perfection of the contract, Towit: the thing sold, the price and 
the consent." Art. 2439, La. Civil Code of 1870. 
6° See Arts. 1108 -1122, French Civil Code; Holstein, "Vices of consent in the Law of Contracts" 
(1939) 13 Tulane Law Review 362. 
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principles of vices of consent in the law of obligation.' Accordingly, one should not be 
astonished when he discovers that the consequences of an imperfect contract follow 
where it transpires that the goods delivered by the seller are defective. 
This correlation in the civil law between redhibitory vices and vices of consent can 
also be demonstrated by a close consideration of the Articles of the French Civil Code. 
According to Articles 1116 and 1117, vices of consent resulted from error, violence, or 
fraud give rise to actions for avoidance of the contract.' Article 1110 of the Code, 
however, states that error is not cause of avoidance of a contract, "unless it rests upon 
the very substance of the thing which is the object thereof'. Under Article 1641 
redhibitory defects are those, which seriously impair the use of the goods, sold. It 
would appear that "substantial error" is involved in those transactions where such 
defects exist but are unknown to the buyer. That is the concept of the substantial error 
is broad enough to cover the more restricted one of the redhibitory defects, which must 
impair the use of the object of the sale. This idea has been supported by the view of the 
prevailing construction of Article 1110 of the French Code, which "interprets error in 
substantia as equivalent to a misconception affecting a substantial quality of the 
object ".63 There are, nonetheless, instances in which error may "rest upon the very 
substance" of the object of the sale, and yet its use not be impaired. Consequently, it 
could be said that redhibitory defects under Article 1641 are merely a special 
application in the field of sale contracts of the broad concept of error in substantia in 
the general field of obligations. 
The seller's liability against the sub -buyer for the defects in the quality of the 
goods 
The remedy of the sub -buyer is another issue which has been considered by the French 
civil system. Unlike Anglo -US and Iranian law there is no such obstacle as "privity of 
61 See Colin et Capitant, supra., note 56, p. 536; Planiol et Ripert, supra., note 40, at p. 126. 
62 For the full text of the Articles 1116 and 1117 of the French Civil Code, see Appendix III. 
63 See Holstein, supra., note 60, at p: 375 et seq. See also Laurent, Principes de droit fiancais XXIV (5 
èd. 1893) p. 272, where it is agreed: "But the error which causes the vendee to be unable to use the 
thing, is this not the most substantial of errors ?" 
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contract" in this system to debar the sub -buyer from resorting to the remedies available 
to the buyer under the French Code.64 In fact, while some of the decisions are clearly 
based on Article 1382, the delict Article of the Code, it is just as clear that the warranty 
and the remedies of Articles 1641 -1649 are available to the sub -buyer as well as the 
buyer.65 This means that a buyer can bring an action founded on liability for latent 
defect, not only against the seller that sold the goods to him, but also against any prior 
seller in the chain of supply including the manufacturer.66 Where the original buyer has 
been sued for the defective goods, he may, by means of elastic methodology of the 
"call in warranty ", make the original seller a party in the cause, determining all the 
issue in one suit.67 This solution adopted by the courts is based on the idea that by 
reselling the goods the buyer has transmitted to the sub -buyer all rights, which were 
conferred upon the buyer by the original sale.68 
The buyer may bring an action against the seller who sold the goods to him and 
the manufacturer, who will be held jointly liable for the damages caused by the 
defective goodsó9, but only the seller to whom the goods are returned will have to repay 
the purchase price.70 
However, an action by the sub -buyer against any prior seller may not succeed if 
any of the intermediate buyers has had knowledge of the defect in the goods." 
Moreover, it has been held that the sub -buyer who is entitled to obtain damages from 
the manufacturer cannot seek to rescind the contract of sale in the cases where the 
purchase price in the successive sales was significantly different.' 
The sub -buyer of an article may also bring proceedings against the prior seller to 
rescind his contract and to claim damages on the basis of the product's "lack of 
64 See Smith, "Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The stipulation Pour Autrui" (1936) 11 Tulane 
Law Review 18. 
65 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra., note 40, p. 145. 
66 Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 9 October 1979, Bull Cav I, no 241. 
67 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. Supra., note 40. 
68 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra., note 40, p.145. 
69 Coure de Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 15 May 1972, Bull Cav IV, no 144. 
70 Cour de Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 17 May 1982, Bull Cav IV, no 182. 
71 Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 13 May 1981, Bull Cav I, no 165. 
72 Cour de Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 27 January 1973, JCP 1973, II, 17445. 
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conformity" to specification or the contract's provision.73 The courts have given no 
juristic reason for such an action by a sub -buyer, but it may well be argued that the 
right of action of the previous buyer against his seller is subject to the general rules of 
contractual liability and as such it can vest in the sub -acquirer. In other words, the 
seller's failure to fulfil his obligation to deliver a "conforming" article will give rise to a 
right in the buyer to take action against him. And this right of action of the buyer 
against his seller is transmitted to the sub -buyer of the article. However, a sub -buyer 
can not take any action against a prior seller for the lack of conformity of the goods 
when such lack of conformity arises from a breach of specific contractual provisions 
for which the prior seller is not liable, since he was not a party to that particular 
contract. 
73 Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 9 March 1983, JCP 1984, II, 20295. 
287 
Chapter 4 
Warranty of Quality of Goods under Iranian Law 
Implied warranty against latent defects 
The Iranian law of sale has been derived mainly from the Islamic legal system, and, 
as such, it requires, in the case of each and every bargain, that there be honourable 
dealing on the part of the parties concerned. As to the seller, this means that he has a 
duty to supply a sound and price -worthy article, even if there is no stipulation in the 
contract to this effect.' 
This requirement imposes on the seller a duty of directing the buyer's attention to 
the existing imperfections in the goods,' including a defect which impairs their utility 
for the intended purpose for which they are bought,' as well as one which goes to 
their price- worthiness before he enters into a contract of sale with the latter. It is 
immaterial whether the seller knows these imperfections or not. In other words, the 
seller is excused from liability as against the buyer only in so far as the imperfections 
are known to the buyer at the time of the sale. It is self -evident that the seller's 
undertaking as to price- worthiness exists even where there is no bad faith on his 
part,' unless he can show that the buyer knew the proper value of the goods before 
the conclusion of the contract of sale.' It could be argued that the parties have 
impliedly agreed that the quality of the goods delivered is commensurate with the 
contractual price. Thus, the Code permits the buyer to cancel the sale where he has 
suffered gross loss which "in accordance with common usage it is not susceptible of 
The Code imposes the same obligation on the purchaser, that is he has an obligation to provide 
consideration which is commensurate with the value of thing purchased. 
2 See N. Katoozian, Hoghooghé Madani "Civil Law" (Tehran, 3rd ed. 1984) § 87, p.137 
3 See the Iranian Civil Code, Article 422. For the full provisions of this Article see Appendix IV. 
See the Iranian Civil Code, Article 416. 
5 Iranian Civil Code, Art. 416. 
6 Iranian Civil Code, Art. 418. 
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being overlooked. "' The purpose of this remedy under the Iranian Code is to 
compensate the purchaser against the damages, which he may have suffered as a 
consequence of the product's imperfections in a validly concluded contract. In other 
words, unlike French law, under the Iranian law, this fact that the buyer did not know 
the proper value of the goods purchased would not enable him to avoid the sale on 
the ground of mistake or vice of consent on his part.' 
Similarly, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties in the contract, the seller is 
liable for a defect which impairs the utility of the property sold, even if he has acted 
in perfect good faith in dealing with the buyer in the sense that he did know of the 
defect at the time of the deal. 
The implied warranties against inherent defects and priceworthiness of the goods 
by the seller will apply irrespective of whether the goods are new or second hand. 
Although the Code has no provision to this effect, it seems that it is the intended 
use of the thing sold which must be impaired.' Thus, an article may be lacking in 
certain qualities thought to be present, but if the lack of quality does not impair the 
intended use, the buyer cannot invoke the remedies which are available to him for a 
latent defect under Article 422 of the Code. Sometimes this use is clear; when it 
corresponds to the normal use of such goods, the seller cannot pretend to be ignorant of 
' Iranian Civil Code, Art. 417. For the detail of the buyer's option to cancel the sale in such instances see 
further, N. Katoozian, Doreie Moghadamatiè Hoghoghè Madani `Introduction to the Civil Law" (3rd ed. 
1995 Tehran) pp. 396 -409. 
8 As will be shown later, unlike the cases where a transaction is avoided on the ground of mistake or 
vice of consent by either of the parties in the transaction, the buyer's right to cancel the sale under 
Article 417 does not have retrospective effect on the parties concerned. 
9 The same rule is applicable under Italian, French and South African law. Article 1490 of the Italian 
Civil Code provides: 
"A seller is bound to warrant that the thing sold is free of defects which render it 
unfit for the use for which it was intended or which appreciably diminish its 
value." 
As to French law, see Colin A. et Capitant H., Cours élémentaire de droit civilrancais II (7th ed. 1932) 
p. 529. As to the law of South Africa, see Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods In South Africa, op. cit. supra., 
note 39, part 1, chapter 1. Under the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Civil Code (herein after referred 
to as BGB) para. 459, the goods are defective if they are unfit either for: (i) ordinary use or (ii) the 
particular use contemplated by the parties in the sale. In the latter situation, only if this purpose has 
become part of the bargain. 
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it. If a special use is intended, the seller is not liable for the goods' unfitness for that use, 
unless the buyer has advised him before the contract of the intended use. 
As against those systems10 which limit the seller's liability concerning a 
defective product to the cases where the defects in the product are in existence at the 
time of the sale, Article 425 of the Iranian Code provides for the extension of his 
liability to cover the defects which occur after the sale, but before delivery of the 
property to the buyer." Under the provisions of this Article, in other words, the 
goods supplied by the seller must be sound at the time of the sale and remain so until 
they are delivered to the buyer. Accordingly, where the contract requires the article to 
be transported some distance from the seller to the buyer, the former will be liable for 
any defect which may occur to the article before being delivered to the latter, unless 
he can prove that the defects were caused by the buyer himself, in which case the 
latter will have no recourse against the seller for the defect.' The advantage of this 
approach over the respective provisions of both common law and French law is that 
it relieves the buyer from the difficult question of proving that the defects were in 
existence at the time of the sale. Obviously, the buyer's actual knowledge of the 
defects in the property is a factor, which may prevent him from bringing an action 
against the seller for breach of the implied warranty of quality of the property. Since, 
in such instances, the buyer could be said to have acquired what he has contracted 
for. Nevertheless, unlike most other systems,13 Article 424 of the Iranian Civil Code 
does not deem him to be aware of the defects by the mere fact that the defects were 
10 See, for example, the French law cases of Grenoble, 4 mars 1867, S. 67. 2. 255; Cass. -req., 8 Mars 
1892, S. 95. 1. 341, in which it was held that the defect must exist at the time of the sale, or in the case 
of generic sales, at the time of appropriation. The South African law applies the same mle; 
Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods in South Africa, op. cit. supra., note 39, part 1, chapter 1, at p. 136. 
" Iranian Civil Code, Art. 425. 
'2 Iranian Civil Code, Art. 389. 
13 For example, Article 1491 of the Italian Civil Code in part provides that the warranty against defects in 
the thing sold is not applicable if the defects were easily detectable at the time of the sale. Likewise, 
Article 460 of BGB states: 
"In the absence of express warranty the vendor is under no liability for defects 
which the buyer could have ascertained by the exercise of reasonable care." 
See further, Article 200 of the Swiss Code of obligations (Wettstein's ed. 1928) 
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evident where he did not realise the fact.14 In other words, the fact that the defects in 
the property were evident at the time of the sale does not bar the buyer from seeking 
recourse against the seller where he did not actually notice the defects. It could be 
argued that, in such instances, the contractual price between the parties is based on 
the understanding that the seller would supply a good article without defect. 
Therefore, it is unjust to allow the seller to escape from liability vis -à -vis the buyer if 
it later becomes apparent that the property delivered is not sound as agreed between 
the parties. One may reach the same conclusion by arguing that the parties impliedly 
agree that the goods delivered will be sound and price- worthiness. This will entitle 
the buyer to buyer to recourse to a remedy provided in the Code where the seller fails 
to deliver goods in conformity with this agreement even if the buyer examines the 
goods at the time of the contract, provided that the examination does not actually lead 
him to detect the non -conformities in the goods. The purpose of the buyer inspecting 
the goods is not to detect the non -conformities in the goods for which the seller will 
be liable, but to get to know those particulars in the goods which are of interest but 
for any reason have not been provided in the contract. 
Accordingly, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, an un- 
exercised opportunity to inspect the property by the buyer does not debar him from 
invoking the remedies afforded by the law for a latent defect. The same rule applies if 
he did not actually detect the defects by examination or inspection of the property at the 
time of the sale. In other words, the argument that the buyer should have reasonably 
noticed the defects by examination or inspection of the property before the sale appears 
to have no place under the Iranian legal system where he can show that such 
examination or inspection did not actually lead him to discover the defects. This seems 
to be a sound approach, which, unlike other legal systems, rightly allows the buyer to 
seek recourse against the seller for the defects in the property in the cases where he, 
despite the inspection or examination of the property, did not discover the defects 
before the purchase. Clearly, because it prevents the seller from hiding the defects 
which he knew of before entering into a transaction with the buyer, hoping that the 
14 For the full provisions of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
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latter would not be able to detect them upon inspection of the product, and 
consequently, he could sell the defective product for the price of a sound one without 
bearing any liability against the buyer for the defects in the product. Opponents of this 
view may argue that this approach would overburden the seller, particularly in cases 
where he is in good faith in dealing with the buyer in the sense that he knows nothing 
about the defects in the product before entering into the deal with the latter since, in 
such cases, the loss sustained by the buyer is caused by his own failure to detect the 
defect upon inspection of the product. Therefore, the seller should take no 
responsibility for the defects in the property, which are discovered by the buyer after 
the transaction. The argument, however, does not seem to be justifiable for, in the 
absence of an express stipulation to the contrary by the parties, the price agreed 
between them is based on the their mutual understanding that the property sold is not 
defective where they are not aware of the existence of the defects before the 
transaction. In other words, the price received by the seller is based on the 
consideration to deliver sound property and, therefore, the fact that the buyer carried 
out an inspection on the property before the deal should not be used as an excuse to 
exonerate him from the liability against the buyer for the defects if the inspection did 
not actually lead to detection of the defects.' Under this view, the buyer's skills and 
experience will have no effect whatsoever on the extent of the seller's liability 
concerning the defects in the property in so far as he did not notice the defects before 
the sale. In other words, unlike Anglo -US law, the buyer need not show his reliance on 
the seller's skill or knowledge when he sues the later for a latent defect discovered after 
the time of delivery. 
The buyer's remedies 
15 In fact, as it will be discussed later, an inspection of the goods before the sale which did not lead to 
discovery of the defect in the goods by the buyer not only would not deprive him from invoking of 
the remedies afforded by the law for an inherent defect, but also it enables him under Article 413 of 
the Code to sue the seller for non -conformity of the goods with the quality which they possessed at 
the time of the inspection if the purchase is based on his previous inspection. 
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Article 422 of the Iranian Code provides the remedies available to the buyer where 
the thing purchased is defective. According to this Article: 
"If after the transaction it transpires that the property was defective [before 
being delivered by the seller], the buyer has the option either to keep the 
property and ask for compensation for its defects, or to cancel the transaction." 
Under these provisions the choice of one action or the other is entirely in the buyer,16 
when latent defects render the property unfit for use, or when they impair the use to 
such extent that he would not have acquired the property if he had known of them. 
This option in the buyer continues until one remedy or the other has been obtained; 
until that time, the buyer may shift from one to another. 
The same remedy is available to the buyer even if only some of the several 
things sold are defective, that is; he may either cancel the sale altogether or keep the 
whole things and ask the seller to compensate him for the defect. But he cannot retain 
the sound part of the things and withdraw the sale or apply for compensation for their 
defective part, unless the price of each one of them is fixed separately in the sale or 
the seller gives his consent to discrimination of the things by the buyer." 
Unlike French law, which does not allow the buyer to act unilaterally but 
requires him to apply to the court to rescind the sale for redhibitory defects,18 under 
the Islamic and Iranian law the existence of several "options ", including the `Option 
of Defect', allows the buyer to cancel the sale with the seller at his option without 
need to resort to the court. 
Nevertheless, the aggrieved buyer who chooses to cancel the contract must be 
able to return the goods and their attachments to the seller in the same condition as 
the latter delivered them to him. This means that buyer will lose the option to cancel 
the sale and, therefore, may only claim compensation vis -à -vis the seller for the 
defects in the property where he fails to observe this requirement. Accordingly, 
16 Accord: Art. 205, Swiss Code of Obligations; Arts. 462, 465,466, BGB; Art. 1644, French Civil 
Code; Art. 2208, Argentine Civil Code. Considerable doubt seems to exist as to availability of this 
option of actions to the buyer under the South African law. See Morice, Sale in Roman -Dutch Law 
(1919) at pp. 145 -148; Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods in South Africa, op. cit. supra., note 39, part 1, 
chapter 1, at pp. 136 -137. 
" Iranian Civil Code, Article 43. 
18 Amos & Walton's "Introduction to French Law" (3rd. ed., edited by F. H. Lawson, A. E. Anton, 
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Article 429(2) states that the purchaser can only claim compensation where the 
defective goods sold have been changed.19 It is immaterial whether the changes in the 
goods are caused by the buyer's action or not. Similarly, the buyer may only seek 
compensation from the seller for the defects if the goods are destroyed when they are 
in his (i.e., the buyer's) possession; or if they are passed to a third party by him after 
the sale.2° Moreover, the buyer is not entitled to return the goods purchased to the 
seller by cancelling the sale with the latter if after the time of delivery another defect 
occurs in the goods." The new defect, however, will be no impediment to the buyer's 
right in cancelling of sale and returning the goods to the seller if it occurred during 
the time when the buyer has his special option, "or if it is resulted from the former 
defects which existed in the goods before the time of delivery.' 
The defect may exist in the thing sold or in its accessories, and where a number 
of things are sold, the defect may exist in one or more. Obviously, the buyer may 
invoke any of the remedies afforded by the law for a hidden defect where the thing 
sold can be divided into the principal thing and its accessories, and the defect appears 
in the principal. The question, however, arises as to whether these remedies are also 
available to him where the defect is in the accessory. According to Article 356 of the 
Code, the accessory is considered as part of the thing sold and, therefore, it becomes 
the property of the buyer upon the sale. On this basis, one may argue that the buyer 
may also avail himself of either of the remedies under Article 422, namely 
cancellation of the sale or reduction of the price, for an inherent defect in the 
accessory particularly if the defective accessory, impairs the utility of the principal.' 
and L. N. Brown, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) pp.187 -9. 
19 For example, the buyer cannot cancel the sale where the object of the sale is some leather, which 
has been used by him in making shoes. 
20 Iranian Civil Code, Art. 429(1). 
221 Ibid., Art. 429(3). 
22 Ibid. It is to be noted that Article 396 of the Iranian Civil Code provides several options which, 
dependant on the circumstances of each case, give to either the seller or the buyer a right to cancel a 
validly concluded transaction between themselves. 
23 Ibid., Art. 430. 
24 The Roman law granted no remedy to the buyer for a latent defect in an accessory unless the 
accessory was mentioned and sold separately. See Moyle, J.B., The Contract of Sale in Civil Law. 
with references to the laws of England, Scotland and France (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1892) at p. 
199. This rule has been followed by the South African law. See Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods In South 
Africa, op. cit. supra., note 39, part 1, chapter 1, at p. 139. 
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Nevertheless, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, it seems 
appropriate not to allow the buyer to resort to the remedy of cancellation of the sale 
when the defect in the accessory has no substantial affect on the utility of the 
principal specially, since the Code does not regard an accessory to be so important in 
the contract as its principal. As an example, Article 342 states that in a contract of 
sale the quantity, type and nature of the goods must be known to the parties 
concerned otherwise the sale would be void for there is strong possibility that one of 
the parties may sustain loss if the requirement of this article is not met, while under 
Article 356, the existence of the accessory may even be unknown to the parties at the 
time when they make a valid contract. 
The effect of cancellation of the transaction by the buyer is to restore the 
ownership of the goods to the seller. The buyer must return the goods to the seller 
after cancellation of the transaction before he can claim back the price from the latter. 
The Code does not clarify the consequences of the seller's refusal to accept the 
property redelivered to him by the buyer after cancellation of the transaction between 
the parties. Article 273 of the Code, which concerns performance of an obligation by 
a party states that: 
"If a party entitled to receive payment of a debt refuses such payment, the 
obligor can obtain discharge by making payment to a judge or his substitute in 
which case he will thereafter have no liability for any damage in respect of the 
object of the undertaking." 
By analogy to the provisions of this Article, it may be said that in the case of the 
seller's refusal to receive the goods which are returned to him by the buyer after 
cancellation of the sale, the latter must deliver the goods to a judge or his substitute if 
he wishes to claim back the purchase price from the seller. 
In contrast with both Roman and French law' concept of resolution or 
rescission of the contract, cancellation of the sale under Iranian law does not have 
25 See D., 21. 1.43. 8; 21. 1.21. 1; Moyle, J.B., The Contract of Sale in Civil Law: with references to 
the laws of England, Scotland and France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892) 204. 
26 See Morrow, "Warranty of Quality: a Comparative survey" (1940) 14 Tulane Law Review 529, 536; 
Colin A. et Capitant H., Cours élémentaire de droit civil fiançais II (7th éd. 1932) n° 580, p. 532. 
Like French law, Article 205 (1) of the Swiss Code of Obligations permits the buyer to sue the seller 
for rescission of the sale in the case of breach of the implied warranty against latent defects (the actio 
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retrospective effect on the parties concerned. This means that the buyer has no 
liability to return to the seller fruits or profits which he derived from the property 
after the sale and before its cancellation, as he is not entitled to sue the seller for the 
cost incurred by him in keeping the property or for the profit which the latter 
obtained from the price during this period of time. 
Article 427 of the Code spells out the methods upon which compensation for the 
defect in the goods sold is to be calculated in cases where the buyer chooses to 
receive compensation rather than to cancel the sale. According to this article: 
"The true price of the property sold, in undamaged state and its true price in 
damaged state will be determined by experts.27 
If the [true] price of the property in undamaged state be equal to the purchase 
price as fixed between the parties at the time of the sale, the difference between 
this price and the [true] price of the property in its damaged state will be the 
amount of the compensation. 
And if the [true] price of the property sold in undamaged state is less or greater 
than purchase price, the proportion which the [true] price of the property in the 
damaged state bears to its [true] price in undamaged state will be calculated, and 
the seller will retain that proportion of the sale price, and will return back the 
rest as the compensation to the buyer." 
Should the experts disagree, the average of the prices determined by them is 
considered as the authoritative price for the purpose calculating of the compensation 
for the defects in the property sold.28 
Article 435 of the Code requires the buyer to exercise the "option of defect "29 
immediately after discovery of the inherent defects.30 Nonetheless, the parties may 
modify this time limit by agreement.31 
redhibitoria) if he so wishes. According to Article 208(1) of this Code, the buyer, in the case of 
rescission must return the goods and the benefits therefrom to the seller in exchange for return of the 
purchase price. Following Articles 208(2) and 208(3) of the Code of Obligation, the seller has, 
further, an obligation to refund the buyer any interest accrued from the price together with the cost of 
legal action and all of related expenses. Similarly he is bound to compensate the latter for damages 
directly resulting to the him following the delivery of the defective goods (Art. 208(2) of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations). Finally, in the cases where the seller was negligent he must also reimburse the 
buyer for any indirect damage caused to him by the defective goods. There is, however, a 
presumption of negligence which can be overcome by opposing evidence from the seller (Art. 208(3) 
of the Swiss Code of Obligations). 
27 Special officers of the court who act as appraisers 
28 Iranian Civil Law, Art. 428. 
29 The buyer's option either to cancel the sale or to accept the goods and ask for compensation for the 
damage under the Iranian Civil Code is regarded as the "Option of defect ". 
30 It is to be noted, however, that, unlike the other systems, the Iranian Civil Code does not recognise 
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The aggrieved buyer who fails to observe the time limit is considered to have 
waived his option to cancel the deal or to receive compensation for the defects in the 
property sold, and he will no longer be able to sue the seller for the defects.32 
However, Article 435 of the Code's time limit does not bar the buyer from suing 
the seller for cancelling of the sale if it is later discovered that the latter wilfully 
deceived him through, for example, deceptive concealment of the defects in the 
property sold. Since Article 439 of the Code33 expressly states that the buyer in the 
case of fraud or trickery (tadlis) by the seller has a right to cancel the sale and recover 
the price paid to the latter.34 In addition, in such instances, the buyer may also sue the 
seller for any damages which he sustained as a result of the delivery of defective 
property by the latter.' 
Moreover, the time limit does not affect the buyer's right to seek recovery of the 
purchase price from the seller if he can show that because of the defects, the goods 
sold have in actual fact no proprietary worth and no price. For under Article 434 of 
the Code, in such Instances, the transaction between the parties is void ab initio and 
thereby the buyer may recover the purchase price together with all fruits or profits 
which the seller may have derived from the price.36 As an example, suppose the 
any specific period of prescription for an action for the redhibitory actions and the action quanti 
minors. That is the buyer may bring any of these actions against the seller whenever he discovers a 
latent defect in the subject matter of the sale. 
31 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 10. 
32 Similarly, under Arts. 201(2) and 201(3) of the Swiss Code of Obligation the buyer will loss his 
rights under the warranty where he fails to notify the seller of the hidden defects immediately after 
discovery. However, lack of notice or belated notice does not affect the seller's liability concerning 
the latent defects in the goods where he wilfully deceives the buyer (e.g., in the case of deceptive 
concealment of a defect). For similar provisions under the laws of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden see FR. Vinding Kruse, A Nordic Draft Code (Else Giersing translation 1963 
Copenhagen), Articles 918(1) & (2). 
33 Iranian Civil Code, Art. 439. 
34 For further discussion concerning the Option of Lesion see Katoozian, op. cit. supra note 2 at pp. 
35 -36, 182; Amin, S. H., Commercial Law of Iran, (Tehran 1364H/1986 AD) pp. 59 -60; S. H. 
Emami, Hoghooghé Madani "Civil Law ", (Tehran, 8th ed. 1368 H.Sh.; 1989), vol. 1, pp. 514 -516; 
N. Katoozian, Doreie Moghadamatiè Hoghoghè Madani "Introduction to the Civil Law ", (Tehran, 3rd 
ed. 1995) pp. 396 -409. 
35 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 331. 
See also Katoozian, op. cit. Supra note 2 § 134 p. 202. 
36 It is to be noted that under the Iranian system the purchase price may be money or, unlike the 
common law, any other property which is given by the buyer in consideration of the goods sold. See 
Katoozian, op. cit., supra, note 2, § 49, p. 84. Therefore, the question as to whether the transaction is a 
sale or a barter very much depends on the intention of the parties concerned. Where they exchange 
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buyer purchases a computer set on the basis of his previous inspection, but after its 
delivery he discovers that because of an accident before the sale the computer is 
broken down in a way that it had no proprietary worth at the time of the sale. In this 
case, the sale between the parties is void ab initio and the purchaser under Article 
265 of the Code has a right to recover from the seller the price and the fruits and the 
profits which the latter derived from the price. The buyer's right to recover the fruits 
and the profits which the seller has derived from the goods is based on the principle 
of unjust enrichment. Since, the property in the goods did not pass to the seller in the 
cases where the transaction is void and therefore, he has no right over the fruits or 
profits derived by him from the goods after the sale. If part of the goods sold is 
proved to be worthless, then the sale in respect of that part is void and the buyer 
under the "Option of Sales Unfulfilled in part" (khiare tbaoze safgheh) may keep the 
sound part of the goods and claim back the consideration for the defective part, or to 
cancel the sale altogether and to sue the seller for the whole consideration.37 In the 
latter case, the buyer may also recover any benefit which the seller has derived from 
the consideration concerning the defective part of the goods. He may, further, require 
the seller to pay compensation for the expenses, which he has incurred for keeping of 
this part of the goods. 
Similarly, if the buyer can show that although the goods were not worthless at 
the time of the sale, the defects in them caused them to lose all their value before 
being delivered to him, the transaction between the parties is regarded as cancelled 
automatically from the time of the loss of value in which case the buyer may claim 
back the purchase price under Article 387 of the Code.38 
Finally, as pointed out earlier, under Article 416 of the Code, the quality of the 
goods sold must be commensurate with the contractual price agreed between the 
parties concerned. Unlike Anglo -US law, this allows the buyer who has sustained 
gross loss in dealing with the seller to cancel the transaction with the latter (the 
two things with each other without defining which of them is price the transaction is barter which is 
the subject of general rules of contracts, but if they regard one of the things as the price of the other 
the specific regulations of a sale will apply to their transaction. 
3' Iranian Civil Code, Article 434. 
38 For the full provisions of this Article, see Appendix IV. 
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Option of Lesion), even if the property delivered does not suffer from a defect that 
impairs its intended utility. The buyer does not lose his right of cancellation of the 
sale under this Article by the seller's offer to refund him the difference in price, 
unless the buyer agrees to receive the difference in price.39 As to the defects in the 
property, this means that the buyer may cancel the sale even if, for one reason or the 
another, he has lost his right under the "Option of Defect" (aib) if he can show that 
the defects render the property sold unpriceworthy. 
The Code does not clarify whether, in the case of latent defects, the buyer can 
require the seller to repair the goods sold where they are repairable. However, as 
pointed out earlier, it could be argued that the seller has impliedly undertaken by the 
sale that the property sold would be free from any latent defects which might impair 
its utility. Under the Islamic general principle of ufu bu uqud (honour your 
contracts),40 the seller has an obligation to provide property in conformity with the 
terms of his agreement with the buyer. Where the seller in breach of this obligation 
delivers a defective article, the buyer, as his primary remedy, should be able to 
require him to have it repaired where it is reasonable to do so. Shikh Morteza Ansari 
as a prominent Islamic scholar supports this view. 41 In his book, which is the most 
authoritative legal treatise on Islamic commercial law, he favours specific 
performance as a primarily remedy for breach of a contract. According to him, the 
option to terminate the contract or apply for a damage on the ground of the breach of 
an obligation by the aggrieved party is available only if it is not practical to force his 
counterpart to comply with the terms of the contract. He bases his view on the notion 
of sanctity of contract in Islam as referred to in the First Verse of Fifth Chapter of 
Koran which addresses the believers and states: "ufu bu auqud" (keep faith with your 
contracts). Nevertheless, he argues that the creditor will lose his right to demand 
specific performance where such a demand is unreasonable in the sense that it inflicts 
39 Iranian Civil Code, Art. 421. 
For detail of the Option of loss, see S. H. Emami, Hoghooghé Madani "Civil Law ", (8th ed. 1368 
H.Sh.; 1989, Tehran), vol. 1, pp. 496 -500; see also, A. M. Helli, Sharaeol Islam (2nd ed. Edited by A 
M. Ali 1983 Beirut) vol. 2, p. 22. 
40 See the 1st Verse of the Fifth Chapter of the Koran (The Nourishment) which states: " a fu bil 
auqud" (keep faith with your contracts). 
41 See Ansari, M., Makasib, (Isfahan, 1305H/1887, edited by Mulla Hussein Khorasani) pp. 283ff. 
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against the party in breach a greater loss than the loss suffered by the creditor. To 
justify the argument he refers to the Islamic principle of la darar (no halm) and states 
that in such cases the principle of iza ta 'araza tasagata (any two contradictory 
pieces of evidence invalidate each other) would impede the creditor to apply for 
specific performance. 
For the same reason, the buyer may, as an alternative remedy, demand that the 
seller replace the defective article delivered with a sound one, where the subject 
matter of the sale is of a general nature as opposed to a sale of specified goods, since 
in the former case, the seller has an option to select an article from various units in 
conformity with the contractual terms. Accordingly, the law does not consider him to 
have performed the contract by appropriating a defective article to the sale. The 
Code, in fact, considers the seller has failed to perform his obligations undertaken 
under the contract where the article delivered is defective. And, therefore, the buyer 
may as his remedy demand him (i.e., the seller) to replace the defective article, under 
Article 279.42 On,the other hand, where the parties are agreed on a sale of specified 
goods, the seller performs the contract, though defectively, by delivering the said 
goods to the buyer, even though the latter may cancel the sale or receive 
compensation from the seller on the ground of latent defects in the goods. 
As mentioned earlier, the seller's liability as to the latent defects under Iranian 
law does not depend on whether or not he was ignorant of their existence at the time 
of the transaction, though he is in worse case if he knew of them and dishonestly 
withheld his knowledge from the buyer, for, then, in addition to his liability against 
the buyer under Article 422 of the Code, he is also liable under Article 331 to make 
good to the latter any loss which he may have sustained through making the contract 
even if this loss was not predictable to the parties at the time of the contract. 
Nonetheless, the seller's liability vis -à -vis the buyer, under Article 331, is delictual 
rather than contractual. That is, the seller will have to bear no responsibility 
whatsoever against the latter for possible injuries or damages caused to the buyer by 
the delivery of defective property where the latter has no evidence to prove the 
42 Iranian Civil Code, Article 279. 
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seller's negligence in dealing with him. This approach, however, suffers of various 
flaws. First, as pointed out earlier, the price in a contract is set on the understanding 
by the parties that the goods delivered are not defective. This means that the seller by 
entering into the contract impliedly undertakes to provide the buyer with a safe and 
sound article. Clearly, he is in breach of the contract where the article appears to be 
defective and, consequently, must under the principle of la darar (no harm) bear 
responsibility for all damages which the defects inflicted to the buyer.43 Further, it is 
both unjust and unreasonable to allow the seller who has received the price for sound 
goods to escape from liability where it transpires that they are defective and that the 
defects in them have caused damages to the buyer simply because the latter is unable 
to prove his fault in the deal In fact, the breach of the contract by the seller to provide 
safe and sound property to the buyer is in itself a fault committed by the former 
which allows the latter to sue him for damages caused by the defects on delictual 
ground.44 Equally, under the Islamic principle of Man lahol ghonm faalaihel ghorm 
(one who set to benefit from something must also bear all responsibility arising from 
it), the seller is the only person who benefits from selling the property, and, therefore, 
he should also bear all consequences of its defects if it is discovered to be defective at 
the time of delivery. 
Express warranty under the Iranian law 
Pre -contractual misrepresentations 
The Iranian Civil Code does not specifically deal with the issue of pre -contractual 
misrepresentation made by the seller concerning the quality of the goods sold. The 
dominant view seems to be that the seller has no liability with regard to pre- contract 
43 See Ansari, op. cit. supra., note 42, pp. 252 -53. See also Article 727 of the Iranian Civil Procedure 
Code which states that the aggrieved party may apply for compensation from his counterpart for loss 
resulting from non -performance or delay in performance of the contract by the latter. According to 
Article 728 of this Code the damages are to be assessed by the court and should include pecuniary 
loss as well as loss of profit which have directly resulted from the breach of the contract. 
44 See Iranian Civil Code Arts. 226 -30. See further Katoozian, supra., note 2, pp. 206 -6. 
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negotiations, in so far as they did not become part of the terms of the contract 
between the parties. Nevertheless, Article 439 of the Code states that the buyer in the 
case of fraud or trickery (tadlis) by the seller has the right to cancel the transaction 
with him. Under this Article, the seller is liable to the buyer if the latter can establish 
that specifications or /and descriptions of the goods in the former's pre-contractual 
statements misled him. This liability, however, is limited to the cases where the seller 
has actively deceived the buyer by misrepresenting the property before making the 
transaction with him. In other words, the seller would have no liability vis -à -vis the 
buyer in the cases of innocent misrepresentation, or where his misrepresentation did 
not actually mislead the latter in purchasing the property. 
A question, however, arises as whether or not the seller is liable for delivering 
goods which do not conform with specifications or /and descriptions contained in his 
advertisements or manuals which were unknown to the buyer at the time of the sale. 
In such instances, the buyer's ignorance of the existence of the misrepresentation 
concerning the quality of the goods before the sale would bar him from cancelling 
the transaction under the option of fraud or trickery (tadlis), since the 
misrepresentation did not cause the buyer to be misled as required by Article 439 of 
the Code. Moreover, the seller may argue that his misrepresentation does not 
constitute part of the transaction between the parties since it was not known to the 
buyer at the time of the transaction and, therefore, he should bear no liability for the 
damages caused to the latter by the misrepresentation. It seems, however, that these 
arguments are not tenable since, as Professor Katoozian points out, in every contract 
of sale the seller impliedly undertakes to provide the buyer with adequate 
information on the condition of the of the goods and precautions that must be taken 
concerning the use of the goods as he is bound to warn the latter about the possible 
dangers of the goods and the risk incidental to their use.45 In other words, the seller is 
in breach of the contract and thereupon liable against the buyer if it transpires that the 
descriptions or specifications given in his advertisements or manuals are incorrect 
even if the latter was ignorant of their existence at the time the sale. Moreover, the 
45 Katoozian, op. cit., supra., note 2 at p. 213. 
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seller is the only person who takes benefit of an advertisement or a manual by 
persuading the public to purchase their products and, therefore, he should under the 
maxim of man lahol ghonm fa alaihel ghorm accept its consequences where it turns 
out to be incorrect. Finally, as pointed out earlier, all the expenses sustained by the 
seller in respect of a pre -contractual advertisement are taken into account in setting 
the contract price with the buyer. Therefore, it is unjust under the general principle of 
la darar (no harm) to allow the seller to avoid his liability for the damages inflicted 
on the buyer by his misrepresentation as to quality of the goods in the advertisement 
on the ground that the latter did not know about it at the time of the deal. It is 
immaterial whether he was bona fide in dealing with the buyer in the sense that he 
was unaware that his representations about the goods were incorrect. This means that, 
unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, the seller should be held liable for the 
damages caused to the buyer by his pre- contract representations concerning the 
product's quality, even if he was innocent in making of the representations.46 
If this argument is correct, then the seller's liability as to the statements or 
representations made before the sale is contractual and, as such, it is, unlike non - 
Islamic systems, not subject to a limitation period under Iranian law.47 In other 
words, the seller is liable for breach of the contract if the goods delivered do not 
conform with his pre -contractual statements or representations as to the goods' 
quality. 
Contractual warranties relating to the quality of the goods 
46 For the same provisions see Article 1602 of the Luxembourg Civil Code under which the seller is 
contractually bound to explain to the purchaser clearly what his obligations will be under the contract 
of sale. An obscure or ambiguous agreement will be construed against the seller. Similarly, section 18 
of the Norwegian Purchase Act (Kjopsloven) (Act 27 of 13 May 1988, governing the sale of goods) 
states that the seller is liable against the buyer if he fails to deliver goods which correspond to the 
statements which he made in his publicity materials or elsewhere which can be assumed to have 
exerted an influence on the latter. 
47 It is to be noted that, in compliance with the Islamic principle under which a person should not be 
deprived of pursuing his right by passage of time, the law relating to the prescriptive period has been 
generally abolished by the Iranian law after the Islamic revolution in 1979. 
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Apart from the implied warranty outlined above, the parties may provide by the 
contract that the goods sold will have a specific character, in which case the seller is 
liable if the goods delivered do not correspond to the contractual provisions. Like 
Roman law, the Iranian Code extends this liability to cover not only expressly 
promissory words (promissa) made by the seller, but also his representations or even 
descriptions of the goods in the contract (dicta). It is not material whether these 
representations or descriptions are made before the sale or after it. In the latter case, 
the statements and the representations by the seller are considered as an amendment 
of the contract of sale if the buyer accepts it and, unlike English law, it need not be 
supported by a consideration on the part of the latter. 
Article 23548 of the Civil Code grants the buyer the right to terminate the 
transaction where the goods delivered do not conform with the seller's promissory 
words concerning their quality in the contract. Nonetheless, this article does not 
clarify whether and how the buyer's knowledge about the goods would affect the 
seller's liability concerning the express warranty made by his promissory words. 
Similarly, the article gives no answer to the question of whether the buyer's 
inspection of the goods before the transaction has any effect on the extent of the 
seller's liability in failing to fulfil his contractual promissory words with regard to 
the quality of the object of the sale. It may be argued, in the former case, that the 
buyer's knowledge would impede his right of cancellation of the sale under Article 
235 for non -conformity of the goods with the condition of description made by the 
seller, since the quality of the goods received by the buyer is in conformity with his 
expectation in the contract. In other words, he did not expect to receive the goods 
with a quality other than what he knew before the sale. The argument, however, does 
not seem to be tenable, since there are instances in which the buyer may, despite his 
previous knowledge of the goods' quality, expect the goods be in conformity with the 
contractual terms. This is the case, for example, where there is a long interval period 
between the time of acquiring knowledge by the buyer and the time of the sale, 
during which there is a strong possibility that the quality of the goods is substantially 
48 For the full provisions of Article 235 of the Iranian Code, see Appendix IV. 
304 
altered before being sold by the seller. Consequently, the former may reasonably 
expect that the goods delivered would be in accordance with the express warranty 
given by the seller in the contract. Moreover, this warranty is one of the main factors 
which would have a substantial effect on the parties' decision in setting the amount 
of the contractual price between themselves. In other words, part of the price is 
impliedly set as a consideration for the express warranty made by the seller in the 
contract of sale and therefore, it is unreasonable to allow him to escape from the 
liability for non -conformity of the goods with the express warranty by arguing that 
the buyer either knew the goods' non -conformity or he should have known it upon 
his inspection of the goods before the sale. Under this approach, it is the duty of the 
seller to ensure that the quality of the goods would be in accordance with the express 
warranty made by him before entering into the deal.' Of course, the seller may 
exclude his liability concerning non -conformity of the property with its description in 
the contract (dicta) by expressly providing that the description is made merely for the 
purpose of the buyer's information and it does not constitute an express warranty 
against him. In such instances, the buyer would have no remedy against the seller for 
the property's non -conformity which he knew or should have been known to him 
upon its testing before entering into the deal with the latter. These regulations, 
however, do not apply to the seller's promissory words concerning the product's 
quality (promisa), since it is absurd to allow the seller, on the one hand, to take 
benefit of his promissory words as to the quality of the product by increasing of the 
price in the transaction and, on the other hand, to exclude his liability for the breach 
of the express warranties made by these promissory words. 
It seems, however, that this approach has not been adopted by the Code, in so far 
as the express warranty is created by descriptions of the product in the sale. On this 
basis, Article 410 of the Code states: 
"A buyer who purchases an article by description only without having seen it', 
has the option of either cancelling the transaction or accepting the article as it is 
a9 Nevertheless, Article 232(1) of the Code relieves the seller from the liability arising from the 
condition of description as to the quality of the goods if the condition is proved to be impossible to 
fulfil. ' Italics added. 
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if upon inspection after the sale he discovers that the article does not possess the 
description which the seller made in the transaction. "S1 
According to the provisions of this Article, in other words, the buyer would lose his 
remedy of cancelling the sale for non -conformity of the goods with a description 
made by the seller in respect of their quality where he inspects them before entering 
into the deal with the latter. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether he will also lose his 
right to cancel the transaction where the seller gives him an opportunity to examine 
the goods but he fails to carry out the examination before their purchase. It might be 
argued that in the case of inspection, the buyer will directly acquire knowledge 
concerning the quality of goods at the time of inspection and, therefore, in his 
dealing with the seller, he does not rely on the information given by the latter through 
description of the goods in the contract. One might, further, argue that, in the case of 
un- exercised opportunity of inspection, the cause of damage sustained by the buyer 
for non -conformity of the goods with the contractual descriptions is his own failure 
to carry out an inspection of the goods and, therefore, he should have no recourse 
against the seller for the damage caused by his own failure. The argument of reliance, 
however, is hardly justifiable since there is no reason why the buyer, in dealing with 
the seller, cannot rely both on his own knowledge, which he acquires by examination 
of the goods, and on the information provided by the seller through descriptions of 
them in the contract. This policy allows the buyer to avail himself of the remedies 
afforded by the law for non -conformity of the product's quality with both the 
description made by the seller and/or the description which he directly acquired by 
inspecting the product before the sale. In other words, the inspection of the property 
by the buyer before the sale not only does not preclude him from cancelling the sale, 
if the property does not possess the quality represented by the seller's description in 
the sale, but also it enables him to sue the latter under Article 413 for non -conformity 
of the product's quality with the descriptions which he acquired by the inspection.' 
5' On the other hand, under Article 411 of the Civil Code, only the seller will have the right to cancel 
the sale if he has not seen the property sold whereas the buyer has seen it and it transpires that the 
property possesses qualities which are other than those described in the sale. 
5' Nonetheless, it could be argued that the sale between the parties is void under Article 342 where 
there is a conflict between these two sets of descriptions, since it is not clear what is the exact nature 
of the product which is to be delivered by the seller (moamelehe gharwy). See Katoozian, op. cit. 
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Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the buyer has already paid for the express 
warranty arising from the descriptions of the goods in the sale and there is no 
reasonable ground to prevent him from having a recourse against the seller for non- 
conformity of the goods with the warranty, even if he was not aware of the warranty 
prior to completing the sale, since, under the principle of man lahol ghonm faalihel 
ghonm (a person who stands to gain from something must also accept any 
responsibility arising from it), the seller, by being paid for the description, is to 
assume liability against the buyer if the goods do not possess the qualities 
represented by the description. 
The fact that the quality of the goods may be altered during the time between 
their inspection and the sale has been recognised by Article 413 of the Iranian Code, 
under which the buyer is entitled to cancel the bargain if he discovers that the 
property does not possess the qualities which it had at the time of the transaction and 
which became the basis of the bargain between the parties. Nonetheless, this article 
does not consider the situation where the buyer relies both on his previous inspection 
and on the information given by the seller through a description of the property in the 
sale. Similarly, the article does not clarify the buyer's legal position as to the quality 
of the property purchased if in the latter case there is a conflict between the 
descriptions of the property which he discovered by his previous inspection and those 
which were provided by the seller in the contract. It appears that in such 
circumstances the property delivered should conform both with the descriptions 
which where discovered by the buyer's previous inspection and became part of the 
basis of the sale and with the descriptions made by the seller where there are no 
conflict between these two group of descriptions, otherwise the former descriptions 
should be considered to have been altered or modified by the descriptions which the 
seller latter provided in the contract. 
According to Article 412 of the Code, in the instances where the buyer has 
inspected only a portion of the goods, while purchasing the rest from description or 
by way of samples, he shall have the option either to reject all the goods or accept 
note 2 § 55 p. 89. For the full provisions of According to Article 342 of the Iranian Code, see 
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them all if he later discovers that the remaining portion of the goods is not in 
conformity with the contractual description or sample. In other words, in such 
instances, the buyer cannot discriminate between the different portions of the goods 
by keeping the portion which was inspected by him before the sale, while rejecting 
the other portion which is not in accordance with the description or sample provided 
by the seller. For under Article 441, the buyer may avail himself of this remedy (i.e., 
khiare tabaoze safgheh) only if the transaction, in respect of a part of the goods sold 
is void for any reason,'3 whereas the transaction, in the aforegoing case, is valid but 
the buyer has a recourse against the seller for non -conformity of a portion of the 
goods with the description. 
Nonetheless, this rule applies only to the cases where the description of the 
article sold is a collateral part of the transaction between the parties, otherwise the 
transaction between the parties is void ab initio, under Article 353 of the Code, if the 
description was essential for the parties concerned in making the transaction and the 
article does not conform with the description. This is because, in the latter case, the 
parties intended to sell something different from the thing which was actually 
delivered to the purchaser, therefore, the transaction under the Islamic principle of 
ma ghasad lam yagha va ma vaghaa lam yaghsed (what was intended did not happen 
and what happened was not intended) is void. In such cases, if only part of the chattel 
sold is not in accordance with the contractual description, then the transaction only 
with regard to that part is void and the buyer under the "Option of Sales Unfulfilled 
in part" (tabaoze safgheh) is entitled either to retain the other part of the chattel 
which conforms with the description, whilst returning the consideration of that part 
in respect of which the transaction is void, or to cancel the remainder of the deal.'` 
It must, however, be remembered that the aforegoing provisions do not cover a 
contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by description. Unlike the sale 
of a specific thing, in such instances the buyer's remedy for non -conformity of the 
product delivered by the seller is not to cancel the sale but to sue the latter for 
Appendix IV. 
53 For the detail of this option of the buyer (i.e., Khiare tabaoze safgheh) see Katoozian, op. cit., 
supra., note 7, p.436 -446. 
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replacement of the product with another product which complies with the contractual 
description." Since, as mentioned earlier, the effect of cancelling the sale by the buyer 
is to reverse the title which has passed to him by the sale to the seller, whereas in such 
instances the buyer acquires no title by the contract of sale in order to reverse it to the 
latter. In other words, the seller in a sale of merchandise of a general description is 
not regarded to have performed his contract with the buyer by delivering goods 
which do not conform with the express warranty created by his descriptions in the 
contract. Therefore, the buyer may, in such instances, demand the seller replace the 
goods or to repair them so as to make them in conformity with the express warranty 
provided in the sale. 
In the case of the seller's refusal to replace or to repair the non -conforming 
goods, the buyer may ask the court to compel him to do so. Of course, if, despite the 
court's order, the seller resists performing his obligation by replacing or repairing the 
non -conforming goods, the buyer may cancel the sale and demand compensation for 
the loss caused by the seller's breach. 
The seller's liability against a sub -purchaser concerning the quality of the goods 
Like English law, the Iranian system does not recognise the French legal theory that 
following resale of the goods by the buyer, all the rights which were conferred upon 
him by the original sale will be transmitted automatically to the sub -buyer. Under 
Article 231 of the Iranian Code, an undertaking or a transaction is "only binding on 
the two parties concerned except in the cases coming under Article 196." Article 196 
states: 
"Unless otherwise stated in a contract or unless subsequent evidence to the 
contrary is established a person who enters into the contract is deemed to be 
acting for himself, nevertheless, he may agree to undertake an obligation in the 
contract for the benefit of a third party." 
Sa Iranian Civil Code, Article 353. 
55 Iranian Civil Code, Article 414. 
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According to the provisions of the foregoing articles, unless otherwise expressly 
undertaken by the seller, the original sale between him and the buyer confers no right 
to the sub -buyer as against the seller for breach of a warranty. Similarly, resale of the 
defective goods by the buyer to the sub -buyer creates no obligation whatsoever, 
against the original seller for the defects. In other words, `lack of privity' of contract 
between the seller and the sub -buyer, under Iranian law, prevents the latter from 
bringing a suit against the seller for the product's inherent defects or /and for its non- 
conformity with the descriptions provided by the former in the original sale.56 
The argument of "lack of privity" should not, however, deprive the sub -buyer 
from recovering compensation from the seller for breach of a warranty concerning 
the quality of the product in the original sale particularly in the case of implied 
warranty against inherent defect and where the express warranty arises from an 
advertisement made by the seller or a brochure provided by him to the buyer, since 
the main purpose of the seller in providing the warranty in such cases is to increase 
the sale of his product to the public of which the sub -buyer is a member. It may be 
said that the seller's warranty as to the quality of the product in these cases is in fact 
an offer to the public which binds him against anybody who purchases the product, 
irrespective of whether the latter purchases the product directly from him (i.e. the 
seller) or from an intermediary (i.e. the original buyer). Therefore, the allegation that 
no privity exists between the seller and the sub -buyer is incorrect, even though the 
former did not directly sell the goods to the sub -buyer. Moreover, in such instances, 
the seller is a man who, in the final analysis, will gain most from the warranties 
concerning the quality of product through which the public including the sub -buyer 
as one of its member is induced, at least partly, to purchase more of the seller's 
product. Consequently, under the general principle of man lahol ghonm fa alaihel 
ghorm, the law should hold him responsible against the latter where the product is 
not in accordance with the warranty. Moreover, allowing a sub -buyer to sue directly 
the original seller for breach of a warranty not only would save the parties both time 
and expense but also it would diminish the amount of litigation in the courts. 
56 Nonetheless, the sub -buyer may recover from the seller in tort, if the latter's fault can be 
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It seems, however, that there is no legal ground for the application of this 
approach to express warranties other than those mentioned above, namely the 
warranties arising from the seller's statements, which are not directly addressed to 
the public. This means that a sub -buyer cannot sue the original seller for a breach of 
an express warranty arising from a statement not directly addressed to the public. 
Nonetheless, under Article 196 of the Iranian Code, the parties to a contract may 
agree on an extension of the seller's liability concerning the breach of an express 
warranty against a sub -buyer who would subsequently purchase the goods from the 
buyer. 
Exclusion of the seller's responsibility concerning the quality of the goods 
Article 448 of the Iranian Code allows the seller to contract out of his obligation 
concerning the quality of the goods sold.' This means that he will have no liability to 
the buyer for an inherent defect or for non -conformity of the merchandise with its 
contractual descriptions where he sells it `as it stands' or `with all faults'. 
Nonetheless, a mere inspection of the goods, even by an expert before the sale does 
not relieve the seller from his liability against the latter for a latent defect if the defect 
is not actually discovered by the inspection or if the defect in the goods occurs during 
established. 
57 Iranian Civil Code, Art. 448. It is to be noted that the Iranian Civil Code provides several Options 
which, depending on the circumstances of each case, give rise to the right to either of the aggrieved 
parties to cancel his violable contract with the other. This Options have been enumerated by Article 
396 as follows: 
" 1. The Option of Meeting -place. 
2. The Option of animals. 
3. The Option of Conditions. 
4. The Option of Delayed payment of the price. 
5. The Option of Inspection and Incorrect Description. 
6. The Option of Lesion. 
7. The Option of defect. 
8. The Option of Fraud (trickery). 
9. The Option of Sales Unfulfilled in part. 
10. The Option of Unfulfilled conditions." 
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the time after the sale and before their delivery or /and for their non -conformity with 
the descriptions provided by the parties in the sale. 
The main difference between English and US law, on the one hand, and Iranian 
law, on the other hand, is that, under the former systems, an offer granted to the 
buyer to examine the goods will exclude the seller's liability concerning defects 
which should have been reasonably discovered by such an examination even if the 
buyer has failed to examine the goods, whereas, under Iranian law, such an 
examination has no effect whatsoever on the seller's liability if it did not lead the 
buyer to actually discover the defects, even if they were evident at the time of 
examination but the buyer did not realise the fact58 
It is unclear whether the seller's liability as to an inherent defect could be 
excluded by a non -warranty clause in the contract where he knows the existence of 
the defect and deliberately remains silent about it. It might be argued that the seller 
by stipulating not to warrant against a latent defect in the property, implicitly warns 
the buyer that there might be a defect in the goods sold and, therefore, he must take 
the risk if the goods turn out to be defective. This argument is consistent with the 
language of the Article 448, which generally states that the parties may agree to 
waive any of the Options available to either of them in the contract of sale. The 
argument, however, is inconsistent with both the general principle of `la darar' 
which prohibits a person from any activity which may inflict losses to others and the 
principle of ̀ good faith' which is implied in every contract of sale and whereupon the 
seller is bound not to conceal a material defect which is known to him at the time of 
the sale. Accordingly, the seller should not be allowed to relieve himself from the 
liability for a defect in the goods where he knows of the defect and instead of 
declaring it, stipulates that he does not warrant against it. This view is also consistent 
with the Islamic principle of man lahol ghonm fa alihel ghorm, since the seller is the 
person who gains from concealing of the defect which is known to him at the time of 
the sale and, therefore, the law should impose responsibility on him by invalidating 
his non -warranty clauses provided in the contract of sale. 
58 See Iranian Civil Code, Article 424. 
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The same view should apply in the cases where the seller knows at the time of 
the sale that the goods sold do not correspond with the descriptions provided in the 
contract of sale, and yet stipulates to avoid his liability concerning non -conformity of 
the goods with those descriptions. For it is unjust to allow the seller to benefit from 
his false descriptions of the goods provided in the contract and at the same time to 
escape from the consequences of the false descriptions by a contractual clause. 
It must, however, be noted that in the sale of goods of a general nature (i.e. when 
they can be specified from numerous units), the buyer has no Option of Inspection to 
be excluded by non -warranty clause by the seller.59 Therefore, a clause by the seller 
disclaiming his liability in delivering goods in conformity with the descriptions in the 
contract of sale is void. Nonetheless, the question may arise as to whether or not such 
a non -warranty clause will also avoid the whole sale between the parties concerned 
under Article 233(2).6° The answer to the question seems to be affirmative since, 
under the Islamic principle of iza ta' araza tasagata, the conflict between the seller's 
obligation to deliver goods in conformity with the description in the contract and his 
non -warranty clauses disclaiming this obligation invalidates both of these clauses. 
This means that the vendor sells goods of a general nature to the purchaser without 
agreeing on their descriptions with the latter, in which case the transaction between 
the parties would be null and void, under Article 351,61 and the buyer can recover the 
price and any fruit or benefit which the seller has derived from the price.' 
For the same reason, in a sale by sample the seller's stipulation disclaiming his 
liability for non -conformity of the goods with the sample will nullify the transaction 
s9 Iranian Civil Code, Article 414. 
60 For the full text of Article 233 of the Iranian Code, see Appendix IV. 
61 For the full provisions of this article, see Appendix IV. 
62 Unlike the cases where one of the parties cancels the transaction which is effective from the time of 
the cancellation, voidness of the transaction has retrospective effect on the parties concerned. 
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between the parties, in which case the buyer must return the goods to the seller and 
demand him to return the purchase price. 
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Chapter 5 
The seller's liability as to quality of the goods under the UN 
Convention for International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
Under the CISG, the seller's obligation, concerning the quality of the goods sold is 
dealt with in Articles 35 and 36 
Paragraph (1) of Article 35 requires the seller to deliver goods, which conform to 
the contract (conformity principle), and paragraph (2) of this Article sets conformity 
criteria. This paragraph states: 
"The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner 
required by the contract." 
The phrase "required by the contract ", which is repeatedly used in this Article, 
the seller's obligation as to the quality of the goods referred to in this 
provision, in contrast with the Anglo -US systems, is not imposed by the law. Rather 
like the civilian tradition, it arises from the parties' consensual agreement. Therefore, 
it could be said that, except in the case of sale for a particular purpose where the 
buyer's reliance on the seller's skill or judgement is crucial in holding the seller is 
liable for failing to deliver goods which are fit for that purpose, the buyer's reliance, 
unlike the Anglo -US systems, is not material in determining the extent of the seller's 
liability as to the quality of the goods delivered. In other words, the existence of a 
contractual term under the CISG does not depend on whether or not it was relied on 
by the buyer. It seems, therefore, the seller may not escape from liability for failing 
to deliver goods in conformity with the statement as to the quality simply by arguing 
that the statement was not relied on by the buyer, or that it was merely a reflection of 
his opinion about the goods, and, accordingly, did not constitute a warranty of quality 
as against the buyer. Nevertheless, the possibility that a court may consider the issue 
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of the existence of contractual terms as a subject matter of validity to be governed by 
its domestic law threatens to undermine uniformity in the application of the CISG. 
In accordance with Article 35(1) of the CISG, the seller's failure to deliver 
goods in conformity with the contractual specifications as to quality, quantity and 
description is in breach of the contract, entitles the buyer to resort to the remedies 
provided by the CISG. In 1993, for example, the arbitral tribunal found the French 
seller to be in breach of the contract with the Syrian buyer since some of the goods 
delivered did not conform to the specifications provided in the contract and ordered 
reimbursement of the buyer for the sums paid for these goods. Referring to Article 
1153 -1 of the French Civil Code, the tribunal also awarded the buyer interest, even 
though it was found that Article 84 of the CISG was somewhat ambiguous as to 
whether interest was payable if it had not been requested by the buyer.' Nonetheless, 
the buyer may avail himself of the provisions of Article 35(1) only if he examines the 
goods and gives notice to the seller specifying the nature of lack of conformity within 
a reasonable time, after delivery. Accordingly, in one case, the German court applying 
the CISG, dismissed the plaintiff's claim for damages for non -conformity of the 
goods against the defendant seller. The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to give 
notice to the defendant specifying the lack of conformity within a reasonable time 
under Article 39(1) of CISG even though he had examined the goods pursuant 
Article 38 and detected the lack of conformity in due time, since the notice was given 
only three months after delivery of the goods.' 
The drafters of the CISG, nevertheless, failed to state whether the seller is liable 
for non -conformity of the goods with his statements concerning their quality made 
after making the contract with the buyer. Under English law, such a statement after 
the contract does not bind him against the buyer because of a lack of consideration on 
the part of the latter, whereas, under the American UCC, the time of the statement, 
with regard to the quality of the goods is, immaterial.' The Iranian Civil Code does 
See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /8 (21 December 1995) Case 
103, at p. 3; Journal de Droit International, 1993, 1041. 
See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /12 (26 May 1997) Case 167, 
P. 5. 
3 See pp. 232 -234, ante. 
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not contain any express provision in this regard, but since the parties are allowed to 
amend their contract, even if there is no consideration on the part of either of the 
parties for the amendment of the contract, the seller's statements with regard to the 
quality of the goods made after the contract, may render him liable if they are found 
inconsistent with the statements. Under Scots law, the seller's statement, concerning 
the quality of the goods sold, does not affect his liability under the contract if the 
statement is made after the conclusion of the contract. However, such a statement 
may constitute a unilateral promise by the seller which binds him as against the 
buyer4. Accordingly, the question of whether the buyer can sue the seller for failing 
to deliver goods in conformity with the statements made by the latter after the 
conclusion of the contract is, unfortunately, left to be resolved by reference to the 
domestic laws of the forum where the case is to be heard. One may, however, argue 
that the price set in the contract is based on the understanding that the quality of the 
goods would conform to any statement made by the seller, regardless of the time 
when such a statement is made. If this view is correct, then any statement by the 
seller after the contract concerning the quality of the goods is contractually binding 
and the buyer may, without offering any consideration for such an statement, sue him 
for breach of Article 35 if he fails to deliver goods in conformity with the statement. 
There is a major difference between the provisions of the CISG and those of its 
predecessor ULIS. Article 33(1) of ULIS stated that the seller would not have 
fulfilled his duty to deliver if the goods handed over failed to conform with the 
requirements of the contract, whilst, under the CISG, the delivery is considered to 
have taken place by handing over of the goods which meet general description of the 
goods,' even though they are not in conformity with the contract with respect of 
quantity or quality.' In other words, unlike ULIS, the CISG distinguishes between the 
This view has been taken from academic discussion with Professor Forti during my LLM course as 
well as with Professor Gretton George L. as my ex -Ph.D. supervisor and therefore, I am grateful to 
both of them in this respect. 
' See, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods, prepared 
by the United Nations Secretariat in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International 
Sales of Goods (Vienna, 10 March - 11 April 1980), Official Records, New York, 1981, 14 -66, I, 32.) 
6 But, the fact that seller is regarded having fulfilled the duty of delivery under the CISG does not 
affect the buyer's remedies for their non -conformities. 
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case of non -performance, where the seller fails to hand over the goods to the buyer, 
and that of defective performance, where he delivers goods which do not conform 
with the contractual requirements. The distinction is important since, in the latter 
case, the buyer is required to examine the goods' and duly notify the seller of the 
assumed lack of conformity in them, otherwise he will lose the right to recourse to 
the remedies provided under the CISG against the seller for breach of the contract in 
failing to deliver the goods in conformity with the contractual requirements.' This 
was the case, for example, where the German buyer of fresh cucumbers appealed 
against the decision of the court of first instance which rejected his application for a 
reduction of the price for non -conformity with contract specifications and ordered 
him to pay to the Turkish seller the balance of the price due under the contract. In 
this case, the German appellate court found that CISG was applicable as part of the 
German law agreed between the parties and upheld the judgement of the court of first 
instance on the ground that the buyer lost the right to rely on non -conformity of 
goods and reduce the price proportionally for failing to give notice of non -conformity 
in due time; instead he gave notice of the defect only when the goods arrived in 
Germany, i.e., seven days after he had opportunity to examine the goods at the place 
of delivery in Turkey. In another case, the defendant, a German buyer of textiles, 
alleged reduction of the sale price on the basis of lack of conformity in the goods 
delivered. The appellate court, applying the CISG rejected his allegation on the 
ground of his failure to raise the issue of lack of conformity within a reasonable time. 
The court found that the buyer could have discovered easily the non -conformities in 
the goods and raised the objection within a few days after delivery and held that the 
notice of defects given only after two months after deliver was not considered within 
reasonable time within the context of Article 39 of CISG.10 
An important consequence of the introduction of the innovative unifying notion 
of defective performance into the CISG is to avoid the troublesome distinctions both 
See CISG, Article 36. 
8 See CISG, Article 39. 
9 See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 1994), Case 48 at 
pp. 3 -4. 
10 See, United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /6 (10 April 1995), Case 81 at 
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between conditions and warranties under the English law," and between the delivery 
of goods of different kinds (aliud pro alio) and defects or lack of qualities. 
The provisions of Article 35 furthermore treat both express and implied terms of 
the contract in the same unified manner. That is, any deviation, however trivial, from 
contractual terms concerning the quality of the goods delivered is taken as defective 
performance'', which entitles the buyer to resort to the remedies provided by the 
CISG under Articles 46 to 52. Thus, unlike some domestic systems as well as 
ULIS,13 in the absence of an agreement to the contrary by the parties concerned, the 
principle of de minimis does not apply to a contract which is subject matter of the 
CISG,14 unless an established trade usage so provides.15 But the remedies available to 
the buyer under the CISG may, depending on whether or not non -conformity 
constitutes a fundamental breach, differ from one case to other.16 
Unfortunately, the drafters of the CISG failed to provide for similar provisions 
as those of the Iranian law tradition requiring the seller to deliver goods, which are 
priceworthy and free from latent defects." This means that, like Anglo -US law, the 
seller, under the CISG, will have no liability as against the buyer, in so far as the 
goods delivered are in conformity with the contract specifications and suitable for 
the purposes for which they are acquired by the buyer, even though they suffer from 
latent defects which were known to the seller but he refused to reveal them to the 
buyer at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, in accordance with Article 35 of the CISG 
the seller is liable for any non -conformity of the goods with the contractual 
specifications or any defect which renders the goods unsuitable for the purpose for 
which they are purchased by the buyer even though, like Anglo -US law as well as the 
P. 3. 
" See pp. 22 -24, ante. 
12 See CISG, Article 45. 
13 Concerning the applicability of the principle of de minimis non curate lex (the law does not pay any 
attention to trifles) under the English law See, Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., Part 1, Ch. 
1, note 73, p. 106. 
14 In this respect, the Vienna Conference rejected an Australian proposal to the effect that minor 
differences in quantity or quality of the goods should be should be regarded as immaterial. 
15 For detailed discussion on the role of a trade usage under the CISG, see Amy H. Kastely, "Trade 
Usages in International Sales of Goods: An Analysis of the 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions" (1984) 
24:3 Virginia Journal of International Law 619. 
16 See pp. 162 -179, ante. 
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civilian tradition, the seller was unaware of the non -conformity or defect in the goods 
at the time of the sale, unless such a lack of conformity or defect was known to the 
buyer or, unlike the Iranian system, he could not have been unaware of it when the 
parties entered into the contract. 
The question, however, arises in the cases where the lack of conformity in the 
goods is known to both the seller and the buyer, or they could not have been unaware 
of it when they enter into the contract with each other, since, in such instances, on the 
one hand, the CISG, under Article 35(3), excludes the seller's liability as to the non- 
conformity of the goods sold, while, on the other hand, under Article 40, it states that 
the seller will be liable even if the buyer fails to give notice to the seller specifying 
the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time as required by Articles 
38 and 39. It seems that the seller is to be excluded from any liability in such 
instances where he reveals the lack of conformity to the buyer at the time of the 
contract, unless the contract clearly states that the parties did not intend to exclude 
the seller's liability by revealing non -conformities to the buyer, since the seller by 
specifying lack of conformity to the buyer passes the risk of non -conformity to the 
him. Similarly, the seller should also be exempted from being liable for non - 
conformities of the goods with contractual specifications where the defects are 
actually known to the buyer at the time of the sale, even though his knowledge has 
not been acquired through disclosing of non -conformities by the seller, unless there is 
clear evidence to lead the buyer to believe that the lack of conformities would be 
cured by the seller before delivery of the goods to the buyer. Where, however, the 
buyer could have discovered the non -conformities of the goods but because of his 
own negligence he failed to do so, it seems unreasonable to discharge the seller from 
liability as against the buyer if he knew of the non -conformities at the time of the 
contract but did not reveal them to the buyer. For as the German appellate court in 
one case pointed out: "even a very negligent buyer deserves more protection than the 
fraudulent seller. "18 In this case, the defendant sold a used car to the plaintiff, both 
" See pp. 281 -285, ante. 
18 United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /12 (26 May 1997), Case 168 pp. 
5 -6. 
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parties being car dealers. The documents relating to the car showed that it was first 
licensed in 1992 and the mileage on the odometer was low. The parties provided for 
the exclusion of any warranty. The plaintiff later sold the car to a sub -buyer, who, as 
a matter of fact, detected that the car was first licensed in 1990 and that the actual 
mileage on the odometer was much higher. The plaintiff brought an action against 
the defendant to recovering the damages which the former had to pay to the sub - 
buyer for non -conformity of the goods with the contract specifications. Pursuant to 
Articles 35(1), 45 and 74 of the CISG, the court held in favour of the plaintiff 
Referring to the general principles embodied in Articles 4019 and 7(1) of CISG, the 
appellate court held that, although the plaintiff could have discovered the car's lack 
of conformity with the contract, the defendant could not avail himself of Article 
35(3)20 of CISG for, the defendant knew the actual age of the car and accordingly 
acted fraudulently. Similarly, where an Italian plaintiff sold and delivered wine 
which contained %9 water to the German defendant who refused payment on the 
basis of unmerchantability of the wine, the court, following Article 40 of the CISG, 
found that the plaintiff could not have been unaware of the non -conformity and held 
that the defendant had not lost his right to rely the non -conformity of the wine, even 
though the defendant did not comply with Articles 35, 38 and 39 of CISG to examine 
the wine for water after delivery and to give notice of the defect to the plaintiff within 
a reasonable time thereafter." 
Unlike Anglo -US law, Article 40 of the CISG following the civilian tradition 
states that the seller who knew, or could not have been unaware, of the lack of 
conformity in the goods, but failed to disclose it to the buyer cannot invoke the 
provisions of Articles 38 and 39 concerning the buyer's duty to examine the goods 
and give notice to the seller specifying within a reasonable time the nature of the lack 
of conformity." In other words, like French law, non -disclosure of the defects in the 
goods by the seller rightfully entitles the buyer to avail himself of the remedies 
19 For the full provisions of Article 40 of CISG, see Appendix V. 
2° For the full provisions of Article 35 (3) of CISG, see Appendix V. 
21 See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /12 (26 May 1997), Case 170 
p.7; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift- Rechtsprechungreport (NJW -RR) 1996, 564. 
22 J.D. Feltham, The United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods ", 
321 
provided under the CISG, even if the buyer has failed to give notice of defect 
specifying the nature of the defect within a reasonable time, as required by Articles 
38 and 39 of CISG. For example, in a series of contracts for the sale of goods on 
F.O.B. terms, the buyer disputed, both prior to shipment and upon arrival, the 
conformity of goods with certain contractual specifications. To make the goods more 
saleable, the buyer treated the goods and sold them at a loss. The seller asked for full 
payment of the price, and the buyer, in a counterclaim, applied for compensation for 
direct losses, financial costs, lost profits and interest. The arbitral tribunal of 
International Court of Arbitration, applying the CISG, found that the buyer had 
complied with the requirements of Articles 38(1) and 39(1) of CISG in examining of 
the goods and notifying the seller in a reasonable time. Referring to Article 40 of the 
CISG the tribunal held that the seller would not be entitled to invoke the buyer's 
non -compliance with Articles 38 and 39 of CISG to discharge his liability for 
delivering non -conforming goods since the seller knew, or could not have been 
unaware, of the non -conformity of the goods with contract specifications at the time 
of the contract.'3 
Paragraph (2) of Article 35 of the CISG sets out a series of objective standards 
which, in the event of the parties' failure to provide express or implied provisions 
concerning quality of the goods, will determine whether and to what extent the seller 
has complied with his obligation in delivering of goods in conformity with the 
contractual requirements. In other words, the standards set out in this paragraph have 
a supplementary role and they are applicable only if the parties do not expressly fix 
the quality and description required by the contract,'4 since, only in such instances, it 
becomes necessary to interpret the contract to find out the exact definition of the 
seller's obligations with respect of the quality of the goods through the standards 
mentioned above. To achieve this goal, the CISG, following common law systems, 
has given the purpose for which the goods are acquired by the buyer an overriding 
(1981) Journal of Business Law 346, at p. 354. 
23 See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 1994) Case 45, p. 
2; Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, vol. XV (1990), p. 70. 
24 See Bianca, Conformity of the goods and third party claims, in Bianca -Bonell, Commentary on the 
International Sales Law, (1987) p. 272. 
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significance. Where, for example, a car is sold, the seller's obligation concerning its 
quality may dependent on whether it is to be used as a road vehicle, as scrap metal or 
for exhibition in an art museum, be differed. 
Fitness of goods for ordinary purposes 
According to Article 35(2)(a) of the CISG, in the absence of an agreement by the 
parties on certain specific qualities, the goods delivered by the seller must primarily 
be fit for the purpose for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be 
used. Accordingly, the Italian manufacturer of tile was held to have breached the 
contract with the German company under CISG, since the goods delivered were not 
fit for the purpose for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be 
used.- 5 
In order for the goods to be fit for ordinary use, they must possess the normal 
qualities: i.e., the characteristic normally required from goods as described by the 
contract, and they are to be free from defects normally not expected in such goods.26 
The goods are considered to be unfit for their normal use if they lack proper 
characteristics, or defects impede their material use, or yield abnormally deficient 
results, or take unusual costs. The goods also are unfit for ordinary use if the lack of 
proper characteristics or the defects, though not affecting the material use of the 
goods, lesson conspicuously their value affecting their trade use. For example, where 
the plaintiff, an Italian tie manufacturer demanded payment of the balance due under 
a contract from the defendant, a German company, the German court, applying the 
CISG, found that the plaintiff failed to deliver goods fit for the purpose for which 
goods of the same description would ordinarily be used and, as a consequence, held 
that the defendant was entitled to declare the contract partially avoided and to reduce 
25 See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /3 (24 May 1994) Case 50, p. 
4; Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 1992, 651. 
26 As an example, see United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /12 (26 May 
1997), Case 170 p.7, the fact of which stated in note 17 above; Neue Juristische Wochenschrift - 
Rechtsprechungreport (NJW -RR) 1996, 564. 
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the price.27 On the other hand, in another case, a Swiss company sold New Zealand 
Mussels to a German buyer who refused to pay because the mussels had been found 
by the Federal Health Office to be generally not safe because they contained a 
cadmium concentration in excess of the statutory limit of 0,5 mg/kg. The German 
court of appeal held that the supply of mussels with higher cadmium composition did 
not constitute lack of conformity of the mussels with the contract specifications 
under Article 35(2) of the CISG, since the mussels were still fit for eating.28 
In the case of sale of multi -purpose goods, however, the CISG does not state 
whether the seller have complied with the provisions of Article 35(2)(a) if they are fit 
only for some of the purposes within the range of their ordinary purposes. It seems 
that, in such instances, the seller should be held liable if the goods are not fit for any 
purpose within the range of ordinary purposes, unless use of the goods for such a 
purpose has been excluded by contract. 
Furthermore, the CISG contains no provision to specify whether the place of 
business of the seller or of the buyer is to be taken as the standard for ascertaining the 
fitness of the goods for their ordinary uses. This question has already caused a 
dispute among the legal authors. Professor Schlechtriem states that "ordinary use" 
should be defined: 
"by the standard of the country or region in which the buyer intends to use the 
goods. In Europe, gasoline for the operation of cars is still understood as leaded 
gasoline, whereas the expectation of an American buyer who stocks up on gas 
on the Rotterdam spot market might be directed toward unleaded gasoline. "29 
This view is not shared with other prominent writers, such as Professor Bianca who 
maintains that:3o 
"The fitness for ordinary use must be ascertained according to the standard of 
27 See United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACS /3 (24 May 1994) Case 50, pp. 
4 -5; Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) (1992) 62; Diritto del commercio internationale 
(July- September 1993) p. 651. 
28 See United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACS /6 (10 April 1995) Case 84, pp. 
4 -5; Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) (1994), 593. 
29 Schlechtriem "The Seller's Obligations Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods ", in Galston N.M. - Smith. (Eds.), International Sales, (1984, New York) 
Chapter 6, p. 21. 
30 See Bianca, Conformity of the goods and third party claims, in Bianca - Bonell, Commentary on the 
International Sales Law, (1987) p. 274. 
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the seller's place of business. "31 
He goes on to argue that the seller is not supposed to know about specific 
requirements or limitations in force in other countries unless that may reasonably be 
expected from him according to the circumstances.' In other words, he agrees that 
the standard for the definition of the fitness of the goods for ordinary use must be the 
place where they are to be sent or used if the seller knew, or he should reasonably 
know, the said standard at the time of the contract. It seems, however, that this 
approach should also apply even if there is no evidence to show that the seller was 
aware of the aforegoing standard. The seller should not be discharged from the 
liability under Article 35(a) for failing to deliver goods which are fit for their 
ordinary use at the place where they are to be sent or used simply because he did not 
know the standard of fitness for ordinary use at that place. In fact, it is part of the 
seller's duty under the contract to discover the said standard if he is to deliver goods 
in conformity with the contractual requirement. Such a duty could be deduced by 
analogy to Article 42(1), under which the seller is required to deliver goods which 
are free from any right or claim of a third party based on industrial property or other 
intellectual property under the law of the State where the goods will be resold or 
otherwise used (if it was contemplated in the contract that the goods would be resold 
or otherwise used in that State) or under the law of the State where the buyer has his 
place of business. This duty, like any other seller's obligations with respect of the 
quality of the goods is not, as pointed out earlier, based on the buyer's reliance but it 
arises directly from the contract. This means that the seller is bound to deliver goods, 
which are fit for ordinary use according to the standard of the place where they are to 
be used by the buyer, even though this standard is unknown to him at the time of the 
contract. If he does not know the place where the goods are to be used, the standard 
for the fitness of the goods for ordinary use should be the buyer's place of business. 
The German court, applying the CISG, followed this approach in one case. In this 
case, the plaintiff, a Swiss company, sold New Zealand mussels to the defendant, a 
German company. The defendant refused to pay as the mussels had been found by 
31 Ibid. 
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the German Federal Health Office to be generally not safe for containing a cadmium 
concentration in excess of the statutory limit of 0.5 mg /kg. The appellate court 
referring to the statutory cadmium limit in Germany (i.e., the place where the goods 
were to be used by the buyer) and found that this limit expressed an optimum 
situation of food items and was not a binding maximum limit, and, accordingly, held 
that the high cadmium composition did not constitute lack of conformity of the 
mussels with contract specifications under Article 35(2) of the CISG, since the 
mussels were still edible.33 
The CISG does not specify what grade of quality of the goods the seller is to 
tender to fulfil his obligation in conformity with the contract requirement under 
Article 35. In the Vienna Conference, the Canadian delegation proposed an 
amendment whereby the goods would be considered as reasonably fit for the 
purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used if: 
"(a) they are of such quality and in such condition as it is reasonable to expect 
having regard to any description applied to them, the price, and all other relevant 
circumstances; and 
if the goods, in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the 
description... and... of an even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and 
among all units involved..." 
The delegation later withdrew this proposal leaving open the question whether the 
seller, in the absence of contrary indication in the contract, is obliged to deliver 
goods of average quality. 
3'- Ibid. 
33 United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /6 (10 April 1995) Case 84, pp. 4- 
5; Rechtder Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 1994, p. 593. However, this approach was rejected by 
the German Supreme Court by holding that: 
"Articles 35(2)(a) and (b) CISG does not place an obligation on the seller to 
supply goods, which conform to all statutory or other public provisions in force 
in the import state, unless the same provisions exist in the export State as well, 
or the buyer informed the seller about such provisions relying on the seller's 
export knowledge, or the seller had knowledge of the provisions due to special 
circumstances." 
See United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /9 (7 June 1996) Case 123, pp. 
3 -4; Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 129, p. 75, Shlechtriem, 
"Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht" (EwiR)Art 35 CISG 1/95. 
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In many countries this issue has been addressed by requiring the seller of generic 
goods to provide goods of at least average quality. As an example, Article 289(2) of 
the Greek Civil Code and Article 243 of the German Civil Code lay down that 
performance of a generic obligation must be of average kind and quality. Similarly, 
under section 2 -314 of the UCC, the seller is required to deliver goods which are 
merchantable and this obligation is satisfied only if they are of a fair average 
quality.34 
In other countries such as New Zealand' and England,36 however, the seller, in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, may deliver goods, which are of below 
average quality.37 
Lack of express provision in the CISG to deal with the issue of the degree of 
quality of goods which the seller is bound to deliver under the contract is a source of 
uncertainty between the parties concerned, which may lead to forum shopping in an 
international sale by them.38 To avoid such an uncertainty, the parties are 
recommended to. stipulate in their agreement the degree of quality of the goods, 
which is to be delivered by the seller to satisfy his obligation under the contract. 
Fitness of goods for particular purpose 
Following the common law systems, the CISG distinguishes "ordinary use" from the 
"particular purpose" for which the goods are purchased by the buyer. The distinction 
is decisive for qualities of the goods where the buyer has made it expressly or 
impliedly known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract. In 
accordance with Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG, the seller must deliver goods which: 
"are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the 
34 Under Article 1246(3) of the French, Belgian and Luxembourg Civil Codes and Spanish Civil 
Code, Article 1167, the seller who is obliged to deliver generic goods need not need not deliver the 
best, but may not deliver the worst quality. In accordance with Article 6: 28 of Dutch BW and Article 
1178 of Italian Civil Code the goods delivered must not be below average good quality. 
35 See, for example, Taylor v. Combined Buyers Ltd. [1924] NZLR 627, 645. 
36 Kendall v. Lillico [1969] 2 AC 31, 79 -80 per Lord Reid. 
37 See pp. 203 -204, ante. 
38 See Article 7(2) of the CISG. 
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seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for 
him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgement." 
According to these provisions, the seller is obliged to deliver goods which fit the 
buyer's particular purpose provided that such purpose has expressly or impliedly 
been made known to the seller at the time when the contract was made. For example, 
if a buyer orders equipment to be used in the extensive hot weather of the State of 
Kuwait but is destined for use on a pipeline -laying job in Siberia in winter, the 
equipment delivered must have special qualities to make it suitable for operation in 
severe cold, on frozen soil or ice. 
As pointed out earlier, the seller's liability in such instances, is based on the 
principle of reliance by the buyer. Where the purpose for which the buyer intends to 
use the goods is apparent or is made known to the seller, the buyer is presumed to 
have relied on the seller's skill or judgement to receive goods which are suitable for 
that particular purpose. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the buyer has infouiied the 
seller about his -particular purpose does not render the seller liable under Article 
35(2)(b) if the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill or judgement. 
Strictly speaking, the buyer's reliance on the seller's skill or judgement is a 
question of fact, although whether his reliance is "unreasonable" must involve an 
element of evaluation. Where the seller is also the manufacturer of the goods it is 
hard to rebut the reliance by the buyer who has brought to the attention of the seller 
the purpose for which he has intended to use them. The fact that the seller and the 
buyer are both members of the same commodity market might be used as evidence 
against inference of the buyer's reliance, but it does not necessarily negate such 
reliance. Where, for example, the buyer- merchant has informed the seller of his 
particular purpose in purchasing the goods before the time of the conclusion of the 
contract and the seller has recommended them to the buyer such reliance may be 
found. Similarly, the mere fact that the buyer himself has chosen the goods purchased 
does not mean he did not rely on the seller's skill or judgement in purchasing the 
goods. Suppose, for example, the seller- manufacturer receives an order in which the 
buyer informs him that he intends to use the goods in Saudi Arabian desert. The fact 
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that the buyer is allowed to choose the goods from the seller's store does not negate 
the seller's liability for lack of reliance if the goods are proved to be against the hot 
weather. Nonetheless, a difficult question, under the CISG, is whether an inspection 
of the goods by the buyer before the sale may rebut the inference that he is relying on 
the seller's skill or judgement. It seems that the answer to this question depends on 
whether or not the buyer, by such an examination, may reasonably detect the defect, 
which causes the goods to be unfit for the particular purpose for which the buyer 
requires them. Only in the latter instances, can the buyer invoke the Article 35(2)(b). 
Similarly, where the buyer has invited a third party to examine the goods on his 
behalf, and the third party has reported favourably to the buyer in reliance on the 
seller's skill or judgement, there may be a question whether the buyer himself can be 
regarded as having relied on the seller's skill and judgement or whether he has 
merely relied on the third party report. It seems that there is no reasonable ground to 
prevent the buyer from invoking the provisions of Article 35(2)(b) against the seller 
in such circumstances if the goods delivered are not suitable for the particular 
purpose for which they are purchased. On the other hand, where the seller supplies 
goods in conformity with the specifications provided by the buyer, lack of reliance 
by the latter prevents him from invoking the provision of this Article, unless the non - 
suitability of the goods is related to matters which were not contained in the buyer's 
specifications and on which the buyer has relied on the seller's skill or judgement. 
If the buyer is more skilful than the seller it is unreasonable to presume that he 
has relied on the seller's skill or judgement that the goods purchased would be fit for 
the particular purpose for which the buyer is intended to use them. Similarly, if the 
buyer, at the time of contract, was well aware that the seller could only supply him 
with one particular brand of goods in question it can hardly be said that he has relied 
on the seller's skill or judgement. 
As pointed out above, under Article 35(2)(b), the buyer may sue the seller for 
failing to deliver goods in conformity with his particular purpose for purchasing 
them, provided he has expressly or impliedly made known this purpose to the seller 
at the time of the contract. An unanswered question in this respect, under the CISG, 
is whether the protection afforded to the buyer, under this provision, covers the cases 
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where the seller himself acquires such knowledge before the conclusion of the 
contract with the buyer. Nonetheless, it seems that, under the general principle of 
good faith, the seller is bound to inform the buyer if the goods are not suitable for 
his particular purpose for which he purchased the goods, otherwise the seller would 
be liable for failing to deliver conforming goods unless he can show that the buyer 
did not, or could not reasonably, rely on his skill or judgement at the time of the 
contract. 
It is, however, to be noted that provisions of Article 35(2)(b) are not concerned 
with the cases where the seller himself illustrates the special purpose the goods are fit 
for or where the buyer orders goods to be fit for specific purpose. Such instances are 
clearly covered by Article 35(1), which deals with sale by description. 
Conformity of the goods with the sample 
The third criterion for complying with the CISG requirement to deliver goods in 
conformity with the contract is that they must possess the qualities of goods which 
the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample or model.39 Accordingly, The rule that 
obligates the seller to deliver goods conforming to the standard of a sample or model 
is applicable in almost all modern legal systems, though it might be interpreted 
differently by each system. For example, under English law, the mere fact that a 
sample was provided by the seller for the buyer's inspection is not sufficient to make 
the sale a sale by sample.40 This approach has given rise to confusion in respect of 
parole evidence, as it is not clear whether or not such evidence is admissible to show 
that a sample was produced to the seller and that the sale is a sale by sample when 
the contract is reduced to writing and writing does not make any reference to a 
sample.41 Similarly, under Article 33(c) of ULIS, the seller was not bound to deliver 
39 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (16 August 
1996) Case 131 p. 3. 
40 See PS Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., supra., Part 1, Ch. 1, note 73, pp. 177 -178. 
'In many cases, the courts in England have refused to accept that parole evidence would be sufficient 
to prove that the sale was a sale by sample, while in other cases it was held to be sufficient for holding 
the sale as a sale by sample. See the cases which Professor Atiyah has quoted in this respect. Ibid. 
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goods which correspond with the sample or model in quality if he had submitted the 
sample or model to the buyer without expressly or impliedly undertaking that the 
bulk would conform therewith. This provision could give rise the same problem as 
that of English law with respect to parole evidence. The CISG has avoided this 
problem by eliminating the aforegoing reservation in ULIS. This is because the 
submission of a sample or a model involves by itself the seller's promise to provide 
goods possessing the same qualities as those of the sample or the model shown to the 
buyer. This approach seems to be consistent with Iranian law, under which both 
written and parole evidence are treated equally. 
The CISG does not directly address the issue of whether the seller is in breach of 
Article 35(2)(b) where non- confoiniity of the quality of the goods with that of sample 
or model is trivial. However, Article 36(1) expressly provides that the seller would be 
liable for "any lack of conformity" in the goods delivered provided that such non- 
conformity exists before the risk passes to the buyer. It follows from this that, unlike 
English law, the.seller, under the CISG, will be responsible for any non -conformity, 
however trivial,' in the quality of the goods with the sample or model presented to 
the buyer for inspection. The same approach has been adopted by the UCC in respect 
of the sale by sample or model,43 which, unlike English law, is regarded as an express 
warranty.44 Of course, the seller who has presented a sample or model with the intent 
to point out only some qualities of the goods is not bound to deliver goods totally 
conforming to that sample or model. However, this intention has to be clearly 
expressed by him in the contract. 
In accordance with English law, the use of sample by the seller does not protect 
him from the liability for hidden defects, which are not reasonably discoverable by 
examination of the sample, and renders the goods unsatisfactory.4' The CISG does 
not contain an express provision to this effect. Professor Bianca argues that: 
"the submission of a sample or a model is a factual description and, therefore a 
42 As to the position under English law, see pp. 184 -185, 206, ante. 
43 It is to be remembered that, unlike a sample, a model is not drawn from the bulk of goods for sale. 
44 See UCC, Section 2 -714. 
as See Sale of Goods Act 1979 ( as amended by Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, Section 
14(2C)(c)). 
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contractual way to determine the kind and quality of the goods the buyer is 
entitled to. "46 
He goes on to conclude "that the reference to a sample or a model excludes the 
application of the examined criteria [paragraph] (a) and (b) [of Article 35(2)]. "47 This 
argument, however, seems untenable. Because there is no provision in the CISG to 
prevent some or all of the criteria set in Article 35(2) for conformity of goods to be 
applicable together in such instances. The parties, of course, are free to exclude the 
seller's obligation arising from subparagraph (a) and (b) in so far as it is valid to do 
so under domestic law applicable to the contract48 but, they may equally agree not to 
exclude either or both of the said subparagraphs from their contract as they may 
agree on an obligation for the seller not provided by the CISG. 
The duty that the goods are properly contained or packaged 
The last standard for the goods to be in conformity with the contractual requirement 
under the CISG is that they are adequately contained or packaged at the time of 
delivery. This provision, which is similar to that of section 2- 314(2)(e) of the UCC, 
but has no antecedent in ULIS, is very important as it expressly states that the seller's 
obligation as to delivery of goods includes his accessory duty to do what is ordinarily 
required so as to allow the buyer to receive the goods in satisfactory condition. 
It is established that the seller in a contract of sale involving carriage of goods 
has a duty to provide for an adequate packaging of the goods sold. There has been, 
however, doubt in some national legal systems such as Iranian49 and German law5° 
46 See Bianca, Conformity of the goods and third party claims, in Bianca -Bonell, Commentary on the 
International Sales Law, (1987) p. 276 
47 Ibid. 
48 The issue of validity of excluding the seller's liability under these subparagraphs has been excluded 
from the CISG's scope and, therefore, it is to be addressed by a domestic law applicable to the 
contract. See Article 7(2) of the CISG. 
49 Like English law, there is no express provision under the Iranian Civil Code to require the seller to 
provide goods which are adequately contained or packaged in order to allow the buyer to receive 
them in satisfactory condition. Nonetheless, such a duty may be imposed on him by a common usage. 
50 See Schlechtriem, The Seller's Obligations Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, in Galston N.M. -Smit H. (Ed.), International Sales (New York 1984) 
Ch. 6, p. 23. 
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whether this rule is also applicable to the cases where the delivery takes place at the 
seller's place of business or where the goods are stocked, manufactured or produced. 
This uncertainty has been avoided by the provision of Article 35(2)(d) under which 
the goods in these cases also are required to be properly contained or packaged so as 
to allow the buyer to load and carry them away. Nonetheless, the parties may agree to 
shift the burden of packaging the goods to the buyer, but they can do this only 
through providing a clear contractual clause. 
What is the proper manner in which the goods are to be contained or packaged is 
a question of fact which, depending on the nature of the goods, the way and the 
distance in which they are to be carried and other surrounding circumstances may 
differ from one case to another. The seller is bound to provide goods which are 
contained or packaged in a way adequate to endure the carriage and last till their 
handing over to the buyer at their destination. If there is a standard manner for 
containing or packaging the goods sold, it must be observed by the seller at the time 
of delivery. If the goods are differently contained or packaged from place to place, 
the seller, under Article 7 of the CISG, must first refer to the usual manner in 
international trade or, in the absence of such a manner, to the usual manner at his 
own place of business, unless the destination where the goods are to be carried is 
known to him and a particular manner is necessary for protecting and preserving 
them there in which case this manner is to be observed by the seller. The latter 
solution is consistent with the CISG's principle requiring the goods to be fit for the 
purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller since one of the buyer's 
purposes is to send the goods to their destination and preserve them there. 
Exclusion of the seller's liability with respect of quality of the goods 
Article 35(3) of the CISG excludes the seller's liability for any lack of conformity of 
the goods with the CISG standards set in Article 35(2)(a -d) where the buyer knew of 
such a lack of conformity or could not have been unaware of it before conclusion of 
the sale. 
333 
The underlying principle of this rule is that the buyer who knows the condition 
of the goods at the time of the conclusion of the contract could not expect the seller 
to impliedly warrant the ordinary or particular purpose requisite for the contractual 
purpose. As Professor Honnold points out, the case which normally falls within 
Article 35(3) is the sale of specific goods which do not possess "ordinary" qualities 
within the meaning of Article 35(2)(a). For example, the buyer who has been given a 
reasonable opportunity to examine the goods which the parties have agreed upon at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract is assumed to have purchased the goods as 
they were and, therefore, he will have no remedy as to those non -conformities which 
would reasonably be discoverable by the examination. Similarly, the seller is not 
liable for defects in the goods resulting directly or indirectly from their contractual 
description. Nonetheless, the rule in Article 35(3) does not prevent the buyer from 
availing himself of the remedies provided by the CISG if non -conformities are 
related to the hidden defects which were unknown to the buyer and which were not 
reasonably discoverable by the normal examination of the goods, though they might 
have been discovered by a special analysis of the goods through an unusually 
complex or sophisticated professional method. 
It is, however, unclear whether the above rule may relieve the seller from the 
liability for non -conformities resulting in the defects which could have discovered by 
a normal examination of the goods, where the buyer did not actually examine the 
goods despite being given a reasonable opportunity to do so. It may be argued that by 
offering an opportunity to the buyer to examine the goods, the seller impliedly 
demonstrates his intention to sell the goods as they are and, accordingly, he will have 
no liability with respect to the defects which could have discovered if the buyer had 
carried out such an examination of the goods. However, even if such an intention can 
be inferred from the seller's offer, it is not binding on the buyer unless he consents to 
it, either expressly by stating so in the contract or by implication through actually 
carrying out of the examination. In other words, in the absence of an express 
agreement to the contrary by the parties, the mere opportunity of the buyer to 
examine the goods does not exclude the seller from the liability concerning non- 
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conformities arising from defects discoverable by examining of the goods if no such 
examination has in fact taken place. 
The other controversial problem with respect to the rule under Article 35(3) is 
that it does not refer to the cases where the buyer knows, or could not have been 
unaware, that the qualities expressly agreed by the parties in the contract are missing. 
Suppose that the buyer enters into negotiations for the purchase of a machine which 
is described by the seller as being able to produce mirror glasses of up to 6 mm, but 
upon examination of the machine before the contract he discovers that the machine in 
reality has only the capacity of manufacturing mirror glasses of up to 3 mm. The 
question in such a cases is whether the buyer can still sue the seller for failing to 
deliver goods which correspond with the contractual requirement under Article 35. 
Professor Bianca thinks so.51 According to his view: 
"The fact that the buyer knows or ought to know the real condition of the goods 
is irrelevant when there is specific contractual provision because it does not 
change the content of what the seller has promised to the buyer nor can it free 
him from his promise. "' 
However, not everybody shares this view. Enderlien, for example, suggested that the 
rule under Article 35(3) should analogously be extended to cover the lack of 
conformity under Article 35(1) so as to exclude the seller's liability in the cases 
where non -conformities in the quality of the goods arising from the express 
contractual promises which the buyer knew or could not have been unaware that they 
are missing.53 Referring to this approach, Professor Bianca rejected it as unjustifiable 
and stressed the idea that: 
"the distinction must be kept clear between lack of conformity according to the 
Convention's criteria (or usage), and according to express contractual provisions 
(an implied provision about the quality of the goods is not conceivable if the 
buyer knows ought to know that the goods do not have such quality)." 
5' See Bianca, Conformity of the goods and third party claims, in Bianca -Bonell, Commentary on the 
International Sales Law, (1987) pp. 279 -280. 
52 Ibid. p. 280. 
s3 Enderlein F.- Maskow D.- Stargardt M., Kaufrechtskonvention der UNO (mitVerjabrungskonvention) 
(Berlin 1985) p. 35 as cited in Bianca, Conformity of the goods and third party claims, in Bianca - 
Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law, (1987) p. 280. 
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It would seem that although Professor Bianca is right in distinguishing between the 
two instances noted above, such a distinction does not necessarily render the seller 
liable in the latter case, namely, where the goods do not correspond with the express 
contractual description. For example, there is no justification for the buyer to hold the 
seller liable in such instances where he has undertaken to inspect the goods at the 
time of contract if such an inspection would actually reveal the non -conformity of the 
goods with contractual requirement. For under the Islamic principle of iza taaraza 
tasaghata,54 the buyer's commitment to inspect the goods and his actual discovery of 
their non -conformity renders the contractual promise by the seller ineffective. Under 
Iranian law, the contract might be void ab initio if the contractual promise is the 
principal obligation of the seller. On the other hand, the seller's liability as to the 
non -conformity of the goods is not excluded if there is evidence to suggest that he 
will repair or replace the non -conforming goods before the time of delivery. Such 
evidence may, for example, be obtained from the course of negotiations, any 
practices which Jhe parties has established between themselves, or usages of trade 
with respect of the goods sold. Accordingly, it would seem that the contractual 
descriptions, in such instances, loses its character and, therefore, the correct way to 
ascertain whether or not the buyer is entitled to hold the seller liable for the lack of 
conformity in the goods is to determine the parties' common intention by interpreting 
the contract in the light of Article 8(3). 
Disclaimers 
The possibility that an interpretation of the contract may, in certain circumstances, 
reduce or exclude the seller's liability under Article 35 presents the issue: whether 
and to what extent the seller may reduce or exclude his obligations and his liability 
by a disclaimer clause? Article 6 of the CISG explicitly supports such clauses by 
stating that: 
"[t]he parties may exclude the application of this Convention or... derogate from 
In accordance with this principle, two conflicting evidence will eliminate effect of each other. 
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or vary the effect of any of its provisions." 
The same inference can be drawn from the formulation of the provisions in Article 
35(2), according to which the implied warranties of that paragraph are applicable 
only if the parties have not "agreed otherwise." Nevertheless, a contractual clause 
exempting or reducing the seller's liability for breach of an obligation under Article 
35 is ineffective as against the buyer if it does not meet the requirement for validity 
of such a clause under the provisions of the domestic law which, in accordance with 
the conflict of laws rules of private law, would govern the contract," since under 
Article 4(a) the issue of "the validity of the contract or any of its provision" has been 
excluded from the scope of the CISG.'6 In other words, the CISG will not give effect 
to a disclaimer clause if the substantive domestic law that would otherwise govern 
the contract would not do so» Unlike Anglo -US law, under the civilian systems such 
as Iranian, German and French law, for example, the seller who knew of the defects 
in the goods, but refused to reveal them to the buyer is considered to have acted 
fraudulently and, consequently, any contractual clause to negate his liability with 
respect of these defects would be invalid. Thus, in a contract for the sale of a second 
hand car, the document presented by the seller showed that the car was first licensed 
in 1992 and the mileage on the odometer was low. The sale contract included a 
clause by which the seller excluded his liability for breach of any warranty. The 
buyer later sold the car to a customer, who detected that the car had been first 
licensed in 1990 and that the actual mileage on the odometer was much higher. The 
buyer paid damages to his customer and demanded the same amount as damages 
from the defendant -seller. The German appellate court, referring to the general 
principle embodied in Articles 40 and 7(1) of the CISG, and held that the defendant 
55 See CISG, Article 7(2). 
56 It has been rightly argued by Professor Winship that although the parties under the principle of 
freedom of the contract laid down in Article 6 are allowed to alter the CISG or any of its provisions, 
but this freedom does not reach to such extent as to circumvent national mandatory laws by agreeing 
to exclude Article 4(a). See Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International Sale 
Contracts, in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (1984) § 1.02[5], at 1 -34. 
57 Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Sixth session to 
UNCITRAL para. 32. at 8, U.N. Doc. A /CN. 9/100 (1975) reprinted in [1975] 6 Y. B. UNCITRAL 
para. 32, at 52, U.N. Doc. A /CN.9 /SER. A/1975. 
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could not avail himself of Article 35(3), requiring the buyer to give notice of defect 
within a reasonable time after delivery, since he (the defendant) knew the actual age 
of the car and, thus, acted fraudulently. Moreover, although the exclusion of any 
warranty was possible under Article 6, the appellate court found that the substantial 
validity of such a clause was not governed by the. In this case, this question was 
governed by German law, according to which an exclusion of warranty is invalid if 
the seller acts fraudulently.58 
Similarly, section 2- 316(2) of UCC states that "to exclude ... the implied 
warranty of merchantability ... the language must mentioned merchantability and in 
case of writing must be conspicuous.i59 The implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose may be disclaimed by general language, but such a disclaimer 
"must be by writing and conspicuous.ió0 Such repeated use of the auxiliary verb 
"must" demonstrates the mandatory character of section 2- 316(2) of the UCC. "The 
effect of holding a statute mandatory is to require strict compliance with its letter in 
order ... to enable persons to acquire rights under it. "61 section 2- 316(2)'s mandatory 
nature denotes that its requirements are those of validity. These requirements are, 
however, "subject to"' section 2- 316(3) of the UCC. A seller who has failed to 
comply with section 2- 316(2) may still have made a valid disclaimer under section 2- 
316(3).63 Whereas section 2- 316(2)'s requirements are quite specific, section 2- 
316(3) allows for generalities. The existence of such generalities may suggest the 
conclusion that section 2 -316 sets forth mere guidelines for interpretation of the 
parties' agreement rather than requirements for valid disclaimers.' This argument, 
58 See, United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /10 (26 May 1997) Case 168 
pp. 5 -6. 
59 See Walker Ford Sales v. Gaither, 265 Ark. 275, 277- 78, 578 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1979); Angola Fartm 
Supply & Equip. Co v. FMC Corp., 59 N.C. App. 272, 277, 296 S.E.2d 503, 506 -07 (1982). 
6o UCC, Section 2- 316(2). As an example, see Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514, 
1533 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Hi Neighbor Enters. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F.Supp. 823, 826 (N.D. Fla. 
1980). 
61 N. J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction (4th ed. , Deerfield, Ill. : Clark 
Boardman Callaghan, 1984), vol. 2, § 57.12 at 667. 
62 UCC, Section 2- 316(2). 
63 See Lord, "Some Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied Warranties" (1980) 56 
North Dakota Law Reiew 509, 680. 
64 J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention 
(1982), § 234, at p. 259. Professor Honnold argued that section 2- 316(3) provides a rule of 
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however, is unpersuasive for a disclaimer that fails to meet the requirements of either 
subdivision will be held to be invalid.65 section 2- 316(3)(a) allows the seller to 
exclude an implied warranty by using expressions such as "with all faults," "as is," or 
"other language which in the common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty." This is 
not an automatic disclaimer; the circumstances must be such as to give the buyer 
reason to know that there is no implied warranty.66 In contrast with the UCC, the 
seller under Iranian law may agree on a disclaimer clause with the buyer to negate or 
to reduce some or all of his obligations and liabilities with respect to non -conformity 
of the goods with the warranties implied by the law. A disclaimer clause may be an 
oral or a written one, and it may either specifically name any implied warranty which 
is to be excluded or use a general language to negate all implied warranties in the 
contract. Any exclusionary clause with respect to implied warranties agreed between 
the parties is valid unless, like the German law,67 it discharges the seller from his 
principal obligation undertaken under the contract. In other words, whilst according 
section 2- 316(3) of the UCC a disclaimer clause may exclude the seller from any 
liability with respect to the fitness of the goods, such a clause may be void under 
both Iranian and German systems for negating the principal obligation of the seller. 
The rule invalidating a disclaimer clause with regard to implied warranties under 
any system is mandatory and is designed to protect the buyer from the unexpected 
and un- bargained for language of a disclaimer and therefore, cannot be excluded by 
the parties' agreement.68 But inconsistency of such a rule under various legal systems 
interpretation because it allows language, which in the "common understanding" of the parties alerts 
the buyer to the exclusion of warranties, and "makes plain" that there is no implied warranty. 
65 See, e.g., Cooper Paintings & Coatings Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13, 19 -20, 457 S.W.2d 
864, 867 (1970); Hartwing Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co, 28 Wash. App. 539, 542, 
545 -547, 625 P.2d 171, 173 -76 (1981); Moye, "Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Under the 
UCC- How to Succeed in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying" (1969) 46 Denver 
Law Journal 579, 605, 612. 
66 Ramirez v. Autosport Corp., 88 N.J. 277, 287, 440 A.2d 1345, 1350 (1982); Weintraub, "Disclaimer 
of Warranties and Limitations of Damages for Breach of Warranties Under the UCC" (1975) 53 Texas 
Law Review 60, 66. 
67 See, Schlechtriem, The Seller's Obligations Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, in Galston N.M. -Smit H. (Ed.), International Sales (New York 1984) 
Ch. 6, p. 24. 
68 See UCC, Section 2 -316, Official comment 1. 
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is likely to undermine the uniformity in application of the CISG and to cause much 
uncertainty among the parties concerned. 
The time when the goods must be of conforming quality 
According to Article 36(1) of the CISG, the seller is liable for non -conformities 
which are present at the time when the risk passes to the buyer, even if they becomes 
evident later.69 This provision makes it clear that defects existing at the time of the 
passage of risk constitute a lack of conformity within the meaning of the CISG 
regardless of when they are being detected by the buyer. Conversely, the deficiencies 
which come into existence only after the passage of the risk do not amount to non- 
conformity so as to render the seller liable under the CISG. This provision, which is 
identical to the rule of most of the continental systems as well as that of Iranian law, 
70 couples the seller's obligations and liabilities as to the quality of the goods with the 
passing to the buyer of the risk to pay even though he does not receive the goods, or 
he receives them in a non -conforming condition. 
There may be instances in which the non -conformity, which becomes apparent 
later, is the result of the development of the condition already existing at the time of 
the passage of the risk. In such instances it is necessary to ascertain if the goods in 
their original condition, at the time of delivery, were in conformity with the 
contractual requirement in quality. But an unresolved question in these instances is 
whether the buyer has a burden to prove that the goods were already defective when 
their risk passed to him, or it is the duty of the seller to show that the goods 
conformed with the contract at the said time. 
According to Article 36(2), the seller is also liable for any non -conformity which 
occurs after the passage of the risk if it is due to his breach of any of his obligations 
"including a breach of any guarantee that for a period of time the goods will remain 
69 See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly, A /CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /4 (30 August 1994) 
Case 56, pp. 3 -4; United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.9 /SER.0 /ABSTRACTS /8 (21 December 
1995) Case 103, p. 3. 
70 See, e.g., Swedish Sales law, Article 44; German Civil Code, Section 459(1); Iranian Civil Code, 
Articles 388. 
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fit for their ordinary purpose or for some particular purpose or will retain specified 
qualities or characteristics." The seller, for example, is liable if the loss or 
deterioration of the goods occurred because he did not send them with the proper 
carrier, or because he did not pack them in the proper manner, or because he failed to 
give the necessary warning as how to handle them. 
The last part of this Article clearly indicates that the seller is liable for any 
express guarantee concerning the durability of the goods, but it does not specify 
whether he is also liable for breach of an implied guarantee in this respect. In fact, the 
real issue is whether the buyer, under the CISG, is normally entitled to obtain goods, 
which will remain fit for a proper period. However, as Professor Schlechtriem 
argued, the CISG's provisions on ordinary purposes and particular purpose known to 
the seller under Articles 35(2)(a) and (b): 
"determine for how long the goods shall remain useful and what qualities they 
have to have at the time the risk passes in order to last that long. "" 
This means that the seller will be liable if the goods fail to remain fit for their 
ordinary purposes or for a particular purpose during the period implied by the law. 
" See, Schlechtriem, The Seller's Obligations Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, in Galston N.M. -Smit H. (Ed.), International Sales (New York 1984) 




From this comparative examination of law of the sale with regard to duties of the 
seller under different jurisdictions one might identify certain main themes. These are 
as follows: 
1) The issue of the maintenance of the contract between the parties, 
2) The issue of balance of interests as between the seller and the buyer, and 
3) The issue of diversity and uniformity of the law between different legal systems 
concerning the seller's duties in an international sale of goods. 
Maintenance of the contract 
Maintenance of the contract is in fact the main goal of the parties in dealing with 
each other. There are two different methods through which a legal system may 
achieve this goal. The first method is to restrict the buyer's right to reject goods and 
to treat the contract as repudiated, and the second method is to allow him to apply for 
specific performance of the contract by the seller by repairing of the defects in the 
goods delivered or by delivering of alternative goods in conformity with the 
contractual terms. 
Restriction of the right to reject 
Our examination of the legal systems under consideration reveals that with the 
exception of US, and to a certain extent Iranian law, all these systems generally 
restrict the buyer's right to reject the goods and to bring the contract to an end for the 
seller's breach of a contractual term. In the case of English law, for example, the 
buyer may reject the goods only if the term breached amounts to a condition as 
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distinguished from a breach of warranty. In the latter case the buyer may only apply 
for compensation for the damages caused by the breach. Nonetheless, the problem 
under the English system is that unlike the position under other legal systems under 
consideration, the key statutory implied terms are considered as conditions, and 
therefore any breach of them, however trivial, entitles the buyer to reject the goods 
and repudiate the contract with the seller.' This means that the buyer under English 
law may reject the goods and repudiate the contract of sale for any non -conformity of 
the goods with, for example, the contractual descriptions when the sale is by 
description, or with the sample when it is by sample irrespective of how significant is 
the non -conformity. By contrast, in these circumstances, the buyer under French law 
cannot cancel the sale if the non -conformity is trivial.' Similar problems have been 
encountered by English law in contracts involving the carriage of goods by sea with 
regard to the express terms in the contract in so far they deal with the issue of the 
time of delivery. Unlike the position under French and Iranian law, the buyer under 
English law may in such instances reject the goods on a technical basis in order to 
escape from a bad bargain with the seller.' As is the case in US law,4 the Iranian 
Code allows the buyer to cancel the sale for any non -conformity, however trivial, of 
the goods with the contractual terms which have been expressly or impliedly agreed 
by the parties,' while in contrast with the former system, in the case of late delivery 
he may reject the goods only if the time of delivery constitutes the essence of the 
contract between the parties6 or if there is no possibility to enforce the contract 
against the seller by requiring him to deliver the goods within a reasonable time.' The 
CISG avoids the foregoing flaws under US, English and Iranian law by empowering 
the buyer to reject the goods only if the breach is fundamental, irrespective of 
' See pp. 22 -24, ante. 
2 See French Civil Code, Article 1618. See further, p. 18, ante. 
3 See p. 14, ante. 
4 See UCC, Section 2 -601. See further, p. 62, ante. 
5 See pp. 113 -114, ante. 
6 See pp. 121 -122, ante. 
' Ibid. 
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whether the breach is caused by non -conformity of the goods with implied or express 
terms or by a late delivery.' 
Further restrictions on the buyer's right to reject has been provided under 
English and US9 law by empowering the seller in specific circumstances to repair the 
in- conformity in the goods delivered. The difference between these two systems is 
that under English law the seller may repair the non -conformity in the goods only if 
the time for performance of the contract has not expired,10 whereas under the US 
system he may do so under certain conditions even if the time for performance of the 
contract has passed." The main problem under both these systems in granting the 
right to the seller to repair the non -conformity in the goods delivered is that they do 
not consider the inconvenience which this procedure may cause to the buyer. This 
problem has been appropriately addressed by the provisions of the CISG under which 
the seller may, subject to the buyer's right to reject, repair the non- confol inity 
irrespective of whether or not the time for performance has passed provided that it 
does not cause unreasonable inconvenience to the buyer.' 
Although there is no correspondent express provision under Iranian and French 
law to allow the seller to repair the non -conformity in the goods delivered, there 
seems no reasonable justification for preventing him from doing so where no 
unreasonable inconvenience arises from the repair to the buyer.13 
A further problem concerning maintenance of the contract arises where the 
quantity of the goods delivered is more than what was contracted for by the parties. 
In such instances, French law does not allow the buyer to divide the goods delivered 
and therefore, he may either reject the whole goods or accept them and to pay for the 
excess at the contractual rate. In addition to this option, English and US law allow 
the buyer to accept any part of the goods delivered and to reject the rest even if the 
part accepted is less than the amount set out in the contract. In other words, under all 
above systems the buyer has an unjustifiable option to treat the contract as an end and 
$ See pp. 163 -164, 168 -178, ante. 
9 See pp. 52 -61, ante. 
10 See p. 19, footnote 77, ante. 
" See pp. 52 -61, ante. 
12 See pp. 156 -162, ante. 
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to sue the seller for its breach.'' The drafters of the CISG have also avoided this 
problem by requiring the buyer to accept the goods included in the contract and by 
granting him an option either to accept all or part of the excess in quantity and to pay 
for them at the contractual rate or to return them to the seller.' 
Specific performance 
As pointed out above, another method of maintaining the contract between the parties 
is to direct the breaching seller specifically to perform the contract between the 
parties. Under this method the seller is required either to repair the non -conformity in 
the goods to replace them provided that it does not cause unreasonable inconvenience 
to the buyer or to deliver substitute goods where it is impossible to carry out such a 
repair or where it causes unreasonable inconvenience to the buyer. Repair of the non- 
conformity in the goods delivered in this sense is the duty of the seller rather than a 
right on his part to restrict the buyer's right to reject. 
As pointed out elsewhere, specific performance is the prime remedy of an 
aggrieved buyer under civilian systems, including those of Iran and France.16 In 
contrast with these systems, the aggrieved buyer under common law systems such as 
those in England and the US may only in certain circumstances obtain an order of 
specific performance as against the breaching seller." Moreover, there seems no 
provision under English and US law to require the breaching seller to repair the 
defects in the goods delivered when it is demanded by the aggrieved buyer. In other 
words, repair of the non -conformity under these system may only take place as the 
seller's right vis -à -vis the buyer rather than as his duty towards the latter.'$ 
Non -availability of specific performance along with inadequacy of the damages 
recoverable by the aggrieved buyer in most instances particularly where the seller 
l' See pp. 114 -115, ante. 
14 See pp. 20 -22, 51 -52, ante. 
15 See pp. 152 -153, ante. 
16 See pp. 92 -96, 122 -127, ante. 
l' See pp. 31 -35, 76 -79, ante. 
18 Ibid. 
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deliberately breaches the contract19 are in fact the major factors which may 
discourage the seller from performing his duties in conformity with the contract 
under English and US law. Unfortunately, the drafters of the CISG failed to go far 
enough to obviate this problem for although the aggrieved buyer may demand for 
specific performance of the contract by the seller, the courts are not required to 
comply with this demand unless their respective domestic laws bind them to do so.20 
However, in accordance with Article 46(3) of the CISG, the aggrieved buyer in the 
case of a fundamental breach may demand that the breaching seller remedy the lack 
of conformity by repair unless this demand is unreasonable under the circumstances 
surrounding the case. 
Balance of interests between the parties 
Comparative study of the different legal systems under consideration reveals that 
every legal system contains various implied warranties which ascertain the quality of 
the goods to be delivered by the seller where there is no stipulation in this respect in 
the contract. The main goal of these warranties under each system is to strike a 
balance between the interests of the parties in a contract of sale. However, the extent 
of the success in achieving this goal under each system depends on both the implied 
warranties and the extent of the protection which they grant to the buyer. 
As pointed out elsewhere,' the Iranian civil law requires the seller to deliver 
goods which are both sound and commensurate with the contractual price. This 
requirement, together with the fact that both parties are bound to reveal to each other 
any defects which they knew before making of the contract, indicates that the extent 
of protection available to an aggrieved party under Iranian law is broader than its 
equivalent under the other legal systems under consideration. In fact, it seems that 
these provisions under the Iranian system maintain the balance of interests between 
the parties by precluding each one them from luring the other into a bad bargain 
19 See pp. 25 -29, 30 -31, 74 -76, ante. 
° See pp. 165 -168, ante. 
21 See pp. 281 -285, ante. 
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through substantially overvaluing or undervaluing the goods sold or hiding the 
defects in them. Unlike the position under the Iranian system, there is no implied 
warranty under other legal systems under examination that the goods are price - 
worthy and as a result the buyer has no remedy as against the seller, if after the 
conclusion of the contract, he discovers that the price agreed between the parties is 
substantially higher than their market price at the time of the contract." Apart from 
this difference, the other implied protections afforded to the aggrieved buyer under 
Iranian law are also available to him under French law. This means that the seller 
under both Iranian and French law is under obligation both to reveal all the defects 
known to him at the time of the sale to the buyer and, in the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary, to deliver goods free from latent vices.23 The seller's failure to reveal 
the defects in the goods will render him liable for any loss caused by the defects, 
including those of consequential damages even if, unlike English and US law, they 
were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract24 or the seller has 
disclaimed his liability for them by an otherwise rightful contractual clause.25 The 
significance of this rule for the buyer becomes clearer when it is considered in the 
light of the Roman law principle of spondet artis peritiam which also applies to 
French law and under which a trader or a professional seller is assumed to know all 
the defects in the goods sold.'6 This provision, together with the fact that the scope of 
application of "the implied warranty against latent defects" under French law is 
wider'' than its counterpart of "satisfactory" or "merchantable" quality under English 
and US law, indicate that the protection afforded to the buyer under the former 
system is significantly broader than those under English and US law. In fact, despite 
the gradual retreat of the common law maxim of caveat emptor, it still plays a 
paramount role in regulating the relationship between the parties under English and 
US law. This is because under English and US law, the seller has no liability for his 
failure either to disclose the defects known to him to the buyer at the time of the 
22 Under English law, for example, see p. 183, ante. 
23 As to the French law, see pp. 259 -262, ante. 
24 See pp. 267 -272, ante. 
25 
See pp. 261 -262, ante. 
26 
See pp. 101, 262, 268, 271, ante. 
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conclusion of the contract if they do not render the goods unmerchantable or 
unsatisfactory where the seller is a merchant who is selling the goods in the course of 
his business or to deliver price -worthy goods.28 Moreover, under these systems the 
seller may exclude liability concerning his duty to deliver goods of satisfactory or 
merchantable quality by a contractual clause in an international sale.29 He may do so 
even if at the time of making of the contract he knows that the goods are defective 
and that the defects in the goods render them unsatisfactory or unmerchantable 
within the law but declines to disclose these facts to the buyer. 
These factors show that provisions of both the English and the US systems with 
regard to the quality of the goods to a large extent favour the seller, particularly in an 
international sale of goods. Despite the foregoing similarities between the English 
and US systems, there are also some major differences between these two systems 
concerning the implied warranties of quality under the terms of "satisfactory" and 
"merchantable" which have been respectively used by the English and US law. One 
of the main differences relates to the grade of the goods which the seller is to deliver 
where there are several grades of quality available in the market for the goods sold 
under a general description. In accordance with the US law, the requirement of 
"merchantability" under section 2- 314(2) of the UCC means that the seller in the case 
of fungible goods is bound to deliver goods at least of "fair average quality" within 
the contract description,30 whereas under English law, the goods delivered in such 
instances do not need to be of any particular grade of quality in order to comply with 
the requirement of "satisfactory" quality within the context of section 14 of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 (as amended).31 This means that the implied warranty of 
"merchantable" quality under US law is more favourable to the buyer than its 
counterpart "satisfactory" quality under English law. 
The provisions of Article 35 of the CISG concerning the seller's duty as to the 
quality of the goods delivered are almost identical with English law and as such they 
See pp. 102 -104, ante. 
28 See pp. 182 -183, 191 -193, 245 -248, ante. 
29 
See p. 192, ante. 
3° See pp. 249 -250, ante. 
3' See pp. 203 -204, ante. 
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are susceptible to the same criticisms as those of the latter system. This means that 
the seller will have no liability against the buyer if the quality of the goods delivered 
are not commensurate with the contractual price or if they suffer from some latent 
defects which, although not harmful for their ordinary use, substantially reduce the 
market value of the goods.' Moreover, as in English law, the seller is not required to 
disclose to the buyer the latent defects which are known to him at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. Nonetheless, unlike the position under US law, the 
aggrieved buyer in such instances is not barred from relying on the defect in the 
goods where he fails to give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the defect 
within a reasonable after he has discovered it, or ought to have discovered it, within 
the context of Article 39 of the CISG if the defect renders the goods unfit for any of 
their ordinary uses.33 However, whether in such instances a contractual clause 
excluding the seller's liability concerning to those latent defects which distort the 
fitness of the goods for their ordinary uses is valid under the CISG is an issue which 
is not covered by the CISG and which is to be ascertained by reference to the 
provisions of the local law which govern to the contract under the rules of private 
international law of the forum where the case is being considered.34 This raises the 
question of uniformity and diversity of the law with regard to the seller's duties 
between different legal systems and to what extent the drafters of the CISG have 
succeeded in obviating the problem of diversities among these systems and to bring 
about uniformity as the main goal of the CISG in an international sale of goods. 
Diversity and uniformity of the law between different legal systems concerning 
the seller's duties in an international sale of goods 
Our comparative examination also reveals that there are many similarities as well as 
differences between these systems with regard to the issue of the seller's duties in a 
contract of sale. Obviously, no problem may arise for the parties in an international 
32 See p. 310 -312, ante. 
33 CISG, Article 40. See further, pp. 177, 312 -314, ante. 
34 See p. 331, ante. 
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sale where the provisions of all the legal systems are similar and unambiguous 
concerning a particular issue, even if the CISG contains no provision on this issue. 
The difficulty arises, however, where despite the similarity of these provisions under 
these systems they are ambiguous or where that particular issue is treated differently 
under different legal systems and the CISG either has no provision in this respect or 
its provisions do not properly address the issue. 
Concerning the duty of delivery, all these systems agree on the assumption that, 
in the absence of a contractual stipulation to the contrary by the parties concerned, 
the seller must bear the expense of and incidental to putting the goods into a 
deliverable state while the expenses of taking delivery of the goods must be borne by 
the buyer.3' Obviously, such a provision causes no problem for the parties in an 
international sale even though there is no equivalent provision under the CISG. 
Similarly, there seems to be no fundamental problem in the CISG with respect of the 
issue of the buyer's right to avoid the contract for non -conformity of the goods, their 
shortfall in quantity, their late or non -delivery since despite the short comings and the 
differences between the provisions of different legal systems in this respect, the 
CISG uniformly and unequivocally states that the buyer may avoid the contract only 
if the seller's breach is fundamental.36 In the case of non -delivery, the seller's default 
constitutes fundamental breach only if he declines to deliver within the additional 
period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with Article47(1).37 In the absence of 
a contrary agreement by the parties, the time of delivery under the CISG is not 
therefore, considered as constituting the essence of the contract. The buyer may not 
avoid the contract for non -delivery even if, in contrast with the position under 
English law,38 the contract involves the carriage of goods by sea unless the buyer 
comply with the Nachfrist avoidance procedure under Article 47(1).39 
35 See pp. 6, 36, 83, 109, ante. 
36 See pp. 168 -176. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See pp. 12 -17, ante. 
39 See pp. 168 -169, ante. 
350 
The provisions of the CISG appropriately avoid the flaws in English, US and 
French law' concerning the issue of the excess in quantity of the goods delivered by 
requiring the buyer to accept the goods included in the contract and by giving him an 
option either to accept all or any part of the excess at the contractual rate.41 Although, 
in contrast with the Iranian law, the option under the CISG at the first glance appears 
to some extent to favour the buyer particularly, where the excess in quantity is 
significant and its market price is substantially higher than the contractual rate, but 
this option may be justified on the ground that, as noted above, the other provisions 
of the CISG considerably favours the seller's interests and that the return of the 
excess in an international sale is very costly for the seller.' 
Finally, the provisions of the CISG with respect of the seller's right to remedy 
address the issues of the differences between different legal systems under 
consideration and the existence of flaws in the provisions of the English and US law 
in this respect by allowing him to remedy only if it does not cause unreasonable 
inconvenience to the buyer irrespective of whether the remedy takes place before or 
after expiry of the time of performance of the contract.43 Nonetheless, it is an open 
question under the CISG as to whether in the case of fundamental breach the buyer's 
right to avoid the contract or the seller's right to remedy the breach is to be given 
priority over the other.44 
Where the parties fail to set the time for delivery of the goods sold, some legal 
systems such as Iranian and Swedish law require the seller to deliver the goods 
immediately after conclusion of the contract. Of course the seller under these systems 
will have sufficient time to make delivery but that time may be very short in 
appropriate circumstances. The advantages of this approach are to release the seller 
from the risk of loss of the goods as soon as he can deliver them to the buyer and to 
give the buyer an opportunity to use the goods as he wishes thereafter.' In contrast 
with this approach, under English and US law the seller in the case of non -specified 
40 See pp. 18 -22, 51 -52, ante. 
41 See pp. 152 -156, ante. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See pp. 156 -162, ante. 
a4 Ibid. 
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time for delivery may deliver only within a reasonable time after entering into the 
contract with the buyer.4ó In other words, the seller in such instances is liable for the 
breach of the contract if he insists on delivery of what is considered as an 
unreasonable early date if the buyer chooses not to accept such a delivery.47 The 
provisions of the CISG do not seem to have gone far enough to obviate the problem 
which may arise for the parties in an international sale from the diversity of the 
civilian and the common law approaches in ascertaining of the time of delivery 
where there is no stipulation in this respect in the contract. This is because, although, 
like English and US law, where no time has been fixed by the parties in the contract, 
Article 33(c) of the CISG binds the seller to deliver "within a reasonable time after 
the conclusion of the contract ". This provision depending on whether it is applied in 
common law or civilian countries, is open to two different interpretations and as such 
it threatens to undermine the CISG's main purpose which is to bring about 
uniformity at a world -wide level in the law of international sales contracts. The first 
interpretation relates to the courts in common law countries where the seller is liable 
for the breach of the contract if the time when the delivery takes place is regarded as 
unreasonably late or early, while under civilian systems the phrase "within a 
reasonable time" is most likely to be interpreted as to allow the seller to deliver 
within a shortest time as reasonably possible to make such delivery. As to the place 
of delivery, the provisions of the CISG48 are generally similar to those of French, 
English and US law and accordingly, they are subject to the same criticisms as that of 
the latter systems. An open question under all these systems is how to determine the 
place of delivery where the goods sold are not specified and the seller has more than 
one place of business.49 According to Article 10(a) of the CISG, the place of delivery 
in such instances is that: 
45 See pp. 110 -114. 
ae Similarly, French law requires the seller to deliver within a reasonable time where there is no 
stipulation as to the time of delivery in the contract. See, judgement of December 9, 1903, Cour 
d'appel, Besançon, [1904] Gaz. Pal I 22. However, it is unclear whether the seller is in breach of the 
contract if he delivers the goods immediately after the conclusion of the contract. 
47 See pp. 47 -48, ante. 
48 See pp. 141 -148, ante. 
49 See pp. 144 -145, ante. 
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"which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance, 
having regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at 
any time before or at the time of the conclusion of the contract." 
Nonetheless, this provision does not completely obviate the aforegoing problem, as 
the CISG does not clarify the meaning of the "closest relationship" in Article l0(a). 
This might be justified on the ground of the need for a certain degree of flexibility in 
the Article's application in practice. However, the CISG's reference to both "the 
contract and its performance" in this Article may create ambiguity. Suppose that the 
parties in State A enter into negotiation and conclude a contract under which the 
buyer undertakes to pay the price in State B where the seller has another place of 
business. The CISG does not give any indication as which of these places is to 
prevail for the purpose of delivery of the goods. To avoid such a problem under 
Article 10(a) of the CISG, the parties are recommended to specify in their contract 
the place where the goods are to be delivered. 
The buyer's right to obtain specific performance under CISG is another issue 
which threaten to undermine the CISG's object in establishing uniformity and 
certainty in the law governing international sales. This is because under Article 28 of 
the CISG, the outcome of an action to obtain a decree of specific relief by the 
aggrieved buyer entirely depends on the geographical location of the trial court and 
on the discretionary view of an individual trail judges who considers the case.5° 
Further disparity with respect to the application of the CISG's provisions 
concerns the issue of validity which is excluded from the scope of the application of 
the CISG. As an example, in contrast with the US system, where a post sale warranty 
by the seller automatically modifies the terms of the contract between the parties," 
such a warranty under English law is valid only if it is supported by consideration by 
the buyer, while under some other legal systems such as Iranian law the post sale 
°° See pp. 165 -168, ante. 
51 See pp. 236 -239, ante. 
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warranty may constitute an independent contract which binds the seller without any 
consideration on the part of the buyer. 
In short, given the fact that there are many diversities between the provisions of 
the different legal systems and that it is hard if not virtually impossible for the parties 
in an international sale to know what effects these diversities may have on their 
respective interests in the contract, the introduction of the CISG is an admirable and 
remarkable step towards the achievement of a uniform set of provisions governing 
international contracts of sale of goods and towards the goal of reducing differences 
and uncertainties arising from the municipal rules of the private international law 
under various legal systems and bringing about certainty among the parties 
concerned.52 Nonetheless, exclusion of such important issues as validity of the 
formation of the contract or any of its provisions, inadequacy of the protection 
granted to the buyer for the seller's breach of the contract, the disparity of the law 
caused by the provisions of Article 20 of the CISG with respect of specific 
performance, and the ambiguity of the some of the CISG's provisions which may be 
interpreted differently under various legal systems are some of the major flaws which 
may undermine the aforegoing goals. 




The United States Uniform Sales Act 1903 
Under section 11 of the Uniform Sales Act: 
"(1) Where the obligation of either party to a contract to sell or a sale is subject 
to any condition which is not performed, such first- mentioned party may also 
treat the non -performance of the condition as a breach of warranty. 
(2) Where the property in the goods has not passed, the buyer may treat the 
fulfilment by the seller of his obligation to furnish goods as described and as 
warranted expressly or by implication in the contract to sell as a condition of the 
obligation of the buyer to perform his promise to accept and to pay for the 
goods." 
Under section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act: 
"Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an 
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to 
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods 
relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement 
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a 
warranty." 
Under section 14 of the Uniform Sales Act: 
"Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by description, there is an 
implied warranty that the goods shall correspond with the description and if the 
contract or sale by sample, as well as by the description, it is not sufficient that 
the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods did not also 
correspond with the description." 
According to section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, there is no 
implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular 
purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows: 
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the 
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer 
relies on the seller's skill or judgement (whether he be the grower or 
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be 
reasonably fit for such purpose. 
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods 
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of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an 
implied warranty that the goods shall be of a merchantable quality. 
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as regards 
defects, which such examination ought to have revealed. 
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of specified article under its patent or 
other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular 
purpose. 
(5)An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a particular 
purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade. 
(6) An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition 
implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith." 
Under section 16 of the Uniform Sales Act: 
"Implied Warranties in sale by sample. In the case of a contract to sell or a sale 
by sample: (a) There is an implied warranty that the bulk shall correspond with 
the sample in quality. (b) There is an implied warranty that the buyer shall have 
a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample, except so far as 
otherwise provided in section 47(3)(c) If the seller is a dealer in goods of that 
kind, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be free from any defect 
rendering them un- merchantable which would not be apparent on reasonable 
examination of the sample." 
Under section 68 of the Uniform Sale Act: 
"Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods, a 
court having the powers of a court of equity may, if it thinks fit, on the application of 
the buyer, by its judgement or decree direct that the contract shall be performed 
specifically, without giving the seller the option of retaining the goods on payment of 
damages. The judgement or decree may be unconditional, or upon such terms and 
conditions as to damages, payment of the price and otherwise, as to the court may 
seem just." 
Under section 69 of the Uniform Sales Act: 
"(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his 
election- (a) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the seller, the breach of 
warranty by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price; (b) 
Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages 
for the breach of warranty; (c) Refuse to accept the goods, if the property therein 
has not passed, and maintain an action against the seller for damages for the 
breach of the warranty; (d) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse to 
receive the goods, or if the goods have already been received, return them or 
offer to return them to the seller and recover the price or any part thereof which 
has been paid. 
(2) When the buyer has claimed and been granted a remedy in any one of these 
ways, no other remedy can thereafter be granted." 
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The United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
Under section 2- 103(1)(b) of the UCC: 
"`Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 
Under section 2- 309(1) of the UCC: 
"The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided 
in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time." 
Under section 2- 309(2)of the UCC: 
"Where the contract provides for successive performance but is indefmite in duration 
it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any 
time." 
Under section 2- 309(3) of the UCC: 
"Termiñation of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event 
requires that reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement 
dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable." 
Under section 2 -320 of the UCC: 
"Due tender by the seller requires that he comply with the requirements of the 
Uniform Commercial Code sections governing shipment contracts and, in the case of a 
destination contract due tender requires physical delivery of the goods at the 
destination specified in the contract." 
Under section 2 -503 of the UCC: 
"(1) Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the 
buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable 
him to take delivery. The manner, time and place for tender are determined by the 
agreement and this Article, and in particular 
(a) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods they must be kept 
available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the buyer to take possession; 
but 
(b) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facilities reasonably suitable to the 
receipt of the goods." 
Under section 2- 503(5) of the UCC: 
"Where the contract requires the seller to deliver documents (a) he must tender all 
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such documents in correct form, except as provided in this Article with respect to bills 
of lading in a set (subsection (2) of section 2 -323); and (b) tender through customary 
banking channels is sufficient and dishonour of a draft accompanying the documents 
constitutes non -acceptance or rejection." 
Under section 2 -504 of the UCC: 
"Where the seller is required or authorised to send the goods to the buyer and the 
contract does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, then unless 
otherwise agreed he must 
(a) put the goods in the possession such a carrier and make such a contract for their 
transportation as may be reasonable having regard to the nature of the goods and other 
circumstances of the case; and 
(b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any document necessary to 
enable the buyer to obtain possession of the goods or otherwise required by the 
agreement or by usage of trade; and 
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment. 
Failure to notify the buyer under paragraph (c) or to make a proper contract under 
paragraph (a) is a rejection only if material delay or loss ensues." 
Under section 2- 508(1) of the UCC, 
"Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non -conforming and 
the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably notify the 
buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract time make a 
conforming delivery." 
Under section 2- 508(2) of the UCC: 
"Where the buyer rejects a non -conforming tender which the seller had reasonable 
grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the seller 
may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a 
conforming tender." 
Under section 2- 711(1) of the UCC: 
" Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or 
justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and with 
respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (section 2 -612), the buyer 
may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much 
of the price as has been paid ..." (emphasis added) 
Under section 2- 612(1) of the UCC: 
"An `instalment contract' is one which requires or authorises the delivery of goods in 
separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a clause 
`each delivery is a separate contract' or its equivalent." 
Under section 2- 612(3) of the UCC : 
"Whenever non -conformity or default with respect to one or more instalment 
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substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach of the whole. 
But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a non -conforming 
instalment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action with 
respect only to past instalments or demands performance as to the future instalments." 
Under section 2 -714 of the UCC: 
"Where the buyer accepted goods and given notification (sub -section (3) of 
section 2 -607) he may recover as damages for any non -conformity of tender the 
loss resulting in ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined 
in any manner which is reasonable." 
Under sections 2- 723(2)and (3) of the UCC: 
"(2) If evidence of a price prevailing at the times or places described in this 
Article is not readily available the price prevailing within any reasonable time 
before or after the time described or at any other place which in commercial 
judgement or under usage of trade would serve as a reasonable substitute for the 
one described may be used, making any proper allowance for the cost of 
transporting the goods to or from such other place. 
(3) Evidence of a relevant price prevailing at the time or place other than the 
one described in this Article offered by one party is not admissible unless and 
until he has given the other party such notice as the court finds sufficient to 
prevent unfair surprise." 
Official Comment to Uniform Commercial Code 
Under Comment 4 to section 2 -308 of the UCC: 
" ... The surrounding circumstances, usage of trade, course of dealing and course of 
performance, as well as the express language of the parties, may constitute an 
"otherwise agreement ". 
Under Comment 4 to section 2 -309 of the UCC: 
"When the time for delivery is left open, unreasonably early offers of or demands for 
delivery are intended to be read under this Article as expressions of desire or intention, 
requesting the assent or acquiescence of the other party, not as fmal positions which 
may amount without more to breach or to create breach by the other side. See Sections 
2 -207 and 2- 609." 
Under Comment 3 to section 2 -313 of the UCC: 
"In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during 
a bargain are regarded as part of the description of the goods; hence no 
particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them 
into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such 
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affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. 
The issue is normally is one of the fact." 
Under Comment 7 to section 2 -313 of the UCC provides: 
"The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or sample 
are shown is not material. The sole question is whether the language or samples 
or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used 
after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and 
receives an additional assurance), the warranty becomes a modification if it is 
otherwise reasonable and in order (section 2- 209)." 
Under Comment 8 to Section 2 -314 of the UCC: 
"[P]rotection, under this aspect of the warranty, of the person buying for resale 
to the ultimate consumer is equally necessary, and merchantable goods must 
therefore be "honestly' resalable in the normal course of business because they 
are what they purport to be." 
Under Official Comment 2 to section 2 -508 of the UCC: 
"Such reasonable grounds can lie in prior course of performance or usage of trade as 
well as in particular circumstances surrounding the making of the contract. The seller 
is charged with commercial knowledge of any factors in a particular sales situation 
which require him to comply strictly with his obligations under the contract as, for 
example, strict conformity of documents in an overseas shipment or the sale of 
precision parts or chemicals for use in manufacture. Further, if the buyer gives notice 
either implicitly, as by a prior course of dealing involving rigorous inspections, or 
expressly, as by the deliberate inclusion of a `no replacement' clause in the contract, 
the seller is to be held to rigid compliance. If the clause appears in a `form' contract 
evidence that is out of line with trade usage or the prior course of dealing and was not 
called to seller's attention may be sufficient to show that the seller had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the tender would be acceptable." 
Under Comment 2 to section 2 -608 of the UCC: 
"[T]he question is whether the non -conformity is such as will in fact cause a 
substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the seller had no advance 
knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances 
Under Official Comment 2 to section 2 -715 of the UCC: 
"Subsection (2) operates to allow the buyer, in an appropriate case, any consequential 
damages which are the result of the seller's breach. The `tacit agreement' test for the 
recovery of consequential damages is rejected." 
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Append1Ilx II 
The United Kingdom Salle of Goods Act 1979 
Under section sections 11 (2), (3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"(2) Where a stipulation in contract of sale is subject to a condition to be 
fulfilled by the seller, the buyer may waive the condition, or may elect to treat 
the breach of the condition as a breach of warranty and not as a ground for 
treating the contract as repudiated. 
(3) Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach of which 
may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the 
breach of which may give rise to a claim for damages but not to aright to reject 
the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, depends in each case on the 
construction of the contract; and a stipulation may be a condition, though called 
a warranty in the contract." 
Under section 11(4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Where, a contract of sale is not severable and the buyer has accepted the goods or part 
of them, the breach of a condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be treated as a 
breach of warranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the 
contract as repudiated, unless there is an express or implied term of the contract to that 
effect." 
Under section 13 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended): 
"(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an 
implied term that the goods correspond with the description. 
(2) If the sale is by sample, as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the 
bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also 
correspond with the description. 
A sale of goods is not prevented from being a sale by description by reason only 
that, being exposed for sale or hire, they are selected by the buyer." 
Under sections 14(2A) and 14(2B) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979(as amended): 
"(2A) Goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a 
reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any 
description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant 
circumstances. 
(2B) The quality of goods includes their state and condition and the following 
(among others) are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality of goods - 
(a) fitness for all purpose for which goods of the kind in question are commonly 
supplied, 
(b) appearance and finish, 
(c) freedom from minor defects, 
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(d) safety, and 
(e) Durability." 
Under section 14 (2C) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended): 
"The term implied by subsection (2) above does not extend to any matter 
making the quality of goods unsatisfactory - 
(a) which is specifically drawn to the buyer's attention before the contract is 
made, 
(b) where the buyer examine the goods before the contract is made, which that 
examination ought to reveal, or 
in the case of a contract for sale by sample, which would have been apparent on 
reasonable examination of the sample." 
Under section' 14(1) of Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Except as provided by this section and section 15 below and subject to any 
other enactment, there is no implied condition or warranty about the quality or 
fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale." 
Under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended): 
"Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term 
that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality." 
Under section 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Where the seller sells goods in the course of business and the buyer, expressly 
or by implication, makes known- 
(a) to the seller, or 
(b) where the purchase price or part of it is payable by instalment and the goods 
were previously sold by a credit -broker to the seller, to that credit -broker, any 
particular purpose for which the goods are being bought, there is an implied 
condition that the goods supplied under the contract are reasonably fit for that 
purpose, whether or not that is a purpose for which such goods are commonly 
supplied, except where the circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or 
that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill or judgement of the seller or 
credit -broker." 
Under section 14(5) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"The preceding provisions of this section apply to a sale by a person who in the 
course of a business is acting as agent for another as they apply to a sale by a 
principal in the course of business, except where that other is not selling in the 
course of business and either the buyer knows that fact or reasonable steps are 
taken to bring it to the notice of the buyer before the contract is made." 
Under section 14(6) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
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"Goods of any kind are of merchantable quality within the meaning of subsection (2) 
above if they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are 
commonly bought as it is reasonable to expect having regard to any description 
applied to them, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances." 
Under section 15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"(1) A contract of sale is a contract for sale by sample where there is a term in 
the contract, express or implied, to that effect. 
(2) In the case of a contract for sale by sample (a) There is an implied condition 
that the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality; (b) There is an implied 
condition that the buyer will have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the 
bulk with the sample; (c) There is an implied condition that the goods will be 
free from any defect, rendering them un- merchantable, which would not be 
apparent on reasonable examination of the sample." 
Under section 27 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"It is the duty of the seller to deliver the goods, and of the buyer to accept and pay for 
them, in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale." 
Under section 29(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Whether it is for the buyer to take possession of the goods or for the seller to send 
them to the buyer is a question depending in each case on the contract, express or 
implied, between the parties." 
Under section 29(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Where under the contract of sale the seller is bound to send the goods to the 
buyer, but no time for sending them fixed, the seller is bound to send them 
within s reasonable time." 
Under section 29(6) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, the expenses of and incidental to putting the goods into a 
deliverable state must be borne by the seller." 
Under section 30(2A)(a)of the Sale of Goods Act 1979(as amended): 
"A buyer who does not deal as consumer may not- 
(a) where the seller delivers a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell 
reject the goods under subsection above if the shortfall,...is so slight that it 
would be unreasonable for him to do so." 
Under section 31(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Unless otherwise authorised by the buyer, the seller must make such contract with the 
carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable having regard to the nature of the 
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goods and other circumstances of the case; and if the seller omits to do so, and the 
goods are lost or damaged in the course of transit, the buyer may decline to treat the 
delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself or may hold the seller responsible in 
damages." 
Under section 32(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised or required to send 
the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier (whether named by the buyer 
or not) for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is prima facie deemed to be 
delivery of the goods to the buyer." 
Under section 34 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended): 
"(1) A contract of sale is a contract for sale by sample where there is an express 
or implied term to that effect in the contract. 
(2) In the case of contract for sale by sample there is an implied term 
(a) that the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality; 
(b) that the buyer will have reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the 
sample [this subsection has been repealed by the Sale and Supply of Goods act 1994 
but the equivalent provision is now to be found in section 35(2)(a)]; 
(c) that the goods will be free from any defect, making their quality 
unsatisfactory." 
Under section 41 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"(1) subject to this Act, the unpaid seller of the goods who is in possession of them is 
entitled to retain possession of them until payment or tender of the price in the 
following cases: 
(a) where the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit; 
(b)where the goods have been sold on credit but the term of credit has expired; 
(c) where the buyer becomes insolvent. 
(2) The seller may exercise his right of retention notwithstanding that he is in 
possession of the goods as agent or bailee or custodier of the buyer." 
Under section 51(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"Where the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer, the 
buyer may maintain an action against the seller for damage for non -delivery." 
Under section 52(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods the court 
may, if it thinks fit, on the plaintiff's application, by its judgement or decree direct that 
the contract shall be performed specifically, without giving the defendant the option of 
retaining the goods on payment of damages." 
Under sections 53 (1), (4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, or where the buyer elects 
(or compelled) to treat any breach of the condition on the part of the seller as a 
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breach of warranty, the buyer is not by reason only of such breach of warranty 
entitled to reject the goods; but he may - 
(a) set up against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of 
the price, or 
b) maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty. 
(4) The fact that the buyer has set up the breach of warranty in diminution or 
extinction of the price does not prevent him from maintaining an action for the 
same breach of warranty if he suffered further damages. 
Under section 61(1)(b) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
"'Warranty' (as regards England and Wales and Northern Ireland) means an 
agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale, 
but collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which gives 
rise to a claim for damages, but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the 
contract as repudiated." 
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Appendix III 
The French Civil Code 
Under Article 422 of the French Civil Code: 
"If after the transaction it is transpired that the property sold was defective, the buyer 
has the option either to accept the defective property together with compensation for 
its defect, or to cancel the transaction." 
Under Articles 1116, 1117 of the French Civil Code: 
"There is no valid consent if the consent has only been given by error or if it has 
been obtained by violence or procured by fraud. A contract entered into by 
error, violence, or fraud is not void, as a matter of right; it only gives rise to an 
action for avoidance or rescission ..." 
Under Article 1149 of the French Civil Code: 
"The damages due to the obligee are, in general, for the loss which he has sustained 
and for the benefit of which he has been deprived, subject to the expectations and 
modification hereinafter 
set forth." 
Under Article 1150 of the French Civil Code: 
" The obligor [the seller] is liable only for the damages foreseen or which could have 
been forèseen at the time of the contract, so long as it is not to his fraud that the 
obligation has not been performed." 
Under Article 1151 of the French Civil Code: 
"Even in the case where non -performance of the agreement is due to the fraud of the 
obligor, the damages may include only that portion of the loss sustained by the obligee 
and of the benefit of which he was deprived, which is the immediate and direct 
consequence of the non -performance of the agreement." 
Under Article 1247 of the French Code: 
"(1) Payment must be made at the place designated by the agreement. If the place is 
not thereby designated, payment in the case of definite and specified object, must be 
made at the place where the thing forming the subject matter of the obligation was at 
the time the obligation was contracted. 
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(2) Alimony (aliment) allowed by a court must be paid, except where the judge 
renders a contrary decision, at the domicile or the residence of the one who is to 
receive it 
(3)Except for these cases, payment must be made at the domicile of the debtor." 
Under Article 1382 of the French Code : 
"Every act whatever of an individual which causes injury to another obliges him 
by whose fault it happened to repair it." 
Under Article 1383 of the French Civil Code: 
"Every one is responsible for the injury which he has caused not only by his act, 
but by his negligence or imprudence." 
Under Article 1604 Of the French Civil Code: 
"He [the seller] has two principal obligations, one to deliver and the other to warrant 
the thing which he is selling." 
Under Article 1604 of the French Code: 
"The delivery of personal effects takes place: 
Either by actual transfer, or by handing over the keys to the buildings which contains 
them, or even by mere consent of the parties, if the transfer cannot be made at the time 
of the sale, or if the buyer has already acquired control in another manner." 
Under Article 1609 of the French Civil Code: 
"Delivery must be made at the place where the thing sold was at the time of the sale, if 
no other place has been agreed upon." 
Under Article 1611 of the French Civil Code,: 
"In all cases, the seller must be ordered to pay damages if injury has been caused to 
the buyer by failure to make delivery within the time agreed upon." 
Under Article 1612 of the French Civil Code: 
"The seller is not bound to deliver the thing if the buyer fails to pay the price, and the 
seller has not granted him an extension of time for payment." 
Under Article 1615 Of the French Civil Code: 
"The obligation to deliver a thing includes its accessories and all things associated 
with its permanent use." 
Under Article 1642 of the French Civil Code: 
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"A vendor is not responsible for apparent defects which the purchaser has been 
able to ascertain for himself'. 
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Appendix I 
Iranian Civil Code 
Under Article 10 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"Private contracts shall be binding on those who have signed them, providing 
they are not in the contradiction of the explicit provisions of a law." 
Under Article 226 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"In the event of non -performance of undertakings by one of the parties under the 
contract, the other party cannot claim damages for loss sustained, unless a 
specified period has been set for performance of the undertaking and that period 
was expired. If no period was provided for the performance of the undertakings 
a party can only claim damages if he was given a right to fix the period for 
fulfilment of the obligations." 
Under Article 230 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"Where in a contract the amount of the compensation to be paid in the event of 
its non -performance is stipulated, the court may not condemn the party in breach 
to pay more or less than the sum fixed." 
Under Article 233 of the Iranian Code: 
"The following conditions are of no effect and will nullify the contract itself: 
1. Conditions which are contrary to the contract's requirements. 
2. Conditions which are unknown and of which lack of knowledge entails ignorance 
of the consideration." 
Under Article 235 of the Iranian Code: 
"Where in a contract it transpires that the condition of description provided by the 
parties is absent, the party in whose benefit the condition has been provided shall have 
the right to cancel the contract." 
Under Article 279 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
" If the subject matter of the contract to be delivered is not specified article but is of a 
general nature, an obligor under the contract is not bound to deliver an article of the 
best quality, but must not hand over an article which according to custom and usage is 
considered defective." 
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Under Article 282 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If one of the parties to a contract owes several sums to the other party, the former 
shall decide on what count any particular payment is made." 
Under Article 331 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"A person who causes a property to be destroyed is liable to give back its equivalent 
or its value, and if he causes a defect or damage to it he must pay compensation for 
any depreciation in its value." 
Under Article 341 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"A contract of sale between the parties may be made with or without any conditions 
and also it may contain a term for delivery of the whole or part of the thing sold or of 
the total or partial payment of its consideration." (Italic added). 
Under Article 342 of the Iranian Code: 
The quality, type and description of the thing sold must be known and the fixing of the 
quality by weight, measure, number, length, area, or by inspection is made in 
conformity with the local custom and usage." 
Under Article 351of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"In the case of a sale of goods of general nature, i.e. where they can be specified from 
numerous units, the sale is valid only if it stipulates for the goods' quantity, quality 
and description." 
Under Article 353 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If a specified chattel belonging to a special category is sold and it is found that 
the chattel delivered does not belong to such category the sale is void, and if a 
part of the chattel sold is not up to quality then that part of the sale is void and 
the buyer has also the right to cancel the remainder of the deal." 
Under Article 356 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"Anything which according to a common usage and practice should form part of the 
article sold or is regarded as an attachment to it or which is indicated to be part of the 
article forms part of the sale and belongs to the buyer, even if this has not been clearly 
stated in the contract of sale by the parties and even if it was known to them at the 
time of the contract." 
Under Article 362 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
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"The following conditions are of no effect and will nullify the contract itself: 
1- Conditions which contradict with the requirement of a contract. 
2- Conditions which are unknown and of which lack of knowledge entails ignorance 
of the consideration." 
Under Article 362(3) of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"A contract of sale makes the seller responsible for delivery of the thing sold." 
Under Article 368 of the Civil Code: 
"The delivery takes place when the thing sold is placed at the disposal of the purchaser 
even if the latter has not actually taken physical possession of it." 
Under Article 373 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"When the goods sold are already in the possession of the buyer a fresh delivery is not 
necessary; the same applies to their consideration in the contract of sale." 
Under Article 374of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"For taking possession of the goods no authorisation is necessary and the buyer can 
take their possession without any authorisation." 
Under Article 375 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"Delivery of the goods must be effected at the place where the contract was made, 
unless other place is required by common usage or unless a special place has been 
provided in the contract of sale for the delivery." 
Under Article 376 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
" In the event of delay in delivering the goods sold or of their price, the party in 
default will be forced to perform his duty under the contract." 
Under Article 378of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"The seller cannot reclaim the goods which have been voluntarily delivered by him 
except in the case of the cancellation of the transaction where he has been given the 
option to do so." 
Under Article 378 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"For taking possession of the goods, no authorisation is necessary. The buyer can take 
possession of the goods purchased without any authorisation." 
Under Article 380of the Iranian Civil Code, : 
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"In the event of the bankruptcy of the buyer, if he has retained in his possession the 
actual object of the sale, the seller may reclaim it and he may decline to deliver if he 
has not done so." 
Under Article 381 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"The responsibility for cost of delivery of the goods, such as the expense of their 
transportation to the place of delivery, cost of counting, weighing of them and so on 
are placed on the seller, whilst the expense of payment of the contractual price is to be 
met by the buyer." 
Under Article 383 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"The delivery by the seller should contain all elements which are the parts and 
appurtenances of the thing sold." 
Under Article 384 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If at the time of the contract the quantity of the goods sold are fixed but less than this 
quantity are delivered to the buyer, he will have a choice to cancel the sale or to take 
the quantity of the goods delivered and to pay for them at the contract rate. If the 
quantity of the goods delivered is more than the contractually fixed amount, the excess 
belongs to the seller." 
Under Article 386 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"In the case of cancellation of the contract for failing to deliver the agreed quantity of 
the goods by the seller, he must refund, over and above the price any costs of the 
contract and reasonable expenses incurred by the buyer." 
Under Article 387 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If without fault or neglect on the part of the seller the thing sold perishes before 
delivery, the sale will be cancelled and the price is to be returned back to the purchaser 
unless the seller has already applied to a magistrate or his substitute for the 
enforcement of the delivery, in which case the loss will be borne by the purchaser." 
Under Article 389of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If under the circumstances described in the above two articles the loss of goods or 
their deterioration in value is caused by the buyer's act, he will have no claim against 
the seller whilst he must pay the contractual price to him." 
Under Article 413 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If one of the parties to the transaction has previously seen the property and makes the 
transaction on the basis of his previous inspection and if it transpires, after the 
inspection, that the said property does not possess the qualities which it previously 
372 
had, he shall have the right of cancelling the transaction." 
Under Article 414 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"In a sale of merchandise of a general description there is no Option of Inspection [in 
the buyer] and the vendor is to deliver goods which are in conformity with the 
descriptions agreed between the parties." 
Under Article 416 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"Either of the parties to a transaction if he has suffered (gross loss) may, after being 
appraised of the lesion, cancel the transaction." 
Under Article 418of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If the party who has sustained loss knows, at the time of the transaction, the proper 
price of the object of the sale, he will have no right of cancellation." 
Under Article 42 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If the party to a contract who has deceived his counterpart delivers the difference in 
price, the Option of Loss does not extinguish unless the aggrieved party agrees to 
receive the difference in price." 
Under Article 424 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"An inherent defect is one which is known to the buyer, whether this ignorance arose 
from the fact that the defect was really latent, or whether the defect was evident but 
the buyer did not realise that fact." 
Under Article 431 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"Where several things are sold in one transaction in such way that the price of each 
one is not separately fixed, the buyer may either return all of them and recover the 
price or retain all of them and take compensation but he cannot make any 
discrimination except with the consent of the seller." 
Under Article 434 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"If it is transpired that the defective thing sold has in actual fact no proprietary 
worth and no price, the sale is void; and if a part of the thing is worthless, the 
sale in respect of that part is void and purchaser has, in respect of the remainder, 
a right of cancellation in consideration of the Option of Sales Unfulfilled in 
part. 
Under Article 439 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
" In the case of fraud by the vendor as to the thing sold, the vendee will have a right to 
cancel the sale, and similarly the vendor may cancel the sale where the vendee 
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practice fraud concerning the price paid by him." 
Under Article 441 of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"The option of sales unfulfilled in part arises where the deal, in respect of a part of the 
goods sold, is void for any reason in which case the buyer has an option to cancel the 
deal or to accept that part of the goods in respect of which the deal is valid and to 
refund the consideration for the 
remaining part of the goods in respect of which the deal was invalid." 
Under Article 448of the Iranian Civil Code: 
"Some or all of the Options may be forfeited as a condition inserted in the contract of 
sale." 
Iranian Law of Civil Procedure 
Under Article 729 of the Iranian Law of Civil Procedure: 
"Where the object of the obligation is an action which can be done only by the 
obligor, the court may at the request of the obligee issue an order instructing the 
former to pay a fixed sum to the latter for each day if he fails to implement the 
obligation within the period of time specified in the order." 
Under Article 728 of the Iranian Law Civil Procedure: 
"The court will hold the obligor to pay compensation only if the claimant/obligee 
proves that he has suffered a loss and that the loss is directly caused by non- 
performance or delay in performance of the contract by the former or by his failure to 
deliver the thing which under the court's order has to be delivered to the latter. The 
damages may resulted from the actual loss of property or from the loss of profits 
which the obligee may have gained if the obligation was performed by the obligor." 
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Appendix V 
Vienna Convention for International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) 
Under Article 7 of the CISG: 
"(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance 
of good faith in international trade. 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not 
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law 
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law." 
Under Article 9 of the CISG: 
"(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any 
practices which they have established between themselves. 
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought 
to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly 
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned." 
Under Article 25 of the CISG: 
"A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results 
in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee 
and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not 
have foreseen such a result." 
Under Article 28 of the CISG: 
"a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific performance unless the 
court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not 
governed by this Convention." 
Under Article 32(2) of the CISG: 
"If the seller is bound to arrange for carriage of the goods, he must make such 
contracts as are necessary for carriage to the place fixed by means of 
transportation appropriate in the circumstances and according to the usual terms 
for such transportation." 
Under Article 34 of the CISG: 
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"If the seller is bound to hand over documents relating to the goods, he must hand 
them over at the time and place and in the form required by the contract. If the seller 
has handed over documents before that time, he may, up to that time, cure any lack of 
conformity in the documents, if the exercise of this right does not cause the buyer 
unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any 
right to claim damages as provided in this Convention." 
Under Article 35(1) of the CISG: 
"The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner 
required by the contract." 
Under Article 35 (3) of the CISG: 
" The seller is not liable under sub -paragraphs (a) to (d) of the proceeding 
paragraph for any lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of 
such lack of conformity." 
Under Article 36 of the CISG: 
"(1) The seller is liable in accordance with the contract and this Convention for 
any lack of conformity which exists at the time when the risk passes to the 
buyer, even though the lack of conformity becomes apparent only after that 
time. 
(2) The seller is also is liable for any lack of conformity which occurs after the 
time indicated in the preceding paragraph and which is due to a breach of any of 
his obligations, including a breach of any guarantee that for a period of time the 
goods will remain fit for their ordinary purpose or for some particular purpose 
or will retain specified qualities or characteristics." 
Under Article 37 of this CISG: 
"If the seller has delivered the goods before the date for delivery, he may, up to that 
date, deliver any missing part or make up any deficiency in the quantity of the goods 
delivered or remedy any lack of conformity in the goods delivered, provided that the 
exercise of this right does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or 
unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as 
provided for in this Convention." 
Under Article 39 of the CISG: 
"(1) The buyer losses the right to rely on lack of conformity of the goods if he 
does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity 
within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered 
it. 
(2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack conformity of the 
goods if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of 
two years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the 
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buyer, unless this time -limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of 
guarantee." 
Under Article 40 of the CISG: 
"The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of articles 38 and 39 if the 
lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew or could not have been 
unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer" 
Under Article 42(1) of the CISG: 
"(1) The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or claim of a 
third party based on industrial property or other intellectual property, or which at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been 
unawaré, provided that the right or claim is based on industrial property or other 
intellectual property: 
(a) under the law of the State where the goods will be resold or otherwise used, 
if it was contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
that the goods would be resold or otherwise used in that State; or 
in any other case, under the law of the State where the buyer has his place of 
business." 
Under Article 44(1) of the Draft Convention: 
"Unless the buyer has declared the contract avoided in accordance with Article 45, the 
seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to 
perform his obligations, if he can do so without such delay as will amount to a 
fundamental breach of the contract and without causing the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by 
the buyer. The buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this 
Convention." 
Under Article 45 of the CISG: 
"(1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this 
Convention, the buyer may: 
(a) exercise the rights provided in articles 46 to 52; 
(b) claim damages as provided in article 74 to 77. 
(2) the buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by 
exercising his right to other remedies. 
(3) No period of grace may be granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal 
when the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract." 
Under Article 46(2) of the CISG: 
"If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of 
substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of 
contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice 
given under article 39 or within reasonable time thereafter." 
Under Article 46(3) of the CISG: 
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"If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller to 
remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to 
all the circumstances. A request for repair must be made either in conjunction with 
notice given under Article under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter." 
Under Article 48(1) of the CISG: 
"Subject to Article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at 
his expenses any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without 
unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience 
or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the 
buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in 
this Convention." 
Under Article 49 of the CISG: 
"(1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided 
(a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or 
this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract; or 
(b) in the case of non -delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the 
additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of 
Article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. 
(2) However, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the 
right to declare the contract avoided unless he does so: 
(a) in respect of late delivery, within a reasonable time after he has become aware that 
delivery has been made; 
(b) in respect of any breach other than late delivery, within a reasonable time: 
(i) after he knew or ought to have known of the breach; 
(ii) after the expiration of any additional period of time fixed by the buyer in 
accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 47, or after the seller has declared that he 
will not perform his obligations within such an additional period; or 
(iii) after the expiration of any additional period of time indicated by the seller in 
accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 48, or after the buyer has declared that he will 
not accept performance." 
Under Article 51(1) of the CISG: 
"If the seller delivers only part of the goods or if only part of the goods delivered is in 
conformity with the contract, Articles 46 to 50 apply in respect of the part which is 
missing or which does not conform." 
Under Article 51(2) of the CISG: 
" The buyer may declare the contract avoided in its entirety only if the failure to make 
delivery completely or in conformity with the contract amounts to a fundamental 
breach of the contract." 
Under Article 66 of the CISG: 
"Loss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the buyer does not 
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discharge him from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss or damage is due to 
an act or omission of the seller." 
Under Article 69 of the CISG: 
"(1) In cases not within article 67 and 67, the risk passes to the buyer when he takes 
over the goods or, if he does not do so in due time, from the time when the goods are 
placed at his disposal and he commits a breach of contract by failing to take delivery. 
(2) However, if the buyer is bound to take over the goods at a place other than the 
place of business of the seller, the risk passes when delivery is due and the buyer is 
aware of the fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place. 
(3) If the contract relates to goods not then identified, the goods are considered not to 
be placed at the disposal of the buyer until they are clearly identified to the contract." 
Under Article 73 of the CISG: 
"(1) In the case of a contract for delivery of goods by instalments, if the failure of one 
party to perform any of his obligations in respect of any instalment constitutes a 
fundamental breach of contract with respect to that instalment, the other party may 
declare the contract avoided with respect to that instalment. 
(2)If one party's failure to perform any of his obligations in respect of any instalment 
gives the other party good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of contract 
will occur with respect to future instalments, he may declare the contract avoided for 
the future, provided that he does so within a reasonable time." 
Under Article 74 of the CISG: 
"Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. 
Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to 
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and 
matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of 
the breach of contract. 
Under Article 75 of the CISG: 
"If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time 
after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the 
goods, the party claiming damages may recover the difference between the contract 
price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages 
recoverable under article 74." 
Under Article 76 of the CISG: 
"(1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party 
claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under Article 75, 
recover the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at 
the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under Article 74. If, 
however, the party claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the 
goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead of the 
current price at the time avoidance. 
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(2) For the purpose of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the price 
prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there 
is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable 
substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the 
goods." 
Under Article 77 of the CISG: 
" A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable 
in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the 
breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in 
the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been prevented." 
Under Article 81(1) of the CISG: 
"Avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their obligations under it, 
subject to any damages which may be due. Avoidance does not affect any provision of 
the contract for the settlement of the contract governing the rights and obligations of 
the parties consequent upon the avoidance of the contract." 
Italian Civil Code 
Under Article 1490 of the Italian Civil Code: 
"A seller is bound to warrant that the thing sold is free of defects which render it unfit 
for the use for which it was intended or which appreciably diminish its value." 
German Civil Code 
Under Article 460 of BGB: 
"In the absence of express warranty the vendor is under no liability for defects which 
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